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## GORDON AT KHARTOUM





**C.E. Gordon.** (an hours sketch taken in a Western has left for the East 21 Dec 1882)

*Handwritten signature/initials*

*Handwritten signature/initials*

*Charles George Gordon*  
1882





# GORDON AT KHARTOUM

BEING A PERSONAL NARRATIVE OF  
EVENTS

IN CONTINUATION OF "A SECRET HISTORY OF THE  
ENGLISH OCCUPATION OF EGYPT"

BY

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT

*"We are an honest nation, but our diplomatists  
are conies, and not officially honest."—GORDON.*

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## PREFACE

**I**N the present volume, which is a continuation of my "Secret History of the Occupation of Egypt," I take up once more the task of chronicling the events of my time. Lord Cromer's recent book, "Modern Egypt," makes this a duty to the truth which I feel ought not to be postponed, while there is also the hope that by insistence it may still be possible to direct those in power with us to adopt an attitude towards the Mohammedan World less antagonistic than in the past to its thoughts and feelings.

The period treated here, between 1882 and 1886, is the darkest of the whole Anglo-Egyptian record, a monument indeed of perverse unwisdom recognized by all. But I doubt if it is yet fully understood how immense a wrong was inflicted by our English mismanagement of affairs at Cairo, not only on Egypt and the Upper Nile, but on all Mohammedan lands hindered by it in their work of liberal enlightenment, and thrown back for a whole generation on lines of fanatical reaction. This I hope to make clear. Lord Cromer would have us believe that it was contrary to our Government's desire that we remained on in Egypt in spite of repeated declarations of an intention to withdraw. It will here be shown that there was never any such intention at the Foreign Office, and that if it existed in Mr. Gladstone's mind it was of that barren kind which refuses to take the means which alone can lead to the desired result. With regard to the Soudan and the series of barbarous campaigns which signalized those three disastrous years, the explanation, too, has been made that these were

## *Preface*

forced by circumstances upon our Government, as was also the separation of the Upper from the Lower Nile, a separation brought about under conditions of violent disruption, which made it a permanent injury to Egypt and absolute ruin to the Soudan, with the depopulation of whole provinces through famine and disease and chronic warfare. It will be shown that European action alone was the initial cause of the trouble, that the fanatical character of the Soudanese revolt was due solely to the intervention of the Christian Powers at Cairo and that its extent and violence were increased by each successive step of English interyention, also that to the refusal to make peace with the Mahdi, either before or after the fall of Khartoum, may fairly be ascribed all that subsequently happened of misfortune to the tribes of the Upper River. These were realities that needed placing in their proper perspective, and I have endeavoured in this volume to present them as they to my knowledge were.

My personal position while the chief tragedy of the time, Gordon's fatal mission to Khartoum, was being enacted was one singularly advantageous for my present purpose of accurate narration. Occupying no official post, I nevertheless found myself a deeply interested spectator behind the official scenes in London, as well as behind those of the Oriental world, and from time to time playing a small part myself in the drama, close enough to the chief personages to observe the details of their action, and in near view of the machinery used for their stage effects. The diary, which with an instinct of its future importance I kept carefully written at the time, remains with me as a sure guide on which I can rely for each day's happenings, and this, in spite of its many crudities of thought and expres-

## *Preface*

sion, and much in it that I am conscious is to my own disadvantage, I have decided to print almost uncensored as it stands. It is the strongest evidence I can offer of the accuracy of my narrative, and the best refutation of the pseudo-history which has grown up about the mission. On many points I am very conscious that my diary needs apology. It was written with no thought of publication, and contains harsh judgements of men and things with many of which I have since come to disagree, violences of language of which I am now ashamed, and expressions of feeling softened since by years and by that tolerance of view taken in old age of human insanities. Much in it I would willingly not have written, or written otherwise, and much recording my own sayings and doings I would suppress in publishing if it were not for the feeling that to do so would impair its entire sincerity. In telling things disadvantageous to others I could not in fairness be sparing of my own mistakes. Therefore I leave all unexplained to its own justification and the indulgence of my readers.

On one point only have I thought it necessary to reconsider at any length my attitude of the time. This is in respect of the blame laid by me on Gordon for the failure of his mission on lines of peace. As will be seen from my diary I was one of the few Englishmen who, with a strong feeling of esteem and affection for Gordon, disapproved from the first of his mission, suspecting what was indeed the fact, that there was in it a political intrigue connected with the continued occupation of Egypt, and I was one of the very few who rejoiced at the failure of the relief expedition and the fall of Khartoum. My belief, however, at the time, that Gordon was himself through his soldier's obstinacy mainly responsible for the



## *Preface*

failure, and that he did, as was being pretended by Ministers, exceed his instructions, wantonly changing the character of his mission from a peaceful one to one of war, was unjust, and I recognize the necessity of correcting my misjudgement. The publication of Lord Cromer's book four years ago, with its exaggerated attack on Gordon on these very heads, roused my suspicion and caused me to re-examine the evidence connected with the whole matter, and I speedily discovered that, though Gordon made without doubt many mistakes in its discharge, the prime responsibility of the mission as one necessarily of war was certainly not his, but that of those who sent him; also, on further examination, that in spite of Lord Cromer's denial the failure of the mission was principally due to no other than Lord Cromer's self.

I have consequently devoted several chapters of the present volume to clearing up this much vexed matter, and I have added to them, for the special benefit of Egyptian readers ignorant of Gordon's superlative moral merit and regarding him only as a too zealous agent of the British Government, and so their enemy, a memoir of this great man's life and character, gathered in part from his published letters scattered through many works now out of print and notably from those wonderful letters to his sister collected by Dr. Hill, in part from my own recollection of him, and that of others who knew him personally. In this, which has been to me a labour of love as well as of reparation, I have been powerfully assisted by Gordon's nephew and literary heir, Colonel Louis Gordon, by his sole surviving sister, Mrs. Moffitt, and by his niece, Miss Gordon, who are the chief living authorities on all things concerning him. These have not only put me on the track of all published knowledge, but have been good enough

## Preface

to entrust to me many important documents not hitherto printed, which will be found either in the text of this volume or the Appendix. One of these is of deciding value to the case, a letter which Lord Cromer in his *apologia* seems to have forgotten, and which fixes on himself the responsibility of the mission as one far wider in scope than has hitherto been admitted.

If I have anything to add to these few words of preface it is this—I have been reproached with lack of patriotism in that I have made it my business of late years to denounce the errors and political misdeeds of my fellow countrymen in Egypt. In answer to this I can only say that I belong to a generation of Englishmen holding an idea of patriotism entirely different from that now accepted, and one that I think saner. According to the teaching of my youth the patriotic idea was essentially connected with the love of the land of one's birth, the passion of courage which prompted Thermopylae and Bannockburn and the thousand and one battles where men have stood up in defence of their homes against invading strangers; also with that other moral courage which strengthened a man to oppose in speech the folly of his fellow men whom he saw doing dishonour to that land. It had nothing whatever to do with the modern idea, now prevalent among Englishmen, of solidarity with the enterprises, often criminal, of the cosmopolitan finance of London and Liverpool and Manchester, which has usurped control over our lives and honour in its dealings with our national affairs abroad, which controls our press, manipulates our parliament, and uses our ancient and honourable English name for its base un-English purposes. There is no lack of patriotism in refusing to bow to this new leadership in evil, or in denouncing its ungodly doings.

## *Preface*

I am by instinct of birth a conservative to my inmost fibre, that is to say a believer in tradition and the value of all that is ancient in our national institutions and creeds and moralities. I remember the disgust of my older Tory friends when, under Semitic influence thirty-five years ago, the new-fangled style of Empress was proposed to be added to the time-honoured title inherited by our Sovereign Lady Queen Victoria, and when the British Empire first began to be talked about as an improvement in nomenclature on our long sufficing Kingdom of England. What was good enough for the "spacious days of great Elizabeth" was surely, we protested, good enough for us. We wanted none of the imperial nonsense. As to a transfer of our patriotic loyalty from our good island realm of England to a colonial monarchy beyond the seas, it seemed not only a vulgarity but a contradiction in physical terms. We did not spare our mockery and contempt for the whole "Brummagem" innovation.

This is my sentimental view of British imperialism still, nor is it a matter of sentiment alone with me. My reading of history has taught, and practical experience has confirmed to me the fact that the task undertaken by a nation of ruling other nations against their will is the most certain step for it upon the road to national ruin. It is impossible to exercise tyrannical authority abroad and retain a proper respect for the dignity of liberty at home. The two things are not permanently compatible. The virus of lawlessness in foreign lands infects the body politic at home by a gradual process of contempt for human brotherhood and equal right, which are the basis of all law and the only guarantee of freedom in free nations. Nor, on the other hand, can a community afford to distribute its energies in a hundred different direc-

## *Preface*

tions without injury to its mental balance and danger of intellectual decay. The British Empire of the present day is being run on lines of speculation which is often sheer gambling. It has lost the sense of all economy in its finances, and all moderation in its spendthrift ways. How can it be moderate with a thousand speculative ventures to uphold in all four quarters of the globe? Moreover—and this is perhaps the most dangerous feature of it all—the vanity of imperialism, of being members of an imperial caste, is rapidly teaching Englishmen to rely, wherever possible, for their living upon the labour of others rather than their own. The great Crown Colonies, the Indian Empire, and the South African federation are all slave communities in disguise, where white men do not work themselves but live by “native” labour. The example of their sloth is gaining rapid ground at home, and soon all will be too proud to do any manual service. The virile part of the community is flocking already to lands where they can live in less laborious ways; the feeblar part remains to propagate and starve at home. Who shall say that England is not on a perilous downward path?

What moves me most to anger is to note how, just as four hundred years ago the Spanish race, urged by the speculative lust of gold and a belief in their own supreme imperial and Christianizing mission, rushed out upon the innocent New World and enslaved and slew its primitive peoples happier far than they, so we English speaking men enslave and slay in the name of civilization—here, there, and everywhere—races less well armed, but in other respects more fit for survival in the spaces they have primitively occupied than ourselves. The work of subjugation goes on under a score of false pretences;

## Preface

and these, officially recorded, remain for the misleading of posterity in the pages of our printed Blue Books. History thus comes to be written in a sense suited to the self satisfaction of those who would like to think themselves God's messengers to an unenlightened heathendom, while in reality they are only gathering in its wealth, and their crimes of conquest are concealed. In the days of Spain's madness there was a single honest monk who denounced his fellow countrymen for their misdeeds, and dared to love the Indians more than his own people, because he saw these suffering atrocities of injustice at their conquerors' hands. He was not popular in Castile for his plain speaking. Yet where—among the nations—is imperial Spain to-day? And which has the better title now to be called a patriot, Las Casas or Pizarro?

There will be found at the end of the volume an Appendix containing a selection of papers forming the *pièces justificatives* of this portion of my history. Some of these are of considerable intrinsic value, others of less importance but needed for the refutation in detail of the historic inaccuracies of Lord Cromer's book, and in answer to certain remarks found in it concerning myself. Such especially are the additional evidence here brought forward of the Khedive Tewfik's connection with the riots at Alexandria and Tantah in 1882, which, without reason given, Lord Cromer has pronounced to be unproved; and my correspondence with 10, Downing Street, which he has in a few sentences attempted to discredit. The correspondence makes my position towards Mr. Gladstone absolutely clear, as does, in another direction, my more generally interesting correspondence with my Oriental friends.

The pencil drawing of Gordon, reproduced as

## *Preface*

frontispiece to the volume, is by Edward Clifford, and is now in the collection of the National Portrait Gallery. Though inadequate as displaying Gordon's more popularly heroic attitude, it is the only one that at all reveals his inner and more mystic mind, or which I recognize as a true presentment of the man as I personally remember him.

W. S. B.

*13th September 1911.*

Twenty-ninth anniversary  
of Tel-el-Kebir.



# CONTENTS

	PAGE
GENERAL GORDON . . . . .	<i>Frontispiece</i>
PREFACE . . . . .	v

## CHAPTERS

I. THE DUFFERIN SETTLEMENT . . . . .	1
II. SIR EVELYN BARING ARRIVES AT CAIRO . . . . .	38
III. GORDON'S WORK ON THE WHITE NILE . . . . .	87
IV. GORDON IN PALESTINE . . . . .	122
V. GORDON'S LAST MISSION . . . . .	144
VI. WAS GORDON DISOBEYED? . . . . .	181
VII. EXCITEMENT ABOUT GORDON IN LONDON . . . . .	207
VIII. MY EXCLUSION FROM EGYPT . . . . .	245
IX. CONSTANTINOPLE IN 1884 . . . . .	284
X. GORDON'S DEATH. CHAOS . . . . .	344
XI. RANDOLPH CHURCHILL AND THE FOURTH PARTY . . . . .	412
XII. THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1885—RANDOLPH AT THE INDIA OFFICE—DRUMMOND WOLFF'S MISSION	471
NOTE ABOUT THE MAHDI'S DEATH . . . . .	505

## APPENDICES

A. UNPUBLISHED GORDON PAPERS . . . . .	509
B. MR. BLUNT'S ORIENTAL CORRESPONDENCE . . . . .	539
C. CORRESPONDENCE WITH DOWNING STREET . . . . .	568
D. CORRESPONDENCE WITH LORD RANDOLPH CHUR- CHILL . . . . .	608
E. ARABI'S PROGRAMME OF 1883, AND MOHAMMED ABDU'S VIEWS . . . . .	617
F. EXTRACTS FROM LADY ANNE BLUNT'S DIARY . . . . .	627
G. LETTERS TO MR. BLUNT ALLUDED TO IN, AND EXEM- PLIFYING, THE TEXT . . . . .	630
INDEX . . . . .	645





# GORDON AT KHARTOUM

## CHAPTER I

### THE DUFFERIN SETTLEMENT

I TAKE up my narrative of Egyptian events where I left them at the end of 1882.

The restoration of the Khedive Tewfik at Cairo had been accomplished by Lord Wolseley's army, and Egypt, prostrate and dumb, lay like a woman betrayed waiting the fate to be allotted to her at the hand of her despoiler. Arabi's trial over, it became a matter of supreme interest for all of us who had interested ourselves in the National movement as one of progress and reform to speculate on what was to be the ultimate fortune or ill-fortune of the Egyptians meted out to them by Mr. Gladstone's Government—whether they would return to their ancient slavery under the Circassians, or whether, as we hoped, Gladstone would make good his promises of favouring the development of their political institutions, and helping them on their road to self-government—or whether, again, they would meet the fate of so many other nations of the East, and become permanently incorporated in the British Empire.

For this last course all the Imperialists of England, headed by "The Times," were crying out, and it was generally believed that Bismarck, then Lord Paramount of Europe, would consent to it, while France, though sullen and vexed with herself for having missed an opportunity of acquisition she had long marked out as her own, was not prepared for effectual remonstrance. Her seizure of Tunis the year before, under circumstances of even less legality,

## *Hopes for Egypt in 1883*

closed her mouth for any moral preaching, as did the avowed selfishness of her attitude towards Egypt which had been even more blatantly than ours that of advocate there of financial and foreign commercial interests.

I do not think, however, that it was really within the power of our Liberal Government all at once and so entirely to falsify their pledges. A protocol of disinterestedness had been signed by Lord Dufferin at Constantinople at the meeting of the Conference the previous summer, which in the most public manner possible engaged England to make her intervention one for the general European good, and not merely for British advantage. Lord Granville, too, was bound over and over again by his declarations to the theory that the English army had been sent to Egypt solely to restore order and maintain the *status quo*, while both the Khedive's authority and the Sultan's had been invoked to give the intervention a colour of legality, and Sir Beauchamp Seymour in a solemn document, published a fortnight after the bombardment of Alexandria and before landing troops, had engaged the faith of England not to attempt conquest or in any way injure either the religion or the liberties of the Egyptians. To annex or proclaim a protectorate would consequently have been a huge moral lapse Gladstone was not prepared for, though a certain section of the Cabinet, headed by Hartington and Chamberlain, were pushing hard in that direction, while the Foreign Office, refusing to accept the evidence of the new facts revealed at the trial, clung to its false theory of the causes of the war, which it needed as an excuse, and hardened its heart against all repentance for its past mistakes. Moreover—and for this I think I may claim to have helped to avert

## *Gladstone's Dilemma*

from Egypt the supreme disaster of annexation—the non-conformist conscience of the old-fashioned Liberals of England was now awake to the iniquity of the war, and was indignant at the betrayal by Gladstone of his Midlothian principles, and was insisting with him that liberty should not be altogether suppressed on the Nile. This was a consideration which could not but affect a politician of Gladstone's temperament; and there was yet another reason perhaps stronger than all the rest with him, though I as yet only half suspected it, his economic prudence as ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer, which made him shrink from incurring full responsibility for England for the liabilities of a country then believed to be on the point of bankruptcy. Egypt from that point of view might be a burden involving money expenditure for many years as well as international trouble, and this consideration in all probability decided him. It is certain that, in subsequent years, his scruples about retaining Egypt became less and less imperative in almost exact correspondence with the revival of the financial credit.

Be this as it may, the opportunity of English annexation was, fortunately for the Egyptians, let slip in 1882, and did not again recur in Mr. Gladstone's lifetime; nor, let us hope, will another be found in the still less scrupulous future reserved for the British Empire. Egypt, though wounded almost to death, did not die as a nation with the destruction of her national army at Tel-el-Kebir, and still preserves her historic identity as a legally self-governing State, technically dependent on no European Power. The settlement of her future as such was the outcome of the divergent ideas and

## *Dufferin as a Young Man*

motives and pledges and interests just enumerated, and, as all the world knows, was entrusted to Lord Dufferin, already in Egypt, in the opening months of the year 1883. Dufferin's task, it may be admitted, was a difficult one. It was to effect a compromise which should at the same time satisfy Europe, keep nominal faith with the Khedive, and have at least an appearance of giving back to the Egyptians the political liberties they had for a moment won and were now once more deprived of. At the time of his appointment I had considerable confidence in Dufferin. I had known him personally for more than twenty years, from the time indeed when, as an attaché to the Legation at Athens, I had made his acquaintance on his return from his Nile tour in the winter of 1859-60, and I knew that his sympathy with the fellahin had then been great. He was in those days an interesting and very charming young man of not much more than thirty, and he had spent most of his time at Athens with us at the Legation, joining our rides and excursions, and taking part in our mounted paper chases which took place twice a week, as well as in such social amusements as the Corps Diplomatique at Athens afforded. His mother, herself the most charming of women, was travelling with him, and both had been especially kind to me in a way I did not forget, and I am glad to think that during the whole of Lord Dufferin's long life the pleasant relations thus begun between us were maintained as often as we met.

In the year following he had received his first public appointment, that of Commissioner to Syria at the time of the Maronite massacres, and he had returned to Athens after them, and I remembered the details of the settlement he had so successfully arranged for the Lebanon. By this he had pledged

## *His Mission to Syria*

himself to the principle of provincial autonomy under Ottoman sovereignty, while a little later the weight of his opinion had been given to our Government when it insisted with the French that they should withdraw their army of occupation from Syria. It is curious how closely parallel were, in fact, the two cases of intervention—the French intervention in Syria in 1860 and the English intervention in Egypt in 1882. It seemed to me, therefore, that he might be trusted to oppose anything like a renewal of the old Turco-Circassian tyranny, and also to respect the independent administrative rights of the Egyptian people. His task, however, as I have said was a difficult one, indeed almost impossible. In order to give back their liberty to the fellahin, or indeed to introduce any of the reforms advocated by Arabi and his friends, it would have been necessary to reinstate, if not Arabi himself, at least a Nationalist Ministry, for the Turco-Circassian clique, which Wolseley had put back into power, were the enemies of all reform, while the Khedive himself, who had betrayed his constitutional pledges, could no longer be trusted to work honestly with a constitutional Government. He would need to be replaced by some other prince who had not forfeited the confidence of his people.

Such a course, though difficult from the Foreign Office point of view, would have met with little obstacle in Egypt itself. Indeed, it would have been a quite simple affair. Tewfik, at that time, had absolutely no friend in the country outside the circle of his own small palace clique, and hardly a voice would have been raised for him if his retirement had been insisted on as a political necessity, not even in all probability his own. Pensioned, he would not unwillingly have returned to private life, for his ex-

### *A new Khedive needed*

perience of the Khedivial dignity had not been such as to cause him to be enamoured of it. Two courses would then have been open in regard to his successor. Either the recognized order of succession might have been followed, which would have placed the present Khedive Abbas, still a child, upon the throne, under a Regency; or the older order of succession might have been reverted to, which would have given it to Prince Halim. In neither case would there have been difficulty in restoring a constitutional regime. Probably the best arrangement, if our Foreign Office could have been got to consent to it, would have been the first, with Arabi for Regent. Arabi was still, in spite of his defeat and the poor fight of it he had made at Tel-el-Kebir, most widely popular, and could have been trusted to work honestly with those plans of material and moral reform which England professed to have at heart, not indeed as Minister, for he lacked the administrative ability, but as exercising by delegation the duties of a constitutional head of the State. For that no Egyptian could have been better fitted, he being a large-minded man as well as a good Moslem. Nor would England's legitimate influence have been a loser by it. Arabi, in spite of the quarrel forced upon him by the Foreign Office, had always refused to see an enemy in the English people. He had nursed himself to the last in the belief that, if only the British public could be got to know the truth, it could not fail to sympathize. England, it must be remembered, was traditionally believed in Egypt, prior to 1882, to be the universal patron of liberal and national movements throughout the world, and in an especial manner the friend of Islam. Arabi had been bred in that tradition, and had to the last moment, in common with most

### *Dufferin's Opinion of Arabi*

Egyptians, imagined that the quarrel was due to a mistake as to facts. The rectification of it would therefore have seemed natural to him and to all, and would have restored the general Egyptian goodwill.

For a moment we thought that Dufferin, whom the disclosures connected with the trial had made acquainted with the true history of the war, would have recommended this enlightened course, and it would have saved him and his employers at the Foreign Office much subsequent trouble had he had the courage to insist on it. He was perfectly aware of Tewfik's real character, and he was aware also of Arabi's merits. Indeed, so far had his confidence gone in the honesty and patriotism of the defeated National leader that he had got him at the moment of his leaving for Ceylon to draw up a Memorandum of Reform for Egypt, the text of which, though doubtless existing at the Foreign Office, has never been published. It will be found at the end of this chapter, a copy of it having been furnished to me by Arabi from Ceylon the following summer. Also I had learned from General Charles Gordon, in a conversation I had had with him, while Arabi was still in prison, in December 1882, that the idea of Arabi's rehabilitation and recall to Egypt was at the time contemplated in Downing Street; while, as will be seen further on, I received additional confirmation of it as being in Gladstone's mind in a message received from him as late as the summer of 1883. We were therefore not without justification in the hope we reposed in Dufferin, though it is improbable that the Foreign Office, obstinate and deeply compromised, was ever converted from its hostility to the National leader. Indeed it is pretty certain that, whatever representa-



## *Gordon's Evidence*

tions of the truth Dufferin may have made or whatever new suggestions offered, the policy he was instructed by Lord Granville to pursue remained unyielding; and the publication a few months later of Dufferin's famous despatch of 7th February did but register a foregone conclusion.<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, it is worth while to put on record what evidence we possess of a wiser and more liberal policy having been contemplated at least for a moment by some of those in power. Not to lay too much stress on the hopes held out to us by Dufferin at the time of the compromise of Arabi's trial, which may have been dictated by an unauthorized desire to persuade us, it is certain that Arabi's early return to Egypt was believed in not only at Cairo at the end of the year 1882, but also in London. Gordon's evidence on this head is decisive, and shows that it was entertained in official quarters. Though looked upon in Downing Street as "not clothed in the rightest of minds,"<sup>2</sup> Gordon's opinion on Egyptian affairs was considered worth taking. He was in occasional correspondence with Lord Northbrook, and he was intimate<sup>3</sup> with Reginald Brett (the present Lord Esher), just then transferred with Lord Hartington, whose private secretary he was, to the War Office, while Wolseley also was his friend. There was talk,

<sup>1</sup> I find the following in my diary of 11th December 1891: "Anne called on Princess Nazleh who told her that she did not think the Khedive Abbas would hear of Arabi's return. Others say the contrary. She repeated what we already knew from her that after Tel-el-Kebir Tewfik ordered two guillotines from France for the execution of the 'rebels.' . . . Dufferin told Princess Nazleh once in an unguarded moment that, if he had earlier known the kind of man Tewfik was, he would have made the other (meaning Arabi) Khedive."

<sup>2</sup> See "Secret History."

<sup>3</sup> See Lord Esher's "To-day and To-morrow."

### *His Views on Egypt*

too, already at the time, as we shall presently see, of Gordon's possible return as Governor-General to the Soudan, and he was in an excellent position to hear and know. What therefore he told me in the conversation referred to cannot but be convincing of the fact. The circumstances under which it took place were these.

It will be remembered by readers of my first volume, "A Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt," that while the campaign of Tel-el-Kebir was still in progress I received a letter from General Gordon dated Cape Town, 3rd August 1882, the text of which is there given, expressing to me the strongest sympathy with my view of the iniquitous causes of the war, and ending with the words, "As for Arabi, whatever may become of him individually, he will live for centuries in the people; they will never be 'your obedient servants' again." A copy of this letter I had forwarded to Gladstone, and it had not been without effect on him in what had happened subsequently in Egypt. To Gordon I had sent in reply a printed copy of my private correspondence with Downing Street, and the article on the Egyptian Revolution, published in the September number of the "Nineteenth Century Review," and had received a second letter from him which I here print.

"En route to England 21 Oct. 1882.

"MY DEAR MR. BLUNT,

"THANK you for your kind letter Sept. 7, received as I was leaving Cape Town. Sorry you have been abused, but you are not the worse because the world does so, neither are you better when it praises you. You are as you are. Thanks for XIX century and pamphlet, which I read with interest. I have a

### *Gordon calls on me*

conviction that things will turn out well for the Egyptian people in the long run, and though our people may suffer, it will be for welfare of the human race. I cannot now write on the subject, for I have an idea that things are ruled for the best, by an overruling Power, and that to put any say in what He does seems presumptuous on my part; in fact if one took up the cudgels for the oppressed every-where, one would have too much to do. I may meet you some day, and perhaps can enlighten you on some subjects, such as why the Joint Note 9 Jan<sup>ry</sup> was written, from *my* point of view. As for Dilke I think he is an impostor in a great measure. With kind regards. Believe me, Yrs. sincerely,

"C. G. GORDON.

"P.S.—I have seen papers up to 26 Oct. and it seems H. M. G. have just fought to reinstate the Parasite ring of Pachas. As for Raouf and Ismail [Eyoub] Pachas' being on Arabi's trial, it means simply the condemnation of Arabi. I know both these two men well, they would shrink at nothing, and are the representative men of the Pacha clique."

It was therefore natural that, on his return to England in November I should be one of the first persons upon whom the General called. My diary, which at the time I had unfortunately interrupted, fails me in regard to the exact details of the visit paid me; and I have no more than a memorandum to the effect that Gordon called at my house in James Street, Buckingham Gate, on 5th December, and that not finding me at home he left his name with my servant at the door characteristically thus: "General Gordon or Gordon Pasha, I daresay you have heard of him before"; and with it a note

## *Gladstone will do Justice*

written on a sheet of my own paper. But this I have preserved and it fixes the date. It says: "I will call at Buckingham Gate 9 a.m. Friday, if you could be in. I sincerely hope you can recover the £4,000 you spent on Arabi [alluding to the costs of the trial]. I will give £5 a year till you are repaid. It would be a pleasure to do it and no risk, for Arabi will be back in Egypt within two years, and he will repay it. I hope that the inferior prisoners will not be forgotten, for Riaz and Co. will do their best to crush them, for Riaz' fate depends on their extinction. My address, 68, Elm Park Road, Chelsea."

It must have been, therefore, on Friday the 8th December that Gordon called again, and, as I remember well, breakfasted with us and spent the whole forenoon in talk, mainly on Egypt and the Soudan, but also on India and the relations generally between Europe and the East. With regard to Egypt my recollection is distinct that we were in entire agreement in our sympathy with the "rebellion," and our condemnation of Tewfik. In my "Nineteenth Century" article I had engaged myself to write a sequel to it, but I remember that he advised me to leave this promise for the present unfulfilled. "You do not require it," he said, "for your own justification, and, as for the Government, they are resolved now to do justice. You may have perfect faith in Mr. Gladstone, and I know that he intends to restore Arabi as soon as public opinion shall have cooled down, and he can do it without too sudden a reversal of his policy. Arabi will be back in Egypt in a couple of years, and you can then write your history far more effectively than now."

This is my recollection of the visit, and it is confirmed to me on the point in question by a second note received from him at the close of the year bid-

## *Arabi to be Recalled*<sup>1</sup>

ding me farewell just before his leaving England for Jerusalem, which letter I have also preserved.

"5 Rockstone Place, Southampton 2, 26, 12, 82.

"MY DEAR MR. BLUNT,

"THANK you for your kind note. I am sorry not to have seen you and Lady Blunt before I left. I go tomorrow and will do my best about the Sheiks.<sup>1</sup> Above is my safe address. I will write you from Palestine.

"I have to a small degree tried to use the verse: 'If thou seest the violent oppression of the poor, or the subversion of justice, marvel not at it, for the Higher than the Highest regardeth it.' Ecc. v, 8.

"Not that I am inclined to be silent on these matters if I think I can do any good, but it comforts me to feel that one can get access to a Higher than they.

"Arabi will be back in a couple of years, say in 18 months.

"I think things are very critical in Cairo, and the day I called on you, I went to Brett and begged him to urge Government to assemble the Notables at once. Napoleon I suffered far more from the revolts of Cairo than from the troops. Colvin is to be recalled.

"Believe me with kindest regards to Lady Blunt and yourself, and with hopes for the future thro' your efforts, Yours sincerely,

"C. G. GORDON."

This taken with the rest is, I think, decisive. As to the Soudan, my recollection of Gordon's

<sup>1</sup> This is an allusion to certain Sheykhs of the Teaha and Terrabin tribes in whom I was interested and who were in prison at Jerusalem.

### *Arabi's Memorandum*

talk is that he expressed himself at the time in entire sympathy with the Mahdi as the popular leader of a revolt against an iniquitous Government, but that, whereas I, sharing the views of many Egyptian Nationalists in 1882, was for giving the Soudanese complete independence, Gordon insisted on the retention of Khartoum as a necessity for Egypt in connection with the Nile water supply, and as an outpost to be held politically. On this point alone we disagreed.

Arabi's memorandum, drawn up for Lord Dufferin, is another important bit of evidence. It shows that at least the question of a change of Khedive had been presented to, and must have been considered by, him; nor is it to be supposed that the intention of a complete pardon for the writer can have been absent from the diplomatist to whom it was addressed. It is certain, at any rate, that Dufferin was influenced by it in his scheme of reforms, and was then favourably impressed, and to this I can testify of my own knowledge, for I more than once had opportunities in after years of learning the high opinion Dufferin entertained of the ex-National leader. The passage in the memorandum of immediate importance to the point we are considering is this:

"The question," says the memorandum, "of appointing a new ruler (Waly) is an important one, and I will lay before you my own views and those of my comrades. I say: that the family of Ibrahim Pasha, son of Mohammed Ali, is absolutely worthless for the sovereignty; no matter how they might be controlled by a Constitution, for they are of notoriously corrupt principles. In my opinion there is a choice of two courses. 1. To appoint Halim Pasha, son of Mohammed Ali Pasha, Waly of Egypt, under the conditions before laid down [*i.e.*,

### *Halim Recommended*

those of a Constitution]. He is a man who has been tried by misfortune, and has tasted the bitterness of injustice, and has reached the age of about fifty five years, and I believe that such a man might try to win the sympathy of the people by justice and kindness.

2. The other course is to appoint as Waly for Egypt one of her own men of the National Party whose deeds have borne witness to their goodness of disposition and peaceful character. But, as to any idea of appointing a foreign ruler, I say that, as the mass of the Egyptians are Moslems, with the exception of the Coptic section (and these are the same as the Egyptians in their dealings and ways of life), I believe that the appointment of a foreign Waly would not suit the temper of the Egyptians, but would perhaps lead to trouble among them."

This, though not conforming to strict official phraseology, goes to the root of the matter, and is full of common sense. Let us consider how it would have been if Dufferin had made the idea of such a change of ruler his own, as he made other recommendations of the memorandum his own, and had pressed it as a necessity of the Egyptian case upon the Foreign Office if an honest settlement was to be made and the British troops withdrawn from Egypt. As regards Egypt proper, the appointment of Halim would have solved the whole difficulty of popular disaffection. Halim, who was a really estimable man, bore a good repute in Egypt. His domestic life was a blameless one. His wife, a woman of high distinction with a good European education, would have helped him in his relations with the resident foreign element, and he himself was sufficiently Europeanized to play the part needed of a modern Egyptian ruler. He had none of the vices of the elder branch of the family of Mohammed Ali. He was

## *How to Pacify the Soudan*

neither a spendthrift nor a voluptuary, nor a coveter of his neighbour's goods, nor on any point a law breaker. Moreover there would have been no difficulty in obtaining the Sultan's consent to the appointment. Halim was in some sort the Sultan's own candidate, as also the candidate of most of the European Powers. He could have worked easily with the National Party and the Constitution, and thus the British garrison could have been at once withdrawn. If to this had been added, what was talked of at the time, the appointment of Sir Charles Wilson as Malet's successor at the British Agency, even a preponderance of English influence in Egypt could have been secured. Wilson was a strong sympathizer with the Nationalists, and his advice would have been followed. The suggestion of Halim was an entirely wise one, suited to every necessity of the case, as would have been the other of Abbas with Arabi for Regent.

Above all it would have saved Egypt and England from those terrible disasters which beset both countries with a pursuing curse in regard to the Soudan during the next three years. That the intervention in Egypt was the direct cause of the revolt in the Soudan is certain. One of the most fatal acts of the Dual Control had been to give to the Soudan in 1880, as Gordon's successor, a reactionary and wholly corrupt Circassian Governor-General, Raouf Pasha, and it had been through his tyranny and incapacity that the country had fallen into disorder and the Mahdi had gained his first adherents. Two years later Arabi's first administrative act when he became War Minister at Cairo had been to recall Raouf,<sup>1</sup> and send a really competent man, Abd-el-

<sup>1</sup> Raouf was afterwards named, in contempt of equity, one of the judges on Arabi's trial.



## *England's Responsibility*

Kader Pasha, to replace him. Under Abd-el Kader the rebellion had been localized, Khartoum scientifically fortified, and order restored everywhere but in the western provinces. Moreover Arabi had put himself into epistolary communication with the Mahdi, and had established a *modus vivendi* between him and the National Government in view of the common menace of European and Christian aggression in Lower Egypt. It was the landing of English troops at Alexandria that gave its fanatical character to the Mahdist rebellion, while it also denuded the Soudan of its best troops recalled to Egypt to repel the menace of invasion. But, for Tel-el-Kebir, the utmost misfortune that could have befallen Egypt in that direction would have been the loss of the Bahr el Ghazal province and Kordofan. Even now, after the defeat of Tel-el-Kebir, all could have been repaired had the change of Khedive been resolved on according to Arabi's suggestion, with a recall of the Nationalist leaders, and an end put to the tyrannical Circassian regime at Cairo. Terms could easily have been come to with the Mahdi which would have secured Khartoum and the Eastern Soudan from attack. The Christian army withdrawn from Cairo, the Mahdi's rebellion would have lost its fanatical *raison d'être*. It will be seen later that Arabi, even before the defeat of Hicks, was quite ready to abandon Kordofan and the Equatorial provinces, while there would have been no difficulty in retaining Khartoum, where the chief weakness of the garrison in 1883 lay in the fact that the troops composing it were Arabi's ex-soldiers devoted to him and wholly disaffected to Tewfik. For the issue of bloodshed and destruction witnessed for a generation in the Soudan, the obstinacy of our Foreign Office in retaining Tewfik was directly responsible.

## *Egypt sacrificed to Granville*

It was one of those fatal mistakes which statesmen make and persist in because they are too proud to own their error.

Was there ever a greater tragedy of errors? And all for what? It is probable that the real reason why Tewfik was maintained in his place as Khedive, instead of being pensioned and sent to join his father in an exile more or less honourable, was neither a consideration of Egypt's interests nor that of England's interests, nor yet of the interests of Europe, nor so much as those of the bondholders. None of the upholders of these interests had any belief or trust in Tewfik as a prince capable of maintaining order at Cairo, or of restoring Egyptian credit, or even of efficiently serving British interests. He was known to have none of the qualities of a strong ruler, and he was popular with no one, native or European. As a puppet prince he might have his uses, but the situation demanded something more than a puppet prince, and he was good for no other purpose, political or financial. No. The probability is that the real reason with Gladstone's Cabinet was that Tewfik's retirement would have entailed the retirement also of Lord Granville, and Lord Granville was too popular a member of the Cabinet to be forced into such a step against his will; also that Lord Granville, a needy man, much in debt, and dependent on his official salary to eke out an insufficient income, was not prepared for the personal sacrifice. The fiction of Tewfik's loyalty and of Arabi's rebellion had therefore to be persisted in and upheld. It could not be contemplated that a Minister should admit an error which had been accompanied by the slaughter of thousands of peasants, and the expenditure of millions, and a war which had been

## *Dufferin's Failure*

boasted of as one undertaken as a "duty of honour." Granville must have resigned if his Cabinet had belied him. There was no "political" way out of it, except for the Foreign Office to harden its heart and persevere in its accomplished wrong. This, I say, was the tragedy of the situation, and for this Egypt was sacrificed. As for Dufferin, he doubtless argued, being an old diplomatist with a career to maintain, that he had been sent to Egypt by the Foreign Office to get them out of an all but impossible scrape, but that his instructions did not include the duty of proving them fools. He therefore made his settlement on the lines prescribed. It may be said of him with truth that he missed, unwillingly, an heroic opportunity, and I think also with truth that it left him with occasional qualms of conscience which troubled him through the rest of his long and eminently successful life.

For these reasons nothing in the way of an efficient new policy was insisted on by Dufferin, or adopted by the Government, and all the rest of the programme so elaborately drawn up by him of councils and assemblies, and dignified with the name of a Constitution, was rendered impotent from the outset by being entrusted to hands the least desirous of its success and the least competent to deal with it.

We, who were watching, were not long in being undeceived in our hopes. The new year 1883 began badly. Although its actual first act at Cairo was the issuing of the decree promised us by Dufferin of a general amnesty for all connected with the "Rebellion," and though I had received from him a private letter announcing to me the good news of the release of 450 political prisoners, for which I had duly thanked him, it soon appeared that the operation of the decree was being evaded in practice

## *The Amnesty Broken*

where the Khedive needed to be indulged in acts of unsatisfied vengeance on those who had specially offended him. But for this, I had intended that with the issue of the amnesty my political intervention in Egypt should end. I felt that I had done my whole duty by salvaging, as far as I could, the wreck of the National Party; I had so far succeeded in saving the lives, if not the liberty, of all concerned, and it was my thought to rely, as Gordon had advised me, on Gladstone for the rest, and to turn my energies into other channels. A very few days, however, passed before it became evident that things were going less fairly in Egypt than they seemed. About the 15th of January Napier,<sup>1</sup> having finished his work at Cairo, returned to London, and from him I learned that, notwithstanding the amnesty and the clearing of the prisons announced by Dufferin, a certain number of the political prisoners had been detained while others were being arrested and put on trial before special courts on charges connected with the past year. The charges brought were so-called "criminal charges" against persons implicated in the riots at Alexandria, Tintah, and other places, before or during the war, and on this pretence vengeance was being taken on political enemies by the Khedive and the Court Party. What made these prosecutions the more infamous was the fact that innocent men were being indicted for the very crimes their accusers had been themselves guilty of, and, to make the injustice of it the more glaring, some of them were being tried before military courts appointed by the very man, Omar Pasha Lutfi, now Minister of War, who with the Khedive's connivance and suggestion had prepared the Alexandria

<sup>1</sup> The Hon. Mark Napier, who, with Mr. A. M. Broadley, had been counsel for Arabi at the trial.

## *Executions at Alexandria*

riot not a year before. It was a "judicial atrocity" of the most shameless kind.

I therefore wrote to Dufferin a letter, the full text of which will be found in the Appendix at the end of this volume, complaining of the exceptions that had been made to the amnesty. "It would seem," I said, "most unfair that the leaders of the 'rebellion' having foregone their right of being publicly defended, any of their followers or associates should be punished for rebellion. . . . I cannot understand how it can be the wish of our Government to make scapegoats of the rank and file of those charged with the criminal acts of June and July, while the chief offenders enjoy immunity. If one thing has been proved to the satisfaction of the Government more than another, it is that Omar Lutfi was responsible for the murderous character of the riots of the 11th of June, yet we read still of executions at Alexandria for crimes committed on that day by others, the chief culprit himself being the while at large, in honour, and even holding high office under the Khedive. I say nothing of the Khedive himself, though you doubtless know how little his conduct on that day would have borne investigation."

Dufferin's answer to this, while personally amiable, was the reverse of satisfactory. It referred me to a report drawn up by Sir Charles Wilson about the discharge of political prisoners, but ignored the real point of my remonstrance, the breach of the amnesty of which I had complained. The monstrosity of the prosecutions being carried on in the Khedive's name for acts due to the Khedive's own instigation was too delicate ground to be ventured on, and Dufferin was diplomatically silent. In the meanwhile men were being hanged, and among them, on the 5th of February, a young officer charged with

## *Abu Diab Hanged*

being responsible for the riot at Tantah in July 1882.

The riots of Tantah, which took place a few days after the bombardment of Alexandria, were the work of the Alexandrian mob which had fled from that city. They were permitted and encouraged by the then governor of the province, Ibrahim Pasha Adhem, an adherent of the Khedive, who sought to emulate the conduct of Omar Pasha Lutfi in the Alexandrian case. The Tantah massacre would have attained very large proportions but for the intervention of Ahmed Bey Minshawi, a neighbouring fellah proprietor of great local authority, aided by Yusuf Abu Diab, one of Abd-el-Aal Pasha's aides-de-camp, who had been sent by Arabi to protect the Christians. The governor, Ibrahim Adhem, had then been arrested by Arabi's order, and sent a prisoner to the citadel, but on the return of the Khedive to Cairo had been reinstated in his office at Tantah and had inverted the rôle of guilt in the affair. Early in the year 1883 Abu Diab had been singled out and tried for the other's crime, and now while I was still in correspondence with Dufferin hanged at Tantah. His execution, where the truth of the affair was known to every one and where Abu Diab was highly esteemed, struck terror through the whole province. I did not hear of the case until too late to intervene; but when, a few days later, Dufferin's unsatisfactory answer came, I resolved not to allow such another injustice to go by without public remonstrance. It is impossible that Dufferin who, though he had refused to examine into the history of the Alexandrian riot, knew in a general way how the case really lay as between the Khedive and the Nationalists, should not have suspected that this and other trials on similar charges were a perversion of justice. Also

## *Bedouins hanged by Warren*

it is certain that there was a strong political interest to serve, if the Khedive was to be rehabilitated and supported, in providing him with a scapegoat for his own and his agents crimes. Nor can it be left out of view that the theory of the Nationalists' responsibility for the riot had been made the pretext and excuse throughout by our diplomacy, and by Dufferin himself at the Constantinople Conference, for its intervention. Dufferin was no sentimentalist in politics, and could at times be hard. In this case, as in others which preceded and followed it, he contented himself with directing the formal presence of an Englishman at the trial, one unacquainted with the language, to watch it, and thus allowed the Khedive to have practically his own way.

The next case that occurred was that of the vengeance taken on a number of unfortunate Bedouins charged with the murder of Professor Palmer during the war. Palmer (see "Secret History") had been sent by our Government, and especially by Lord Northbrook, to bribe the Bedouin tribes east of the Suez Canal, and with him Gill and Charrington, two English officers, had met their deaths in its performance. They had all three, travelling disguised, been taken prisoners and shot in the desert by order of the Egyptian governor of NakhI, an act not of common murder but clearly of warfare, and one which should certainly have been covered by the amnesty, the business the disguised officers were on giving them the character of spies. But our Government had special reasons for resenting their death; and after the war was over an English officer, Colonel Warren, was despatched to the Sinai peninsula to "do justice" on the tribes. This duty he performed by driving in to Suez some scores of Bedouins, men, women, and children, and selecting

## *The Lords Lie*

out of them five for hanging, while the rest were retained for many months in prison as hostages for more important persons still at large. This was the same Warren who afterwards figured so lugubriously at Spion Kop in the Boer war. The true facts of the case had been brought to my knowledge by Palmer's widow, who came to me incensed against the Government, and holding them, and especially Lord Northbrook who had sent him, responsible for her husband's death. She now laid the whole particulars before me; and we had questions put about it in Parliament, and eventually a debate raised on the Address, and another in the House of Lords, in which Her Majesty's Ministers rose, one after the other, and, like Ananias and Sapphira, lied valiantly in the public cause. It is a curious feature of our parliamentary conventions that so worthy and straightforward a man as the late Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman should have consented on this occasion to deny absolutely facts of which there was the clearest possible written proof, and of which he could not have been ignorant, in Palmer's own handwriting, while also it concerned a sum of public money no smaller than £20,000. Lord Northbrook was the Minister really responsible and Bannerman was his Under-Secretary at the Admiralty, and to him the work of denial was given by his chief. We failed to save the Bedouins but obtained for the lady a handsome pension, and for Palmer sepulture in St. Paul's. The whole story is instructive but has been told in my "Secret History," and its sequel does not sufficiently concern Egyptian history to detain me here.

A third still more important case among the political hangings of the year was that of Suliman Bey Sami, the Nationalist Colonel of the Alex-



## *Suliman Sami Hanged*

andria garrison, who, at the time of the riots, had come down with his regiment and put an end to the massacre in spite of the conniving civil Governor, Omar Pasha Lutfi. Omar Lutfi was a strong partisan of the Khedive, and the resentment of the Court party was, for this reason, especially keen against Sami. It was a case precisely on the same lines as that of Abu Diab, except that the charge brought against Sami was not in regard to his conduct at the time of the riot, but for having set fire to Alexandria during the bombardment a month later. It is especially disgraceful to our Government that this man should have been hanged with their connivance, and by a court martial appointed by this very Omar Lutfi, because the charge brought against him concerned one of their own political fictions, namely, that Alexandria was set fire to not at all by the guns of the British fleet, but solely by the Egyptians, a fiction in which they had not only a political but also a pecuniary interest, involving responsibility for the three millions sterling indemnity claimed by the victims of the bombardment. The hanging, moreover, was the clearest possible breach of the amnesty, for Suliman's act had the perfectly legitimate excuse of warfare, as one designed to cover the retreat of the Egyptian army. Here the case was so strong a one against the Government that I was able to secure the help of that really efficient fighter in the House of Commons, Lord Randolph Churchill, an occasion memorable to me as the beginning of a valuable political friendship long preserved.

Randolph Churchill was an extraordinarily interesting young man, the most attractive at that time in English public life, the head of the little group of four Tories in the House of Commons which went

## *The Fourth Party Protest*

by the name of the Fourth Party. Until the spring of 1883 I had not come across him personally. He had been kept away from the House during the whole earlier session of 1882 by illness, and I had not had the good fortune of securing his help. I have often thought that but for the accident of his illness that spring, when the Egyptian crisis occurred, the whole trouble and discredit of the bombardment and the war might have been prevented, for it needed nothing but a powerful and persistent voice on the Opposition side in Parliament to deter Mr. Gladstone from an enterprise so strangely at variance with his life-long teaching. Unfortunately, such a voice had not been available. The members of Mr. Gladstone's own party did not dare, with the single exception of Sir Wilfrid Lawson, to reproach him with the necessary courage, and as for the Tory Opposition, not one of them had the wisdom to take with him a humanitarian line, the only one which could have convinced him of his folly.

In the short autumn session, Churchill had reappeared and had given courage to his followers, and they had helped us in getting a fair trial for the vanquished "rebels," Churchill himself generously subscribing to the Arabi defence fund. But so far we had not personally met. Now, however, in my anger at the barbarities which were being committed in Egypt, and by the advice of my friends, especially Lady Gregory and my cousin, Algernon Bourke, who was still on the staff of the "Times" (see "Secret History") I turned to Churchill as the one man capable of dealing in Parliament effectively with the case. Dufferin, his mission ended, had turned his back on Egypt, and the small local protection given by his presence was no more to be had. It was an urgent necessity, if these black doings were to be stopped,

## *Randolph Churchill*

that the home Government should be at once subjected to vigorous and even violent remonstrance, and that Gladstone should be attacked individually as the responsible author of the atrocities due to his intervention. In his younger days Gladstone had denounced the State crimes of Bourbon rule in Naples with its arrests, imprisonments, and sanguinary political punishments, and it was urgent now that some one should stand up in the House and remind him of his more reputable past, and shame him from the countenance his agents were giving to the same State crimes in Egypt. Churchill in his place below the gangway was the man for this. He was "spoiling," I was told, "for a fight," and to him in my new need I turned as the one knight errant on whom I could quite rely.

I like to remember Lord Randolph as I then first saw him one afternoon in May when, by appointment, I met him to discuss the situation at some rooms in the Strand where a chess tournament was going on. Chess was one of his few hobbies, and he had asked me to meet him there. At the time of which I speak he was, with no very regular features, a distinctly good-looking young man, smartly dressed and with a certain distinction of manner which marked him from the common herd. He was of ordinary height—by no means the dwarf his caricatures suggest—well built and well set up, his face a pleasant one, eyes full of intelligence, though rather *à fleur de tête*, while his mouth, overhung with a strong moustache curling up above his cheeks, gave an aggressive tone to his countenance it would not otherwise have had. In colour he was then, as always, rather pale, with a look of ill-health which later increased from year to year, a symptom of the constitutional weakness of which he so prematurely

## *A Glorified Schoolboy*

died. There was no lack, however, as yet of virility in his movements or gestures. On the contrary, it was just the vital force in him which was the chief attraction and the frank irresponsibility in all he did and said. Indeed, it was difficult when conversing with him, even after he had become a Cabinet Minister, to regard him as a quite serious statesman—a glorified schoolboy rather, ready still to rob an orchard or tie a cracker to the head master's coat-tail. This simplicity of speech and pleasant humour, joined to a high-bred courtesy with strangers, made him a favourite, especially with young men nor only of his own class in England, while, as I afterwards found, it opened to him no less the doors of confidence in the minds of the many Orientals whom I brought to see him—minds usually suspicious of Englishmen, and slow to reveal their thoughts. He had none of that arrogant coldness that so much repels these, nor again of that abruptness of address which is apt to frighten them, as birds are frightened at any too sudden movement. Such visitors never failed after an interview with Churchill to speak to me enthusiastically in his praise. To myself he was invariably charming. My somewhat romantic view of politics, so little like his own, attracted him, and my knowledge of the East, of which he was as yet ignorant; and, being some ten years his senior in age, I was able to inspire him almost from the beginning of our intercourse with new ideas, enlarging his political horizon, and as I have always been glad to think, encouraging him in the humaner paths of public virtue. To these he was already in a vague way inclined, and on the occasion of our first meeting I had no difficulty in persuading him to take up the Egyptian patriotic case, the more so because it gave him an opportunity for immediate action in

## *Helpers in Parliament*

Parliament most damaging to the Government. He found it a pleasant fancy, when I suggested it to him, that he should array himself in the Grand Old Man's Midlothian garments, left as it were outside a tavern door, and preach to him to his face of "righteousness and temperance and a judgement to come."

With Churchill's assistance I was able to enlist other strong helpers, Drummond Wolff, who was the member of the Fourth Party specially affected to foreign affairs, and Gorst (Sir John) its legal adviser—both men of great ability and political courage. Outside their radius, too, I had for friends in the House of Commons Robert Bourke,<sup>1</sup> who represented foreign affairs on the Opposition front bench; Sir Wilfrid Lawson, the most honest man in Parliament; and Labouchere, whom I had known in my old diplomatic days as a fellow attaché, and who was now leader of the extreme Radical division below the gangway. All these were good men and true in a parliamentary fight, and, working together, could be counted on to force the official entrenchments of the Government, and make the Grand Old Man the object of daily attacks which should convince him of his shame. We had good help, too, from the Irish party, and it had been O'Donnell who had opened the campaign for us with the Palmer case.

Thanks especially to Churchill's energy that summer, and to the great publicity he was able to give to the Khedive's connection with the riots, I have the satisfaction of remembering that we succeeded at last in putting a stop to the worst barbarities of the restored regime at Cairo, nor was any further political

<sup>1</sup> The Rt. Hon. Robert Bourke, M.P., afterwards Lord Conemara.

## *Lady Gregory's Letter*

hanging' after that summer permitted as long as Gladstone remained in office. The experience of the past year, however, left me wholly sceptical of the good faith of either our Cairo diplomacy or the London Foreign Office, and permanently estranged me from that vast official machinery of the British Empire which, I now came to see, maintained its power in the East only by a system of mingled lying, force, and fraud repellent to common honesty and equally demoralizing to the governors and those it governed. It was in this mood that Dufferin's famous "Charter" of Egypt's liberty found me when at last I read it in the pages of a new Blue Book.

I reproduce from among my papers the following interesting letter from Lady Gregory<sup>1</sup> which admirably describes our common feeling about the charter at the time we read it. It was written just when I was seeking to bring forward the charges against the Khedive, and when Dufferin, having returned to England, was using his influence with the press to get the charge hushed up. It is too good and instructive a letter not to be printed here in full.

(Undated but written at the beginning of May 1883.)

"I am curious to hear what you think of Lord Dufferin's despatch. It reminds me of what someone of the ancients said of human life, 'a comedy to those who think, a tragedy to those who feel.'

"I am very sorry I did not know you had not seen Lord Dufferin's despatch. I read it, and sent it off yesterday to Sir William, but would have sent it to you first if I had known. It would not, however, do much to put you in good spirits. There are some good suggestions in it, taken from Arabi's programme, such as a National Bank to come be-

<sup>1</sup> For Sir William and Lady Gregory see "Secret History."

### *Dufferin approaches the "Times"*

tween the people and the usurers, and a reform in the working of the Cadastre. But for all evils his remedy is: Put in more Europeans. Of course when the country is well stocked with English surveyors and judges and engineers it will be necessary to keep English troops there to protect them. I would rather they annexed at once. There would be less hypocrisy about it. He winds up with a panegyric on Nubar, Sherif and Riaz and alludes in terms of admiration to Sultan Pasha and calls the Khedive amiable and benevolent. So you may imagine the style of the document, in which there are poetic allusions to Memnon and Pactolus and a great flourish about putting the house-tax on Europeans, and this ridiculous Parliament which is to have no hold on the purse strings and will be of course useless, but sounds well. I don't blame Lord Dufferin so much. Of course the Government told him what was expected of him, but he might just as well have drawn up this prose poem at Therapia without going to Egypt at all.

"I enclose copy of your statement which I am keeping for the present. I have seen Chenery<sup>1</sup> to-day and talked the matter over with him, but Lord Dufferin has been beforehand with me! having already interviewed him and, as if he knew what was coming, persuaded him that any attack on the Khedive would add immense difficulty to the action of the Government just now—that, whatever his faults may be, he has promised to support English policy, and that for the interests of the Empire it is much better to let bygones be bygones—and that the 'Times' is such a very important paper that anything that appeared in it against Tewfik would at once be made use of by the French, and within

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Chenery, then Editor of the "Times."

### *Chenery makes Excuse*

two hours be telegraphed to the Khedive, who would believe the Government and the 'Times' were the same thing—that this is a time of change in Egypt, a new man being sent there and a new start made and the less stir made about what had already occurred there the better. This is also Lord Granville's view!

"Poor Chenery had then to listen to my appeal as to whether Arabi's character was never to be cleared from the slurs cast upon it by Gladstone and Dilke in the House, and never withdrawn, just to save the Khedive whom no one has any opinion of, and he became agitated after reading your statement and said that if it were true the Khedive ought to be hanged—but that at the same time, for the reasons given before, he is very doubtful whether he ought to publish it, even in a letter from you. In the end he said that, if you would modify as far as possible the *personal* attack on the Khedive and add a paragraph laying the crime more on the Palace party than on him and make it as much as possible a defence of Arabi rather than an indictment of Tewfik, he would see if he could publish it, though not binding himself by a promise, and if he could not would return it to you in time to publish it elsewhere, as I told him it must be out by the 11th. He was very kind and I think was really anxious to be amiable, and spoke most affectionately of you, and I really don't blame him for not wishing to quarrel with the Government. Indeed I was hopeless from the time I heard Lord Dufferin had taken him in hand. What are we against him?

Don't seek to hinder him  
Or to bewilder him  
Sure he's a pilgrim  
From the Blarney stone!



## *Dufferin's Charter*

"I told Sir William all this and he is pretty sure Chenery will be afraid to print it in any form, and I should be very unwilling to take away any of the force of the accusation against Tewfik. I thought all the more of its importance from Chenery being so afraid of the effect it might have. Sir William and I both think that if you could get Lord Randolph to make the statement in the House it would be your best course, as it would thus gain publicity, and the Tories at all events might take it up. Do you think this will be possible? I should not like you to publish it in any paper but the 'Times.' Chenery talked cheerfully of a 'little pamphlet,' but that was of course to prevent the little foundling being laid on his own doorstep."

My own impression of Dufferin's charter, and his famous dispatch expounding it, was little different from that here quoted. It was obvious to all of us who knew anything of Egypt that in the present condition of things there, under the restored regime of Tewfik and the Turco-Circassian Pashas maintained in power by a British army and allowed to imprison and hang whom they would, where there was neither freedom of speech nor of the press, and where all political society was honeycombed with spies, the talk of giving back liberty to the Egyptians was in the nature of a sorry jest. The Queen's speech which had ushered it in on the opening of Parliament had been a mere repetition of all the old Foreign Office platitudes of the previous years. Her Majesty had been made by Gladstone's Cabinet to say: "The reconstitution of Egypt and the reorganization of its affairs under the authority of the Khedive have in part been accomplished, and will continue to receive my earnest attention. It will be my endeavour

## *Arabi's Memorandum*

to secure that full provision shall be made for the exigencies of order, for a just representation of the wants and wishes of the population, and for the observance of international obligations," a programme more meagre than that of the previous year, in which "the prudent development of Egyptian institutions" had been promised, with the result of Egypt's parliament having been crushed and abolished six months later by a British army. What was it possible to hope from the liberalism of a government which had restored the absolute power of a Prince so detested by his subjects that it needed British bayonets to keep him on his throne? Dufferin's charter, to be made a reality, called for a change of Khedive as a first condition of its success, and of this no sign whatever had been given. To talk of granting a Constitution, as a novelty, to a people who had just been robbed of their Constitution, and whose constitutional leaders had been ruined and driven into exile, could be only a mockery; and as such it appeared to us. Dufferin had indeed been a "pilgrim from the Blarney stone."

### MEMORANDUM OF REFORMS FOR EGYPT DRAWN UP AT LORD DUFFERIN'S REQUEST BY AHMED ARABI PASHA, DECEMBER 1882 (EXACT DATE NOT GIVEN)

1. The Constitution granted to the Egyptian Nation of 7th February 1882 should be confirmed.
2. Rules should be laid down as to the limiting of the power of whoever may be appointed Ruler of Egypt, so that he shall no longer be an absolute Ruler.
3. Rules should also be laid down as to the Ministers and Heads of Departments, so that each should have conditions imposed on him which he could not transgress.
4. A Mejlis or Council of Elders should be formed as a Body of Appeal on important questions where differences shall have

## *Arabi's Memorandum*

occurred between the Government and the Chamber of Representatives.

5. New regulations should be issued for the reorganization of the various administrative departments, so that each Department or Province or Office should have so many officials of assigned rank belonging to it, at fixed salaries liable neither to increase nor to decrease, with regulations as to promotion according as vacancies occur through resignation or death or for any other natural reason.

*Remark.*—Public offices in Egypt have hitherto been conducted on no fixed rule, but every Minister or Governor or Chief of Police has done with his administration as he pleased, dismissing or promoting all under him without inquiry, and removing officials from post to post according to his fancy, so that the budget has always exceeded what was right, and increased from year to year without sufficient reason; this it is which has caused yearly deficits in the budget.

6. Rules should be made to control the action of the police so that they should cease to interfere with the judicial inquiry into cases, as now is done, but each police station should have a small Council to deal with cases in its own district and refer them to the tribunals of First Instance for decision. The police should appear in the character of prosecutors only.

7. Municipalities should be formed in Cairo, Alexandria, and other considerable Egyptian towns, as may be suited to each town, and the funds raised by dues in each town should be kept in the treasury of each Administration to be spent on improvements for that town only, such as mending roads, repairing public buildings, lighting the town with gas, supplying water, erecting slaughter-houses, hospitals, and public markets for the sale of whatever produce is brought in from the country, and on whatever else may be of advantage to the town or prevent its injury.

8. Rules shall be laid down to control the transactions of the small and the large banks, and to fix the maximum rate of interest all over Egypt.

*Remark.*—The banks themselves are at present the cause of the ruin and destruction and misery which have fallen upon the indigent fellow.

9. Tribunals shall be instituted all over Egypt with the formation of the High Courts, one of them at Cairo, the other at Alexandria, the members of both of which shall be chosen from among the Native and Foreign Notables; and it shall be their function to pronounce final decisions. Rules shall be laid down for the guidance of these Courts suitable to the country.

## *Arabi's Memorandum*

10. The Consular jurisdictions shall be abolished, and all suits concerning foreigners inhabiting Egypt shall be tried before the abovementioned tribunals.

11. All foreigners inhabiting Egypt shall be on an equal footing with the natives in paying taxes and customs duties, and all such imposts as are incumbent on the natives.

12. The Mixed Tribunals shall be abolished, the Courts abovementioned being sufficient.

13. The official language in all parts of the country shall be Arabic.

14. Egypt shall remain dependent on the Ottoman Porte as she is now, inasmuch as we know that the hearts of the Egyptians are in sympathy with the Porte. But inasmuch as the shoulders of Egypt are burdened with debts, and as the situation demands such a diminution of the debt, as will be mentioned below, so also it becomes necessary to diminish and limit the yearly tribute paid to the Porte to the amount imposed upon Egypt in the time of Mohammed Ali Pasha, considering, too, that at that time Egypt had no debt.

15. The Suez Canal shall be under the protection of the European powers generally and jointly.

16. Slavery shall be abolished absolutely and permanently.

17. The Sudan ought to remain a dependency of Egypt, and that because it has a fertile climate; and, if a railway were made to Khartoum, it would become the great centre of commerce for the Sudan and the East, and it would begin to be gradually civilized.

18. A rule should be made determining the conditions according to which everyone, whether native or foreign, is employed in the Egyptian public administration, and the term of his service and retirement and promotion and dismissal shall be fixed.

19. The assessment of taxes in general must be reformed, and the customs duties, because they are based at present on inequitable principles.

20. All these administrations, of which the revenues are mortgaged for the Egyptian debt, such as railways, ports, Governorships, the Municipality in Cairo, and the Administrations of the Domains and the Daira Sanieh, shall revert to the Government, in order that they (the Government) may administer these revenues as they think best, and may refund the surplus to the Treasury of the Malieh, inasmuch as the continuance of those administrations under present conditions is a yearly loss to the Egyptian Treasury.

21. The Caisse de la Dette shall be abolished, the Treasury of the Malieh being sufficient.

## *Arabi's Memorandum*

22. The Egyptian Debt must be unified and diminished to 50 millions sterling, at an interest of 3 per cent. yearly, so that the Egyptian Government shall be itself a guarantee for the payment of the instalments when due, and those instalments shall be paid at the dates fixed, and those dates shall be fixed at the end of the harvest, winter and summer.

23. A commission shall be formed of eminent engineers and men of science and art to repair ancient Arab buildings which have begun to decay, and to restore them to their original condition, taking care to preserve the hieroglyphics and temples and monuments of ancient Egypt, and to examine them and put them in order, and to build a large museum to receive the Egyptian and Arab antiquities.

24. The native schools in the towns and villages shall be put in order and made accessible for the education of children of both sexes and the spread of knowledge and civilization.

25. A real Budget shall be drawn up each year with great accuracy, so that the Government may know its exact revenue, as also its expenses. These should be reckoned each year, after the necessary reforms shall have been decided on. Three months before the end of each financial year there shall be an inspection of the surplus cash in the Treasury of the Malich remaining after payment of all expenses; and this sum shall be divided into two portions, according to circumstances—one of them to be applied to paying off a part of the original capital of the Debt, and the other to reclaiming lands suitable for cultivation.

26. The question of appointing a new Ruler (Waly) is an important one, and I will lay before you my own views and those of my comrades. I say: That the family of Ibrahim Pasha, son of Mohammed Ali, is absolutely worthless for the sovereignty, no matter how they might be controlled by a constitution, for they are people of notoriously corrupt principles.

In my opinion there is a choice of two courses:

1. To appoint Halim Pasha, son of Mohammed Ali Pasha, as Waly for Egypt under the conditions above laid down. He is a man who has been tried by misfortunes, and has tasted the bitterness of injustice, and has reached the age of about 55 years, and I believe that such a man may try to win the sympathy of the people by justice and kindness.

2. The other to appoint as Waly for Egypt one of her own men of the national party, whose deeds have borne witness to their goodness of disposition and peaceful character. But as to any idea of appointing a foreign Ruler, I say that, as the mass of the Egyptians are Moslems, with the exception of the small section of Copts, and these also are the same as the Egyptians in

## *Arabi's Memorandum*

their dealings and ways of life, I believe that the appointment of a foreign Waly would not suit the character of the Egyptians, but that it would perhaps cause trouble among them. As to the regard to be had for the interests of foreigners, I say that when equitable tribunals shall have been formed, with the High Courts *previously mentioned*, those Courts will themselves guarantee the interests of natives and foreigners together, for it has hitherto been unheard of that any Egyptian should wrong a foreigner.

## CHAPTER II

### SIR EVELYN BARING ARRIVES AT CAIRO

THE events briefly narrated in the last chapter will explain the bitterness of heart with which in the late summer of 1883 I once more prepared to leave England for Egypt on my road to India. What little belief I may have retained in the honour or indeed the common honesty of Mr. Gladstone's Government in its relations with the unfortunate people, which it had first passed under the harrow of its arms and then mocked with the jibes of its diplomacy, had given place in me to a resentment which seemed to impose it as a duty henceforth of my life to take sides with the poor Nile dwellers against their European betrayers, and to do my utmost to counterwork the financial and Foreign Office rogues in their design of perpetuating their subjection.

In Egypt itself there seemed little for the present to accomplish. With Churchill's help I had succeeded in putting a stop to the worst excesses of the restored regime. Malet and Colvin were both being removed to less dangerous spheres of official activity, and the appointment of Major Baring in their place at Cairo seemed a guarantee against any violent renewal. Baring, who was afterwards to be Lord Cromer, had a reputation at that time for large mindedness which imposed upon the public, in spite of his financial connections, and caused it to be believed that he would do his best to hasten, not delay, the evacuation of Cairo. He was supposed to represent Mr. Gladstone's policy of a reconstruction of the Khedivial autonomy on a basis of free institutions as declared in his famous speech of 9th August,

## *Morley on Baring*

when he promised that "having given Egypt a fair start England would wish her God speed." It is worth recalling this, and also John Morley's testimonial to Major Baring's sound Liberal ideas, published at the time of his appointment in the "Pall Mall Gazette," if only for the contrast of his prediction with the notorious sequel of Lord Cromer's career. This is how Morley announced the event:

"Major Evelyn Baring is now semi-officially announced to have been appointed Consul-General in Egypt in place of Sir Edward Malet. The selection is a good one. Major Baring is something more than an eminent Anglo-Indian; he is an experienced Anglo-Egyptian, familiar both with men and affairs in the Nile Valley. His appointment will help to reassure the public both at home and abroad as to the tendency of English policy in Egypt, for it is well understood both at Cairo and in London that Major Baring is not an advocate of a forward policy, and that he is free from any delusions as to the possibility of inaugurating a millennium in Egypt by placing it under 'the masterful hand of a British Resident.' It is not in that direction that Major Baring will lead the country in which he will be the accredited representative of England."

I had disburdened my mind to a certain extent of its anger by writing my diatribe in verse (see "Secret History") "The Wind and the Whirlwind," but I felt that a more active campaign was required of me, and Egypt being, as it seemed for the present, closed to me, I had made up my mind before publishing what I still had in view, a true history of the Egyptian revolution and the intrigues which had



## *Jemal-ed-Din Afghani*

ruined it, to pay a visit to Arabi and his fellow exiles in Ceylon, and from there to go on northwards and make good my knowledge of the Islamic situation by visiting Mohammedan India. In this last design I had been encouraged by that early apostle of Mohammedan reform, Seyd Jemal-ed-Din Afghani, a sketch of whose biography has been given elsewhere, and whose acquaintance I had made that spring in London. Since the time of his having been expelled from Egypt in 1879 by the Anglo-French control, Jemal-ed-Din had wandered through many lands both east and west, in India first, whence he had been driven by the persecution of the political police; and then in the United States, where he had endeavoured to qualify by residence as an American citizen; and then, after passing through London, lastly at Paris, where he had gathered around him a group of Nationalist exiles banished from Egypt after Tel-el-Kebir. I had talked my intended visit to India over with him, and he had thought it might be of use; and it had been fixed that I was to leave England at the beginning of September for the East, when the incident occurred to which allusion has been made in my "India under Ripon," and which sent me once more to Egypt. As it relates to a point which has been challenged by Lord Cromer in his "Modern Egypt," I will give some further account of it here, and it will serve as yet another proof of the half intention there was still in Downing Street to recall Arabi.

A few days before the date fixed for my departure an unexpected message reached me from Mr. Knowles, the editor of the "Nineteenth Century Review," who, an old friend of Gladstone's, had once before been used by the Prime Minister to convey a message to me, and whom I knew to be interested in Arabi's case,

## *A Message from Gladstone*

begging me to call on him before starting on my journey; and I consequently went to breakfast with him at his house at Clapham on the morning of the 29th August. Knowles then informed me that he had recently seen the Prime Minister, and that it was in Gladstone's mind, notwithstanding all that had occurred during the past year, to recall Arabi to Egypt, and that he only needed an excuse of some public kind to do so. His idea was that according to the new Constitution decreed in harmony with Lord Dufferin's despatch, Arabi might be elected to one of the two consultative bodies which were to form the basis of Egyptian self-government. Elections to the General Assembly were about to be held, and, if it could be arranged that Arabi should be returned as a member of it, it would serve as a reason for urging his pardon on the Egyptian Government, and his recall from exile. It was thought, too, that during my passage through Egypt I might usefully suggest such a course to my friends there and so arrange the matter. This plan, with its parliamentary device so characteristic of Gladstone's mind, was one which I could not refuse to fall in with—though I knew how difficult it would be to carry out. It would, of course, be impossible to do anything at all without our Government's help at Cairo. Knowles, however, told me that Malet, already for some time appointed to Brussels, was to leave for his new post in a few days, and that Baring, who was to succeed him at the Agency, was expected to inaugurate the new regime in full accordance with Liberal principles. Colvin, too, was on the point of leaving Egypt to resume his place in India as before in the Civil Service. The field was therefore open, and anything might be expected. I have a record of this conversation in letters which I wrote at the

### *Baring to have Carte Blanche*

time to Mrs. Howard, whose guest at Nawarh I had recently been, and to Lady Gregory. These say:-

“ 30th August, 1883.

“ At James Street I found many important letters, among others a note from Knowles, asking me to breakfast at Clapham; there he gave me the news. He had seen Mr. Gladstone lately, and is assured he will both stay in office, and, if he can find some way for his pride, restore the National Party in Egypt. It appears they are quite aware the present state of things cannot be made to go on, and Sir Evelyn Baring has been appointed with *carte blanche* to devise a new policy in place of Malet's and Dufferin's, which have proved failures. Baring has written an article for the 'Nineteenth Century' on Lord Ripon's policy in India, full of the most Liberal ideas, which will come out in October, and Knowles thinks he will receive me with open arms. So he advises me to be there soon after he arrives, and thinks the Government will be delighted if we can get Arabi returned for Cairo, and other Nationalists for other places.”

Lord Cromer's article here referred to, and which will be found in the October number of the "Nineteenth Century Review" of 1883, though not a very striking one, is of importance in connection with the view taken of it at the time in the minds of those who appointed him and with his later views. It is a somewhat feeble plea for local self-government in India and a free press. He declares himself to be on the side of those "who have established a free press, who have promoted education, who have admitted natives more and more largely to the public services in various forms, and who have favoured the exten-

## *Baring's Ideas*

sion of Local Self-Government." The most forcible passage in the article says: "No one who watches the signs of the times in India with even moderate care can doubt that we have entered upon a period of change. The spread of education, the increasing influence of a free press, the substituting of legal for discretionary administration, the progress of railways and telegraphs, the easier communication with Europe, and the more ready influx of European ideas, are beginning to produce a marked effect upon the people. New ideas are springing up. New aspirations are being called forth. The power of public opinion is growing daily. • Such a condition of affairs is one in which the task of Government, and especially of a despotic Government, is beset with difficulties of no light kind. To move too fast is dangerous, but to lag behind is more dangerous still. The problem is how to deal with this new born spirit of progress, raw and superficial as in many respects it is, so as to direct it into a right course, and to derive from it all the benefits which its development is capable of ultimately conferring upon the country, and at the same time to prevent it from becoming, through blind indifference or stupid repression, a source of serious political danger. It is only what ought to be expected by every thoughtful man, that after fifty years of a free press, and thirty years of expanding education, with European ideas flowing into the country on every side, and old indigenous customs, habits and prejudices breaking down, changes should be taking place in the thoughts, the desires and the aims of the intelligent and educated men of the country, which no wise and cautious Government can afford to disregard, and to which they must gradually adapt their system of administration, if they do not wish to see it shattered by

### *Knowles and Hamilton*

forces which they have themselves called into being, but which they have failed to guide and control."

Again, in a second letter a week later, I wrote:

"8th Sept., 1883.

"We have taken our places for Suez by the French steamer which leaves Marseilles on the 16th, and so hope to arrive at Cairo about the 25th. By that time Malet and Colvin will have gone their ways, let us hope for *ever*, and if there is anything in Knowles's argument I shall find the field open for me with Baring. At the same time I confess I am far from sanguine. In the first place I do not trust Mr. Gladstone as you do, and then I *know* the difficulties; these will be immense, and without really cordial co-operation from Baring I could do nothing at all that would be any good. I rather suspect, too, that the Foreign Office may be trying to make use of me by encouraging just so much opposition to the elections as to make them appear spontaneous. But we shall see; half an hour's talk with Baring will probably be enough to show me whether it is worth my while staying in Egypt or whether I should not rather go on to India. . . . I had a very interesting talk with an Oriental yesterday who tells me . . . that there are still strong influences about the Sultan in favour of Arab independence in Egypt, and that, if the English Government chooses, the party can be restored, but it all depends upon the action of our Government."

Parliament at the date of this letter had not long been prorogued, and all the world was out of town. Gladstone, among the rest, was away; he had gone yachting with Sir Donald Currie, his host on the occasion, Sir Algernon West, and a party of his other

## *A Visit to Downing Street*

friends, and was actually, I believe, on the coast of Norway, and I could not wait for his return, my own departure from England being fixed for the 12th of September. Nevertheless, while I was considering the matter I received a note from Sir Edward Hamilton, Gladstone's private secretary, asking to see me before I went, and the morning before I was to start I heard again from him that he wished to see me. I went therefore to him the same morning to Downing Street, and talked the matter of the restoration of the National Party over with him, as described in "India under Ripon," and it was agreed between us that I was to call on Baring while passing through Cairo, and that if Baring would help I would try to get the Nationalist leaders elected at the elections; but all depended on the co-operation of our officials. He asked me whether I was going to take anybody with me to Egypt, and I said I had been thinking of taking Sabunji, my Oriental secretary,<sup>1</sup> but that as he was looked upon with so much suspicion by the Foreign Office I had resolved not to do so. Later, however, I found it necessary to take him, and I let Hamilton know my change of plan. The next day I started with my wife for Paris, where, as I have explained in my other volume, I saw Sheykh Jemal-ed-Din, and arranged with him the details of my Indian journey.

It was on this occasion that I first made acquaintance with James Sanua, better known as Sheykh Abu Naddara, who was living in a little lodging in the Avenue de Clichy, where he edited his paper and gained a precarious livelihood as a master of languages. About this very worthy Egyptian patriot, who has resided now in Paris for upwards of thirty years and has gained a considerable position in the

<sup>1</sup> See "Secret History" and Appendix C.

## *Abu Naddara*

French journalistic world, I will here say a few words. James Sanua was one of the earliest sufferers for liberty on the Nile. An Egyptian Jew by birth, and a man of considerable wit and education, he had become acquainted with Sheykh Jemal-ed-Din, Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, and others of the Mohammedan reformers, who with their wide ideas of religious tolerance received him into their circle in the Azhar, and put him in the way of literary work. They then, seeing that he had a pleasant wit, encouraged him in a plan he had of starting a puppet show, which, under the guise of amusement, was to spread political ideas among the lower class. This had an immediate success, the butt of Sanua's wit being, under various disguises, always the Khedive Ismail. The Polichinelle of the puppet show was a personage in spectacles, called *Abu Naddara*, Father of Glasses, from whom Sanua took his adopted name—he was himself half blind with a neglected ophthalmia. From this commencement he went on to publishing a small newspaper, at first in manuscript, and then lithographed, which was distributed by hand at Cairo and Alexandria. In it the same tone of nonsense was kept up, and with good political effect, among the people of the streets. It was continued for two or three years; Ismail himself, who came to hear of it, joining, it is said, in the laughter, until at last it overstepped the bounds of what his despotism considered allowable, when it was suppressed and its author summarily exiled. Sanua, however, was not to be beaten so easily, and with the help of his friends found a refuge in Paris, and there continued to print his "*Abu Naddara*" as a monthly sheet, and to get it distributed as regularly as before in Egypt. At one time it had considerable political importance, and was of sufficient

## *We Return to Egypt*

interest to induce the British Museum to desire a complete series of its numbers, which I helped them to obtain. (See also Appendix E.)

About the actual condition of things in Egypt Sanua told me there were two parties, the clerical, which looked to Constantinople for help, and the lay, which was powerless because it had no leader. He and Jemal-ed-Din were at that time on intimate terms with each other, and we spent most of our time with them during the few days we were at Paris. On the 17th we left for Marseilles; and from this point I am able to take up my narrative by transcription from my journal.

"16th Sept.—On board the *Pei Ho*. Sat at dinner next a well-known Syrian merchant of Alexandria, Naghib Zogheb, and learned his views, which, no doubt, represent those of the commercial class generally. He is all for continued occupation, annexation, or anything else that shall secure commercial stability. He looks upon the English policy as '*très fin*. It says little, and does a great deal.' All posts are being filled up with Englishmen. The low class Europeans do not like this, as it takes the bread out of their mouths, but he and all respectable men are pleased. He believes Egypt to be perfectly solvent, but the English have been persuading the fellahin not to pay their debts to the usurers. Zogheb is too great a man to be a usurer with the fellahin himself, so as to assist the collection of the revenue, and thinks the English will end by being not unpopular except with the 'fanatics.' The Khedive and his Ministers are only dummies. Tewfik is *un homme nul*, disliked by the *indigènes*, and despised by the Europeans.

"17th Sept.—My Syrian neighbour is amusingly



## Alexandrian Usurers

naive. It appears that he does lend money, but only in hundreds and thousands; indeed Sabunji tells me he is the greatest of all the Alexandrian usurers, and at dinner to-day he detailed to me some of his transactions. 'To get money from the Arabs,' he says, '*il faut de la ruse*. They owe you £100; they have not the money; you take produce from them worth £200, or you lend them another £100 on the value of £200. Yet there are some of them who, when brought before the Court, are so shameless as to deny their signatures.' I asked him at how much he reckoned the private debts of the fellahin, and he told me to guess. I said, 'Our Government pretends they owe ten millions.' He said, 'Say twelve or fifteen, but their creditors would be content with eight millions, if it was secured or paid off and they could leave the country. The whole thing could be well settled for ten millions.' 'There is no difficulty,' he added, 'in Egypt except what is to be done with the *indigènes*. All the rest is simple. Egypt should be colonized by Europeans, by Englishmen, and made to pay all her debts.' But the soil was getting worked out by overcropping, losing about 15 per cent. yearly, set off by about 15 per cent. more land being cultivated. He was again eulogistic of English cunning in getting hold of Egypt. 'They spent a deal of money in buying the Bedouins, but it was money well spent. At Port Said they had had the face to say when they disembarked that they came as friends to help the Khedive; but all is fair when one's own interest is concerned.' For himself he was glad they came and hoped they would remain.

"18th Sept.—I have a new neighbour at table, another moneylender, a Greek of Cairo. His views are not very different from the other's, and he thinks

## *How to treat the Natives*

that the English Government is really serious about withdrawing the troops." [*N.B.*—It was intended at the time to withdraw the Cairo garrison at the end of the year, leaving only 3,000 men at Alexandria as an "army of observation."] "'The misfortune is,' he says, 'that Mr. Gladstone is too loyal. He promised not to annex, and he thinks it necessary to keep his promise. But you will see, the day the English troops go, there will be another massacre of Europeans. The army under Sir Wood will join the Arabs; they are all savages together. To know the Arabs you must have lived with them. They are like beasts. You take an Arab servant, you treat him well, he poisons you on the first opportunity; you beat him, perhaps he loves you. The English have destroyed respect for the Khedive. He will be the first person killed. There is no government in Egypt. The Khedive hates the English. The Arabs hate the Khedive. The poor Europeans join the Arabs against the English. Every one who is interested in the country prays for Mr. Gladstone's retirement from office. Then the country will be annexed.' I asked him about Arabi, whether the Arabs still talked of him. He said: 'They talk of him only as a vagabond. They do not love any one except a man to beat them. Lord Dufferin was told by his Government to give them a Constitution. He has given them one. But if you ask him what he thinks of the Arabs, he will tell you the same as I do. Commerce is ruined in the country because we are all waiting to see what will happen. Business does not go on. We keep our money in our pockets for fear. The uncertainty destroys our confidence.' Poor usurers!

"*19th Sept.*—Another talk with Zogheb. He says: 'The whole question in Egypt is this—to what

## *Circassian Ideas*

extent could the fellah be replaced by other labour? If he alone can dig and plough Europe *must* come to terms with him.' I have written out my programme for the restoration of a National Government in Egypt carefully, and have given it to Sabunji to translate. He is also translating the 'Wind and the Whirlwind.'

"20th Sept.—Sabunji has made acquaintance with a young Circassian, a naval officer. In common with the rest of the Egyptian navy he took no part in the war, and detests the English cordially. The Circassians, he said, were all against Tewfik because he was a fool, and because he had betrayed the country to the English. If it had not been for Tewfik and Sultan Pasha, the English would have been driven out of Egypt with the courbash. Tewfik gave all the plans of Tel-el-Kebir and the Wady to Wolseley, and Sultan Pasha helped them with the Bedouins. He was very wroth with Sultan Pasha, 'a dog, the son of a Coptic dog.' Asked about possible substitutes for Tewfik, he said, 'Nobody thinks of Halim. A few would like Hassan but he is not so popular as his father. Ismail is the man we all want.' He was with Dervish Pasha when he was arrested on his return to Constantinople. He says Dervish was condemned to three years imprisonment, but is now at large. He is young and a sailor, and has probably spoken the truth as regards the general feeling of the Circassians. They were all with Arabi in the last days and during the war, just as the Sultan was. They hate the Arabs, but they hate the English more.

"About three o'clock we sighted the P. and O. homeward mail, with Malet probably on board.

"21st Sept.—I asked my moneylending friends to-day at breakfast their opinion of our various

### *Malet, Colvin, Baring*

officials in Egypt. Colvin they said was a stupid fellow, quite ignorant of finance. He had come as an officer of the Cadastral Survey, and had been pushed on by influence into positions he was quite unfit for. Blignières was really a financier, but Colvin, oh no! Baring? That was quite a different thing. He was a man in a million. He and Blignières had done everything between them that had been done for Egypt. Baring was a master of finance, a man who knew his mind, and was as firm as a rock. His appointment had made Egyptian stock go up already. Malet was a diplomatist; he knew nothing of finance, he was neither liked nor disliked; he was neither capable nor incapable. Dufferin had been a great success; he was charming, gave parties, went to the theatre, played cricket with the officers, conciliated everybody, even the foreign Consuls. His report on Egypt was founded on the truth, but it was full of *plaisanteries*. Wood<sup>1</sup> was an able man; he knew how to manage the natives. The Arabs were like machines; they obeyed their officers. Zogheb is of opinion they will continue to obey them, even after the Army of Occupation is withdrawn.

"22nd Sept.—Arrived at Port Said during the night, and sent Sabunji like a raven from the Ark to get intelligence. He came back with the news that Ibrahim Tewfik is governor of the place, the same agent of the Khedive who got up the trouble with the Bedouins in Boheyra. He has, of course, been promoted and rewarded. Sabunji got hold of a fellah and went the round of the shops with him, looking in at the windows. In one of them there was a picture of Arabi, and the man asked him if he knew it. Sabunji feigned ignorance, and when the man

<sup>1</sup> Sir Evelyn Wood in command of the Army of Occupation.

## *Consul West*

told him it was Arabi, asked if the people still thought of him. The man answered 'Some do.' 'How many?' asked Sabunji, 'the greater or the smaller number?' 'Perhaps the greater,' said the man.

"*24th Sept.*—Landed about midday at Suez, and spent the remainder of the day with the Wests (the British Consul and his wife). Senior wrote about them thirty years ago that they were 'looking forward daily to their final departure from Suez,' and here they still are. West is a man who knows Egypt as well as, if not better than, any Englishman in the country. His knowledge, however, is a little out of date, though he spent three weeks as acting Consul at Alexandria between the riots and the bombardment last year. I had a long discussion of the financial position with him. He was surprised when I told him of Colvin's opinion of its hopelessness. Colvin was here only the day before yesterday on his way to India, but did not talk to him about finance. With regard to the elections, he said that people would elect the man in the district they were most afraid of. At Suez they had chosen the Sub-Governor. In most places they would choose the chief of the police.

"I asked him about the riots at Alexandria. He was of opinion that they were planned. He could not say who planned them. If it was Omar Lutfi it must have been also the Khedive, for Omar Lutfi was, and had always been, a devoted partisan of Tewfik. But he had been of opinion when at Alexandria that it was Arabi. If it was in fact the Khedive, the Foreign Office did quite right not to enquire into it. Tewfik was our king in our game of chess, and our business was to defend him. If anybody upset him we must put him on his legs again. It

## *Colonel Warren's Methods*

didn't do to enquire too closely into those things. He had never seen Arabi, so could not judge of his character.

"West talked a good deal about the Palmer expedition; thought Palmer had much overrated his power of bringing the Bedouins over to the English side. Palmer had not seen the Terrabin Arabs or the Howeytat. He, West, had thought his second expedition with Gill and Charrington a very foolish one. All the Bedouins believed that the Sultan had given Arabi the sword of Islam and that he must be victorious. Of Colonel Warren's method of examining the 'guilty ones' he gave a graphic account. He used to pretend friendliness with them, and drink coffee and smoke cigarettes and endeavour through his interpreters—for he knew no word of Arabic—to trip them up in conversation, and make them contradict each other. On this kind of evidence he satisfied himself as to the identity of five Bedouins as the men who had been actually told off to shoot Palmer and his companions, but they were only the executioners. Ibn Mershid was the Sheykh who gave the order, but Ibn Shedid, the Howeytat Sheykh at Cairo, was afraid of him, and let him go. They had got Ibn Mershid's wife and children still in prison at Suez, and twelve Bedouins in all charged with the affair. This is monstrous. I shall apply to Baring for an order to see them, and get them released.

"25th Sept.—To Cairo by the morning train. On the road there are still some traces of the war, at Shaluf some human bones and a skull or two lying about, but less than one would expect. The principal remains are the iron hoops of packing cases, and broken tins of preserved meat. The celebrated lines of Tel-el-Kebir are, after all, but a low bank and a very shallow dry ditch. They would hardly stop a

## *Cairo in 1883*

hunting field. Cairo looks absolutely unchanged, but by reason of the time of year there are hardly any foreigners in the town. The hotels are empty; we have the Hôtel du Nil almost entirely to ourselves. The only sign of English occupation that I have seen since landing in Egypt has been three men in English uniform.

"At dinner to-day I sat next Colonel Kelly, who is working the police and constabulary under Baker Pasha. He gives an absurd account of their functions, which are restricted to paying and clothing the men, and ordering their promotion. They take all their orders from the Prefect of police, who unites the functions of chief constable, judge, jury, and framer of the laws. The Prefect has under him a private service of spies, and neither Baker nor this Colonel have any right to enquire either why people are arrested, or what becomes of them afterwards. The Englishmen are supposed to have a right of inspecting the prisons, but out of Cairo and Alexandria they are prevented from really doing this by the Mudirs who refuse them all access. Amongst the constabulary are two battalions, 500 men each, one mounted, the other on foot, composed entirely of Turks from Turkey. [This constabulary corps was sent three months later with Baker to Souakin, where all composing it were routed and slain by the Mahdists under Osman Digna.]

"*26th Sept.*—Sent a note to Baring early, asking for an interview to talk over the political situation, and got a very amiable answer, inviting me to breakfast. Baring, who looks about fifty [he was really forty-two], imposes on one a good deal as a man of sense and integrity, and, without being exactly brilliant, seems capable of original ideas. He breakfasted with his suite, among whom I found Aranghi,

## *Sir Evelyn Baring*

Malet's Greek dragoman, still in his same office, and from the circumstance I did not augur well of any change of policy. We talked about India, the Rajputs, Salar Jung, and other interesting topics. Baring said that Salar Jung was the finest looking Oriental he had ever met, with admirable manners, and great dignity. The present state of things at Hyderabad was much 'mixed' since his death, as all had depended on his personal character.

"After breakfast we went down to his room, which I knew so well as Malet's, and he asked me my views about the state of things in Egypt. I gave him a sketch of the position two years ago, of the parties in the Azhar, and the manner in which the Liberal party there had been alienated from England, and the triumph of the fanatical party on the restoration of the Khedive. He seemed to agree with me that a reform should have a religious basis, but would not admit that the Turks and Circassians were incapable of this. He explained that he had come to Egypt originally as representative of the Bondholders, and that he had always held the interests of these and of Egypt to be identical. The Control had, in fact, done great good. While Controller he had always refused to act in too close concert with the Consul-General, as he held himself to be above all things one of the Khedive's officers. He had found that by showing the chief personages, even Riaz, that he only wished their good he had generally succeeded in making them do as he wanted. I objected that he had not prevented Riaz's cruelty, his arbitrary arrests and persecutions. He said that Riaz's fault was that he saw things too *couleur de rose*, he would not believe that neglecting the just claims of the soldiers would raise a rebellion. With regard to finance, which we next discussed, I was glad to find that Baring held



## *Breakfast with Baring*

sound views on the point of the fellahin's debts. He was for settling them down to date, and restoring the old state of the law, making mortgage impossible. He quite understood the evils attending the mixed tribunals, as similar to those of the Civil Courts in India. He said that they should be his first care. He did not, however, seem at all hopeful of Egypt's solvency. With the introduction of a new system of government and the abolition of the courbash, the financial prospect was a very doubtful one. He talked about the elections as a novel experiment, which, if it had not succeeded this time, might another. I explained to him that there was no such novelty in it whatever, and that two years ago there had been elections which *had* succeeded, and if these last had not, it was because all liberty had been crushed. How could a man vote independently as long as there was nothing in the nature of *habeas corpus* to secure him from arbitrary arrest? These arbitrary arrests were, with the debts, the reason of the rebellion, and would be again. He promised to have this provided against though 'perhaps *habeas corpus* was too much to give *all at once*.' What the country wanted above all was order and peace. I asked him if he did not think of restoring the National Party, at least the civilian exiles; but he said this was quite out of the question. They could not restore the National Party without another revolution, and another revolution could not be. He asked me whether the Nationalists had no leader in Egypt; I said none that I knew of, the Reign of Terror had crushed all courage out of the few who had not been exiled or imprisoned. In conclusion he said, that as far as he was concerned, he should support the Khedive and the Circassians with all his power. I saw that it was useless talking further. Whatever Gladstone may dream of, or pre-

### *His plans for Egypt*

tend to dream, it is clear the Foreign Office has not changed its mind."

This conversation, which I transcribe as it stands in my diary, is extremely interesting as showing the ideas with which Lord Cromer started on his long career as Resident in Egypt. The last part of it had been carried on in rather a heated tone, for I had spoken my mind strongly on the impossibility of any attempt either at carrying out the promised constitution, or even of introducing practical reforms for the emancipation of the fellahin, through the instrumentality of the Circassian ruling class. At the time Baring refused to believe me, but he afterwards acknowledged the truth of my view, though it was not till many years later, by practically discarding all the Circassian Pashas from active participation in the government. I did not speak to him of the part Gladstone had had in my coming to consult him, saying only that I had come from Downing Street, and that I understood that something in the nature of a restoration of the National Party was there desired. I should have spoken more plainly had he shown any indication of sharing that idea, but it was clear from the outset that our views on this subject were at a hopeless disaccord, and I left him much disappointed. "This is an end therefore," I wrote, "to any plans we may have had in Egypt, and I have decided that we shall sail in the British India boat on the 3rd."

As this was the first occasion on which I met the present Lord Cromer of the many meetings of which mention will be made in these memoirs, I will here, for the benefit especially of Egyptian readers, attempt a sketch of his very remarkable personality, not merely as I saw him first, but as it revealed itself to me in after years. A member by birth of the well-

## *Lord Cromer's Career*

known London banking family, Baring Brothers, of Dutch, it is generally said of Jewish, origin, Lord Cromer belonged from the beginning of his career to the inner ring of the high finance of Europe, and owed to it the cosmopolitan character, along with the energy for work, and the clear business head distinguishing those who compose it. Several members of the Baring family have in the last hundred years entered English political life, and have been raised to the peerage, and this with their great wealth has given the family an influence in the official world, wider perhaps than that of any other that can be named. Evelyn Baring himself was sixth son of the head of the firm, and having but a younger son's portion was given the army as a profession. He made his education at Woolwich, and served for fourteen years in the artillery, without however seeing any active service, and then in 1872 when his cousin, Lord Northbrook, also a Baring, was appointed Governor-General of India, went to India with him as his private secretary. Thus removed to civil employment, and having left the army with the rank of Major, he found himself more in his true element than as a soldier, and was able for the first time to prove his administrative worth, and he did so with such credit that, on Northbrook's term of office in India coming to an end in 1876, a well paid financial post was found for him in Egypt, first as Commissioner of the Public Debt, and then as Comptroller-General of Finance. This was the beginning of Lord Cromer's Egyptian career.

In 1880, the Whigs having once more come into office, Baring got further advancement and returned to India with Lord Ripon, as his Finance Minister. In all these posts he showed his family aptitude, having precisely the qualities which money dealing

## *A Personal Description*

on a large scale demands. He was a man of integrity and prudence, with sufficient imagination, and no more, to foresee events likely to affect the financial situation, and he had the promptitude of will and ready self-reliance required to deal with each as it arose successfully. The same qualities served him, though in a less degree, as administrator. Incapable, as I judge him, of any very original conceptions, and with small powers of sympathy outside the narrow school of English or rather European political thought in which he was bred, he spent half a life time in the East without understanding it or attempting to understand; also his judgement of individuals was very fallible. Like all business men of practical ability, his views were necessarily short ones, and he judged men rather by a rapid calculation of averages, than by any clear individual insight. Time in his busy life was too valuable to waste in long deliberation, or in reconsidering a course once resolved on; a judgement pronounced, whether on men or things, was always with him the *chose jugée*, which was not worth further discussion. It must stand or fall on the merits assigned to it, and could not block the way to new cases.

Personally I liked Lord Cromer. He had a reputation for rudeness, but I do not think it was justified; at least he was never rude to me. On the contrary, I found it a pleasure to talk with him, as I often did in later years at Cairo on public business. He was always so concise and to the point. He did not affect the mystery diplomats mostly indulge in, nor care to deceive or flatter, unless it might be a travelling journalist or a too inquisitive M.P., whom he had an object in cajoling. In talk with me he was generally sincere, whether in agreement or disagreement; our views were not often the same,

## *Cromer's Public Character*

but when they differed he did not resent speech in me as plain as his own. Above all he was quick to understand, and as quick to decide; it was the secret of his long success on his own lines in Egypt. His failure, when it came, was due, I think, to what the French call the defect of his qualities, his excessive economy of time which limited his view to work immediately in hand, and his lack of the larger imagination which once or twice at critical moments left him blind.

Such I found him personally. With a pen in his hand, however, and when writing with a view to publicity, Lord Cromer was by no means the plain direct man I found him in his private talk. His yearly reports, so far from being straightforward, are models of insincerity, especially those written in his later years, when the habit of political make-believe had grown upon him with the double part he was daily called to play in the "Veiled Protectorate." No one knew better than he how, with a show of frankness, to conceal an inconvenient truth, and how by the admission of a minor error of judgment a larger mistake could be left undealt with. He understood, too, in great perfection the art, through praise of his subordinates, to praise, without seeming it, himself. Year after year his reports used to be published, making an impression on the public mind of being the simple record of great things performed by one careless of personal fame, and at the same time so superior to his readers in his knowledge of his subject as to have the right to say: "This, I and those with me did; that we left undone; the result is what you see." To me, who knew more of Egypt than the public knew, his reports revealed themselves as less candid, and very much less modest. Reading them, they always re-

## *His "Modern Egypt"*

reminded me of those first chapters of the Book of Genesis in which at the end of each day of Creation "The Lord saw all the work that he had done, and found it very good." Yet, if we turn to the same reports now in the light of later experience, we recognize easily enough how vain-glorious and how fallacious most of them are. As to his value as a historian, his book, "Modern Egypt," is not history at all in any sense of being a dependable record of things which actually happened as they happened. It is a long piece of special pleading in regard to his own administrative achievements, in which the defects concealed at the time have latterly become very visible. Lord Cromer never seems to have taken the trouble to consult any native authority, or to have gone further afield than the Blue Books for his knowledge of events unconnected with his own special work. Even about these he is occasionally inaccurate, and seldom quite sincere. As a diagnosis of the land he lived in for so many years without really seeing it—for his mornings were spent at his desk, and his evenings in the European society of Cairo—his final judgements are fallacious through ignorance, the work of a stranger to Egypt rather than of one so long resident there. His prediction of the future of Islam is a fallacy already proved; and his adoption of Lord Milner's foolish phrase about Egypt being the "Land of Paradox," a confession of ignorance inexcusable in one with such long experience, and not a trifle absurd.

But to resume my journal.

The few days that I still spent in Egypt before taking steamer for Colombo showed me only too clearly how hopeless the political position was. On the 27th I called on Sir Benson Maxwell, who had recently been appointed Adviser to the Egyptian

### *Sir Benson Maxwell*

Government in the Department of Justice, which it was designed to reform. " He received me with great cordiality, saying that, although rowing in a different boat from mine, he had great sympathy with my ideas. He is a most liberal-minded man, but, like Baring, he thinks he has discovered a vein of liberal feeling among the Turks. Tewfik, Sherif, and Fakri, he believes, are opposed to Constantinople and jealous of Egypt's independence. He thinks the Turks born to rule, the Arabs to obey. The Turks could be taught justice under English guidance; they wished the English to stay and help them. Ali Mubarak (but he is an Egyptian) had besought him not to desert them till their scheme of justice was in working order. He had a great respect for Sherif (the then Prime Minister) as an honest and good man. I told him the first thing he ought to do was to abolish arbitrary arrest, and he explained that something of the sort was included in his plan, but nothing will be so much as begun before Christmas. I told him of the case of the Bedouin women and children in prison at Suez, which moved his indignation. It was military law, he said, not justice. We will see if anything comes of it. Maxwell is an honest man and really believes what he says, which is more than most of them do, but I am afraid the Turks are making a fool of him. He will do his best and fail, and go home, as many another has done before him. He goes home on leave in a couple of days; his business of reforming justice being at a standstill. He thought very little of Dufferin's charter, but the odd thing is, they all imagine it to be the first suggestion in the direction of free government ever made in Egypt."

The prediction I have just quoted of Sir Benson Maxwell's failure in Egypt was amply verified the

## *Lionel Moore*

following year, when, failing to get his reforms adopted by the Khedive's Government, and being ill-supported by Baring, he finally retired from Egypt.

"Met Lionel Moore (formerly Oriental secretary at the Embassy at Constantinople) and went shopping with him in the Bazaar. He was very communicative, and told me amusing stories connected with the events of June and July at Alexandria. He was staying with Cookson on the day of the riot, and had been out driving in the direction of Ramleh. On coming in to the Consulate at 3, Cookson asked him to go to the Governor's, Omar Lutfi's, because he, Cookson, had been wounded, and might not survive the day. He was to deliver this message: he was to ask Omar Lutfi if he could put down the riot with the soldiers, or whether he, Cookson, should ask help from the ships. He had accordingly gone to the Governor's house, and had found him sitting with Tulba at about 3 30, and, on delivering his message, Omar Lutfi had referred him to the officers, who rudely answered that there would be safety for all '*Amàn li jamia*'; he had accordingly gone up to Tulba and called him a rascal, and bade him provide for the safety of the town. On this Tulba, who had his sword across his knees, half drew it, and Moore, who had provided himself with a heavy stick, put himself in a defensive attitude, and defied him to come on and he would take his sword from him, whereupon Omar Lutfi and the rest had pushed him out of the room, and downstairs, and out of the house. Another story was that he had gone with Beresford to help him to sketch one of the forts, and had detained the soldiers talking while the other made his drawing. Then he had gone away to Syria, and did not come back till after the war. We talked about Malet. He said he was the most in-



## *Tewfik's Unpopularity*

capable man in diplomacy. He knew how to turn a dispatch so as to please the Foreign Office, but he was absolutely ignorant of everything that went on in Egypt. I reminded him of what he had told me last year of the arrangement made at that time (January 1882) between the English and French Governments, whereby it was agreed that in case of intervention, a French force should land, and the English fleet should watch the seaports. The agreement held good till Gambetta's fall. Going up the Mouski he told me that Tewfik had not a single friend in the country. The Circassians and all were against him. Halim would be a better man. He thought Arabi honest, but Tulba and Mahmud Sami were poor scoundrels. He did not believe in the Arabs. Baring had promised him a place, because he was the only Englishman in Cairo, with Rogers, who knew Arabic." [N.B.—An entire libel on Mahmud Sami, who was a very distinguished man. But Tulba was of small account.]

This Lionel Moore was an Irishman by birth, a man of ability, much wit, and a great knowledge of the East and Eastern languages. He had been born in Syria, his father having been Consul at Jerusalem, and he spoke Arabic almost as his mother tongue, so that he was commonly known in diplomacy as the Irish Arab. He was brother of the Colonel Moore mentioned in my "India under Ripon" as A.D.C. to the Duke of Connaught; and he himself, as Oriental secretary at Constantinople, had accompanied the then Prince of Wales in his tour in Palestine, and had remained a favourite with the Prince. He was one of the *habitués* of Marlborough House when in England. He had, however, been obliged to leave the diplomatic service on account of a mysterious illness which had attacked him, and kept him, if I

## *Ali Fehmy's House*

remember rightly, for two years semi-unconscious at the Buckingham Palace Hotel. On recovery he was a changed man, and had never fully regained the use of his wits, though he remained talkative and amusing. But for this weakness, he would undoubtedly have been given the re-employment he sought, for there was no man in Egypt who could speak Arabic as he did of the purest kind and with a knowledge of its literature, and a power of quotation such as he possessed. He lived on for several years after this, and died some time in the eighties.

"Anne went yesterday to see Arabi's wife, and has gone to-day to see some of the other ladies. They tell her that all the people here have the idea that the exiles will soon come back, that they are protected by a high personage in England, and that Tewfik is to go away. The soldiers, too, think this.

"28th Sept.—To breakfast with Moore, who told us much what he had told me yesterday. He said most emphatically that Tewfik had not a single friend in the country, and could not stay when the English were gone. Then to Ali Fehmy's house, a sad visit. Last time I was there I sat with him and Arabi in the garden talking about the Sultan; now all is empty. The old porter was full of tears and thanks, and told us how happy the world would be if his master returned. We went on to another small house to see Ali Fehmy's daughter, a nice little Egyptian girl with a pleasant voice, who talked sensibly about things. She is not married yet, and I went upstairs with Anne to see her. I have written to Eddy Hamilton telling him of my disappointment at the state of things here, and to Sanua. I have also applied to the Domains Commissioner for the title-deeds of my property at Sheykh Obeyd.

"29th Sept.—Hotter than ever. Started at 5.30

## *A Reign of Terror at Cairo*

for our garden (Sheykh Obeyd) and stopped at Matarieh to meet Sabunji and his friend Count Gerouais, with whom he had been staying at Ramleh. The Gerouais are Syrians, ennobled some generations back by the Papal Court, and, what is strange, they are ardent Nationalists. We found Sabunji disguised in his proper dress of an Abbé, which gives him a most respectable appearance. They brought us news, though less than we expected, the most important being that Gerouais had sent his black servant to Damanhur to look for Sheykh Mohammed Khalil, and had returned with the tale that he had died a month before of cholera. His account showed the suspicion and terror of the country districts, for the people he enquired of besought him one and all to depart out of their coasts, an account which exactly corresponds with one brought me yesterday, in answer to enquiries I had made for other friends, of the Boab (gate-keeper) of the Azhar."

The news of Khalil's death distressed me much, as it was that of my earliest friend at the Azhar, Mohammed Abdu's most devoted disciple. Poor man! as I afterwards learnt, he had been driven out of the Azhar on the Khedive's restoration on account of his connection with me, and had wandered about afterwards with a heart broken over the misfortunes of his country. He was of the salt of the earth, and his persecution shows how relentlessly the best men of the Liberal Party were tracked and punished by the reactionaries whom we had replaced in power.

"We found our garden undamaged, and gathered a dozen large pomegranates to take to Arabi. During the war the Mudir of the district had had the house broken into and had taken some of our things, including 17 rifles, some pistols, and the small brass cannon I had bought two years ago for Ibn Rashid

## *Spies Everywhere*

(the Emir of Hail), an act which formed the basis of the French fiction of my having bought a house and stored it as a 'veritable arsenal' before the war. The things were taken to the citadel.<sup>1</sup> We returned at half-past twelve, entertained Moore at breakfast, and afterwards went with him to the Boulac Museum. After dinner Gerouais came with old Salim Basalim and his son. From the old man we learnt a good deal about the feeling of the people at Cairo. All classes, high and low, hate Tewfik, but are in terror of their lives. His spies are everywhere, but, where two or three are gathered together, they long for the return of the exiles. I asked him what the people thought about me, and he said: 'Out of four two would be delighted to see you, and would say so, one would be delighted but would not say so, and one would not care.' At first, after the war, people said: 'What has Mr. Blunt been doing that we hear nothing of him,' and they were angry, saying he had deserted them, but when Napier and Broadley came they knew that he was still their friend. I explained the political situation in England as far as it affected Egypt, the difference of ideas between the two parties, the one which would annex, the other which would leave Egypt, Lord Granville's illiberal ideas, and Mr. Gladstone's character. I bade him tell his friends not to

<sup>1</sup> Gabriel Charmes, the well-known French journalist, was the propounder of most of the fictions current about my action before and during the war. He was angry with the Nationalists for having knocked off the subsidies formerly allotted to the foreign press at Cairo. The rifles were Winchester rifles intended in reality for a new journey we thought of making to Nejd but never set out on. The Reuter's telegrams of the day mentioned them as "seventeen cases of arms." Several years afterwards, while being shown over the citadel at Cairo by the then English Commandant, I found my brass cannon and the rest of the things that had been taken out of my house in store in the arsenal, and having identified them got them restored to me.

## *How Elections were Managed*

lose heart, that it was impossible the present *régime* could last, that with patience they would see the exiles back, and the party of liberty restored. He promised to spread this opinion everywhere, and said: 'There are many in this town who, if they knew you had passed down the street, would kiss the dust of your footsteps.' Then he looked about him in a frightened way, and said he must go. They are all in terror of their lives.

"30th *Sept.*—In the morning came Ali, our head gardener, who finished his narrative of the seizure of our property. I told him the people were donkeys, seeing I was the only friend they had had in England during the war. He said they did not know what they were doing. They had wanted to cut the water and take the coals of the engine, but fortunately were prevented, or the garden would have been ruined.

"Next came a nephew of Arabi's, who had been living on what was left of the family estate near Zaga-zig. I asked him about the elections. He said the fellahin were frightened at being put down on the register, and understood it as a device for enlisting them in the army, but he was afraid of talking. He was followed by Suliman Nashaat, a brother of Abdel-Aal's, who was more courageous. He confirmed what the other had told about the elections. In the towns the Governor or the Prefect of police had sent round privately to tell the people who they were expected to choose, and there was no opposition possible. Dufferin's Constitution would be well enough if they had an honest ruler, one who desired liberty, but under Tewfik it was quite useless. There had never been such tyranny in Egypt before, not even under Ismaïl Pasha. Ismail had taken people's money, but they were not molested as now by the police. They were imprisoned now, and put to death on false

## *Abu Diab's Death*

charges, so that there were many who wished Ismail back. Many of the Circassians were now of the party of liberty, and wished a return of the exiles. The party of liberty did not wish ill to the Europeans, and were at one with the Copts and the Coptic Patriarch, while Boutros<sup>1</sup> and other rich Copts were on the side of Tewfik. As soon as the English troops went the people would rise against Tewfik and kill him. The soldiers would kill their English officers—they were all ready. I told him that would be very foolish. He reproached Arabi with having run away from Tel-el-Kebir; Arabi, he said, used to take three hours saying his prayers instead of attending to his business. It was not the place of a commander to pray so much and run away so soon, and many complained that he had thus lost his honour. Still the people liked him because he was good, but he was more of an *alem* than a soldier. His own brother, Abdel-Aal, would not have run away. Abd-el-Aal had written over and over again to ask to be sent to Tel-el-Kebir, and he had been the last to surrender. This is quite true. He then gave a touching picture of the death of Yusuf Abu Diab, his brother's aide-de-camp, who was hanged at Tantah by the Khedive for saving the lives of Christians. Anne has written the account down in full. He, Suliman Nashaat was in prison with Yusuf, and afterwards went with him to the gallows, and received his last words. Suliman Sami he had known well. It was true that Suliman had burned Alexandria against Arabi's orders, but he was hanged because he would not give up certain papers. Kandil had had papers, and he was promised

<sup>1</sup> Butros Pasha Ghali, the same who, having served English interests in Egypt for many years, became in 1908 Prime Minister, and was assassinated on the 20th of February 1910. (See Appendix as to the Patriarch.)

## *"Les Vengeurs"*

his life if he would hold his tongue about the riots of June. There were plenty of people who would give witness if the case was gone into against the Khedive. In the Azhar every one was frightened. El Abbasi, the new Sheykh El Islam, hated liberty. El Edwi, one of the most courageous Sheykhs, had been exiled to his village, but the Khedive thought now of sending him to the Mahdi to find out what his views were. Suliman evidently sympathizes with the Mahdi, and half believes in him. He said the issue would show whether he was sent by God. Anne has gone to see Princess Inja Hanum.

"1st Oct.—Last night a young man looked in who explained that he was a friend of Wahby Bey's, and that he had been arrested with twenty-five others on a charge of having been connected with a Frenchman who went by the name of Mohammed Said, and had formed or pretended to form a society against the English called 'Les Vengeurs.' His only connection with him was that the Frenchman had come to lodge in his house, and would not go away. They had all been brought before a mixed commission, on which two Belgians had sat, and their release was ordered. But Osman Pasha Ghaleb, the Prefect of police, had detained most of them by superior orders from the Palace on suspicion. The man Husseyn Bey brought me a letter from one of them, Abd el Razak Bey, F.R.G.S., ex-director of the Naval College, written in very good English, and asking me to come and see him in the Zaptieh prison. Accordingly I wrote this morning to Sir E. Baring, asking permission to pay the visit, but as no answer came, and as we are going away to-morrow, I went with Husseyn Bey to try and get in. The discipline of the prison is so lax that this was easy enough. The man at the door brought a key for the asking, but they only let us

## *Saad Zaghloul in Prison*

stay a few minutes. I got out of Razak, however, a most valuable piece of information. He was in prison with Kandil, and knows he had papers connecting the Khedive with the riots of June. Omar Lutfi got them from Kandil on a promise of saving his life, but they meant all the same to hang him, as they did Suliman Sami, who also had compromising documents. I found with Abd el Razak in the prison four others, Mohammed Effendi Fenni, late chief interpreter of the Council of Ministers, Mustafa Bey Sidki, a brother of Husseyn Bey, a landed proprietor at Shubra, Huseyn Sagr, and Saad-el-Zaghloul, assistant editor of the 'Wakaya' under Mohammed Abdu.<sup>1</sup> All these gave me messages to Arabi, and begged me to look after their interests. Then we were hurried away.

"Went with Suliman to pay some visits to distinguished members of the Party of Liberty as the National Party is now called. The first house we called at was Emin Bey Shemsi's, late deputy for Zagazig, and chairman of a section; he had with him three friends, one whom he introduced as a philosopher, another a tall vigorous young fellow, and a third, an old fellah Notable from his own town. Shemsi used to be a country neighbour and personal friend of Arabi's. He is a very intelligent man, and of some courage too, or he would not have received us, for he was only let out of prison a few months ago, and is still watched by spies. I asked him to tell the history of the two crises in which the Notables were concerned last year. In the first, that which resulted in Sherif's fall, there was, he told us, very little difference of opinion. Sultan Pasha alone

<sup>1</sup> This is the same Saad Zaghloul who was made Minister of Public Instruction by Cromer in 1906, and is now (1911) Minister of Justice.



### *Would Arabi be elected?*

supported Sherif. In the second, when Mahmud Sami summoned the Chamber, they were more divided. They met at Sultan Pasha's house before the whole of their number had arrived at Cairo, and Sultan at first got thirty to side with him, leaving forty-five in favour of the Ministry. But on the occasion of the second meeting, when the windows were broken by the mob and Arabi made his famous speech after the receipt of my telegram, Sultan was left alone. There was no doubt in the world that all Cairo, deputies, Ulema, merchants, and mob, insisted on Arabi's return to power.

"They then asked me to explain how it had come about, that with Mr. Gladstone and the Liberal Party in power, there had been a war against liberty, and I explained to them the financial conditions on which the matter hinged, and the divergence between Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville. They were full of gratitude to me for the attempt I had made to get them justice, and asked me what they were to do now to get themselves out of the hands of their tyrants. I said it was first necessary to prove to the world that they detested Tewfik, and desired the return of Arabi, and I asked Shemsi about the possibility of electing Arabi for the Chamber at Cairo. They laughed lugubriously, and explained how the elections were managed. The voting took place in the police station, under the superintendence of the police, and at each station there were men in plain clothes to watch the voting and direct the election on the part of the Government. A man who should have the courage to write Arabi's name on his paper would at once be hustled away, and he and his family would be ruined. 'You don't understand,' he said, 'how these things are done with us. It would be impossible that any one should so much as speak of Arabi.

## *Emin Bey Shemsi*

. If the election were free, every one in Cairo would vote for him.' I said: 'If this is so, you have nothing to do but to make a new revolt; the English troops are to be withdrawn in the spring, and you must then get the Egyptian army on your side. People must be ready to revolt once and twice and thrice for liberty. Then they obtain it.' There was a division of opinion as to the probability of the soldiers joining. But they seemed to think the English officers had them under their thumbs, and they next proposed to go as a committee to London to lay their distress before the English Government. I said I would do what I could to help them in this. But if things are thus, their case is nearly hopeless. The revolt, to be of any use, should be immediately on the departure of our troops, for with Lord Salisbury in power it would only serve as a pretext for annexation. Shemsi and the philosopher seemed to dread the departure of the English troops. As long as Lord Dufferin had been here there was a check, but Malet aided and encouraged Tewfik in his vengeance. We were to have met at their house the telegraph clerk, Mustafa Bey, who sent the message from Tewfik to Omar Lutfi ordering the riot at Alexandria, but he was too frightened to come.

"Our next visit was to an ex-Mudir, a man of superior education and good manners. We asked him about the reception recently given to Tewfik in the provinces. His answer was, 'If Riaz Pasha, who is my worst enemy, were to come to see me, what should I do? I should meet him with a band of music at the door. When we fear a man we meet him with a smile; dark looks would bring endless trouble on our heads.' He seemed less timorous, however, than Shemsi, though he too had been in prison, and came in the evening to repay our visit.

## *I Intervene with Baring*

"Sabunji has got tired of being at Matarieh, and has come into the town. This is foolish of him as he may get into trouble, but I have told him we must all be off back to Suez to-morrow. Husseyn Bey came again at nightfall to say that my visit to the prison is known, and that the sentries have been put under arrest. He wants me to write to Baring to ask his protection. If I do, I must of course tell Baring that I went without his permission. It is curious that of all the people I have seen not one will hear of English annexation, even as an escape from imprisonment and persecution. They all declare they would then revolt against any odds.

"*2nd Oct.*—This morning Baring's answer has come. He regrets that he 'cannot give me the order asked for to visit the prison, such matters being settled by the Egyptian Government,' etc.' Rot! I shall write and tell him I have seen the prisoners, and recommend them to his protection." I did so in a letter dated 3rd October, with the speedy and satisfactory result that on the 6th October Sir Evelyn Baring wrote the following short dispatch to Lord Granville:

"I have the honour to inclose a copy of an important circular issued to the Mudirs of the several provinces by the Minister of the Interior. It is to be hoped that the issue of this circular will have the effect of clearing the gaols of all persons who are improperly or unnecessarily detained in prison." And again 10th October: "I have the honour to inclose herewith, extracted from the '*Moniteur Egyptien*' of the 9th inst., a decree granting a general amnesty to all offenders accused of crimes connected with the rebellion, except to those accused of murder or rape."

Saad Zagloul and the rest of those with him in prison were consequently released. I learned the

## *I am Excluded from Egypt*

news a few weeks later in Ceylon, and that it was due to my intervention, though I cannot remember that any of the prisoners wrote personally to thank me. My action on their behalf was, I believe, a chief reason for my exclusion from Egypt during the following three years, for Baring resented my interference with what ought to have been his sole business. There is a passage in his "Modern Egypt" which displays his displeasure and makes complaint of my correspondence with Mr. Gladstone through Hamilton. His representations, however, to the Foreign Office that it should be discontinued did not have the full effect he supposes, though it made Hamilton cautious. Gladstone's answer to Granville, which Cromer with somewhat puerile malice quotes, proves nothing more than that the two Ministers were in different camps about Egypt, and that Gladstone was anxious to minimize to his colleague the attention he paid to my opinion. Granville never forgave my action in Egypt in 1882, but Gladstone knew that I had been right, though he did not dare avow it publicly. He allowed Hamilton still to remain in touch with me, as will be seen in the course of the present volume, as long as he was in office. All that Cromer was able to effect when he discovered that I had told the Prime Minister the truth, was that having shortly after assumed the rôle of masterly Resident he decreed my exclusion from Egypt, and induced the Foreign Office to support him in continuing it till 1886. My relations, however, with the other side of Downing Street continued on a friendly footing as long as Gladstone remained in power, while Cromer himself some years afterwards came round to my views and tried to get up a native Egyptian Ministry favourable to England out of the *débris* of the Nationalist Party, going even to the length of con-

## *We leave for Colombo*

sulting me about those capable of composing it; but, it was then too late, and English policy in Egypt has floundered ever since in a Serbonian bog of irreconcilable native hostility. He would have done better to have taken my advice in 1883.

"The 'Phare d'Alexandrie' has a long article describing the displeasure of the Khedive at my arrival, and at the visits paid me by relations of the exiles, and there is also rather a nice paragraph in an Arabic paper saying that I had returned to Cairo, and that feasts would have been prepared for me, but those who should have been my hosts were no longer there—strangers had come to eat up the banquet. We have left Cairo for Suez. Gerouais was at the station to see us off with Sabunji, who, thank God, has not been arrested."

This is my last entry while in Egypt that year. From Cairo and again from Suez I wrote two long letters to Hamilton for Mr. Gladstone's reading, one on 28th September, two days after I had seen Baring, and a second on 3rd October, immediately before embarking for Ceylon. These will be found in the Appendix.

The next six months, following on this brief visit to Cairo, were spent by me in Ceylon and India, an account of which will be found already published in my volume, "India under Ripon." The only thing I did that winter of importance for Egypt more than is there recorded was to obtain from Arabi and his companions in exile at Colombo a clear statement of the policy they would recommend, drawn up more or less on the lines of Arabi's memorandum of the year before, with such additions to it as the events of the intervening twelve months might have suggested, especially in regard to the Soudan and Dufferin's unworkable charter. The document, em-

## *A Policy for the Soudan*

bodied in a letter I sent to the "Times" on 5th November and published 13th December, is one of historical importance, and will be found in the Appendix.

It reiterates the truth which underlay the whole Egyptian position, namely, that the supposed necessity of maintaining Tewfik on the Khedivial throne at Cairo must, if persisted in, vitiate any attempt to restore self-government to the Egyptians, or to free England from the prolonged responsibility of protecting him with an occupying force. It suggests in what way Constitutional Government could be restored, and enumerates a variety of reforms, most of which have been subsequently made part of English policy. About the Soudan, too, the affairs of which were about to become a main subject of interest for those responsible for Egypt's welfare, it contains a remarkable paragraph, which may be taken as the text of what will be found in the following few chapters of this volume. And be it noted that at the time it was written, 3rd November, no one at Cairo, still less in London, had begun to perceive the truth that other than military means were necessary to deal with the situation created by the Mahdi's rebellion, if a great misfortune, both for Egypt and for the Soudan, was to be avoided. Arabi, who as Nationalist Minister of War in 1882, had been responsible for the appointment of Abd-el-Kader Pasha to the post of Governor-General at Khartoum, and who in the common interests of the two countries had put himself into communication with the Mahdi, and was to a certain point in sympathy with the cause Mohammed Ahmed represented as being that of a revolt against the Turco-Circassian tyranny they had alike suffered from, was in a far better position to understand how the difficulty should be

### *Arabi's View*

dealt with than any of those in whose hands its solution now lay, and it is certain that, had he been able to maintain himself against Wolseley at Tel-el-Kebir, no difficulty whatever would have arisen in regard to retaining Khartoum, or even eventually of recovering the lost provinces, had such been in the designs of nationalized Egypt. The passage is as follows:

"Although he (Arabi) is of opinion that a certain connection will always be necessary between the lower and upper waters of the Nile, he holds that in the present military and financial position of Egypt it is unwise to attempt the reconquest of all or, perhaps, of any of the lost provinces. He believes that the movement of the so-called Mahdi is not one merely of fanaticism, or that it is only a revolt of the slave-dealers. He thinks that Mohammed Ahmed commands the goodwill of the inhabitants, and that it would be far wiser for the Egyptian Government to come to terms with him than to continue their military operations against him. The Soudan brings nothing into the Cairo treasury, and if Egypt is to enjoy liberty at home she should avoid ideas of conquest abroad. The terms that could be made with the Mahdi Arabi has been too long out of Egypt to judge; but from the communications which reached him while in power he does not believe a friendly arrangement admitting Egypt's suzerainty impossible. The suzerainty of Egypt the Soudanese would probably be glad to admit, for it would protect them against European aggression."

This question of the Soudan was being already much discussed among the exiles while I was in Ceylon, though the defeat of Hicks was not yet known. And, as it was to become a main subject of interest to us all during the next two years, I may

## *Europe's Responsibility*

as well here present the general case of it as it appeared to Nationalist eyes, for it will enable readers better to understand both my own point of view and that prevalent at the time in Egypt. It will serve, too, as a corrective to the false light in which it is seen and described by nearly all European writers, who fail to understand that Europe itself was the sole responsible cause of the trouble. This is how I, looking at the matter, so to say, with Oriental eyes, saw and see it.

The revolt in the Soudan stood in close analogy with that in Lower Egypt. Both had a double character, beginning as the natural rebellion of a people against long misgovernment, and taking later a religious complexion when Christian Europe had intervened in support of the tyrannical ruler against the people. The only difference between the two cases lay in the fact that, whereas in Egypt the reformers were enlightened men, representing the humaner and more progressive side of Islam, the Soudanese reformers were reactionary and fanatical. It cannot be too strongly insisted on that the great, the capital wrong committed by our English Government in 1882 was less the destruction of the hopes of free government in Egypt as a nation, than the treacherous blow its armed intervention struck everywhere at the aspirations of liberal Islam. Arabi, a devout but the least fanatical of Moslems, had come in 1882 to represent not Egypt only, but every Mohammedan land alarmed at the encroachment of Christendom and looking to constitutional reform as its surest safety. And it was just this leader of reform that constitutional and Liberal England chose to strike down. What wonder then that the defeat at Tel-el-Kebir should have been taken through all Mohammedan lands as a set back to



## *The Wrong done by England*

reform, an impulse to reaction? At Constantinople it had the immediate effect of putting all power into the hands of the Sultan Abdul Hamid's fanatical following, and of enabling him to crush what remained of the constitutional party and the party of religious liberalism. In Persia it had consequences of much the same reactionary nature, and throughout North Africa it determined the whole character of religious thought on lines of fiercely bitter hatred of Christendom. The French invasion of Tunis had been answered by the counter move of the fighting fraternity of the Senussia. The English invasion of Egypt was answered by Mohammed Ahmed's appearance in the Soudan as Mahdi. It made it therefore imperative in 1883, if the Soudan was not to be lost to the fanatics, that without delay a liberal Mohammedan Government should be restored at Cairo capable of attracting to it the humaner elements of Islam, and pitting them against the less humane. Had this been done by the end of the year 1882, and the English army withdrawn from Cairo, the situation at Khartoum could have been saved without recourse to arms. Otherwise an English occupation of Khartoum was the sole alternative to an immediate and complete abandonment of the whole of the Upper Nile.

What was done, as we know, was to take neither one course nor the other. It was decided that Tewfik was to be maintained at Cairo, propped up by British bayonets; and at Khartoum that his authority was to be restored without any military propping whatever—the authority of Tewfik, who had come to be regarded as a renegade to Islam, almost as a *Kafir*, the docile servant of a Christian Power! Was it to be expected that the Soudanese, a fiercely Mohammedan population, proud of their

## *Sheykh El Aleysh*

Arab descent and of their anti-crusading ancestry, should accept the domination of one so contemptible, re-imposed on them by a Christian general and without a Christian army at his back? Naturally and inevitably, no! There was, besides, a special reason for anger against Tewfik, which I do not find recorded in any history of the time, but which largely contributed to the detestation in which he was held among the Soudanese. One of the first acts of the restored regime at Cairo had been to arrest the supreme head of the Malekite rite, which is that prevalent in the Soudan and throughout North Africa, Sheykh El Aleysh, a venerable and highly revered personage, who was treated with the utmost indignity, and, as was currently reported, was done to death in prison by the Khedive's order. The news of this impiety was to the Soudanese a new proof of Tewfik's apostate character, and made a reconciliation between him and them doubly impossible. Add to it the folly of recalling Abd-el-Kader, and replacing him with the corrupt and incapable Court favourite Ala-ed-Din Pasha, and giving him Hicks, an Englishman, but without an English military backing, as his Chief of the Staff, and we see the full madness from a Moslem point of view of the attempt made in the spring of 1883 to retain the Soudan; while perhaps the crowning folly of all was to reinforce the Khedivial garrison at Khartoum with the broken remnants of Arabi's army disbanded after Tel-el-Kebir, and recruited afresh for Tewfik's service. Colonel Stewart, who was sent by Dufferin that winter of 1882-83 to report on the condition of things in the Soudan, describes the army Hicks was about to command as a congregation of raw undisciplined recruits mixed with others on the point of mutiny. "The question," he says, "is

## *General Hicks*

whether they will remain faithful or desert, knowing as they will that the Mahdi will not harm them. . . . At one of the late skirmishes they were heard complaining, 'O Effendina Arabi! If you knew the position Tewfik has placed us in.'"

Certain historians have laid stress on the distinction to be drawn between the policy of sending Hicks to hold Khartoum and the insanity of sending him, with an army so disaffected and so ready to mutiny, against the Mahdi in Kordofan. Hicks, they say, might have held his own at Khartoum if the Egyptian Government had been content to leave him there. I see no warrant for believing this. Hicks did his best and was a gallant officer, but he was from the first a doomed man, as Gordon after him was doomed. The fact of their Christianity, and of their holding Tewfik's commission, made it impossible for either of them to succeed in stemming the rebellion; and, though both were able to hold out for a while, nothing but a backing of European troops could have saved them from failure. Hicks, just as Gordon did, gained at the outset an ephemeral advantage, but only to be repaid to by the revolt of the Eastern provinces in favour of the Madhi; and, left without English help, he would have been beleaguered at Khartoum, as Gordon was, and compelled, as Gordon was, to surrender. His advance into Kordofan only accelerated his ruin.

As to this expedition, for which Tewfik and his Ministers and Malet were jointly responsible, it has been the fashion to consider it an act of reckless folly on the part of the Egyptian Government, of lack of intelligent prescience on the part of Malet. It was in my opinion something more criminal than this. On the part of the Khedive and Sherif, and

### *Doomed from the Outset*

especially of Omar Lutfi, the Minister of War, it was a deliberate scheme to rid themselves of the last remnant of Arabi's rebel army and of an English officer obnoxious to their plans. They wanted, or at least Tewfik wanted, a vengeance on the regiments which had headed the revolt against him in 1881, a vengeance which had been denied him by the amnesty after Tel-el-Kebir; while none of them wanted English interference in the affairs of the Soudan. Be it remembered that Hicks's soldiers included Arabi's own regiment of the Guard, or what was left of it, and that Omar Lutfi, who had contrived with Tewfik the Alexandria riots, had sent them to the Soudan in chains. Hicks and his regiments of old Arabists, we may be quite sure, were ordered deliberately to their death at Obeid. All Tewfik's attitude towards Gordon later was in accordance with this reading of the Hicks expedition, and it is the only reading that explains what otherwise would remain an inexplicable act of madness. As to Malet, he was, in this, as in all else, the Khedive's too facile dupe, his unconscious accomplice, just as he had been his dupe in the case of the Alexandria massacre. He believed what Tewfik told him, and did not look beyond. Nothing is more remarkable than the easy indifference displayed by Malet in his published correspondence of that summer as to all that was going on in the Soudan. Hicks saw the danger and everybody else saw it. Malet saw nothing or saw only what the Khedive told him. He did not care to see more.

An additional proof of this, if any be needed besides that of the Blue Books, is supplied to me, though a negative one only, by my own talk with Baring at Cairo in September, and the record of it already given. I remember that in it, though our

## *Cromer's Lack of Prescience*

discussion ranged over the whole field of his Egyptian difficulties, he did not so much as allude to the Soudan as being one of those he had immediately to face—a remarkable omission when it is considered that he had just been spending ten days with Malet at his elbow, who must have had full time to bring his knowledge of every branch of the Egyptian question up to date. Like Malet, Lord Cromer's lack of foresight during the whole of the first two months of his arrival is most noticeable in the Blue Books. These show that his sole anxiety in those last months before the storm broke in the Soudan was the financial difficulty. His only reference to danger in that quarter is where he records a conversation on 26th October with an unnamed gentleman, who described the finance of the Soudan to him as "*un trou inconnu*." Of other than the financial danger there is not a word. In his "Modern Egypt," Cromer excuses himself from all responsibility in regard to Hicks, by saying that Hicks had already started on his campaign three days before his, Cromer's, arrival. But this is not strictly true.

Hicks, though he left Khartoum on the 8th September, remained on in camp on the Nile bank at Duem till the 26th, and could have been still recalled by telegraph had Cromer so insisted. What is true is that Cromer did not foresee the consequences, as Malet did not foresee them. Otherwise how is it possible to account for the optimism of his dispatch of 6th October, where, in complete ignorance of the perils threatening the restored regime, he wrote his confident dispatch reporting that order having been now completely restored "the British garrison of Cairo might with safety be withdrawn"? A small force of 3,000 men, to be retained at Alexandria not as an army any longer of occupation but of observa-

## *Hicks' Disaster*

tion only, would, he assured Lord Granville, be "amply sufficient to maintain the honour of Her Majesty's arms against any force that it may be supposed with any degree of probability it may have to encounter." I, as a stranger spending a week at Cairo, had found out more than this; and Granville had hardly agreed to the evacuation before the storm broke, and it was already too late to apply any remedy short of the dispatch to Khartoum of a British army.

To bring my narrative back to the historical date at which I left it. The rapid sequence of events was startling. On the 1st November news reached Cairo that Captain Moncrieff, British Consul at Suakin, with 500 Egyptian troops in garrison there, having gone forth to give battle to the rebels at Tokar on the Red Sea littoral, had been surprised and slain. On the 19th November the first rumour of Hicks's defeat was received, and two days later, the 21st, knowledge came of the full disaster. The whole of the Soudan west and south of Khartoum was reported to be in insurrection, as well as the Eastern provinces; and Colonel Coetlogon, the English officer left by Hicks in charge of the Khartoum garrison, was telegraphing that Khartoum itself could not be held "unless immediately succoured." All then was for some weeks in confusion at the Cairo War Office, and hardly less in London. Cromer, on the very first news, one can hardly say otherwise than in a panic, had advised the abandonment of the whole Soudan, and by return of telegraph Lord Granville had agreed, and the necessary order of evacuation had been given to the Egyptian Government. Some more weeks had then been wasted in distracted counsels, and, on the 14th January 1884, Gordon was dispatched on his mission to Khartoum. It was in this brief order that

### *News of Gordon's Mission*

I learned the events while travelling in India, and that the news about Gordon reached me at Delhi. It was then that I wrote him that too prophetic letter, the text of which is given in my "India under Ripon," warning him of the treachery of those who were sending him on his mission and foretelling his defeat and death. For the convenience of my present readers, I reprint it here in the Appendix.

## CHAPTER III

### GORDON'S WORK ON THE WHITE NILE

AND here, before I go further, it will, I think, make matters still clearer in regard to the history of the next twelve months in Egypt, including, as it must, Gordon's heroic defence of Khartoum, if I break off my personal narrative and devote a chapter or two to a critical examination of that truly wonderful man's character. I propose to do so not in the spirit of mere hero worship, though I hold him to have been by far the most chivalric figure among Englishmen of our generation; and still less of belittlement; but in the spirit of a sane historian, reconstructing from the many records we have of his inner spiritual life no less than of his public actions, and from some sources, too, of private knowledge and my own recollection of him, a picture of the living man he was.

To appreciate Gordon's character at all accurately, and thereby to judge his career at its true value, it is essential to recognize him as a man of many contradictions and a singularly complex character. He himself, in one of those intimate letters which through life he was in the habit of writing to his sister, and which form the most complete self-revelation made in any letters that have been published in our time, says: "Talk of two natures in one! I have a hundred, and none think alike and all want to rule"; and, again: "No man in the world is more changeable than I"—an exaggeration of the truth yet no less strictly true. Gordon had at least two distinctly antagonistic features in his nature—the one, that of a man of action, with an imperative need of strong



## *Gordon's Double Character*

practical work, the instinct of a soldier who saw the thing he had it in his mind to do with absolute clearness of vision, and as clearly the way to do it- the other, that of a religious mystic, occupied not with this world but with spiritual forces in a world unseen; perplexed perpetually, and perpetually in doubt as to the precise will of God with him, a fatalist, a disbeliever in his own free will, and consequently liable to sudden changes of plan; a seeker of omens and supernatural directions; at times (as he also himself says) a "religious fanatic," perhaps hardly on this one point sane. Not that Gordon was in the smallest degree a fanatic in the sense of one who hated another for his creed. His mind was large on this as on all other matters; but he was imbued with the belief in God's direct dealings with man and with his own interpretation of them, as suited to his own spiritual and temporal case, and with the nothingness of worldly affairs or of life and death for himself and others in view of a life to come.

Entering the army early he saw service for the first time at the siege of Sebastopol, and remained on in Turkey when the war was over as one of the officers on the Commission of frontier delimitation in Bessarabia and Armenia. This gave him his first experience of the Mohammedan East. In 1860 he joined the British forces in China, where he took part in the capture of Peking, and again stayed on, specially employed. Shanghai, one of the Treaty Ports, was just then threatened by the Taiping rebellion, and for its protection an Imperial Chinese force had been raised under European officers, and the command of it was given to Gordon. With the permission of his superiors he thus entered a foreign service, and found himself, at the early age of twenty-nine, commanding an army of Asiatics under the

## *His Military Genius*

Chinese Emperor. His military authority was practically absolute, and by a display of strategy of the highest order and lavish personal courage he succeeded in breaking the Taiping rebellion, and restoring one of the richest provinces of China and some of its most populous cities to the Imperial Government. The Emperor, in gratitude for so great a service, loaded him with honours, and would have enriched him if Gordon had been willing. But with a fine contempt for wealth he would take nothing but his stipulated pay, and, the work done, returned to his ordinary duties in England without further remark or claim on his own Government.

This stamps him as a man entirely above the rank of the common soldier of fortune. That he was also a man of immense natural military genius cannot be doubted, with a power of exerting influence over the soldiers he commanded, and turning the rawest material into good fighting stuff, and in this he compares favourably with any of the great European leaders of Asiatics that can be named in history. It is by no means certain, however, to my mind that in this first brilliant episode of Gordon's life, any more than in his latest at Khartoum, he was fighting on what I should consider the right side, the side that is of those who had the better right in justice. Indeed the Taipings, though the methods of their insurrection were barbarous in the extreme, represented what was more probably the juster cause of the Chinese people than that of the Man Chu Emperors, in whose service Gordon was. Gordon, however, did not often stop to consider points like these when he accepted foreign employment, and only discovered his mistake when it was too late to retire from it. This was the case with him, as he found to his cost, when serving the Khedive Ismail, and so, too, he

### *Gordon as Knight Errant*

discovered and would have avowed it if he had survived his last campaign against the Mahdi. What is important about the Chinese episode is the strong effect it had upon his character. The terrible sights which he there witnessed in the lands laid waste by the Taipings, the appalling incidents of an Eastern civil war, the cruelties inflicted on the weak, the outraged women and the starving children, famine, pestilence, and death spread over immensely populous areas, joined with the almost miraculous victories achieved by the army he commanded, the huge personal risks daily run, and his unvarying success, bred in him a conviction that he was under immediate divine direction, and had for his special mission in life the redressing of wrongs and the protection of the helpless. His attitude thenceforth, though he made mistakes, was that of the Christian knight errant, seeking service through the world wherever there were dragons of iniquity to fight, or distressed persons to be rescued by leaps of arms. It is necessary to remember this if we are to understand rightly the spirit of his early Egyptian service.

For a while, however, Gordon's humanitarian impulse was to be turned into more peaceful channels. In 1865 he returned to England and was given a command at Gravesend with the engineering task of fortifying the entrance to the Thames. Here he had much spare time, and devoted it to works of mercy among the poor, especially to the rescuing of the waifs and strays of the London streets, boys for whom he found employment, and whom he befriended with money and advice. Gordon had, from his youth up, been deeply religious. He belonged to no church or sect, unless it were that of what is called Bible Christianity, a form of belief based solely on the Old

## *His Bible Christianity*

and New Testaments as interpreted, each man, by the light of his own spiritual conscience. He owed this to his mother. It is a little difficult, now in the twentieth century, when the higher criticism has permeated all theology and when science has accepted evolution as its recognized basis, to realize how at the beginning of Queen Victoria's reign the great body of educated Englishmen were brought up to believe with an implicit faith in the text of the authorized English version of the Holy Scriptures as the literal word of God containing all direction needed for the spiritual wants of man. This was specially the case in the middle rank of society, that of Gordon's mother, which for the most part had nonconformist traditions and had remained equally unaffected by the scepticism of the eighteenth century and by the Oxford Church movement of the nineteenth in the direction of authority. Nor was it till some years after Gordon's education was over, and he was well launched on his military career, that the publication of Darwin's "Origin of Species" prevailed at last in dissociating scientific training from the simpler English creeds.

Gordon therefore carried with him untouched into his active life the Biblical foundation of his childhood. He held the text of Scripture from the first verse of Genesis to the last of Revelations to be God's written word, and that it was given to every man by faith and prayer and constant study to find in it all necessary direction both for his temporal and his eternal needs. He spent a certain portion of every day in studying the Book, and, being of a logical mind, in seeking counsel in its pages for each morrow as it came. His certainty that the text was inspired induced him by a further logic to believe that, relying on it, he, too, was inspired. This is the

## *Gordon's Moral Elevation*

real key to much that otherwise would be inexplicable in his public career.

In his moral life Gordon stood on the highest possible plane. Apart from a few boyish escapades at school—and he was all his life high-spirited—there is no record of his ever having transgressed the strictest rules of exemplary conduct. He seems never to have been in love, or to have indulged even for a moment in any dream of earthly happiness to be found in domestic joys. These he regarded as not intended for him, and he was as far from the thought of marriage as though he had renounced the possibility of it by vow. "What a blessing," he exclaims in one of his letters to his sister, "one was never married! Marriage spoils human beings." Even the sentimental regard in which many women held him was distasteful to him. "What I dislike," he says, "in —'s letters is the sentimental part; it is to me quite painful; she is so impressive. I do hope you will try and quiet her. I am torn in two with the wish not to be unkind, and yet I wish her not to bother me." That was his general attitude toward women other than the old and helpless. Dr. Barnes, who was in some measure Gordon's spiritual adviser in the last five years of his life, says of him: "Gordon was much less at ease in talking to women than in talking to men. While conversing with women he seemed to exercise even more than his usual self-control in the expression of his thought and feeling. His sympathy, geniality, and attractiveness became as it were veiled, and he was 'himself again' only when the restraint was removed. He was seen at his best in the society of young children, his keen interest for whom had not been dulled either by solitude or by the necessity—which had often been imposed on him in other relations—for strictly-

## *His Alms-giving and Chastity*

guarded intercourse. With children he was quite at home."

In all things he was abstemious. Even the poor pleasures of the table were generally denied. He hated feasts and entertainments, and at Greenwich allowed his uncomfortable meals to be freely interrupted by any caller on however trifling a business. "His meals," says his brother of him, "were of the most frugal kind, and his arrangements were such that no one was ever prevented seeing him in consequence of his being engaged at any of them, for he had a table with a deep drawer in which when drawn out, the food was deposited, and so if any one came the drawer was shut and there were no signs that he had been engaged otherwise than at his ordinary work." In his evenings, instead of enjoying rest or talk, he would go out to ragged schools or on some other work of mercy. His money he would give away as long as he had any available, and he would even borrow to give, this not in small dribblets, but in considerable sums of £50 and £100 and £200 at a time. On himself he would spend nothing. Speaking to Sir Rivers Wilson about him in 1878, the Catholic Bishop of Khartoum explained the wonderful influence he then enjoyed among the Soudanese as due to his alms-giving and his chastity. It astonished all men that he should care nothing for the two things those in power mostly indulged in, the love of money and the love of women. In all this Gordon was a saint.

Seven years of his life were passed in this way at Gravesend, and there grew up around him a little band of religious admirers which gradually made for him a name in the English humanitarian world. He was willing always to talk on the things of the spirit with the spiritually-minded, and to write to those

## *"Hailing the Tram of the World"*

who sought his opinion or counsel by letter, whether it was on a public or a private matter. It was with the poor and unimportant that he preferred to correspond rather than with those in high places, though among these also he had friends. Thus on a foundation of general esteem gradually acquired, the power came to him which he was to wield in public affairs, and was steadily built up. His worth in his own profession was acknowledged, for he had done mighty deeds in war,—that could not be denied, though by many of his fellow soldiers he was accounted "insubordinate," by others mad. It seemed enough to them to prove his insanity that he did not ask promotions or rewards and that he was careless of his pay.

The only failing I can really find in him—for that of drink with which he has been charged was not a serious one—was a certain tendency to court publicity, which he himself acknowledged as a snare to his generally humble attitude. His sister seems at one time to have pointed this out to him, and his reply shows that he felt her reproach as true. "Newspapers," he says in answer to her, "feed a passion I have for giving my opinion . . . You drew a bow at a venture with your full strength and you have done for your brother; the arrow has gone in up to its feathers! He that speaketh of himself seeketh his own glory! Why, you have knocked down the work of years; what have I ever been talking of but self? . . . I have a sort of wish that I could get rid of *Colonel Gordon*." He called this craving for publicity "Agag; a catering for notice and praise; hailing the tram of the world!" a thing which must be "hewn in pieces before the Lord"—and yet he yields over and over again to it, while he torments himself for his weak-

### *He enters Khedive Ismail's Service*

ness, a point in his character which he shares with many saints who have been canonized by popular acclaim, and which must not be missed, for it, too, explains much.

Such was Gordon at the time of his first entrance on the Egyptian scene in 1874, and it is with the Egyptian period only of his life that we need concern ourselves in any detail. His connection with the Khedivial service came about in this way. In 1871 he was sent on special service once more to Turkey, and finding himself at Constantinople in connection with the Danube commission, to which he had been appointed, it chanced that he met Nubar Pasha at the English Embassy and had a talk with him, which determined his after life. The Egyptian Government was in search of an engineer officer who would undertake, in succession to Sir Samuel Baker, the administration of the Equatorial Province of the Upper Nile, and Nubar consulted him as to the securing of such an officer; and this led a year later to Gordon's agreeing to go there himself as the Khedive Ismail's servant. What tempted him to the work was, I think, a certain natural restlessness and a desire for useful professional employment. English military life at home, with its constant round of unreal duties and of social inanities, was thoroughly distasteful to him, and the freedom of an independent command abroad in however wild a region was always preferred by him to ordinary employment at home. Also he had become interested in the suppression of the slave trade on the Nile and Congo, which was being much discussed at the time, and this was probably what decided him. Be this as it may, he visited Cairo on his way back from the Danube in 1873 and, having received permission from the War Office in London,



## *Governor of the Equator*

was named Governor of the Equatorial Province at the beginning of the following year, his instructions on leaving Cairo for the seat of his new government at Gondokoro being to open a trade route by river to the Equatorial Lakes, to establish the Khedive's authority on these to the Nile sources, and also to put a stop to the slave raiding in the upper provinces, which had become a scandal in Europe, and was injuring the Khedive's credit. Gordon's idea at starting on his mission was that the first half of his instructions would, when accomplished, bring about the second half. "Open out the country," he says in one of his letters of the time, "and it [the slave trade] will fall of itself." It was the general idea held by English humanitarians of the day, but one which Gordon found reason to distrust later.

There are two ways of looking at this question. The slave raiding which prevailed along the whole border line between Equatorial Africa and the waterless northern deserts which extend from the White Nile to the Atlantic had for many centuries been a terrible scourge upon the indigenous black race. It was carried on by the Bedouin tribes, more or less Arab in their origin and Mohammedan in their religion, who had invaded and conquered North Africa in the early centuries of Islam. These considered the Pagan negroes their lawful booty wherever they could capture them, and made a trade of bringing them with other equatorial produce to the sea coasts of Morocco and the rest of the Mohammedan States bordering the Mediterranean and Red Seas. It was a yearly tithe of many thousands taken from the unwarlike agricultural villagers, and may justly be likened to the depredation inflicted on the antelope herds of the same borderland by lions living on the desert outskirts. At first sight, and from a

## *The Logic of Anti-Slavery*

humanitarian point of view, it would seem that the destruction of these human lions was the beneficent duty of any one who would undertake it, and the extirpation of the slave raiders by force of arms the surest way of bringing prosperity to the negro inhabitants. And such was the view taken by most of our European explorers of the nineteenth century, Schweinfurth, Baker, Stanley, and the rest, who were in correspondence with the anti-slavery association in London and were constantly urging the duty of the penetration and civilizing of Central Africa by the states of Europe. Africa once Europeanized, they argued, slave-raiding must necessarily be made to cease and the negroes be freed from an immemorial misfortune. The reasoning harmonized well with the commercial ideas of the day, which saw in Central Africa new fields for its enterprise; and the civilized occupation of the two lines of waterway by which the Soudan could most easily be reached, the Nile and the Congo, was pushed on by the societies as a duty of humanity. I remember attending a meeting of the Royal Geographical Society under Sir Roderick Murchison, to which I had just been elected in 1862, in which our then Consul Petherick at Khartoum was praised for his exploration of the White Nile, as yet an unknown region, on this very ground, that benefit must necessarily accrue to the negroes from the opening up of their country through Englishmen acting in conjunction with the Viceroy of Egypt. Yet this very exploration of Petherick's turned out to be the beginning of far worse evils to the negroes of the White Nile than any they had during all the centuries of their unexplored history experienced, even to the total destruction of some of their communities.

The truth is—and this Gordon came to under-

## *The Lion and the Antelope*

stand at Khartoum, as we to-day are coming to understand it on the Congo—though European civilization is able to deal with certain evils incidental to uncivilized life, it brings with it other evils ten times more destructive than those it cures. It destroys the lions, but the antelopes are not found thereby to increase. On the contrary they become a prey, all of them, to the newcomer, their far more scientific and unsparing friend. And so it is also with the negroes who are ten times worse ruined by European conquest. Of the reality of this truth Gordon gained at least occasional glimpses during the years he served the Khedive Ismail in the Soudan. For myself I have never been in any doubt, since I have had an opinion at all on the matter, that the only true humanity towards the negroes of Equatorial Africa would have been to leave them unvisited, uncivilized, and severely alone with their own local troubles. The alternative policy to that of force applied to the slave raiders was that of the encouragement of Mohammedan reform in the Mediterranean Moslem states, and with it to secure the abolition of slavery as a legal institution and so the demand of slaves from the interior. This policy, however, was never one at all popular with the anti-slave-trade associations. Our professional humanitarians were no more anxious to abolish slavery altogether than masters of foxhounds are anxious to abolish foxes; and Mohammedan reformers were generally discouraged by the societies and reminded that slavery was recognized by the Koran, and so could not be legally condemned by any reformers professing themselves Moslems. This was certainly the case in 1882 when Sheykh Mohammed Abdu and Arabi included the complete abolition of slavery in their programme of national

## *Anti-Slavery an Official Nuisance*

reform. Sir William Muir and Allen, the anti-slavery secretary, at once took up the cudgels against them in the "Times," and their anger knew no bounds. It was an unheard-of thing, they said, that a Mohammedan reformer should dare to strike at the roots of a time-honoured Oriental institution to which their English society owed its *raison d'être*.

Yet the Egyptian reformers of that day were perfectly sincere in their intention. They were poor men, representing a community too humble to be slave owning itself, arrayed against a wealthy ruling class possessed of slaves. Their interests did not warp their judgement, and their judgement on this, as on other things, was humanitarian. The Khedive and the Turkish Pashas, however, were infinitely preferred by Allen and the agents of the society in Egypt, whose salaries would have ceased had slavery and slave dealing really disappeared from the Nile. As to our diplomatic representatives, at Cairo as elsewhere, they hated the worry of the whole slavery question and resented anything that raised its abolition in practical form. It meant for them the tiresome duty of presenting remonstrances to Mohammedan princes who all possessed slaves and who wished to keep them and not to be deprived of the means of getting new ones when required. I remember well the disgust with which dispatches from the Slave Trade department of the Foreign Office were regarded in our Chancelleries. All the same, the method of dealing with them as I have just indicated would have been the true line for our humanitarians to take if the interests of the raided black villagers of the Upper Nile had been alone in question. A pronouncement against slavery at Cairo by a Nationalist Sheykh el Islam, would have been worth more to them than a whole army of

## *Sir Samuel Baker*

civilized protectors sent to guard their desert frontier against the *jellabat*.

It will be interesting to give some extracts from Gordon's letters to his sister and others bearing on these points, letters written while in Ismail's service, for they are infinitely instructive, and as human documents unsurpassed in the political history of our time. They were begun immediately on his arrival at Cairo at the beginning of 1874, and continued without interruption during the whole period of his Soudan service. It must be remembered that the official world of Cairo of that day represented a society as pecuniarily corrupt and as destitute of all public virtue as could well be found upon the face of the globe. The Khedive Ismail, who had all the vices of the East overlaid with a veneer of Western civilization, plausible, unscrupulous, and profoundly immoral, had gathered round him a gang of European speculators whose one object was to extract money from his coffers by contracts, loans, and services rendered at extravagant rates in every branch of the administration. Among the highest paid were those that took service in the Soudan and ministered to Ismail's ambition of conquering the Upper Nile to its sources, and on the pretence of putting down the slave trade adding province after province to his African empire. Gordon's predecessor as Governor of the Equatorial Provinces, Sir Samuel Baker, had been paid at the extravagant rate of £10,000 a year, exclusive of all his expenses, and had left Egypt at the close of his four years' engagement with a solid sum of £40,000 untouched at his banker's. The arrival therefore of Gordon with his unself-seeking ways was a wholly disturbing element for the official mind, and made him enemies from the beginning not only among his

## *Gordon and Sherif Pasha*

fellow Europeans who considered that he was under-selling them in the administrative market, but by the Turco-Circassian and Armenian Pashas who were amassing large fortunes in the general reign of extravagance. The allusion made in one of the first extracts given is to an interview between Gordon and Sherif Pasha, then Prime Minister, in which there had been a characteristic misunderstanding between the two, Gordon refusing the £10,000 salary of his predecessor, and protesting that £2,000 would be ample, Sherif imagining that his refusal was only the coyness of a rogue who wanted a still huger sum. It was difficult, too, for any one at Cairo to understand that Gordon had the suppression of the slave trade really at heart or that his acceptance of the mission to the Equatorial Nile would be followed by any practical result in a humanitarian direction. Ismail, as little as the rest, was sincere in this, but affected a zeal in suppressing the slave trade, which at first took in the not very discerning mind of Gordon, who with all his power of managing Orientals *en masse* was far from being a good judge of individual character,<sup>1</sup> thinking to gain thereby a prop in humanitarian England to his failing commercial credit. The process of Gordon's undeception both as to Ismail and as to the reality of the good he was doing or could possibly do in the Soudan is to me the most interesting feature of the letters, and I will give such extracts from them as seem to bear most directly on this feature of his character, with others exemplifying the strange religi-

<sup>1</sup> Examples of Gordon's little judgement of individuals he came personally in contact with may be found in Samuel Baker, King Leopold, Henry Stanley, and Richard Burton, in all of whom Gordon thought he had discovered elements of unselfish humanitarian zeal akin to his own.

## *Gordon and Nubar*

ous mysticism which was to play so important a part in the drama of his later exploits at Khartoum. Incidentally, too, the extracts will explain much of the official ill-will manifested towards Gordon in 1884 not only by Nubar and the Court clique of ministerial Pashas, but by our own English diplomatists at the British Consulate-General, including Lord Cromer. These are my quotations:

"I believe if the Soudan was settled the Khedive would prevent the slave trade; but he does not see his way to do so till he can move about the country. . . . My object is to show the Khedive and his people that gold and silver idols are not worshipped by all the world. They are very powerful gods, but not so powerful as our God; so if I refuse a large sum you will not be angry at my doing so. From whom does all the money come? From poor miserable creatures who are ground down to produce it. Of course these ideas are outrageous. 'Pillage the Egyptians' is still the cry. . . .

"I remember that God has at all times worked by weak and small means. All history shows this to be His mode, and so I believe if He will He may work by me. . . . I paid a visit to Sherif Pasha, the Minister of Justice, and let him understand that your brother was not an hireling. I did this rather sharply. . . . I think I can see the true motive now of the expedition, and believe it to be a sham, to catch the attention of the English people. As Baker said: I think the Khedive is quite innocent (or nearly so) of it, but Nubar is the chief man. Now what has happened? There has been a mutual disappointment. Nubar thought he had a rash fellow to deal with, who could be persuaded to cut a dash, etc., etc., and he found he had one of the Gordon

### *The Pashas think him Queer*

race. This latter thought the thing real, and found it a sham and felt like a Gordon who has been humbugged. . . . Though I do not credit myself with anything, it cannot be denied but that your brother's conduct [in wishing to cut down expenses] is a silent reproach to the usual mode of doing things in this country and is the more cutting from its silence. It is Greek and Hebrew to them to reason that all the coin one takes is wrung out of poor people. . . . Nubar and your brother do not hit it off, and the other evening So-and-so said foolishly, 'Do not make an enemy of Nubar. He will or may do you mischief.' It was too much, and your brother replied, in the midst of a circle of guests, that there was no one living who could do him the slightest injury which he could feel, and that he would not shape his face to suit any one beyond acting loyally. . . . I think they think me very queer, and I am, I dare say. . . . You have no idea of the intrigues here; it is a regular hot bed, and things cannot last long like this. They are paying 36 per cent. for money. . . . I think the Khedive likes me, but no one else does; and I do not like them—I mean the swells whose corns I tread on in all manner of ways. I saw so and so at Suez. He agrees with me in our opinion of the rottenness of Egypt: it is all for the flesh, and in no place is human nature to be studied with such advantage. Duke of This wants steamer—say £600. Duke of That wants house, etc. All the time the poor people are ground down to get money for all this. Who art thou to be afraid of a man? If He wills, I will shake all this in some way not clear to me now. Do not think I am an egoist. I am like Moses who despised the riches of Egypt. We have a king mightier than these, and more enduring riches and power in Him



## *He loves the Native Blacks*

than we can have in this world. I will not bow to Haman."<sup>1</sup>

Arrived at the seat of his labours and engaged in the work set him by the Khedive of opening up the White Nile to the Equatorial Lakes, we find him speedily disgusted with the methods in use for the spreading of civilization in those remote regions, the petty warfare waged by the troops he was given to command against the primitive negro tribes which were living happily without him, and whose only wish was to be left alone. Baker had been brutal with these poor blacks; Gordon's heart went out towards them. He speedily saw the fallacy of the pretence that he was sent there to do them good.

"They (the native blacks) have had no communication with the world. They would seem to get on well without any regular laws and to live out their span in comparative quiet. . . . No country presents such a field for a philosopher as this country does with its dense population quite innocent of the least civilization. I should say that they are singularly free from vice; their wars are generally very harmless affairs and seldom cause bloodshed. . . . Is it not remarkable that you never find anything like ambition in a native sheikh? They will readily agree to plunder their neighbour, but would never think of annexing his tribe to theirs. . . . They are in tribes of 100 or 300 families, and I expect have been so for ages. . . . The natives suffered in their attack to-day and I do not think they will trouble us again. . . . If they are to be put down it

<sup>1</sup> The "Duke of This," who wanted a steamer, and the "Duke of That," who wanted a house, are not difficult of recognition by those who remember the Egypt of that day. The Duke of Sutherland especially, with his house speculations, must have been in Gordon's mind.

## *"God gave them the Victory"*

is better I should do it than an exterminating pasha who would have no mercy. . . . I wish the whole of this business was over. I do not want to hurt these people, but we must defend ourselves." And later, a detachment of his soldiers having been surprised by the blacks and destroyed: "We derided the poor blacks who fought for their independence, and now God gave them the victory. I declare, in spite of the expressions you may note in my letters, I truly sympathize with them. They say, 'We do not want your cloth and beads; you go your way and we will go ours; we do not want to see your chief. . . . This land is ours, and you shall not have it, neither its bread nor its flocks.' Poor fellows! You will say I am most inconsistent, and so I am, and so are you. We are dead against our words when it comes to action. . . . I have a number of Niam-Niam soldiers. . . . The Niam-Niam warriors are fearful objects; they do look very fierce. They are thick set, sturdy fellows, and they look brave and fearless. I declare it is rather a trial to me to set them on the satin-skinned Baris, but these latter will not leave me alone. . . . Did I not mention the incantations made against us by the magicians on the other side, and how somehow, from the earnestness that they made them with, I had some thought of misgiving on account of them? It were odd their repulse was so soon to follow. These prayers were earnest prayers for celestial aid in which the prayer knew he would need help from some unknown power to avert a danger. That the native knows not the true God is true, but God knows him and moved him to pray and answered his prayer. 'The horse is prepared for the day of battle, but the victory is of the Lord.' . . . The tax-gatherers are out and there is immense excitement among the natives on the other side. Six

*"Come, curse me this People"*

or seven hundred are collected on the hill tops. . . . We cannot see what the tax-gatherers are doing. . . . The taxes are in sight . . . 200 cows and 1,500 sheep. . . . The daughter of the Sheykh was taken: I have now sent to him to say if he will submit I will leave him alone and that he is to come for his daughter. I hope sincerely to make friends with him and end this miserable work, for it is just that.

"I wish they would submit now and save any more of these wars or rather miserable cattle raids; but it is no use wishing—you must take their cows, otherwise they will never give in. . . . To-day on a bare rock a mile off stood a man with two attendants. He held his hands clasped together at the back of his head, and turned to all quarters, putting them down sometimes straight to his sides. I watched him with my glass. 'Come, curse me this people: for they are too mighty for me.' I can quite enter into these poor people's misery at their impotency. 'We do not want beads. We do not want the Pasha. . . . We want our own lands and you to go away.' Their poor minds never conceived such a trial as this before. Rain was their only care, now *civilization* (?) is to begin with them. They are to be brought into the family of nations. . . . There are a great number of natives on Balak's hill to-day. . . . Balaam is there with his hands in the same position; the kings and princes of Midian are sitting like apes behind him. . . . How I hate this country and all the work. . . . I am thoroughly disgusted. These (the Khedive's) people are unfit to acquire the country . . . incapable of civilizing the natives. . . . They are conies, a feeble race. . . . I cannot help it, but I have taken such a dislike to these blacks that I cannot bear their sight. I do not mean the natives, but these soldiers. They are nothing but a set of pillagers,

## *He mocks at Philanthropists*

and are about as likely to civilize these parts as to civilize the moon. Though it tells against my operations, I am glad in my heart that they are afraid of the natives. God permits me to open the road to the interior, but, humanly speaking, I see nothing to encourage the hope that this occupation of their lands will be of any advantage towards civilizing them. In excuse for taking this employ I can only say that I think I have accomplished a work with the nearly minimum amount of suffering to natives and soldiery which would have been done by an Arab Pasha with a great amount of suffering to soldiery and natives. . . . Some philanthropic people write to me about 'noble work,' 'poor blacks,' etc. I have I think stopped their writings by acknowledging ourselves to be a pillaging horde of brigands."

Such, as seen in these intimate letters, was Gordon's own opinion of his work down to the end of his two years as Governor of the Equator. He reconciled it to his conscience only by the reflection that, if another had been entrusted with it than himself, the injury inflicted on the negro tribes would have been greater than it was.

At this time, October 1876, he was so little in love with his exhausting and thankless work, and in so great despair of doing real good in the Soudan, that he resolved to throw it up. "I want to see my way clear first," he writes. "Comfort of the body, a very strong gentleman says, 'What is the use of opening more country to such a Government? There is more now under their power than they can ever manage. Retire now.' But Mr. (I do not know what) says, 'Shut your eyes to what may happen in future; leave that to God, and do what you think will open the country thoroughly to both lakes. Do this not for His Highness or for his Government,

## *An Instrument in God's Hands*

but do it blindly and in faith.'" And a few days later, "To-day Reason says strongly, 'Do not stay and aid such a Government.' But I do not like to be beaten, which I am if I retire; and by retiring I do not remedy anything. By staying I keep my province safe from injustice and cruelty in some degree. . . . When a house gives ominous cracks prior to a fall one's desire is—the rule in ships—to leave it. . . . But I do not like the idea, even if the cracks are serious. Why should I fear? Is man more strong than God? Things have come to such a pass in these Mussulman countries that a crisis must come about soon."

He had come, too, to persuade himself that he was an instrument in God's hands for purposes, obscure at present, but ultimately to be made manifest, which would more than counterbalance the immediate evil. The idea recurs perpetually in his letters, joined with that of a fatalism as absolute as that of any Moslem. Indeed, it is evident that the long years spent with none but Moslems on the Upper Nile, where he was cut off from all communication with men of his own Christian creed, heightened, if it did not initiate, the predestinarian tone of his religious thought. It is a point in his character of the highest importance if we are to understand his action when later he was called upon to rescue the Soudan garrisons. It seems to have grown upon him that he was one pre-ordained to do God's work as was Joshua when leading the armies of Israel as conquerors into the promised land. The uncompromising logic of his mind made him accept this inference from results, and he refused to acknowledge that the same faith which had inspired Joshua and Moses to deeds that were miraculous should be lacking to his own as absolute faith. All

## *Gordon's Fatalism*

were but instruments in the hands of the same God—all were under equal direction. It will be worth while to collect the passages in his letters which most clearly illustrate this belief, a belief founded on Bible teaching, and intensified in the Soudan by the solitude in which he lived. What the Koran was to his Moslem companions, that the Bible was to him, with the Islamic doctrine of submission to God's providence for good and for evil, the fatalism which believes in all things as pre-ordained. Each year spent in the Soudan added to the illusion of his divine instrumentality, especially in the suppression of the slave trade, which signalized the second period of his work when he had become Governor-General, a position to which he was promoted in 1877.

"Has it ever struck you," he writes from Kordofan to his sister, "that if man's birth and death are predetermined by God to happen at certain epochs, so every intervening event must be also predetermined? Few are atheistical enough to say either man's birth or death are things of chance; and how can they therefore dispute that the intervening events are not preordained. In governing these countries I wish I could realize this truth more than I do. . . . The more I live in this country and the more God prospers me, the more I despise myself and feel despicable; some of the *coups* I have made, and which have been successful, have been such flukes, or chances, as the world calls them, as to astonish me quite as much as they have astonished others, and I cannot feed myself with the thought of 'How clever I am,' for impressed on my mind is the fact, 'You know you had no idea of what would happen on your so acting.' . . . I have really no troops with me, but I have the Shekinah (the Lord)

## *No Believer in Free Will*

and I do like trusting to Him and not to man. . . . Had I not got this Almighty Power to back me, with His infinite wisdom, I do not know how I could even think of what is to be done. . . . I do not believe in man's free will; therefore, if my actions are right they are His actions; if evil, they are the inevitable produce of the corrupt body in which I am placed by Him. . . . Those who hold by man's free will must consequently be more or less elated if they do well. Now, if you accepted what I think the truth, namely, that man has no free will, you would never be elated, for you would not arrogate to yourself your actions; neither would you be depressed by your evil acts. . . . I own I feared to trust God in this slave dealer's business; I was tossed up and down. Perhaps physical fatigue may have been the cause. I hold to 'Trust in the Lord and lean not on thine own understanding.' And He has brought me through. . . . You and I are flies on the wheel; try and realize this, that you do not move the wheel. . . . All this points to the absolute rule God has over events, good or evil. As I said before 'Be a fool' in the world's language."

And again: "I wonder if I look ambitious in your eyes. Do you think I sought this place? You should know more than most people, for you have all my thoughts in my letters. Judging myself, I fear it was so when I took the work in hand; not that I cared for the money or the honours to come from it. I think, however, my main idea was a quixotic one—to help the Khedive, mixed with the feeling that I could with God's direction accomplish this work. . . . If God puts ten pounds on a man He will give him strength to bear twenty pounds. And if He puts twenty tons on a man He will (if He wills) give him power to carry sixty tons. This He has done

## *"God is the Governor-General"*

for me; and I in saying this do not seek the praise of any man or society, or king or power. I would have your prayers—they will be heard—but no praise, for He is the GOVERNOR-GENERAL, and I am only His useless agent, by whom He deigns to work His will. . . . I feel I am only a straw, yet God gave the men in Darfour courage under me. I cannot look back or forward to ever having done or to ever doing anything worthy of commendation. . . . I do not and cannot chew the cud of self-complacency. . . . I no more believe in the foresight of Napoleon or the Duke. People made out their talent as foresight after the thing was done. God gives the thought, man carries it out, for the thought is given so strongly as to force him to act thus."

"I am now, thank God, so far from the least thought of man's free will that it never enters into my calculation in these thoughts, however it may guide me as Governor-General or as fellow-man. . . . I feel so strongly that death is not an evil to man that, if I thought the shooting of any number of slave dealers would be of avail in stopping the slave trade, I would shoot them without the least compunction, though if a slave dealer was ill and it was in my power to cure him I would do my best to do so. . . . I believe entirely in the Old and New Testaments as being inspired by God. . . . I base my belief on the Scripture entirely; it is there distinctly laid down that God rules all things. . . . To accept the doctrine of man having no free will we must acknowledge his utter insignificance. For my part I can give myself no credit for anything I ever did; and further I credit no man with talents, etc., etc., in anything he may have done. Napoleon, Luther—indeed, all men—I consider were directly worked on and directed to work out God's great



*"I went on a toss-up"*

scheme. Everything that happens to-day, good or evil, is settled and fixed. . . . No comfort is equal to that which he has who has God for his stay, but believes, not in words but in fact, that all things are ordained to happen and must happen."

Again, when worn out with work and loneliness: "Long before you get this I shall be out of my troubles; so do not pity me, for I have the Almighty to guide me and death is no terror. I only wish you to know how worn I am through having to lean on GOD ALONE. It seems odd but it is diametrically opposed to our flesh to do so, and it is very trying. My flesh says, 'I should like 1,000 good, trustworthy soldiers, and not His promise.' It is utterly wrong, but a widow would prefer £15,000 in the 3 per cent. consols to the promise that God will provide for her. After my spirit I prefer the promise; after my flesh I prefer the 1,000 soldiers; not having them my spirit lords it over my flesh and conquers; but the flesh suffers all the same, and I see the deep lines in my face getting deeper and deeper day by day. *Why did you go?* Well, He sent me, for I went on a toss up. He is the GOVERNOR-GENERAL, I am only His agent."

All these are passages from Gordon's letters written to his sister during his service under the Khedive Ismail between 1874 and 1879. They explain the man. With regard to its results from a humanitarian point of view he was, as I have said, conscious of failure, even when his friends in England were loudest in their praise of his success. He knew it had no permanence.

The work indeed that he had undertaken was one which could not be achieved under the circumstances which then ruled the Soudan. At Khartoum and throughout the whole country slavery

## *The Soudan's Immensity*

was the recognized basis of social and industrial life. The slave was as much property as the ox or the sheep, and though his lot was less hard than it had been in Christian lands a few decades before—for the slave was not put to field labour, as in the West Indies, and was admitted to a certain filial position in the household of his master—the thought of his having any natural right to freedom had not yet penetrated the humanest local brain. The Egyptian officials at Khartoum were, as a rule, the very worst section of their class, men exiled for their misdeemeanours from the lower Nile, while the army was, to a large extent, recruited from convicted criminals. The native Soudanese of Arab origin were wholly disaffected to the Government, and many of them, driven from their homes by its exactions, had formed themselves into bands of robber slave hunters, and were in revolt against it. No real help was to be had from Cairo. Gordon had some nine or ten Europeans with him in all, scattered through the country, and the Christian population of Khartoum, mostly Greeks, were hardly less interested in the slave trade than their Moslem neighbours, many of them being themselves slave owners. There were a few Catholic missionaries, and a bishop, but they exercised little influence, and Gordon, as an Englishman determined to stop the trade, was practically alone. The Soudan was an immense territory with no natural frontiers, few means of communication, and a population of several warlike millions, unamalgamated except by the tie of a somewhat fanatical anti-Christian creed. He thus describes the western regions, where the raids were chiefly organized: "These countries are very curious; they seem to be peopled with huge tribes of Bedouin Arabs, with a small nucleus of more settled people

## *He cannot Free the Slaves*

who congregate in the larger villages. . . . Some of them can put from 2,000 to 6,000 horse or camel men into the field. . . . Now these tribes raid on the negro tribes to the south, or else exchange cloth for slaves with the Bedouin tribes beyond even the pretended boundary of Egypt. . . . The tribes sell the slaves to the little merchants, *jellabat*, of all kinds, who flock into these lands. The merchants, who come from all parts of Egypt, then come down to the more populous places . . . and sell them to others. Even with the British Government in possession, I do not know how this slave trade could be stopped."

Nevertheless, as a soldier, and he was a dogged one, Gordon fought on, though conscious of its being morally a losing battle. As a soldier he was successful and accomplished the work given him of subduing the revolted slave dealers; though the slave trade itself he could not stop, much less slavery in the Soudan. The caravans were too intangible on the open western frontier, and he had no means of setting the recaptured slaves at liberty. In order at all to deal with the case he was obliged himself to purchase slaves, for which he accuses himself thus to imaginary humanitarians sitting in their easy chairs at home: "The slaves I buy are already torn from their homes, and whether I buy them or not they will remain slaves. . . . It is not as if I encouraged raids for the purpose of getting slaves as soldiers. But people will say, 'By buying slaves you increase the demand and indirectly encourage raids.' I say, 'Yes, I should do so, if after buying them I still allowed the raids to continue.' . . . This slave question is most troublesome and difficult to manage. A number of slaves taken in the last raid made near here (in Darfour) refuse to go back, for they find they are better fed with their new masters than they

## *Subdued by Thirst*

were with the old. . . . Darfour is a regular cockpit. One thing troubles me. What am I to do with the two or three thousand slaves that are now at Shaka, if we take it? I cannot take them back into their own country; I cannot feed them. Solve this problem for me. I must let them be taken by my auxiliaries, or by my soldiers, or by the merchants. There is no help for it. If I let them loose they will be picked up in every direction, for an escaped slave is like an escaped sheep, the property of him who finds him or her. . . . If I let the slaves be taken by my soldiers, by the tribes, or by the merchants, instead of there being a cessation of the slave caravans there will be a great increase of them for two or three months and a corresponding outcry against me. But at any rate the slaves will go by frequented routes and will not die on the road. . . . Shall I be cowardly for fear of what ill-informed Europe may say?"

This was written in the early days of his Darfour campaign. As it proceeded, the horrors of the mid-summer warfare in a waterless wilderness oppressed him as a nightmare, the necessity of reducing all, tribes, slave raiders, and slaves alike, by thirst and hunger, seizing the wells and the hidden supplies of corn. "The men find the corn by probing the ground, and by the 'question' applied to captives, which I cannot prevent. The detachment of the Leopard tribe are without water, and have been so for a day. I am sorry for it. Consider it as we may, war is a brutal, cruel affair. . . . You see the people coming over the sand, like flies on a wall. The poor fugitives cannot stand the thirst, and are coming down one by one to water. You have not the very least idea of the fearful effect of want of water in this scorched-up country. . . . Hunger is nothing to thirst; the

### *He cannot Solve the Problem*

one can be cased by eating grass, the other is swift and insupportable."

And all—though he succeeded with the help of his Italian Lieutenant, Gessi, in breaking up the chief slave trading band under Suliman Zebehr—for almost nothing. He finds he cannot solve the problem. "There are some 6,000 more slave dealers in the interior who will obey me now they have heard that Zebehr's son and the other chiefs have given in. You can imagine what a difficulty there is in dealing with all these armed men. I have separated them here and there, and in course of time will rid myself of the mass. Would you shoot them all? Have they no rights? Are they not to be considered? Had the planters no rights? Did not our Government once allow slave-trading? Do you know that cargoes of slaves came into Bristol Harbour in the time of our fathers? . . . I must notice to you one thing which is very different among the society here and that of the planters in the Colonies. One never hears of owners of slaves keeping gangs of them for field labour, or for cultivation. They are kept for slave servants, or by the slave dealers as slave troops. . . . Certain Greeks are now at Katarif on whom I have my eye, who have gangs of slaves cultivating cotton. I mean to make a swoop on them. In fact the condition of the negro is incomparably better in these lands than ever it was in the West Indies, and I therefore claim for my people a greater kindness of heart than was possessed by the planters, with all their Christian profession and civilization. You speak of Mohammedanism being imperilled [he means in peril of damnation]. Not so. I find the Mussulman quite as good a Christian as many a Christian, and do not believe he is in any peril. All of us are more or less pagans. I like the Mussulman; he is not

## *How can he Free the Caravans?*

ashamed of his God; his life is a fairly pure one. Certainly he gives himself a good margin in the wife line, but at any rate he never poaches on others. Can our Christian people say the same?"

It is of importance to consider these sayings of Gordon's in connection with his subsequent action, which so surprised and shocked his English friends six years later.

"This morning I came on a caravan of slaves which is accompanying me—some sixty or eighty men, women and children chained. What am I to do with them? Their homes are too far off to send them to; so I decided to make the slave merchant take off their chains as scandalous, and then to leave them with him. He, looking on them as valuable cows, will look well after them. Don Quixote would have liberated them, and made an attempt to send them back some forty days march through hostile tribes to their homes—which they would have never reached. The only remedy is to stop slave raids on the frontier. . . . You must stop it at its source. Once the slaves have left the source it is useless to try. . . . In all previous emancipations, either there has been a strong government to enforce obedience, or a majority of the nation wished it. Here in this country there is not one that wishes it, or who would aid it even by advice. . . . *No one* is uninterested in the matter." And he could not stop the trade. It was like the hydra with a hundred heads. As soon as he cut off one band another took its place. As soon as he closed one entrance to the slave caravans another entrance was discovered. What he achieved was a miracle, for all depended on himself and his one European Lieutenant, Gessi. No one else either in the Soudan or Cairo cared for or wished to see the traffic stopped.

## *"My Crest is a Thistle"*

The last year of Gordon's Governor-Generalship was one of harassing disappointments. The Khedive had failed him. He received no more support. There was a new regime at Cairo, the Nubar-Wilson one. He was at loggerheads with it, and talks of it in his letters as a "Hermaphrodite government." They did not understand him, and he had no respect for them. It was a constant exchange of telegrams between Cairo and Khartoum in which Cairo made impossible demands for money, and Khartoum responded with bitter refusals. He was left quite unaided in regard to the slave trade. "I have no belief," he wrote, "in the Cairo Government acting against slavery. . . . Nubar never helped me at the equator, though I wrote to him frequently, waste of time as it was!" It was the same with the Khedive, though he still pitied him, for Ismaïl was now at bay surrounded by the financial wolves that were on the point of devouring him.

"I can say truly," he writes in 1879, "that my life is one long series of flesh-vexing telegrams, of rows, of disputes—a regular Ishmaelite existence—I am at war with nearly every one at Cairo, and my crest is a thistle." "I am exceedingly weary, and wish with a degree of bitterness that it was all over. I am cooped up here (at Khartoum) now, and am much occupied with the finances, which are in a very low state. . . . I am striking daily deadly blows against the slave trade, and am establishing a sort of Government of Terror about it." "I am stronger than ever in my belief that if H. H. had taken my advice he would be in a better plight than he is now, and at any rate would have fallen with dignity. Now I see by the paper he is offering to abdicate. This sort of thing cannot last, and I fear for him. He cannot go straight—even his dispatches to me are

## *He despises War*

all evasive. . . . The continual wars that I carry on, and cannot help, are very wearisome; and I feel more and more daily 'How long? how long?'"

It was in this state of despair, and weary of his life that Gordon threw himself into the excitement of his last campaign against the Darfour slave raiders, a campaign he was not destined to finish, for he was recalled in the midst of it once more to Cairo, and had to leave the final capture of the chief raider, Suliman Zebehr, to his Lieutenant Gessi. He had lost, however, his zest for fighting. "I no longer delight in war," he writes, "or fights like this one before me. I look on the accounts one reads of wars as so much romance writing, and, somewhat like the Chinese people, I have rather a contempt for the warrior. . . . Eminent services, etc., are eminent nonsense." His iron health, too, was breaking down. "I have almost entirely given up smoking, for I am much affected in my circulation. If I had gone on with it much longer I believe my heart would have stopped altogether. I may indeed say that I have lost every desire in a material way for the things of this life, and I have no wish for eating, drinking, or comforts. If I have a wish for anything, it would be for a dreamless sleep." It was a terrible oppression to him, too, to find that in spite of all he could do the slave trade was only "scotched not killed." Indeed it flourished still, despite the cost. "I have just made a calculation of the loss of life in Darfour during the years 1875-1879. It comes to 16,000 Egyptians, and some 50,000 natives of Darfour—add to this the loss of life on the Bahr Gazelle some 15,000, and you will have a fine total of 81,000; and this exclusive of the slave trade which one may put down for three years at from 80,000 to 100,000. Upwards of 470 slave dealers have been driven out



## *He leaves the Soudan a Wreck*

of this place since I came here two days ago. This evening we were surprised at a caravan coming in. The slave dealers had come on here with them, and hearing I was here, and having no water, they abandoned their slaves and fled. The slaves were sadly distressed by thirst, thirty had died on the road. Though the water here is putrid, and everything is wretched enough, I am revived when I make these captures. You must count them up. From Oomchanga to Toashia, during, say, a week, we must have caught from 500 to 600. I suppose we may consider that nearly that number must have been passing every week for the last year and a half or two years along this road!!! and this during my tenure of office!!!—which is very creditable to me. These slaves just captured have been four to five days without water. They were in the most terrible distress." A few days later, 21st July, he takes what was to be his final leave of Khartoum, till his last fatal return to it in 1884. "I shall D.V. leave for Cairo in ten days. . . . I am a wreck, like the portion of the 'Victory,' towed into Gibraltar after Trafalgar; but God has enabled me, or rather has used me, to do what I wished to do—that is to break down the slave trade."

It was his last word of comfort to his sick soul. At Cairo, when he arrived there, he found a new order of things established still less to his mind than the old one had been. The Khedive Ismail had made his exit from the scene, and his place was occupied, not filled, by the poor dummy Tewfik, with the Anglo-French financial control for tutor and guardian. He did not long consent to serve it. After finding himself sent on a fool's errand to Abyssinia, where he nearly met his death, he folded his tent and, shaking the dust of Egypt from his feet,

### *Medically Condemned*

once more returned to England. Nothing then was further from his mind than that he should ever see the Nile again. Body and soul he had been overwrought. The British surgeon who examined him at Alexandria before he left found him suffering from "symptoms of nervous exhaustion and alteration of the blood. He recommended "several months of complete rest and quiet," and insisted strongly on his "abstaining from all exciting work, especially such as implies business or political excitement."

## CHAPTER IV

### GORDON IN PALESTINE

SUCH is the history of Gordon's first service in the Soudan under Ismail Pasha, from 1874 to 1879, in its principal features as gathered from his own letters. At this time of his life, 1880, there is no question that to the official world in England as in Egypt, except among his intimate friends who knew him well, Gordon was considered mad; nor wholly, perhaps, without excuse. He had quarrelled in his last two years with nearly every official person at Cairo, including the new Viceroy Tewfik, Nubar Pasha, and most of the Khedivial ministers, as well as with M. de Lesseps and Lord Cromer. There is an interesting memorandum drawn up by himself relating the circumstances which led to his collision with the last of these, and, as it throws light on their later relations, as well as giving a lively picture of the writer, it will be worth epitomizing here.

The memorandum tells us that in the spring of 1878 Ismail Pasha, being in financial difficulties, sent for him (Gordon) to come from Khartoum to Cairo, and help him in making an arrangement with the representatives of his creditors. "I arrived," says Gordon, "on the 7th March, at 9.30 p.m. His Highness sent his equerry to meet me at the terminus and was waiting dinner. Dirty as I was, after a railway journey of 350 miles, I had to obey, but before dinner His Highness took me aside and asked me to be President of an Inquiry into the state of the finances of the country. . . . I said I would accept the Commission of Inquiry as President. His Highness said, 'You will see Lesseps, who will act with

## *Gordon on the Financial Inquiry*

you.' I said 'Yes,' and accepted the mission with the agreement that the Commissioners of the Dette were not to be on the Inquiry. I was angry with these Commissioners because I thought they had been too hard on His Highness. The next day I saw Mr. Vivian, the English Consul-General, and he said, 'I wonder you could accept the Presidency without the Commissioners of the Dette.' I said I was free to accept or to refuse. I then called on the German Consul-General, and when there the French and Austrian Consuls-General and also Vivian came in, and attacked me for having accepted the post of President. They said I was risking His Highness his throne, if he formed the Commission of Inquiry without the creditors' representatives. I said, 'Why do you not tell him so?' They said, 'You ought to do so.' I said, 'Well, will you commission me to do so from you with any remarks I like to make as to the futility of your remarks?' They all said, 'Yes, we authorize you to do so in our names.' I did so that evening, and told His Highness just before dinner at Abdin. I said, 'I have seen the four Consuls-General to-day, and they told me to tell your Highness from them that you run a serious personal risk if you have a Commission of Inquiry without the Commissioners of the Dette being upon it.' His Highness did not seem to care a bit, and said he was only afraid of England, who he was sure would not move. He said, 'You will see Lesseps to-morrow and arrange the Enquête with him.' The next day Lesseps came with Standen, now Resident Commissioner for the British Government Suez Canal Shares at Paris, an old friend of mine. Lesseps began, 'We must have the Commissioners of the Dette on the Enquête.' I said, 'It is a *sine qua non* that they are not to be upon it.' Lesseps replied,

### *Gordon's Opinion of Baring*

'They must be upon it.' Then in came Cherif Pasha and said, 'Are you agreed?' I left Lesseps to speak and he said 'Yes,' at which I stared and said, 'I fear not.' Then Lesseps and Cherif Pasha discussed it, and Lesseps gave in and agreed to serve on the Commission without the Commissioners, but he must ask permission from Paris. Cherif Pasha was pleased, but I instinctively felt old Lesseps was ratting, so I asked Cherif Pasha to stop a moment and said to Standen, 'Now see that Lesseps does not make a mess of it, let him say at once will he act without the Commissioners of Dette or not, do this for my sake, take him into that corner and speak to him.' Standen did so while I took Cherif Pasha into the other corner, much against his will, for he thought I was a bore raising obstacles. I told him that Lesseps had declared before he came he would not act unless with the Commissioners. Cherif was huffed with me and turned to Lesseps, whom Standen had already dosed in his corner of the room, and he and Lesseps had a close conversation again for some time, and then Cherif came to me and said, 'Lesseps has accepted without the Commissioners of the Dette. I disgusted Cherif as I went downstairs with him by saying, 'He will never stick to it.' When downstairs in one of the many antechambers to the Palace His Highness gave me (shall I ever lodge in palaces again? I hope not) I found Baring. Now Baring is in the Royal Artillery, while I am in the Royal Engineers. Baring was in the nursery while I was in the Crimea. He has a pretentious grand patronizing way about him. We had a few words together. I said I would do what His Highness asked me. He said it was unfair to the creditors, and in a few moments all was over. When oil mixes with water we will mix together! I went upstairs."

## *Gordon and Lesseps*

This is interesting as a record of the incompatibility of temper and ideas existing between Gordon and Cromer six years before 1884. It explains indeed what would otherwise be inexplicable, the quarrel that broke out at once between them when Gordon returned to Cairo on his final mission.

It is not necessary to continue Gordon's story of how he was played with on the earlier occasion by our Cairo diplomatists, but one scene which gives us an amusing glimpse of Lesseps, and at the same time of Gordon's character, I will add: "The next morning," he continues, "the 8th March at 9 I went to Lesseps en route to His Highness. Lesseps said, 'See what Cherif Pasha has written to me.' 'Mon cher Vicomte, son Altesse le Khedive m'a chargé de vous présenter ses grands remerciements pour avoir accepté d'être sur la Commission d'Enquête et elle me prie d'ajouter que c'est ce qu'elle a toujours attendu d'un si ancien ami de Mehemet Ali et ses fils.' This letter had been written before I saw Lesseps, and of course His Highness thanked him for being upon the Enquête *without* the four Commissioners of the Dette, which Lesseps declined to do except under certain conditions, so the letter was written to Lesseps thanking him for services which the Khedive was furious about. Lesseps said, looking at his pretty young wife of twenty-two, 'I am off to Halowan and shall not be back until night. I have telegraphed to my Government to ask permission to be on the Enquête with you. Here is a copy of the telegram, will you give it to His Highness?' He gave it over to me to read. I read it, it was thus: 'Son Altesse le Khedive m'a prié de me joindre avec M. Gordon et les Commissionnaires de la Caisse pour faire une Enquête sur les finances d'Egypte, je demande permission.'

## *Pharaoh Flies In*

I said, 'Oh! my dear old fellow M. Lesseps, this will never do.' He said, 'Well, anyway it is off, and I am off to Halowan and shall not be back to-night.' Well, off I had to go with this telegram to Abdin. Cherif and Riaz Pasha were in the antechamber, drowsy and happily smoking. As I went in I saw a bald-headed 'coot,' the Consul-General of the Pays Bas, going in to His Highness. Cherif drowsily said, 'Well, any news?' I said, 'No, only I have a telegram for His Highness from Lesseps.' So Riaz and Cherif chatted away in Turkish till I saw the 'coot' go out and Cherif was called in. Suddenly Cherif came flying out, all drowsiness gone, and said, 'Where is the telegram of Lesseps?' I gave it him and then in came flying Pharaoh (the Khedive) with Cherif. Pharaoh threw himself on the sofa and said, 'Je suis tout à fait bouleversé avec ce télégramme de Lesseps. C'est tout à fait contre mes désirs. Barrat! (l'esclave ecrivain de son altesse) venez ici, dites a quelqu'un d'aller a Halowan et de dire a Lesseps de ne pas télégraphier à Paris,' and then turning to me His Highness said, 'I put the whole affair into your hands.' Then, calling Barrat, he said, 'Telegraph to Goschen, Gordon is charged with the whole affair, arrange with him.' Consequently I telegraphed to Goschen, 'I have recommended His Highness to suspend the payment of the next Coupon in order to pay the employés and meet pressing claims. I will arrange with you for the Commission of Inquiry into the finances.' Goschen answered, 'I will not look at you, the matter is in the hands of Her Majesty's Government.' I then wrote to His Highness and proposed that he should suspend the payment of the Coupon and pay the employés and pressing claims, that he should do it by decree and quote me. Throw all the blame upon me, saying if

## *Gordon and Vivian*

he did not like to do this I would myself write to Lord Derby, to say I had recommended His Highness to do so-and-so; that I did not ask Her Majesty's Government to give any acquiescence to it, but merely to tell them if the Khedive did this, it was my fault. The Khedive hesitated and did not answer me, and shut himself up in his harem for two days and the game was lost. (There would have been no risk in this.) Vivian (English Consul-General), of course, was on the *qui vive*; he knew that some strong measure was in prospect, and telegraphed to Her Majesty's Government, begging the same to authorize him to join the French Consul-General, to stop His Highness taking any sharp measures. Of course Vivian pointed out the Red Republican nature of your humble servant. Lord Derby, against anything abrupt, telegraphed to Vivian, who came to me and said, 'I have a telegram; I will read it to you; but you are not to say anything about it until I have communicated it to His Highness, for it would not be proper.' The telegram ran thus: 'You are authorized in conjunction with your French colleague, to inform His Highness that Her Majesty's Government trusts His Highness will do nothing without accordance with his creditors, and that Her Majesty's Government are willing to send Rivers Wilson out to help him, and that Her Majesty's Government think that Baring ought to be on the Inquiry.' Vivian then said, 'What will you recommend His Highness to do?' I said, 'I would recommend him to bow to Her Majesty's Government.' Vivian said, 'What will he do?' I said, 'He might say I am sovereign and will do as I will.' Vivian (who was a pretty black-eyed boy, and was put by General Fox under my care at the Royal Military Academy, and whom Ruck



## *The Story of the Telegram*

Keene kicked on the ankle when he was removed from that rough school) went home, and on the morrow went in great pomp to His Highness with the French Consul-General, saying on leaving, 'C'est tout ce que nous avons à dire à votre altesse pour le moment.' Of course my tongue was tied; but before they (the two Consuls-General) went to His Highness I wrote to Cherif Pasha, and said, hoping to take the wind out of their sails, 'Tell His Highness if he is troubled, to ask Her Majesty's Government for Rivers Wilson to come out and help me'; and I added (for I had begun to see, with Pharaoh wavering, it was necessary for *me* to look to *my retreat*), 'I will not act with any of the four Commissioners of the Dette.' This also gave His Highness a reason for refusing Her Majesty's Government's recommendation, that Baring should be on the Commission of Inquiry, because he could quote my objections.

• "Now, would you believe it? Vivian never gave His Highness the true telegram. He and the French Consul-General gave him a paper: 'Our Governments authorize us to inform your Highness, that they trust you will only act in accord with your creditors.' Unimportant as this paper was, it sickened him for two days, during which he only spoke of the Soudan; till at last I took an opportunity, as the moment of secrecy was over, to tell him what the true telegram was. He looked quite surprised and said, 'Why, they never told me that!' The fact, however, was that the paper the Consuls-General gave him was so vague, and the solemnity of their manner was so great, that His Highness got frightened; and when I did tell him, after these two days, he had already given in, and had agreed to have the Commissioners of the Caisse (or Dette)

### *Gordon's Quarrel with Nubar*

upon the Inquiry, and as a sequel to call for Rivers Wilson. He never told me he had given in; but four days after I heard of it, and on my seeing him he said (for it was no longer a secret that he had ceded), 'Have you any news?' I said, 'Yes, I hear your Highness has agreed to the four Commissioners of the Dette being on the Inquiry.' He said 'Yes' and the subject dropped. Five days after that I left Cairo with no honours by the ordinary train, paying my passage. The sun which rose with such splendour, set in the deepest obscurity. I calculate my financial episode cost me £800. His Highness was bored with me after my failure, and could not bear the sight of me, which his surroundings soon knew. I dare say I may have been imprudent in speech. I have no doubt it is better as it is. His Highness and I would have fallen out about the composition of the Commission of Inquiry, for I feel sure it was meant to be packed, and that I was only to be the figure head; but the families of the Ameer of Afghanistan will never change their natures; peace be to them."

After this things had only gone from bad to worse in Gordon's relations with the official world. His last act at Cairo, just before leaving it as he thought for ever at the end of 1879, was to have a serious quarrel with Nubar Pasha. He held Nubar responsible for much of Ismail's indebtedness to Europe, and for the international pressure which had been put upon him, and had led to his deposition; and at their leave-taking he had spoken his opinion of him so strongly to his face that he considered it necessary to offer the Armenian ex-Minister "satisfaction." There are letters extant referring to this and to Nubar's answer declining the hostile invitation.

There are some curious letters, too, which Gordon

### *Gordon at the Foreign Office*

wrote about the time of his arrival in London to Lady Burton, wife of Sir Richard Burton, who, like himself, had quarrelled with the Foreign Office, giving his opinion on the chief official personages at Cairo, and of those at home. In one of these he says, 4th February 1880: "You write to an orb which is setting or rather is set; I have no power to aid your husband in any way. I went to F. O. to-day and, as you know, Lord Hammond is very ill. Well, the people there were afraid of me, for I have written hard things to them, and though they knew all, they would say nought. I said, 'Who is the personification of Foreign Office?' They said, 'Currie is.' I saw Currie, but he tried to evade my question, *i.e.*, 'Would F. O. do anything to prevent the Soudan falling into chaos?' It was no use. I cornered him, and then he said, 'I am merely a clerk to register letters coming in and going out.' So then I gave it up and marvelled. I must say I was surprised to see such a thing, a great Government like ours governed by men who dare not call their souls their own. Lord Hammond rules them with a rod of iron. If your husband would understand that F. O. is at present Lord Hammond, and he is ill, he would see that I can do nothing. I have written letters to F. O. that would raise a corpse; it is no good. I have threatened to go to the French Government about the Soudan; it is no good."

Again, from Lausanne, 12th March 1880: "Of course your husband failed with Tewfik. I scent carrion a long way off and felt that the hour of my departure from Egypt had come, so I left quietly. Instead of A (Ismail), who was a good man, you have B (Tewfik), who may be good or bad as events will allow him. B is the true son of A, but has the inexperience of youth and may be smarter. The

## *His Opinion of Nubar*

problem working out in the small brains of Tewfik is this: 'my father lost his throne because he scouted the creditors; the Government only cared for the creditors; they did not care for good government, so if I look after the creditors I may govern the country as I like.' No doubt Tewfik is mistaken, but these are his views backed up by a ring of Pashas."

And a month later from Paris: "I do not like or believe in Nubar. He is my horror; for he had led the old ex-Khedive to his fall, though Nubar owed him everything. When Ismaïl became Khédive, Nubar had £3 a month; he now owns £1,000,000. Things will not and cannot go straight in Egypt; and I would say, 'Let them glide.' Before long time elapses things will come to a crisis. The best way is to let all minor affairs rest, and to consider quietly how the ruin is to fall. It must fall ere long. United Bulgaria—Austria; Syria—France; and Egypt—England. France would then have as much interest in repelling Russia as we have. Supposing you got out Riaz, why you would have Riaz's brother; and if you got rid of the latter, you would have Riaz's nephew. *Le plus on change, le plus c'est la même chose.* . . . Egypt is usurped by the family of the Sandjak of Salonique, and (by our folly) we have added a ring of Circassian pashas. The whole lot should go."

These letters show what Gordon's attitude was towards the Khedive Tewfik and the regime of the Dual Control, and are useful as explaining how impossible it seemed two and three years later at Cairo that he should ever again be employed in the Khedivial service, or accept such were it offered him. It was hardly better as between him and the Foreign Office. His final quarrel with our diplomacy will be found narrated in an entry of my diary of 1880 quoted in my "Secret History," which tells the story

## *"Eyes like Blue Diamonds"*

of Gordon's correspondence with Lord Lyons at the Paris Embassy on his way home to England. It was in regard to what he considered ought to be done in the matter of appointing his successor at Khartoum, and this was repeated at the Foreign Office on his arrival in London. Talking over this episode of Gordon's career with Sir Rivers Wilson recently (1910), he repeated to me the story with more circumstantial details. At that time, the spring of 1880, Wilson was in the habit of being consulted at the Foreign Office on Egyptian matters; and he told me that on one occasion he was sent for by Lord Salisbury, who was then Foreign Secretary, and asked his opinion of Gordon in connection with some proposals that had been made at the War Office for his re-employment. Wilson, while Finance Minister at Cairo the year before, had come into collision with Gordon, not personally but officially, and a number of violent telegrams had passed between the two, Gordon being at Khartoum, Wilson at Cairo. They had never met, and now both had left Egypt, and both under an official cloud. Wilson, in spite of their quarrel and though he considered Gordon wrong-headed and perverse, entertained a high personal respect for him, and hearing of his arrival in London, left a card on him at the hotel where he was lodging, and Gordon returned the visit next morning, as he explained, "to apologize for the rudeness of his telegrams." Wilson on this occasion was much taken with "the strange little unpretending man with eyes like blue diamonds," and had much conversation with him about the affairs of Egypt, in which both were interested; he knew the common talk at the Foreign Office, where Gordon was considered mad, and when a few days later Salisbury asked his opinion about him, he under-

## *Gordon in India*

stood at once what was in question, Gordon's sanity, and answered that though Gordon for all ordinary Foreign Office work was officially "impossible," nevertheless, if there were anything exceptionally astonishing to do in a wild country, he was the man to do it, as, for instance, to settle matters with Cetewayo, the Zulu chieftain who was giving trouble in South Africa.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, the idea of Gordon's madness persisted at the Foreign Office, and he remained unemployed either there or at the War Office as long as the Tories were in power.

Gordon's life for the next year was a series of abortive undertakings, accepted in haste and repented of at leisure. On the formation of Gladstone's ministry of May 1880, Lord Ripon, having been appointed Viceroy of India, offered him the post, a very important one, of going with him as his official private secretary. The offer was made to him through the instrumentality of Lord Northbrook, who had been in correspondence with him about various matters during his own Viceroyalty, and Gordon, under the idea that an entirely new departure was about to be taken in India, according to those principles of justice and self-government of which he approved, without well considering his own unfitness for a post whose principal duties were essentially those of con-

<sup>1</sup> At one moment there was an idea of Gordon's going to Zanzibar, where there were points of difficulty needing solution. I recollect something of this, and that a question had been raised by the Sultan of Zanzibar in regard to the abolition of slavery in his dominions. The Sultan was a very enlightened prince, and would have willingly emancipated the whole of his slaves could he have replaced them with free labourers, and he had made application to the India Office for their consent to employ coolies from Bombay to take their place, and I had some correspondence at the time with Lord Lytton on the matter, though it led to no result.

## *Gordon in Ireland*

ciliation, self-effacement, and the disguising of unpleasant truths, in an ill-considered moment accepted. An interesting memorandum will be found in the Appendix giving the true story of Gordon's ideas at starting with Lord Ripon, and the reason of his resignation within a few days of their arrival at Bombay. It has never before, I believe, been published. He had held the post barely a month.<sup>1</sup>

Three days later, 7th July, we find him embarked on a new adventure in consequence of a telegram received from China, whither he had been called by Sir Robert Hart to advise on a threatened quarrel between the Chinese Emperor and the Emperor of Russia; and without delay he proceeds thither, gives his advice for peace, which is sound and good, but refuses to stay more than two days at Peking, and, having come into collision with our diplomacy at Tientsin, as he had before at Cairo, he leaves once more for England, which he reaches 21st October. His restless energy at this period seems to have had no bounds.

The same autumn saw him in the west of Ireland, whither he had gone "to have a little shooting and satisfy himself on the state of the lower classes." Here again he was bent upon good work, and from Glengariff addressed a memorandum to Lord Northbrook on the subject of settling the land question on lines identical with those adopted in 1886, but so far in advance of what Gladstone's Government was as yet prepared for that Downing Street became more than ever convinced that, as Sir E. Hamilton wrote to me about it, "the writer did not seem to be clothed in the rightest of minds."<sup>2</sup> In February 1881 we find him offering his views (quite sound ones) about Afghanistan to the "Times,"

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix.

<sup>2</sup> See "Secret History."

### *My Recollection of him*

and about the art of irregular warfare to the "Army and Navy Gazette." In April he offers his services to the Cape Government to assist in terminating the Basuto war, and soon after, in May, wishing to serve a friend, he volunteers for Mauritius. In July and September he addresses the Government on the question of the Suez Canal, the route to India by the Cape, and the uselessness of Malta and Gibraltar; and on the 24th of March 1882, having received his promotion to the rank of General, he leaves Mauritius for the Cape, where he accepts new service in Basutoland and does good work. But again not for long; and the 14th of October sees him once more in England—having again quarrelled with the Cape authorities. The year had been one of constant activity and constant change, and of that unconscious self-advertisement he reproached himself with later to his sister as "Agag" or "hailing the tram of the world."

It was at this time, during his short stay in London at the close of 1882, that I had the talk with him described at the beginning of this volume. His personality, as I saw him then, remains very clear with me. It is that of a little, quite unmilitary man, not specially distinguished except for his clear gray-blue eyes, and his singularly frank, unconventional manner. There was nothing in the smallest degree assertive about him, or which could give a stranger the idea of his being a leader of men, or a man accustomed to authority and importance in the world. His conversation was pleasant without any special grace of manner, and he impressed me principally with an appearance of extreme natural goodness and honesty of speech. He had, what is often the case with men of very superior understanding, a great humility in expressing his opinion even about those



## *He Retires to Jerusalem*

things he knew the best. At the same time he was quite able to maintain his own in argument, and had much wit and pleasant humour in discussion. He seemed to take it for granted that the person he was talking to was as good and honest as himself, and with as good a right to an opinion. At that time, as far as my recollection goes, he had no thought of ever returning to Egypt. He had quarrelled too entirely with Tewfik and the Pashas, who composed the Khedivial Court party under the restored regime, to think it possible. His mind was set on a religious retreat in the Holy Land, and, if he had any other plan beyond, it was to take service under King Leopold on the Congo. It was one of his aberrations of intelligence to be constantly deceived as to character, and he looked upon Leopold as an enlightened prince, and his Congo scheme as a humanitarian enterprise for the suppression of the slave trade.

Thus at the end of the year 1882, instead of going to Egypt he left England for Jerusalem, and stayed on in its neighbourhood for nearly the whole of 1883. This was the most mystical part of his life, and has been fully dealt with in various semi-religious works. I confess that it is difficult for any one who is not himself a mystic to read these without a suspicion that on this one point Gordon was at this time less than entirely sane. His great object in visiting the Holy Land was to re-read the Bible, which had been his constant study all his life, on the spot where so many of the events recorded in it happened. He had convinced himself that by prayer and study every riddle contained in the Book could be made clear down to the smallest historical and geographical allusions, hence his time was devoted to localizing the various biblical events, and reconciling difficulties

## *Biblical Speculations*

by solutions, which he considered to be inspired as he read. This led him sometimes into a labyrinth of impossibilities, which he nevertheless clung to and expounded in his letters to his friends, and not to his religious friends only, or to his sister, though these were the chief recipients of his confidences, but to some whom one would have thought entirely outside the category of those to whom such could possibly be made. One of them may be quoted as showing how far he was from the track of ordinary reason about the physical facts of the modern world we know. It might have been written by a recluse of the sixth century, while it was addressed to one no less a Gallio about spiritual things than the late Sir Richard Burton. Gordon had been trying to identify the respective sites of the Garden of Eden and of Ararat, where Noah's Ark rested, with other points of biblical geography, which he thought might interest Burton as a geographer and Oriental scholar. "My idea," he says, writing from Jerusalem, June 3, 1883, "is that the Pison is the Blue Nile, and that the sons of Joktan were at Harrar, Abyssinian Godjam, but it is not well supported. The rock of Harrar was the platform Adam was moulded on out of clay from the Potters' Field. He was then put in Seychelles, Eden, and after the Fall, brought back to Mount Moriah to till the ground in the place he was taken from. Noah built the ark twelve miles from Jaffa at Ain Judeh; the Flood began, the Ark floated up and rested on Mount Baris, afterwards Antonia; he sacrificed on the Rock (Adam was buried on Skull Hill, hence the skull under the Cross). It was only 776 A.D. that Mount Ararat of Armenia became the site of the Ark's descent. Koràn says El Judi (Ararat) is holy land. After the Flood the remnants went East to plain of Shimar. Had they gone

### *Gordon's Religious Monomania*

East from El Judi, near Mosul, or from Armenian Ararat they could never have reached Shimar. Shem was Melchizedek." Was ever serious letter written to so mocking a reader?

The question of Gordon's religious monomania is a difficult one to handle. In treating it, it is hardly possible not to do violence to what is sacred to us all, our beliefs, avowed or unavowed, in the supernatural. There are very few who in their hearts do not hold and cling to beliefs quite contrary to reason, and who do not attach to their own personalities an importance in the immensity of things they cannot at all deserve. Who then of us has a right to say of his fellow that he is less than reasonable because he believes this or that doctrine of his relations with the unseen more strongly than the rest? Gordon was not singular among Englishmen, even in our unbelieving day, in his thought that God had created him for a special purpose in the world—it is indeed the foundation of all Christian doctrine—nor is it easy to argue that the logical deduction he drew from it that God, having so created him, was also in constant communication with him, inspiring him with a daily knowledge how to fulfil that purpose, was other than a sane one. Nevertheless we cannot leave out of account this feature of the position if we are to consider the public case, which we are now fast approaching. The truth would seem to be that his year at Jerusalem was for him, if I may use an expression theologians would not I think condemn, a complete religious debauch which left him more than ever the prey of his own visions, a puppet in the hands of his imagined duty to do this or that for God, he knew not what, which God should presently reveal to him. He was waiting for a call. His letters that year to his sister and to Doctor Barnes, a friend of the

## *Doctor Barnes' Influence*

same school of pietism as his own, give indications of this. Under Doctor Barnes' influence he had during the past two years shifted somewhat his position in regard to the Church of England, of which he was not before a professed member. He had never been confirmed, but he now became a regular communicant, even adopting the doctrine of transubstantiation, or at any rate of there being supernatural elements in the sacrament of bread and wine. His letters are full of this. He corresponded, too, while at Jerusalem with English Church dignitaries, and through Doctor Barnes became intimate with Bishop Temple, and in this way the aspect of his religious mind, which before had been extremely eclectic, became more definitely that of orthodox English Christianity.

Of what the future was to bring him he wrote little, but there are several letters of his about Egypt which are of interest and may be given here.

These are to his sister:

"28 *February* 1883.—Wonderful are the works of God in the Soudan! Look at His work. He has upset the Egyptian people thoroughly, and they will get their liberty from the oppressing Pachas. He has permitted this revolt, which will end, I believe, in the suppression of the slave trade and slaveholding, and He has humbled *me*. I will speak about myself for one moment. I foresaw the Egyptian and Soudan affair, and was not listened to. I am glad I was humiliated, for the things of this world will pass away. I expect Laurence Oliphant will go to the Soudan; there will be no end of trouble to reconquer it, and I am sorely tempted to write Lord Dufferin my ideas; but I will not, for Jesus is Lord and He knows what to do."

*"Arabi Will be Back in a Year"*

"3 *March* 1883.—I have great comfort in thinking that our Lord rules every petty and great event of life both on a small and large scale. Therefore He governs the Soudan now through A., B., and C., as much as he did when I was there, and neither I, nor A., B., and C., have or had anything to do with the Government, as far as others were concerned. With respect to the motives of our actions, it is another matter; they are the permanent residues—the things unseen. This comforts me, for I feel that their welfare, and the course of events that takes place, are being conducted by the same hand, whether I am there or not."

"13 *March*.—. . . I am quite quiet about the Cape and the Soudan; my sympathies are with the people of those countries and not with the Turkish Pashas whom our Government will try and replace. Good will come of it."

To me he wrote: "*April* 3, 1883.—I am living quietly enough here and do not hear anything from Egypt. I expect Arabi will be back there in a year or so. Some of the officers from Egypt have been here. I do not think that it will be a favourite station for the army. I expect that the only man who can, humanly speaking, give quiet to Egypt and some hope of our benefiting the people is Nubar. He is the sort of man who could work with Arabi, and I think the trials he has gone through have benefited him. It is very quiet here, and one can live undisturbed, which is a great comfort. Government ought to get Tewfik's deposition cancelled by the new House, for it has not been so at present."

Again to his sister:

"16 *April* 1883.—I am at work from morning to

### *His View of Hicks' Position*

night. As for Egypt and the Cape, I no more care for them; and Lord Dufferin's despatch shows that, even had I gone out, it would have been another fiasco."

"7 May 1883.—. . . I had a letter from Egypt which is not very sanguine about the state of affairs, all because our Government will not say they will stay; yet stay they must, whether they like it or not."

On the 15th August, when the difficulty of General Hicks' position in the Soudan became known to him, he wrote: "If they do not make Nubar Pasha prime minister or regent in Egypt they will have trouble, as he is the only man who can rule that country. . . . Unless Hicks is given supreme power he is lost, it can never work putting him in a subordinate position, recent events at Cairo show what dependence can be placed upon the Pashas. . . . Hicks must be made Governor General, otherwise he will never end things satisfactorily." On 2nd September he writes to Laurence Oliphant, then at Haifa: "Her Majesty's Government right or wrong will not take a decided line in re Egypt and the Soudan, they drift but at the same time cannot avoid the onus of being the real power in Egypt with the corresponding advantage of being so. It is undoubtedly the fact that they maintain Tewfik and the Pashas in power against the will of the people. This alone is insufferable from disgusting the people, to whom also Her Majesty's Government have given no inducement to make themselves popular. Their present action is a dangerous one, for without any advantage over the Canal or to England, they keep a running sore open with France and are acting in a way which will justify Russia to act in a similar way in Armenia, and Austria in Salonica.

## *The Palestine Canal*

Further than that, Her Majesty's Government must eventually gain the odium which will fall upon them when the interest of the debt fails to be paid, which will soon be the case. Also, Her Majesty's Government cannot possibly avoid the responsibility for the state of affairs in the Soudan, where a wretched war drags on in a ruined country, at a cost of half a million per annum, at least.

"I say therefore to avoid all this, if Her Majesty's Government will not act firmly and strongly and take the country (which, if I were they, I would not do), let them attempt to get the Palestine Canal made and quit Egypt to work out its own salvation. In doing so lots of anarchy will take place. This anarchy is inseparable from a peaceful solution; it is the travail in birth. Her Majesty's Government do not prevent anarchy now; therefore, better leave the country and thus avoid a responsibility which gives no advantage and is mean and dangerous."

"15 *September* 1883.—If the Palestine canal is made we shall abandon Egypt, which will then get self government, and will succeed under God's blessing, for He has a blessing for it."

"28 *September* 1883.—. . . Graham (Sir Gerald) writes from Egypt that he is likely to go there at the end of the year: that looks as though we should evacuate it. I like watching how God governs all things there; He acts to us as we act to others."

"25 *November* 1883.—. . . As for the Soudan, I am much interested, but should feel repugnance to going back there; and that is a great gain, for I had a sneaking desire to return there, when I first came out here. As for the Congo, I have not much choice left me."

The Palestine Canal, to which he alludes, was a somewhat fanciful scheme much talked of at the time by which the Jordan Valley and the Dead

## *A Fulfilment of Prophecy*

Sea were to be inundated and transformed into a long narrow lake, united at the one end with the Mediterranean by a cutting at Haifa, and at the other end with the Red Sea at Akabah. It interested Gordon principally because he looked upon it as the possible fulfilment of Ezekiel's prophecy, "Their fish [*i.e.*, of the Dead Sea] shall be according to their kinds as the fish of the great sea [Mediterranean] and it shall come to pass that the fishers shall stand upon it from En-Gedi even unto En-Eglaim; they shall be a place to spread forth nets." He also looked upon it as a possible alternative route to the Suez Canal, which was the excuse of our having occupied Egypt. "Anything," he says about the scheme, "is better than the wretched want of sympathy between us and the Egyptians, which is now daily increasing into a deadly hate. We must have a nemesis unless we show more sympathy. What single good thing have we done the people? . . . Our Government will never get out of Egypt, for the Europeans there will thwart any reform."

These quotations are of some value as an indication of what his policy was for Egypt as well as the Soudan, immediately previous to his employment by the British Government there. As will be seen in the next chapter, they must already to some extent have had their influence at the Foreign Office. His thoughts, however, were but little connected with Egypt. It was not to Egypt but to the Congo that he intended to proceed, and it was in obedience to a summons from King Leopold at the end of the year that, waking out of his long religious trance, he returned to Europe. His first visit was to Brussels, and only after he had arranged things there with Leopold did he go on, on the 7th of January 1884, to his sister's house at Southampton.



## CHAPTER V

### GORDON'S LAST MISSION

THE problem of how, notwithstanding Gordon's well-known views about the Soudan and Egypt, and the recollection of his past conflicts with our diplomacy both at Cairo and in Downing Street, and the belief entertained there of his madness, he came to be once more employed by Gladstone's Government, and sent to Khartoum on a mission ostensibly not of his own choosing, and then left to perish, is one of perennial interest, which history has not yet finally solved. It has been variously dealt with by official apologists as well as by Gordon's friends. Morley has given an authoritative version of it in his "Life of Gladstone," Fitzmaurice another in his "Life of Granville," and Cromer yet a third in his "Modern Egypt"; but they none of them agree; while opposed to them we have Sir Henry Gordon's and Egmont Hake's narratives, supplemented by Stead's account of his own part in it, and no few other annalists who each has added his contribution to the general knowledge. Above all we have Gordon's own diary at Khartoum, and we have the Blue Books, a body of official information bulkier, perhaps, than that concerning any individual ever employed by the British Government since Blue Books were first published. Nevertheless I doubt if the whole truth has yet been told, or the real reasons given, or the responsibility of failure placed quite on the right shoulders. I will endeavour to supply the lacking evidence and reconcile the various narratives.

The first official suggestion of Gordon's re-employ-

## *Dufferin Suggests Gordon*

ment in Egypt seems to have been due to Sir Charles Wilson, that excellent engineer officer who, it will be remembered (see "Secret History") did such good service to Egypt and the cause of justice at the time of Arabi's trial. Wilson was at that time very closely in Lord Dufferin's confidence, having served under him as perambulating Consul-General for some years in Asia Minor; and, being a personal friend and fellow officer of Gordon's and better acquainted than any Englishman then at Cairo with Soudanese affairs, he was consulted by Dufferin on the subject as soon as the latter arrived in Egypt. The result was a despatch, dated 18th November 1882, in which, after repeating Wilson's opinion, Dufferin adds: "It can be understood that the Khedive should be unwilling to abandon a country with such possibilities of development; and it is probable that, if only some person like Colonel Gordon could be found to undertake its administration, fairly good government might be maintained there without drawing upon Egypt either for men or money. Colonel Gordon I believe has already broken up and disorganized in a great measure the former centres of the slave traffic, and the same energy and ability which has gone so near to effecting this difficult task ought to be sufficient to keep the country in order."

Although, as already explained, I do not believe that at that date, and apart from a change of Khedive and a reconstruction of the National party at Cairo, Gordon could have effected any permanent settlement of the Soudan trouble unsupported by an adequate military force from without, there was still a chance that something of the sort might have succeeded.

It is just possible that, if Gordon had been sent

## *Stewart's Report*

at once to Khartoum, and that if, as was being talked of at the end of the year 1882, Wilson had succeeded Malet at Cairo, and a Nationalist Ministry been reinstated, even under Tewfik, Gordon might have succeeded in reconstituting an effective government at Khartoum in opposition to the Mahdi, though I doubt it for the reasons already given. At any rate the suggestion was not adopted—it is probable that Riaz and the other Pashas of the restored regime opposed it<sup>1</sup>—and nothing more came of it than the sending of Colonel D. H. Stewart to Khartoum “to report,” and a little later, January 1883, to an offer made by Dufferin to Wilson that he should himself go to Khartoum as Governor-General. Wilson, I think, wisely declined this, for it was already too late; and on his refusal Hicks was entrusted with the thankless task, with the result we have seen.

Stewart's report of affairs on arrival at Khartoum proved of the most pessimistic kind. He placed the Mahdi's followers at 338,000 men, and recommended the abandonment of the southern and eastern provinces to their own chiefs, and Darfour to its original Royal Family. He pronounced the Egyptians “quite unfit in every way to undertake such a trust as the government of so vast a country with a view to its welfare”—and in opposition to Wilson, who believed in the Soudan as a country of great prospective wealth, he pronounced it to be a financial burden on Egypt hardly worth retaining.

<sup>1</sup> The MS. of Sir William Butler's Autobiography, recently published, contained, I am told, a passage which was struck out of the printed volume in the editing, to the effect that not only did the Cairo Government of the day reject the proposal of Gordon's services, but that he was to have been refused permission to land in Egypt had he proposed to do so on his way to Jerusalem.

## *Wilson and Stewart*

While mentioning the names of these two, distinguished officers, Wilson and Stewart, who were destined to play each of them a tragic part in the coming drama of Gordon's defence of Khartoum, I will say what I remember of them personally, for it so happened that I met them both at Aleppo in the summer of 1881. They were travelling together at the time, employed on special service as consuls in Asia Minor, under the terms of the Cyprus Convention, and they were both staying, as I was, for some days in the house of the British Consul. They were men of very different types and characters. Wilson shared many of Gordon's characteristics. He was a serious man, with a large knowledge of the East, and much sympathy with its peoples, altogether humane and lovable. Like Gordon, he was a biblical scholar and greatly interested in the topography of such of the lands in which he travelled as were connected with the Old and New Testaments. He had served with Palmer and others on the Palestine Exploration Staff, and was full of learning on the subjects that interested him. After our meeting at Aleppo he travelled with us to Scanderoon, and on by sea as far as Smyrna, where we parted company. I have always retained a very pleasant recollection of him and a high respect for his character. Stewart, on the other hand, though also a hard worker and a man of ability, was of a quite different type. He was a smart young cavalry captain of Hussars, the 11th, with all the ordinary English officer's contempt for "natives" and inability to deal courteously with them. Though I found him an excellent fellow in other ways, our ideas on the East differed entirely. He was all for the extension of English authority, and had little sympathy with Orientals. He was desirous, at the moment, of visiting the Anazeh tribes,

## *Stewart's Character*

from some of which I had just come, and I gave him letters to two or three of the leading Anazeh Sheykhs, my friends. But he, after galloping about the desert for some weeks with a Turkish escort, gave up his attempt, having failed to get into pleasant relations with any of them; they "were all," he explained to me, "such rogues and liars." I judge his character by this. He was a good, active, fearless young Englishman, with all our English virtues, but too little fellow feeling with ways not English to succeed in inspiring Eastern confidence. In one of his dispatches from Khartoum he expresses his "contempt and disgust" for what he holds to be the "cowardice" of the poor exiled Arabist soldiers at Khartoum, sent to die in a cause they abhorred. He could not understand their unwillingness as soldiers to fight.

Lord Cromer's high opinion of Stewart was justified by the fact that both in their separate ways were typical of our English intolerance of Oriental character, and one needs no other explanation than this to understand how it was that Stewart and Gordon failed to pull together. Stewart's death by treachery at Arab hands was one of the minor tragedies of the Nile campaign. His report, nevertheless, of February 1883, was an able one, and had considerable influence on Soudanese policy. Dufferin, in his own report, written about the same time as Stewart's, adopts more than one of his ideas, and though Dufferin takes a far more cheerful view of the situation, as was natural in a man of his hopeful Irish nature, he recommends with Stewart the abandonment of the western provinces. "Some persons," says Dufferin, "are inclined to advise Egypt to withdraw altogether from the Soudan and her other acquisitions in that region. But she can hardly be expected to acquiesce in such a policy. Possessing the lower

## *Dufferin's Soudan Policy*

ranges of the Nile, she is naturally inclined to claim dominion along its entire course; and when it is remembered that the territories in question, if properly developed, are capable of producing inexhaustible supplies of sugar and cotton, we cannot be surprised at her unwillingness to abandon them. Unhappily, Egyptian administration in the Soudan has been almost uniformly unfortunate. The success of the present Mahdi . . . is a sufficient proof of the Government's inability either to reconcile the inhabitants to its rule or to maintain order. The consequences have been most disastrous." He then goes on to say that he places high hopes on General Hicks, who has just been appointed Chief of the Staff at Khartoum, and to suggest the construction of a Souakin to Berber railway, which would "change all the elements of the problem. . . . The finances of the Soudan once rehabilitated . . . commerce would eventually extend the blessings of civilization for some distance through the surrounding region. I apprehend, however," he concludes, "that it would be wise upon the part of Egypt to abandon Darfur, and perhaps Kordofan, and to be content with maintaining her jurisdiction in the provinces of Khartoum and Senaar."

This part of the report, we know from Wilson's biographer, was practically Wilson's own; and we know also that Wilson and Gordon were at one on the subject, and there can be little doubt that, if Dufferin had had full power at the date of his report to deal with the Soudan, and if Wilson had gone there, such would have been his instructions. As it was, the Foreign Office resolved on doing nothing, and Hicks was left unaided and undirected. It was not till nine months later that the question of either Wilson or Gordon was brought

### *Granville proposes Gordon*

forward by Lord Granville. It came about in this way.

In the fortnight immediately following the news of Hicks's disaster, Gordon, who had powerful friends both at Cairo, in Sir Charles Watson and Sir Evelyn Wood, and at the War Office, in Lord Wolseley and Reginald Brett (Lord Esher), had his name brought forward, whether consciously or unconsciously I am not sure, in official circles as a possible saviour of what was now an almost hopeless situation at Khartoum. At the War Office it was known that Gordon, though he considered himself engaged to King Leopold for the Congo, would not in his secret heart be otherwise than glad to take the affairs of the Sudan once more in hand. He was beginning to chafe at his long inaction in the Holy Land, and had a longing for his old life of active employment; and, at the suggestion probably of Hartington, and perhaps also of Northbrook, with whom Gordon was in occasional correspondence, Lord Granville, so we are informed by Fitzmaurice, wrote to Gladstone, 27th November: "Do you see any objection to using Gordon in some way? He has an immense name in Egypt, he is popular at home, he is a strong but very sensible opponent of slavery, he has a small bee in his bonnet. If you do not object I could consult Baring by telegraph." To this Gladstone consented, and the telegram, which appears in the Blue Books, was dispatched to Cromer, 1st December: "If General Charles Gordon were willing to go to Egypt would he be of any use to you or to the Egyptian Government, and if so in what capacity?" Cromer, however, without ceremony refused the offer. He explains in "Modern Egypt" that his real reason for refusing was that he knew Gordon to be an entirely unfit person for the task, and that the

### *Gordon "an Unfit Person"*

reason he gave at the time of the Egyptian Government's being unwilling to send a Christian to Khartoum, in view of the religious feeling there, was not the true one; and he proceeds to give his reasons, founded on his knowledge of Gordon's character, for his belief in the unfitness, though he says nothing of their personal quarrel in 1878, or of the ill-relations in past years between Gordon and Tewfik.

It is certain all the same that Gordon's status as a Christian was a perfectly sound reason with Sherif for refusing his appointment, as Gordon himself discovered when it was too late, three months afterwards. And I cannot help suspecting that the whole plea of personal "unfitness," put forward in "*Modern Egypt*," has been an afterthought on Cromer's part, devised to screen his own share in Gordon's mission and its failure. That Cromer and Gordon were personally antipathetic we know. But, except as a Christian, it is nonsense to talk of Gordon as an "unfit" person for such a duty as was then proposed. It had not at that time been as yet decided that Khartoum was to be evacuated, and no Englishman could have possibly been more fit than Gordon to hold it, if that was possible, against the Mahdi, and restore the Khedive's lost authority. What Gordon was really unfit for, was to be the obedient agent of a shifty and treacherous diplomacy, nominally a servant of Egypt, but ready to execute any order of the British Agency at Cairo, and to defend or betray his Egyptian employers at English bidding. Cromer's idea of loyalty and fitness for service in Egypt was always that of loyalty to himself. Gordon's was a quite different idea. He held that an Englishman, accepting employment and receiving pay from a foreign prince, was bound in honour to do the best he could, not for his own country's diplomatic inter-



### *The "Pall Mall Gazette"*

ests, but for the advantage of the prince and people he served. If Cromer had told us the whole of his thought in "Modern Egypt," we should have found it to be this, and that it was in this sense only, and of his own personal dislike that his objection to Gordon on the ground of "unfitness" must be understood.

Still less is there any truth in what he goes on to say that at this time, December 1883, his hand was forced about Gordon by the London press, and especially the "Pall Mall Gazette"; for such is the reverse of fact and easily disproved. Any one who will take the trouble of looking through the files of the chief London newspapers of that date will find hardly any mention in them at all of Gordon. Indeed, the press seems to have been quite ignorant of the proposal made regarding him. During the whole of that year, 1883, Gordon had been all but ignored by the English public; and, with the exception of two "headed articles" in the "Times," written early in the year while Dufferin was still considering the appointment of Hicks, and one or two references to Gordon in the "St. James's Gazette," I can find absolutely nothing about him. As to the "Pall Mall," that paper was on all matters where Egypt was concerned run strictly on Gladstonian lines, advocating the evacuation of the country at the earliest possible date, and with regard to the Soudan complete abstention. All the earlier part of the year Morley had been still its editor; and he, having experienced a revulsion of feeling in regard to the attitude his paper had taken in bringing about the war of 1882, was now in a mood of anti-Imperialist repentance, nor had the "Pall Mall" changed its tone when Morley, having entered Parliament, left his desk in Northumberland Street at the end of August.

### *Stead depreciates Gordon*

William Stead, the new editor, who four months later was to run Gordon for the Soudan, and be the chief advocate of accepting responsibility in Egypt, was still in October reproving the Tory press for this very advocacy, and indignant with the "Times" for its protest against the withdrawal of the troops. As to Gordon, the only mention of him is one rather of depreciation, written at the time of the first news of Hicks' defeat, and the article might have emanated from the pen of Lord Cromer himself; "Sir Samuel Baker," says Stead in a leading article, 20th November, on the disaster in Kordofan, "fought and conquered in the same region, and it was also the scene of the labours of Colonel Gordon, but although we should have lamented the fate of either of these daring adventurers, no one dreamed that their defeat and death would have entailed any responsibility upon the English Government. The fact that since Gordon's resignation we have occupied the Delta makes no difference in our relation to the officers in command of the Egyptian forces in the Soudan. Whether Hicks falls, or whether he conquers is not our business. *Not a single British soldier will be ordered to Khartoum if the Mahdi were to rout the whole force under the orders of the Khedive's officers.* . . . The question arises whether Sir E. Baring ought not to tell the Egyptian Government that this kind of folly has gone on long enough, and that there would be no chance of the re-establishment of its prestige, credit, and independence, until its ambition in the Soudan is restricted within a manageable compass."

This article, be it noted, was published just a week before Granville's proposal to send Gordon, and, while it stands in strange contrast with Stead's pronouncements of two and three months later, it

### *Cromer affected by Panic*

contradicts absolutely Lord Cromer's excuse that the sending of Gordon was forced on the Government by Stead. It is a mere juggling with the issue to shift the date of the pressure exercised by the press in January and February, 1884, back to November and December 1883. I will return to this matter of the "Pall Mall" and the London press later. What is of more historical importance is to show, as can easily be done by a reference to the Blue Books and to his own avowals, that Cromer, in spite of his attempt to shift the responsibility of the Gordon mission from his own on to the back of the London public, was himself, in all but the individual choice of Gordon as its instrument, the responsible proposer of the mission. The facts are these:

Lord Cromer tells us that his first anxiety about Hicks and the Soudan was in consequence of a talk with Giegler Pasha on 19th November, the day before the article last quoted. Giegler seems to have infected Cromer with something of the panic at that time beginning to prevail at Khartoum; and, taking as he did a purely financial view of the situation, he straightway telegraphed to Granville that, if Hicks should be beaten, "the wisest course for the Egyptian Government to adopt would be to accept defeat and fall back on whatever point of the Nile they could hold with confidence." There is nothing, however, to show that at that time he meant more by this advice than to repeat Dufferin's recommendation of a withdrawal from the southern and western provinces, and a concentration on Khartoum and Suakin. Indeed I think it is pretty clear that it was so understood at the Foreign Office when Granville the next day replied, "If consulted, recommend the abandonment of the Soudan *within certain limits*." It was then that the idea of Gordon's

## *Colonel Coetlogon*

being sent was suggested; and certainly if an Englishman was to go in order to carry out the abandonment Gordon was the obvious man. There was, indeed, nobody else to do it with anything like as good a chance of success. The only English officer then at Khartoum was Colonel Coetlogon, an acknowledged incapable, who had telegraphed that Khartoum could not hold out two months against the Mahdi, while Gordon, though not dispatched till January, and though ultimately unsuccessful, managed by his great energy and military genius to keep the Egyptian flag flying at Khartoum for nearly twelve months after Coetlogon's date. Yet Cromer in his "Modern Egypt" says he judged Gordon for this purpose, "an unfit person." The next stage in the affair is that, the panic at Khartoum still continuing, Cromer on the 3rd December writes a long dispatch, still under the influence of the panic, recommending a withdrawal of the Egyptian garrisons, not only to Khartoum or Berber, but even as far as to Wady Halfa, thus abandoning the Soudan in its entirety. It was probably Coetlogon's continued telegrams that suggested it, and the unwillingness of the English Government to give any material assistance. And to this proposal Granville, on 13th December, at once assents, explaining that all the English Government is prepared to do is to "assist in maintaining order in Egypt proper, and in defending it as well as the ports in the Red Sea."

By the 22nd December, however, we find Cromer in a different mood. He had found the Egyptian Government unable to "agree to the abandonment of the territories which they consider absolutely necessary for the security and even for the existence itself" of Egypt, and they were for invoking the aid of the Sultan and of Turkish troops. Moreover, the

### *Cromer proposes Mission*

reports from Khartoum had begun to be less alarming; the Mahdi had not advanced to attack the place, and was lingering on at El Obeyd. Although Cromer does not say so precisely in his despatch of that date (22nd December), it is easy to read between the lines of it that the idea had occurred to him that, while insisting upon the abandonment of the whole Soudan by Egypt, it might be possible not to surrender it to the Mahdi, but to build up some other form of native self-government, under English direction at Khartoum, which should constitute a semi-civilized buffer state between Egypt and the Mahdi's fanatical rule. The idea of this is to be found in the last sentences of his despatch, where, after recounting the difficulties attendant on the proposed withdrawal and the objections raised by Sherif Pasha, he goes on, in contradiction of his first alarmist dispatches: "The immediate position is not, I think, so alarming as appears to be thought in England. Dissensions seem to be rife among the tribes of the Soudan, some of the most important being opposed to the Mahdi. It is quite possible that by a judicious expenditure of money and by good management the Government of the Khedive may succeed in maintaining its authority northwards from Khartoum. They will not, however, be able to hold that country except on sufferance, and I believe them to be perfectly incapable of governing it properly." Therefore they must be coerced into abandoning it, and he asks for power to coerce them. "The only way," he says, "in which it can be carried out, will be for me to inform the Khedive that Her Majesty's Government insist on the adoption of this course, and that if his present Ministers will not carry out the policy others must be named who will consent to do so." Then he adds, disclosing here his thought: "*It would also*

### *Cromer alters Dispatch*

*be necessary to send an English officer of high authority to Khartoum with full power to withdraw the garrisons and to make the best arrangements possible for the future government of that country."*

I recommend this dispatch to the renewed attention of historians, for in it lies not only the demand for new absolute powers to be undertaken by England in Egypt, but also in regard to the Soudan, the germ of that claim, afterwards enforced upon the Khedive in 1899, that Egypt should abandon the Soudan, leaving it to England to decide what later should be its status. The Egyptian Government was to withdraw its troops, but "an English officer of high authority" was to be sent to Khartoum, not only to insist upon the withdrawal, but also to provide the Soudan with a new government. One cannot help thinking that Cromer may have already contemplated what he afterwards carried out, the appropriation of the great Nile provinces to England herself.

At any rate it is quite certain that we see in this dispatch of 22nd December clearly set forth what was to be the Gordon mission, though Gordon himself is not named in it. An English officer was to go to Khartoum not only to bring away the garrison, as was afterwards pretended, but to re-establish order and set up a new political regime. It is characteristic of Cromer's lack of scruple as a historian that, in order to evade admitting his initial responsibility for the mission and for its failure, he should have omitted, in quoting the concluding sentence of this dispatch in "Modern Egypt," the essential word "English," and should have altered it into "an officer of high authority," thereby enabling him to make it appear that it was not Gordon or any Englishman, but an Egyptian officer he had in his mind when

### *Nobody thinking of Gordon*

writing it. The omission can hardly have been an accident in a passage so important. Yet none of his critics so far have noticed the manœuvre.<sup>1</sup>

This brings us to the end of the year 1883, and almost to the date, 7th January 1884, of Gordon's arrival from Palestine in England; and again I beg the attention of historians to what I am now going to say.

The particular choice of Gordon for the mission Cromer had proposed, though as we have seen his name had been more than once talked of at the Foreign Office, would probably never have been actually made and insisted on but for a combination of chances closely connected with a Cabinet intrigue just then coming to a head in London. Down to the end of the year 1883 nobody was thinking at all of Gordon in connection with actual circumstances in the Soudan, nor was anything known of Cromer's proposal. Gordon had been away close on a year in Palestine, and had kept silence, an unusual thing with him, during the whole of it as far as the press was concerned. Not a dozen persons in England knew of his being on his way back to Europe, and his few friends at head-quarters looked upon him as being engaged to King Leopold for service on the Congo, and so out of the question for Khartoum—this although they knew also that the idea of the Soudan was once more present to his mind, since the

<sup>1</sup> M. Biovès, in absolving our diplomacy of the charge made against it by most Egyptian writers that the abandonment of the Soudan was forced on the Khedive by Cromer with an intention of taking the abandoned provinces for England later, missed this point. The idea in 1883 was not perhaps of a full acquisition by England of the Soudan, but certainly of a region ruled by Englishmen in English interests, what Stead called "Sarawaking the Soudan" after the model of Rajah Brooke's government in Borneo.

## *The Congo or the Nile*

defeat of Hicks, as a possibility and a temptation for his ambition. He had written to Wolseley to get him leave at the War Office to enter Leopold's service, and on landing at Genoa had gone straight to Brussels, there to arrange terms with the King about the Congo. Except for a few reviews of Hake's book "Chinese Gordon," which had been published at Christmas time, I can find nothing about him in any of the London newspapers. And so things stood at the end of the year.

It would be a curious matter to speculate what might have been the respective fates of the Nile population and those of the Congo if Gordon's contract, then all but signed, with Leopold had been carried into effect. It would probably have been for the welfare, or, let us say, the lesser suffering of both. It is difficult to think of the Congo venture taking the inhuman shape it did had Gordon ever had personally to do with it, and had he been left alive to protest against a violation of human rights so monstrous; while, on the other hand, the Egyptian Soudan might have been spared the destruction of four-fifths of its inhabitants at the blundering hands of our Government, and its present melancholy subjection to European rule. Chance, however, or whatever directs the destinies for good and evil in the world, ruled it otherwise, and Gordon, turned aside from the Congo, was to meet his fate, not there, but upon the Upper Nile, while the Congo was to become the scene of still greater horrors. Whose the hands were exactly that pulled the strings in the affair and sent him to his doom, and what was the relative amount of responsibility assignable to each of the chief actors, with the mystery of their secret motives, I have been at great pains to ascertain. This is how the thing, when carefully examined, appears to have come about.



## *The Financiers and the Press*

Gordon's return to Europe, as I have said, coincided very exactly with a crisis both in London and at Cairo closely connected with the mission he was a few days later to be entrusted with. Gladstone's Cabinet had, at Cromer's suggestion, agreed that the Khedive's Government should be advised to evacuate the whole Soudan as far north as Wady Halfa, and the Khedive and Sherif Pasha, his Prime Minister, had refused, and Cromer had asked permission to add threats to advice, and to insist upon the advice being taken. The request involved an entire change in Gladstone's Egyptian policy, which had, so far, been to assume a minimum of governing responsibility in Egypt proper, and none at all in the Soudan. On this point, however, he no longer could count upon a clear majority in his Cabinet, and parties within it were so evenly balanced that, as is usual in such cases, the London press was being called in to add weight to opinion on either side.

Moreover, the press being largely in the hands of capitalists and City financiers, it was happening, as is also usual in such cases, that the balance of journalistic opinion, directly it came to understand the position in the Cabinet, was as largely on the side where money interests were involved. These lay strongly with the continuation of the British occupation of Egypt, and with the undertaking by England, where the chance should be given, of new responsibilities. The house of Rothschild still held half the Domains Loan of £9,000,000 in its own hands, and the "Times" was its obedient organ. It needed therefore only a slight impulse from the War Office, which was the head-quarters of the faction opposed to Gladstone, to set the press in motion on the Soudan question; and on the first day of the year 1884, we find the "Times" publishing a strong letter

## *Baker's Letter to the "Times"*

from Sir Samuel Baker protesting against the abandonment of the Soudan by civilization, and urging the employment of British or Indian troops for the purpose of recovering it from the Mahdi. It was a powerful letter, and we find it supported by a leading article, as strongly recommending the assumption of full authority by England at Cairo and citing with regard to the Soudan the Dufferin recommendation of the year before, namely that, while Darfour and Kordofan might be abandoned, Khartoum and the northern and eastern provinces should be retained, that troops should be sent to Assouan, and that communication with the Red Sea should be reopened by the construction of a railway from Berber to Souakin. This was not only the Dufferin but also the Gordon policy, as was well known both to Samuel Baker and to those who inspired the "Times." Baker was interested in the Soudan both by his former connection with it and by the fact that his brother Valentine (Baker Pasha) had just been ordered to Souakin to defend the Red Sea coast against Osman Digna the new Mahdist leader. In Baker's letter to the "Times" occurs the first public suggestion I can find of Gordon's being employed by the Government to solve the difficulty at Khartoum. It is not repeated in the "Times" article, nor is it more than a question "Why should not General Gordon Pasha be invited to assist the Government?"

Two days later, a Cabinet meeting being about to be held where the fate of the new policy of Egypt was to be decided, we find the "Pall Mall Gazette" yielding to the same influence and announcing its sudden conversion from the evacuationist Gladstonian view of Egyptian policy, of which it had been so stout and consistent a supporter, to that of Gladstone's political opponents in the Cabinet. It

## *Use made of the Press*

opened its campaign by publishing the first of a series of leading articles on the crisis, issued on consecutive days and headed respectively, "Facing a Crisis," "The Alternatives," "Downing Street and Cairo," and "The Drift of Events in Egypt." All were sensational articles, and all in favour of the full authority in Egypt Cromer was demanding, namely, that of enabling him to coerce the Khedive, take the supreme power at Cairo into his own hands and assume sole responsibility in regard to the Soudan.

No one, I think, with any knowledge of journalism can doubt that a conversion so sudden and so violent can have been due to anything less than a Ministerial hint of the very directest kind. The decision of the Cabinet to undertake the new responsibility at Cairo was come to on the 3rd January, the date of the first "Pall Mall Gazette" article, but it was not known to the general public till the 7th, the date of the fourth article, and so must have been the result of private information from within the Cabinet, probably from the War Office and communicated by Brett, who was Hartington's private secretary and his usual intermediary with the press, besides being an old member of the "Pall Mall" staff.<sup>1</sup> There is, however, as yet no mention in any of the "Pall Mall Gazette" articles of Gordon, nor can I find his name in any London paper except in the one phrase I have quoted from the "Times," during that first week of the year, the reason doubtless being that Gordon's few friends knew that on landing at Genoa he had gone straight to Brussels, *en route* for the Congo. The only allusion to Gordon in the "Pall Mall Gazette" of that week is not in the articles, but in an "occasional note," and again in the form

<sup>1</sup> Compare "Secret History," and also later page.

### *Gordon Resigns his Commission*

of a query, "Chinese Gordon is to undertake the administration of the Congo. . . . Is it not a pity that at a time when so much other work is urgently wanting to be done in Egypt and elsewhere the ablest leader of irregular forces England has produced should be told off to the service of an International Association amid the swamps of the Congo?"

This was all that had been said about Gordon before his arrival at Southampton on the 7th. He had spent the best part of the week at Brussels before proceeding to England, and had found there on 2nd January a communication awaiting him from Wolseley, with whom he had been in correspondence, telling him that the permission he had asked for at the War Office to take service under King Leopold was *refused him by the British Government*. This had brought him in haste to England, and he had arrived at his sister's house at Southampton so angry about the refusal that his first act had been to sign and send in his papers to the War Office resigning his commission in Her Majesty's army. His brother Sir Henry tells us that the refusal was "more a Foreign Office than a War Office question, and the refusal emanated from the former." Gordon took it to be due to a Foreign Office prepossession against him. It is possible, however, to read the refusal in another sense, and that Granville, who had already once proposed him to Cromer, and who was considering Cromer's demand for an English officer, still wished to retain a hold over Gordon for the contingency of his being required at Khartoum; and this is how I am inclined to interpret it. It is difficult indeed to understand it otherwise, seeing that the Foreign Office must have just then received Cromer's telegram asking for an officer to carry out a duty

## *Stead interviews Gordon*

precisely such as Gordon was most fitted, indeed the only man fitted, to perform.

For these reasons, too, I refuse to accept as entirely reliable Mr. Stead's claim to absolute independence of official inspiration in the matter of his celebrated interview with Gordon at Southampton, which took place on the day following the general's arrival there. Mr. Stead's genius may very well have conceived the idea of the visit as the particular form in which Gordon was to be advertised; but in view of the series of articles just alluded to, and knowing as I do the ways of journalism and the close connection there was that year between the "Pall Mall Gazette" and the War Office through Lord Esher, and having, moreover, been myself more than once interviewed by Mr. Stead, I find it impossible not to recognize in the sudden entrance of Gordon into the intrigue one of those manœuvres worked from time to time in the "Pall Mall" columns through Lord Esher's agency.

We know from Fitzmaurice's "Life of Granville" that the antagonism between Hartington and Gladstone did actually exist at the time, and that it had just then reached a critical stage; and we know that Hartington, as Secretary for War, must have been the Minister to whom the choice of an officer for Khartoum had been referred, and who, in fact, did a few days later decide it, and we know Lord Esher's position at the War Office, and we know his connection with the "Pall Mall Gazette." Lord Esher was Gordon's friend, Mr. Stead at the time was not. Lord Esher was conversant with his movements, with his application for leave to serve King Leopold, with the refusal of his leave, and I decline to believe that there was no hint given on which Mr. Stead acted. In every newspaper office there are scores of

## *Genesis of the Gordon Boom*

such journalistic secrets never divulged and easily forgotten, and it seems to me vastly more probable that the Gordon "boom" was one of them.

What is quite certain is that, from the moment of the publication of the interview, the "Pall Mall" became avowedly the organ of that section of the Cabinet which was working for intervention in the Soudan, if necessary, by force of arms. If any one doubts this he needs to go no further than to the files of the "Pall Mall" for proof. There is among the rest a perfectly plain confession of the fact in a leading article of 14th February, where Stead thus excuses himself as the Liberal editor of a Liberal journal for his advocacy of the Gordon mission at a time when many Liberals were far from approving it. "From a mere party point of view," Stead writes, "it is often the most useful thing a true Liberal can do to oppose the immediate policy of his party, for it is only by that means that he can secure the adoption of the policy which will give victory to his own side. *Cabinets, it must never be forgotten, are composite bodies, and the outsider who advocates a new departure is often the exponent of the views of those who in the secrecy of the council chamber have been hitherto unsuccessfully striving for the policy that makes for righteousness and peace.* There are times when the most loyal followers may find it necessary to indicate to his leaders the path of safety which they may hitherto have been too preoccupied to perceive or too evenly divided to adopt." The whole passage, and especially those words which I have italicized, is a very candid avowal of the position of things as between the "Pall Mall Gazette" and the section of the Cabinet represented by Hartington, and it was explained to me in this way on my return to England by those in a position to know.

## *Gordon to have Carte Blanche*

With regard to the interview itself, perhaps the most important part of it in this regard are the phrases used in the leading article recommending the interview. It is a repetition and amplification of the question put by Sir Samuel Baker in his "Times" letter of a week before. "Why not," asks Stead, "send Chinese Gordon with full powers to Khartoum to assume absolute control of the territory, to relieve the garrisons, and do what can be done to save what can be saved from the wreck in the Soudan? . . . No one can deny the urgent need in the midst of that hideous welter of confusion for the presence of such a man with a born genius for command and unexampled capacity for organizing ever-victorious armies and a perfect knowledge of the Soudan and its people. Why not send him out with *carte blanche* to do the best that can be done?"

Here we have the Gordon mission exactly as it was sent, in fact if not nominally, by Her Majesty's ministers nine days later, almost exactly as it had been proposed by Cromer in December, namely, the sending of "an English officer of high authority to Khartoum with full power to withdraw the garrisons and to make the best arrangements possible for the future government of that country." Seeing that nothing as yet was known outside the public offices of Cromer's dispatch or of his having made any such demand, and the extreme improbability of an identity of ideas between Stead and Cromer by mere journalistic inspiration, I think we may fairly conclude that the description by Stead of what Gordon was to effect at Khartoum was due to a War Office suggestion rather than mere accident. At any rate, it is absurd that Cromer, of all persons, should complain as he does in his "Modern Egypt" of the idea of the mission having

## *Forcing Gladstone's Hand*

been forced upon him by the "Pall Mall Gazette." All that can fairly be said is that Stead, having got an inkling that such a mission had been demanded, put the dots promptly and powerfully on the *i*'s and named the only man capable of carrying it out effectually. It is difficult indeed to understand, notwithstanding all we know of Cromer's dislike of Gordon and his recent protestations, that Gordon was absent from his mind when he penned his telegram of 22nd December. Lord Cromer has a convenient way of forgetting things when it suits him to forget, and it has probably suited him to forget this among the rest. At any rate, it is impossible to suggest another name.

Neither, I think, can it be pretended that Stead's recommendation of Gordon for the post was so potent and instantaneous an influence at the Foreign Office as to have forced Granville's hand unless Granville had been already willing. Between the publication of the "Pall Mall" interview and Lord Granville's second proposal to Cromer of sending Gordon there was an interval of less than twenty-four hours, and it is far more likely that those in the Cabinet who wanted to send Gordon should have made use of Stead to popularize their plan than that Stead should have been able by his few words, however powerful, so suddenly to force it on them. Gordon's views, publicly and forcibly stated in the "Pall Mall Gazette," may possibly have quickened the pace, and this is all that can reasonably be affirmed about it. The real object of the press campaign of the past week, it is essential to understand, had been to force not Granville's hand, but Gladstone's. Granville needed no convincing. He was already of the Hartington faction in regard to Egypt. But Gladstone, it was known, would be difficult to persuade. Glad-



## *Granville's Position*

stone, unlike the rest, really wanted to get out of Egypt, he really wanted to have nothing to do with the Soudan, and he had only consented to the new responsibility undertaken at Cairo a fortnight before of making and unmaking ministries on its being explained to him that thus alone could he escape being involved in the further responsibility of Khartoum. It was necessary now to force his hand to the idea of sending up an "English officer of high authority" not only to withdraw the garrisons, but also to stay on at Khartoum and to "arrange a future government." Gladstone could hardly be made to swallow this second dose of responsibility, except through pressure from outside the Cabinet, the pressure of public opinion, and this it was that was put upon him by Hartington through Stead and the magic of Gordon's name. The "Pall Mall Gazette" had more than once been used to coerce Gladstone. It was the paper that he chiefly read.<sup>1</sup>

Granville's position was quite different. It was an intermediate one between Gladstone's and Hartington's. A Whig by birth and tradition and, as Foreign Secretary in 1881-82, the member of the Cabinet most directly concerned in the aggression on Egypt, he needed no conversion at all to the idea of remaining on at Cairo or of a further commitment to responsibility in the Soudan, and he was certainly at one with Hartington on these points; but, on the other hand, Gladstone was his chief, with whom he could not afford to quarrel. He was poor and in debt, and dependent on Gladstone for his continuance in office. What made him of value in the Cabinet was his amiability. He was friends with both factions,<sup>2</sup> and was used by them both as go-between. In the present instance it was

<sup>1</sup> See "Secret History."

<sup>2</sup> See Fitzmaurice.

## *A Mission of Peace*

necessary to get Gladstone to go with Hartington the way the Whigs wanted. They had used the press, and precisely the "Pall Mall Gazette" under Morley, against him in the spring of 1882 when they wanted his consent for the sending of the fleet to bombard Alexandria. They were using the same "Pall Mall Gazette" under Stead now that they wanted his consent to the sending of an "English officer" to Sarawak the Soudan. They had pretended to Gladstone in 1882 that the mission of the fleet would be one of moral pressure only, to protect British subjects, and give moral support to the Khedive—no actual firing of guns, nothing at all like an armed intervention in Egypt, still less like a permanent occupation. They pretended to him now that Gordon's mission was to be an entirely peaceful one, a tour of inspection, to withdraw the garrisons by peaceable means and return at once in a few weeks. Of course it was nothing really of the sort; it could not really be anything of the sort, and they knew it; it was to arrange a new government at Khartoum, and this could only be done by reorganizing a fighting force under Englishmen, and thus indirectly by an English occupation of Egypt indefinitely prolonged.

Any one who will take the trouble to go through all the documents of the case with an open mind will, I think, inevitably agree with this reading of the facts. It is the only one that accounts rationally for Gladstone's position afterwards or for that of any one of those principally concerned. Morley, in his "Life of Gladstone," would have one believe that Granville and Hartington, and Dilke and Northbrook, four level-headed English politicians, at least as much rogues politically as fools, went suddenly mad on Stead's persuading them that Gordon was a miracle

### *Granville proposes Gordon again*

man. Cabinet Ministers, however, do not go mad in this way; their madneses have much more method than that. Nor are they thus carried off their legs in twenty-four hours by a newspaper interview. It is they that inspire the newspapers, not the newspapers them; and, though Heaven knows they are guided at times by little enough wisdom, it is seldom to the press they go for their folly, especially at the Foreign Office. For the rest of the situation it is necessary to consider that Granville does not seem to have understood all when on the 9th, the evening of the day after Stead's interview was published, he telegraphed to Cromer, "Would General Charles Gordon or Sir Charles Wilson be of assistance under altered circumstances in Egypt?"—the "altered circumstances" being of course Cromer's assumption of all power. Stead's *ballon d'essai* had been well received in London by the morning papers, and Granville doubtless felt surer of his ground with Gladstone. The circumstances, however, had not been favourable to either Gordon or Wilson. Nubar hated Gordon, and the Khedive hated Wilson, who had baulked him in his intention of hanging Arabi;<sup>1</sup> and Cromer, who only wanted now an obedient agent at the end of a wire, and who knew Gordon was not the man implicitly to obey any of them, willingly joined Nubar and the Khedive in their refusal. Once more, therefore, Gordon was found to be "quite unfit," and Cromer's reply, 12th January, was, "I have consulted Nubar Pasha and I do not think that the services of General Gordon or Sir Charles Wilson can be utilized at present."

Cromer in his "Modern Egypt" says that the man they had in view then was after all no Englishman, but an Egyptian, Abd-el-Kader Pasha, an excellent man

<sup>1</sup> See "Secret History."

### *Gordon visits Barnes*

doubtless for a job in the Soudan, but he does not explain Nubar's objection to Gordon, and in order to avoid the difficulty of doing so, and of reconciling his refusal of either Englishman now offered him with his special request a few weeks before for an *English* officer, he drops, as we have seen, the word "English" out of his earlier telegram. The attempt to get Abd-el-Kader to undertake their work occupied another several more days in the final decision, and it was not till Gladstone's and Cromer's and Nubar's consent had all been obtained, by the 16th, that the actual sending on the 18th was carried into effect. How this was engineered in London, and on what conditions, we will now examine, following Gordon's steps from day to day in accordance with his recorded movements.

Stead's interview with Gordon took place at Southampton on the 8th January, and was published on the afternoon of the 9th. It reached Gordon at Southampton on the morning of the 10th, and had on him a very disturbing influence. In the interview itself he had been careful not to suggest that he was himself willing to undertake the task proposed to him; on the contrary, he had suggested Sir Samuel Baker as the proper man for it. He looked upon the Soudan as a temptation to vain glory, and Stead's suddenly thrusting him forward into the glare of publicity as a candidate for the duty troubled his conscience. In his heart he was tempted to go, if only the Government would send him, yet it was what he called his "Agag," the thing he must "hew in pieces," his besetting sin of "hailing the tram of the world." It was in this double mood that he fled the same evening to the vicarage of his religious friend, Dr. Barnes, at Heavitree, near Exeter, there to take spiritual counsel, and also to see Baker, who

## *Gordon and Baker*

lived in the neighbourhood, and consult with him as to what was to be done. Barnes' story of this visit is brief, but enlightening and most characteristic of the man Gordon was. The worthy vicar thus records it:

"He [Gordon] found time to spend a night at Heavitree Vicarage, and on the morning of Friday the 11th of January, he received Holy Communion in the parish church. This, so far as I can trace his course, was, with one exception, his last communion. On the same morning he visited Bishop Temple, with whom, as we have seen from a letter already quoted, he had wished to 'talk about those things'—the only things which seemed to him to be of really vital interest and importance.

"Later in the day he went on to Sandford Orleigh, Sir Samuel Baker's house; and to those who accompanied him it was pleasant to see the meeting between the two ex-governors of the Soudan. While we were driving from Newton Abbot Station to Sandford Orleigh, Sir Samuel Baker pressed on Gordon the expediency of his again going to the Soudan as Governor-General, if Her Majesty's Government should require it. Gordon was silent, but his eyes flashed, and an eager expression passed over his face as he looked at his host. Late at night, when we had retired, he came to my room, and said in a soft voice, 'You saw me to-day?' 'You mean in the carriage?' 'Yes; you saw *me*—that was *myself*—the self I want to get rid of.'"

The same evening he wrote a letter to Baker—it was probably agreed between them that he should do so—in which he again urged Baker to accept the task, and gave him his idea of what would be necessary for successfully carrying it out. This letter Baker sent to the "Times," and it appeared in that paper

### *Gordon sees Wolseley*

on the morning of the 14th. We will return to what he said in it later, when we consider precisely what those who sent him on his mission intended him to do. It had the effect of causing Granville to write that same day privately (note the humanitarian appeal) to Gladstone: "If Gordon says he believes he could by his personal influence excite the tribes to escort the Khartoum garrison and inhabitants to Suakin, a little pressure on Baring might be advisable. The destruction of these poor people would be a great disaster." Also on the morning of the 15th, Gladstone's consent having been obtained, Wolseley, who had already sent for Gordon, was commissioned to sound him as to his willingness to go, and found him to be so under certain conditions.

What these were, and what exactly passed between the two on the 15th, it is very difficult to disentangle from the conflicting evidence, for little of it was put in writing at the time, and the chief testimony regarding it rests upon the recollections of persons, or rather of partisans, all concerned in excusing themselves many years after the event. Thus Lord Esher (Brett) tells us that on that occasion, besides Wolseley, Gordon saw Hartington and Granville, but I think there must be some confusion of memory here in which the interview of the 15th has been mixed up with that of three days later, the 18th. Esher's words are: "In January 1884, after his interviews with Lord Hartington and Lord Granville, Gordon came for the last time to Tilney Street. He was leaving for Brussels. I can see him now with his muffler and his warm coat walking about the nursery with my eldest son in his arms." Now Gordon, in a letter from Brussels dated the 17th, says: "Brocklehurst is here with me. Government and authorities have been exceedingly kind and I have

### *Gordon returns to Brussels*

every reason to be grateful to them for I have often worried them and they have decided to let me stay on in H. M. S. (Service?).” This, as Brett was certainly in the best position to know, would seem conclusive as to the date, for Gordon left for Brussels the next morning, the 16th, but I feel sure that the visit described at Tilney Street was on the 18th, when Gordon certainly saw both Hartington and Granville. About the 15th, writing soon after the event, Sir Henry Gordon says very clearly, “on the 15th January General Gordon came up to London in accordance with a telegram from Lord Wolseley and had an interview with him of over two hours, during which time although Lord Wolseley saw some members of the Cabinet General Gordon did not.” And Sir Henry goes on to say that his brother that same evening came to dine with him, and next morning went with Brocklehurst to Brussels. As to what took place between Wolseley and Gordon, nothing very precisely is known, as Gordon seems to have kept his own counsel about it. Fitzmaurice says briefly: “Lord Wolseley met General Gordon, then on his way to Brussels, and discussed the situation in Egypt with him. Having asked the General what under the circumstances of the hour he would do, Lord Wolseley received the reply ‘I would send myself.’ The brief conversation suggested that General Gordon, stirred by the thought of the threatened collapse of the edifice which he had helped to raise, through the very dangers he had foreseen, and believing that he alone was the man of the situation, was prepared to cancel his existing engagements and return to the Soudan.”

The text of Granville's telegram of the same evening to Cromer, using the gentle pressure which

### *Granville's Third Proposal*

Gladstone had agreed to, is given in "Modern Egypt," dispatched, doubtless, on Wolseley's report of the conversation. "I hear indirectly that Gordon is ready to go straight to Suakin without passing through Cairo on the following rather vague terms, his mission to be to report to Her Majesty's Government on the military situation in the Soudan and to return without any further engagement towards him. He would be under you for instructions and will send letters through you under flying seal. You and Nubar Pasha to give him all assistance and facilities as to telegraphing, etc. Egyptian Government to send Ibrahim Fowzi to meet him at Suez with a writer to attend on him. He might be of use in informing you and us of the situation. It would be popular at home but there may be countervailing objections. Tell me your real opinion with or without Nubar Pasha." The word "indirectly" would seem to mean that Granville had not himself seen Gordon that day. The phrase about the mission being to "report" only seems to have been the gentle way of putting things calculated to gain Cromer's acquiescence, and it is on this initial account of the mission communicated also to Gladstone, with the design to allay his suspicions as well, that the legend was based to which Gladstone always adhered, that Gordon had received no other instructions, and had disobeyed them by understanding that they covered wider ground. It is quite impossible, however, that this should have been all that passed between Wolseley and Gordon during the two hours their conference had lasted, or that it was in this sense that Gordon understood the proposal made to him by the War Office. Gordon's letter to Baker had been published the morning of the day before in the "Times," and it was very explicit about what ought



## *Impossible to Evacuate*

to be done in the Soudan, and the minimum of outside support needed to accomplish it successfully.

Cromer, in his "Modern Egypt," makes light of the interview with Stead at Southampton as being only talk, but he cannot say the same of the published letter which, according to his usual controversial practice, he passes by in silence. Gordon in the interview had declared in the plainest possible words not only that Khartoum ought to and must be held against the Mahdi, but that the evacuation of its garrison, with the garrisons of Darfur and the Upper Nile, was a physical impossibility; he lays this down in language as to which there can be no conceivable mistake: "Whatever you decide about evacuation you cannot evacuate because your army cannot be moved; you must either surrender absolutely to the Mahdi or defend Khartoum at all hazards, the latter is the only course which ought to be entertained. There is no serious difficulty about it, the Mahdi's forces will fall to pieces of themselves, but if in a moment of panic orders are issued for the abandonment of the whole of the Eastern Soudan, a blow will be struck against Egypt and the peace of the East which may have fatal consequences. . . . Nubar should be left untrammelled by any stipulations concerning the evacuation of Khartoum; there is no hurry. The garrisons can hold their own at present, let them continue to hold on until disunion and tribal jealousies have worked their natural result in the camp of the Mahdi. Nubar should be free to deal with the Soudan in his own way. How he will deal with the Soudan I cannot profess to say, but I should imagine that he would appoint a Governor-General at Khartoum with full powers, and furnish him with 2,000,000 sterling. . . . Sir Samuel Baker might be appointed Governor-

## *Gordon's Fighting Plan*

General, he might take his brother as Commander-in-Chief." This was a strong fighting policy, and, *mutatis mutandis*, precisely how he afterwards understood his instructions. In his letter to Baker he had been even more explicit. "To my mind," he says, "patience and diplomacy are far more needed than arms. Still to some degree you must have the latter. . . . I would recommend (1) permission to be got from the Sultan to engage 4,000 of his reserved troops, both officers and men, which will be under your brother's command, and be volunteers with the promise of remuneration at the end of their service; (2) that some 2,000 Belooches under the native officers should be enlisted in India, who have been soldiers of Her Majesty, old sturdy warriors; for your cavalry you can horse them in the Hedjaz, Palestine, and Syria; (3) that Her Majesty's Government will allow you to purchase from Her Majesty animals, paying a percentage upon all purchases; (4) that Her Majesty's Government should allow military store officers to aid you but not to go into the field"—another fighting programme.

With these two pronouncements of what was to be done hot before them—and Hartington and Granville and Wolseley must all have read them—it is ludicrous to suppose that the real object of the mission, as it was certainly understood by Gordon, and afterwards, to the best of his power, put in execution by him, was not discussed between Gordon and Wolseley, or by Wolseley as go-between with Hartington and Granville, or that these did not understand it in an active sense. Cromer scouts the idea of Gordon having been sent to him only to report, and in this Cromer is right. The talk of reporting was only make-believe, gently to propitiate him, Cromer, and to propitiate Gladstone; it never had

### *Hartington on the Mission*

any reality. Hartington, describing the mission some weeks later in the House of Commons, while attempting to excuse the Government, admits that the mission had a larger and more important scope than either reporting or a withdrawal of the garrisons. "Gordon's mission," he says, 20th February 1884, was "to attempt the rescue of 28,000 men contained in Khartoum and the other portions of the Soudan, and not only these garrisons, but also to make some arrangement for the better government of those provinces." He was clearly quoting Cromer's original words of the previous December, which had all along remained the basis of the mission as understood by himself and his own section of the Cabinet at the War Office.

If Gordon was not sent at once on the 15th to Khartoum it was because Cromer had not yet answered Granville's latest telegram. While waiting for it he consequently went back to Brussels to excuse himself with King Leopold for breaking his Congo agreement. The War Office had already refused to accept his resignation of his commission, and on the 17th, Cromer and Nubar having capitulated on the 16th declaring now that Gordon was the best man, Gordon was telegraphed for and returned to London.<sup>1</sup> Here on the 18th the same process of interviewing took place at the War Office; first, a talk between Gordon and Wolseley; then, in the afternoon, with four members of the Cabinet, who had been hastily got together, all of them members of the Hartington

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Chailé-Long, who served under Gordon on the White Nile from 1874 to 1877, maintains with some show of probability that it was arranged at this time between Gordon and King Leopold that, although he was to go as Queen's officer to sever the Soudan from Egypt, he was ultimately to make over Khartoum and the Upper Nile Provinces to the King as part of the King's Congo State.

## *Gordon and the Ministers*

faction and without Gladstone, who was still away invalidated at Hawarden. The discussion that day seems to have been little more than formal, for Gordon was already in his train by eight o'clock to catch the Brindisi mail for Egypt, and the instructions had had to be drafted and written out and signed at the Foreign Office, and a search made for Stewart, who was to go with him, and good-byes to be said. Gordon was brought into a room where the four Ministers, Hartington, Granville, Dilke, and Northbrook,<sup>1</sup> were, and exchanged a few words with them, and that seems to have been all. The whole of the details clearly had been arranged with Wolseley. Gordon's own account of the interview is given in a letter he wrote to Barnes in the train, and posted at Brindisi on the 22nd.

"I saw Wolseley at 8 a.m. He said nothing was settled, but Ministers would see me at 3.30 p.m. No one knew I had come back. At noon he, Wolseley, came for me and took me to Ministers. He went in and talked to the Ministers and came back and said: 'Her Majesty's Government want you to understand

<sup>1</sup> It is worth noticing that these four Ministers were precisely the four that had had most to do with the original armed intervention in Egypt in 1882. Northbrook's name is especially ominous when we recollect that he was at the head of the Admiralty at the time of the bombardment of Alexandria, and that it was he who had dispatched Palmer, as he was now dispatching Gordon, on his fatal mission, a mission which, like Gordon's, was to begin with an attempt to bribe Bedouin tribes, and was to lead to the betrayal of the missioner and his repudiation by those who sent him. There is extant a letter from Northbrook to Gordon (see Appendix), written just as he was starting, telling him that he had ordered a man-of-war to carry him to Souakin, and that there were £1,000 for his purposes which were being entrusted for him to Admiral Hewett at Souakin, the very same Admiral to whom Palmer had been sent, and from whom he had received the money for buying up the tribes east of the Suez Canal.

### *Gordon takes Train*

this—Government are determined to evacuate Sudan, for they will not guarantee future government. Will you go and do it?' I said, 'Yes.' He said, 'Go in.' I went in and saw them. They said, 'Did Wolseley tell you our orders?' I said, 'Yes.' I said, 'You will not guarantee future government of Soudan, and you wish me to go up and evacuate now.' I said 'Yes,' and it was over, and I left at 8 p.m. for Calais. Very little passed between us. The Duke [of Cambridge] and Wolseley came to see me off, so that is over."

## CHAPTER VI

### WAS GORDON DISOBEDIENT?

IT is said that Gordon drafted his own instructions at the Foreign Office, but I find it hard to believe this, for, if true, it would go near to proving him as great a diplomatic rogue as those who sent him. The instructions are a very crafty document. They begin with a manifest insincerity about Gordon's going to Egypt "to report on the measures it may be advisable to take for the security of the Egyptian garrisons and the European population in Khar-toum," and he is also "to consider and report upon the best mode of effecting the evacuation of the Interior and upon the manner in which the safety and good administration of the Red Sea Ports can be secured." Then there is a paragraph about the slave trade as manifestly insincere, introduced for the satisfaction of the Anti-Slavery Association in London, and he is to send his reports on these subjects under flying seal through Cromer. In all this it is impossible to find more than a hint of the true object of the mission. It is contained in the document, but hidden away in the two unobtrusive concluding paragraphs. These are: "You will consider yourself authorized and instructed to perform such other duties as the Egyptian Government may desire to entrust to you, and as may be communicated to you by Sir E. Baring. You will be accompanied by Colonel Stewart, who will assist you in the duties thus confided to you." (Gordon afterwards described Stewart as having been sent with him as his dry nurse to keep him out of mischief.) "On your arrival in Egypt you will at once communicate with Sir

## *Gordon's Instructions*

E. Baring, who will arrange to meet you and will settle with you whether you should proceed direct to Suakin, or should go yourself or dispatch Colonel Stewart to Khartoum *via* the Nile."

These instructions, I say, are a model of how to conceal an intention, and have the true Foreign Office ring. They really amount to *carte blanche* to propose or do anything that the missionary could get Cromer to consent to, and, in fact, cover all and more than all that Gordon eventually tried to perform. "Such other duties as the Egyptian Government might entrust to you" would have included either his handing over the whole Soudan to the Mahdi, or his determination to smash the Mahdi, or again to Sarawak the Soudan on his own account or King Leopold's or the Queen's. Cromer was made responsible for all, and the Government at home retained the ordinary parliamentary privilege of disavowing their own responsibility for things if things went wrong. Above all, it enabled Granville to telegraph to Gladstone with a free conscience that Gordon had been sent by the War Office simply "to report."

I confess that, though I have blamed and still blame Gladstone for nearly all the misfortunes that have happened since 1882 in Egypt, I here feel some sympathy with him as with a man duped and deceived. He certainly would never have consented to the Gordon mission in its full sense if he had been allowed to understand the full meaning of the instructions. He would have known, not only that the sending of Gordon "to report" would make it very difficult not to accept and act upon his report—this point he noticed in a letter written by him at the time—but also that sending Gordon, who was a fighter born, on a merely peaceful mission to carry

## *Gladstone not responsible*

out a military plan which he had himself declared to be impossible except with the aid of a large body of troops, would make the sending of troops also a certainty. Gordon was in the eyes of the British public a Christian hero starting on a crusade, and it was inconceivable that he should be left to perish for want of Christian help. It is true that, when Gladstone arrived three days later in London, a Cabinet was held, where the thing was more or less explained to him, and that he consented to what had been done; but it was by this time a *fait accompli*, and too late to stop Gordon, who had already reached Brindisi and was on the high seas on his way to Port Said. His mission could no longer be cancelled. All the religious press of England had risen like one man to the occasion, and were rejoicing over Gordon as the champion of Christendom. It was too late to recall him.

What the choice of such a missionary meant for the Government in the way of new astonishing responsibilities may be gathered from Stead's scream of triumph printed in the "Pall Mall Gazette" on the day after his departure. It is headed "At Last." It began: "The whole Egyptian question has been revolutionized in an hour. At yesterday's informal meeting of the Ministers at the War Office there was taken one of those decisive steps that make or mar the destinies of Empires. . . . The question called for immediate decision. After some consultation Ministers determined to accept General Gordon's conditions. The decision was arrived at between 3 and 4 yesterday afternoon. At 8 General Gordon had left London for Khartoum. The die was cast. Henceforth we have the full and undivided responsibility for affairs in the Soudan. Whether we evacuate the country or whether we retain it, as soon as General



### *Gordon's view of his Mission*

Gordon takes command, and for so long as General Gordon's commission holds, England is directly responsible for whatever is done in the name of the Egyptian Government between the third Cataract and the Equatorial Lakes. That is an enormous extension of our responsibilities, but vast as it is it is not all. Whether the public realizes it or not, the dispatch of General Gordon to the Soudan, exercising practically unlimited powers not as Governor-General of the Khedive, but as the accredited representative of the British Government, must entail as a natural and inevitable corollary the assumption sooner or later of a similar responsibility as direct and as unlimited for the affairs of Egypt proper."

Gladstone after this was powerless to draw back, and, putting a good face on the matter as long as the sun shone, he went in for the gamble with the rest. An immense gamble it certainly was, and one for which he was destined to pay heavily.

As for Gordon himself he started in the highest possible spirits. He had got the secret wish of his heart thrust upon him without his seeking it; he had not "hailed the tram of the world"; it was "the tram of the world" that had hailed him, and his conscience was at rest. He was certain now that God was with him and that the service imposed on him was God's service, and so could not but succeed. His very first act after seeing the Ministers was to telegraph to Barnes from the War Office at five o'clock: "I go to the Soudan to-night; if He goes with me all must be well." And in a letter to the same Barnes on his way to Brindisi, he says: "I am quite restored to my peace, thank God, and in His hand He will hide me. . . . The Hosts are with me. Mahanaim." He counted much upon the

### *His Blindness about the Mahdi*

prayers that were being offered for him in every church and chapel in England. "If people ask after me, tell them they can greatly help me with their prayers, not for my earthly success, but that my mission may be for God's glory, the welfare of the poor and wretched, and for me what He wills, above all for a humble heart." And again, 26th January: "I leave for the Soudan to-night. I feel quite happy for I say if God is with me who can or will be hurtful to me? May He be glorified, the world and people of the Soudan be blessed, and may I be the dust under His feet."

That Gordon was absolutely sincere in this estimate of his mission we cannot doubt. Yet what a self-delusion! What a blindness! He did not perceive that those who were sending him on this last great adventure of his life were no angels of the Lord, but four wily statesmen doing the work mainly of the London Stock Exchange, and interested far more in perpetuating England's robber hold on Egypt than in any humanitarian scheme which might be imagined for the Soudan—he himself a useful pawn in their not very noble game, and some of them ready enough already to sacrifice and betray him. He did not perceive this or understand that, if it were a question of God being on one side or the other, it could hardly be with these, but with the poor fanatic Soudanese who really did believe in Him and counted on Him to hear their vociferous prayers and praises, and give them the victory. He did not understand that all the men of good in the Soudan would be found on the Mahdi's side, and all the men of Belial, the scoundrel refuse of the corrupt city of Khartoum, on his own, leaving him with only the least godly weapons of the flesh wherewith to fight, some modern superiority of weapons, money

## *Cromer's Charges*

to buy a faithless fidelity, and his own skill and courage as a fighting man.

It was an instinct of his self-delusion and a knowledge of the base ends of those that sent him that caused me to write to him as I did from Delhi. I knew that this time he must be wrong, that he was being sent on a fool's errand, and that he would be betrayed and defeated.

Of the many things with which Gordon has been reproached officially in the conduct of his mission by those who would shift the blame of his failure from their own backs on to his, I will endeavour to deal with the chief and especially with those brought against him by Lord Cromer, only premising once again that the mission itself was according to my ideas a bad one and doomed from the first to failure. Lord Cromer, his chief assailant, has reproached him with a constant change of plan, with insubordination, with failure to do his duty, and with being the cause of his own defeat. I will endeavour to set these matters in their true light.

Gordon's idea when he left London seems to have been a clear one as to the general lines of what he was to do. He was to make his way to Khartoum as he best could, take over the military command of the place from Coetlogon, withdraw the Egyptian garrisons from their outlying posts in the interior, and make what arrangements he could for a government at Khartoum to take the place of the Khedive's. It was to be a government which was not to be an Egyptian Government, and for which Her Majesty's Government was not to be responsible. These two conditions had been imposed on him, and he had accepted them. All the rest was left to his discretion, subject only to Cromer's official approval.

A point he on his side had insisted on at the out-

### *Queen's or Khedive's Officer?*

set was that he should go under orders from his own Government, and not merely as taking foreign service with his Government's permission. His insistence about this was, I believe, primarily with him a matter of honour. He had engaged himself to King Leopold, and he could not with any decency throw him over to enter the service of another foreign prince unless it was in compliance with an order he as a soldier was bound to obey from his own Government. Also it would ease his conscience, as signifying to him more clearly the command of God, and not the gratification of his own secret wish. This is how I read the matter. It could not have been with him a rooted objection to re-entering a foreign service or in particular the Khedive's service, for as we have seen he recommended Baker, if he went to the Soudan, to go there as the Khedive's Governor-General. What would have been the right course for Baker must have been the right course also for himself. As a matter of fact he would have found himself even more powerless than he proved to be at Khartoum if he had gone there simply as a British officer. Stewart had gone there as such, but his had been no executive mission. Gordon's was to be essentially executive, and it was imperative with him to have local authority from the local sovereign, if only to treat with the tribes for the withdrawal of the garrisons. The English Government could not give him this—it must of necessity be given him by the Khedive. It argues therefore no change of plan that Gordon, on his way to Egypt, should have proposed that if he went to Khartoum it should be in his old capacity as Governor-General. He had gained all that he wanted for his soldier's honour once he had received his own Government's order to undertake the service. The

### *Gordon's change of Plan*

Governor-Generalship was a means to an end, and in his view the only means.

A more reasonable reproach which might be made to him—but it has not been officially made—is that he abandoned the idea he certainly had at the outset of going straight on a peaceful errand to the Mahdi at El Obeyd and treating with him personally for the withdrawal of the Egyptian garrisons. I have always been of opinion that that would have been his wisest course; and it certainly was in his mind when he started from London, for passing through Paris the next morning he saw Sheffield at the Embassy and told him of his intention so to do. There was, of course, considerable risk in the matter, but it was just one of those risks Gordon had over and again run successfully in the Soudan, and there is good reason to believe that, properly accompanied, he would have been courteously received at El Obeyd, and that, if he had negotiated on the basis of withdrawing the garrisons peaceably and handing over Khartoum at once to the Mahdi, the Mahdi would have provided the necessary escorts. At any rate, it was his best chance. But that was not what either our Government or the Government at Cairo wanted; and, once at Cairo and in the Khedive's service, this course was formally forbidden him, nor did Gordon persist in it. It cannot be too strongly repeated that what Gordon was intended to do was not merely to evacuate the Soudan, but to establish a Government at Khartoum and in the eastern provinces which should take the place of the Khedive's Government and serve as a barrier between Egypt proper, including the Red Sea coast, and the Mahdi's fanatical advance. To hand over Khartoum to the Mahdi was not, at that time, whatever Lord Cromer may now pretend, in his more than in the

## *The Sultans of Darfur*

Khedive's plan. I think, nevertheless, that if Gordon had understood the full political power and religious position acquired by Mohammed Ahmed since the fall of El Obeyd and the destruction of Hicks's army, he would have held to the idea of treating with the Mahdi personally. Unfortunately he throughout underrated his opponent and allowed himself to be persuaded that through the power of money and a display of vigour, joined with reforms in the way of more freedom, less taxation, and better justice, he could build up a counter popularity to that possessed by the Mahdi. It was a snare into which he too easily fell.

Another sudden change of plan, which Lord Fitzmaurice says surprised and disturbed the Government soon after Gordon had been despatched upon his mission, and in regard to which he is severe, calling it a plan "fantastic in the extreme," is that which Gordon announced of re-establishing the family of the Sultans of Darfur in their hereditary possessions. It was, perhaps, not a very practical idea, but that the Foreign Office should have been surprised at it only shows its ignorance of its own records, for it is to be found in no less conspicuous a document than Stewart's Soudan Report of February 1883, to say nothing of its having been repeatedly put forward unofficially by Gordon in print and officially by Abd-el-Kader Pasha in December at Cairo. The whole conception of the re-establishment of independent native states in opposition to the Mahdi was, in my opinion, one unsuited to the circumstances of the case, however desirable in itself; but, at any rate, there was nothing new in it nothing to "surprise or disturb" Lord Granville. Gordon had hardly arrived at Khartoum before he found the whole scheme impracticable, and it was

### *Why not Zebehr?*

heard of no more. Even under the most favourable circumstances it would have been very difficult of accomplishment, and, as a move counter to the Mahdi, could not possibly have succeeded.

Much the same may be said about the idea of employing Zebehr. Here, too, the "surprise and disturbance" of the Foreign Office were entirely gratuitous. When Gordon arrived at Cairo Zebehr had already been engaged there for some weeks recruiting and drilling a black force from among the Soudanese, and had got together 200 ex-soldiers and ex-slaves impressed in Egypt proper. These were destined to be sent with Zebehr for service in the Soudan, and had been regularly enlisted by Zebehr for the Government. It was therefore gratuitous on the part of the Foreign Office to affect surprise that it should be proposed by Gordon to take Zebehr and his men with him. There was, of course, reason for comment that it should have been Gordon, and no other, who made the request, for Gordon had quarrelled with Zebehr and had been responsible for his son's death, and Zebehr had been the head and front of the slave trade rebellion in the Soudan. But Gordon was no longer on an anti-slavery war-path. He had lived long enough to understand that battling in the Bahr el Gazal against the slave-hunters was not the surest way of dealing with the evil of slavery or stopping the trade. And his present mission was of an entirely different kind, one which needed Zebehr's help, not a continuance of his hostility. Gordon was a man who never pursued his resentments far, and he was always ready to forget a quarrel and to believe once more in the man's friendship who had wronged him or whom he had wronged. He had buried the hatchet with Tewfik and Nubar and Cromer. Why

## *No Interpreter*

not also with Zebehr? There was nothing really to be surprised at, nothing to blame or to forbid.

As to the policy of enlisting Zebehr as an ally I am not of opinion that it would have led to much profit in the way of helping Gordon to establish a buffer state against the Mahdi. Zebehr had been too long absent from the Soudan to be of use to him in that way. His influence was dead, and it is all but certain that he would have yielded to the new influence abroad among his people and thrown in his lot with the Mahdi. I do not think he would have betrayed Gordon. He was a man of old Arab nobility and chivalrous traditions, and he had no actual blood feud with Gordon, for it was Gessi, not Gordon himself, who had had Suliman Zebehr shot. In after years I have talked these matters over with Zebehr, and am convinced that he would not have betrayed Gordon, only that he could not have stemmed the tide which was then so strongly flowing in the Mahdi's favour. All that he could have done would have been to serve as intermediary between Gordon and the Mahdi, and to warn Gordon against some of the worst mistakes he made.

The great weakness of Gordon's position at Khartoum was that, being almost ignorant of Arabic and without any dependable native interpreter (for his old secretary Berzati had accompanied Hicks on his fatal campaign and there lost his life), he was left to the tender mercies of Greek merchants and other Christian informants as to what was going on. Zebehr would, at any rate, have supplied him with reliable news and a correct interpretation of the letters he received from the Mahdi. As it was, with no one near him to explain the exact truth, Gordon was as a blind man at Khartoum and became the tool of rogues who betrayed him with false tales and pre-



## *Gordon's Insubordination*

vented him from seeing what otherwise he could not but have recognized, the sincerity and high character of the Mahdi. With Zebehr at his side he could not have committed his last crowning mistake of offering Mohammed Ahmed a tarboosh and a Sultanate, an insult which more than any other sealed his doom.

Lastly, as to Gordon's pretended insubordination and disobedience to his instructions, the case against him is really not maintainable. Even admitting that his instructions on leaving London, and the free hand accorded him, were nothing more than are contained within the four corners of the written memorandum drawn up at the Foreign Office, he must stand personally absolved. The paragraph, "You will consider yourself authorized and instructed to perform such other duties as the Egyptian Government may desire to intrust to you and as may be communicated to you by Sir E. Baring," covers him entirely from any blame there might be in the extension of his duty in Egypt. Lord Cromer tries in his "Modern Egypt" to evade his own responsibility in regard to such extensions of duty by pleading that it was Gordon himself who initiated them; thus he instances a telegram he received from Granville dated the 18th: "Gordon suggests that it may be announced in Egypt that he is on his way to Khartoum to arrange for the future settlement of the Soudan for the best advantage of the people." This telegram, Cromer points out, says nothing of his duty of reporting, and he adds, "if General Gordon was to arrange for the future settlement of the Soudan, I fail to see how he could do so without exercising some executive authority." On this ground he protests that "the idea of Gordon's going as Governor-General to the Soudan did not emanate from any one in Cairo, it was made by General Gor-

## *Cromer's Responsibility*

don himself." Lord Cromer seems, however, to have forgotten that the suggestion about the future settlement of the Soudan was, in fact, his own of 22nd December, and he has also forgotten that, if Gordon was sent in order to arrange such a settlement, his appointment as Governor-General was a necessary part of what he himself had approved before ever Gordon arrived at Cairo. Lord Cromer's answer, 23rd January, to the telegram of the 18th, says distinctly: "All Gordon's suggestions are excellent and quite in harmony with the lines on which we have been working. A message was sent by the Khedive some while ago to the leading men at Khartoum which was in the sense and almost in the words suggested by Gordon." This proves that all that had not at that time been contemplated at Cairo was that the English officer expected to arrange the new settlement was to be Gordon and not another, and that he was to go to Khartoum with the full authority of Governor-General.

If, however, there remains any doubt as to Cromer's initiative in the extension of Gordon's duties, I am in a position to supply an important link of evidence by giving the text of a hitherto unpublished letter written by Cromer to Gordon the day before he landed at Port Said. Though a most important letter in the controversy, it is not to be found in any Blue Book, and Cromer in his "Modern Egypt" ignores it entirely. The circumstances under which it was written were these. Gordon's idea in leaving London had been to go straight through the Suez Canal without visiting Cairo, and to proceed at once to Suakin, where he expected to be able to put himself into communication with certain Sheykhs of the Hadendowa tribe to whom he had formerly rendered a service while he was Governor-General, and through

### *A suppressed Letter*

whom he counted on being able to reach Khartoum, and eventually El Obeyd, for his proposed visit to the Mahdi. In the Mahdi himself he thought he had recognized the uncle of a young man who had been formerly in his service, and who had been kindly treated by him, and so hoped to establish initial good relations with him. He had come, however, to see that authority from the Khedive was a necessity of the case, and he expected his Firman of appointment to be delivered to him by Cromer on his passage through the Canal. Such a course, however, was not exactly in Cromer's plan, who wished to get Gordon to Cairo, and so have him from the start more closely under his authority, and to talk over with him and Nubar the further instructions he was to receive. He pretexted, therefore, an inability to spare time for a journey to Port Said (there was no railway further than Ismailia at that time) and instead of going himself, he wrote this letter and sent it by the hand of Sir Evelyn Wood to be delivered to Gordon on landing, with instructions to intercept him and bring him on to Cairo.

*"Cairo, 22nd January, 1884.*

*"MY DEAR GORDON,*

*"I was exceedingly glad to receive Lord Granville's telegram informing me that you and Stewart were coming to Egypt. I feel confident that you may both render very great services as regards Soudan affairs. I need hardly assure you that you can rely on my most cordial support and assistance.*

*"Wood, accompanied by Watson, is going to Port Said to meet you. He is thoroughly acquainted with all the most recent facts of the situation and with the views entertained by myself and others. Under these circumstances I will not dwell at any*

### *Cromer to Gordon*

length on the course of action which, as it appears to me, had better be adopted. I will only say briefly that I think you had better go to Khartoum and arrange for the withdrawal of the Egyptian garrisons etc. as rapidly as is consistent with (1) the saving of life and so far as is possible, property; (2) the establishment of some rough form of Government which will prevent, so far as is possible, anarchy and confusion arising on the withdrawal of the Egyptian troops. The task, though very difficult, will not I believe in your hands be impossible.

"I hope very shortly to discuss the whole question with you personally and my views are of course liable to modification by the light of your greater experience in Soudan matters.

"Lord Granville told me that you were unwilling to come to Cairo. It is not, on public grounds, desirable that I should leave Cairo at present, although of course I would do so for a very short time if it were absolutely necessary. I hope, however, to convince you that it is absolutely necessary that you should come to Cairo. The valley of the Nile is indeed at present the only route by which you can reach Khartoum. The Souakin-Berber route is closed and, so far as our latest information goes, there does not appear to be much prospect of its being opened. It is also, I think, very desirable that before you start you should discuss the whole situation not only with myself, but with Nubar and others, so that we may arrange a common plan of action and prevent any risk of working at cross purposes. For these and other reasons I am very strongly of opinion that you should come to Cairo. I need hardly say that I should not propose a course of action, which I believe to be personally distasteful to yourself, unless I thought that there were

### *The Mission extended by Cromer*

strong public grounds for doing so. Wood has arranged about Ibrahim Bey Fowzi.

“ Believe me very truly yours,  
“ EVELYN BARING.”

It will be noted in this letter, which was written before Cromer had seen Gordon and therefore entirely on his own initiative, that he suggests a new course of action to be adopted far in advance of anything the original written instructions drawn up at the Foreign Office contained. In the first place, there is no mention whatever of reporting; secondly, Gordon is to go to Khartoum by way of Cairo and the Nile instead of by Suakin. He is also to go himself and not merely to send Stewart. Thirdly, he is to withdraw the Egyptian garrisons as rapidly as is consistent with the saving of *property* as well as life, an entirely new condition to be found in no previous suggestion connected with the mission and one necessarily entailing far greater time and labour to effect. Lastly, he is to establish “ some rough form of government which will prevent anarchy and confusion arising on the withdrawal of Egyptian troops.” This, although as we have seen it was in the spirit and intention of the instructions, was an immense extension of anything that had been actually written or telegraphed, of which we have any knowledge; and the writer of the letter could hardly have contemplated, in proposing such an extension, a work which would occupy less than many months to execute, if not a whole year. It is, moreover, absolutely at variance with the pretence afterwards made at the Foreign Office that Gordon’s mission was simply to withdraw the Khartoum garrison. And lastly, its date proves the idea to be Cromer’s and not Gordon’s.

## *The Khedive's Firman*

As we know, Sir Evelyn Wood met Gordon at Port Said with this letter in his hand, and its effect was an entire change of plan on Gordon's part. Instead of going on to Suakin, he went back with Wood and Watson to Cairo, saw Cromer, who took him to Nubar and later to the Khedive both of whom received him graciously. Cromer then obtained the necessary Firman (he probably drew it up himself) assigning to Gordon his new duties. This Firman, be it observed, although it is by far the most important document of the whole case, is suppressed by Cromer in his "Modern Egypt"; and instead of it he gives a letter he wrote to Gordon containing not the instructions themselves but certain remarks about the way in which the instructions were understood by himself. The instructions themselves are to be found in Blue Book, Egypt, No. 12, 1884. They amount practically to a *carte blanche* commission to do whatsoever Gordon would with the Soudan without restriction of time and without limit to his authority. They run as follows:

"HIS HIGHNESS THE KHEDIVE TO GORDON PASHA.

"*January 26, 1884.*

"EXCELLENCY,

"HAVING confidence in your tact and experience, and being aware that the excellent services rendered by you in the Soudan have endeared you to the people of those provinces, and made them acknowledge the good derived from your efforts to introduce among them tranquillity and good government; and seeing that the present state of affairs in those territories requires a person capable of grappling with the difficulties of the situation, and of ameliorating the condition of the inhabitants by restoring public

### *The Firman covers all*

tranquillity on a sure basis, as it is our earnest desire to do what is just and right, to remove all sources of discontent and to observe equity towards the native populations, we do hereby appoint you Governor-General of the Soudan by reason of your perfect knowledge of that country, and we trust that you will carry out our good intentions for the establishment of justice and order, and that you will assure the peace and prosperity of the peoples of the Soudan by maintaining the security of the roads open to commerce.

"Now by these presents we make known to you our desire, and urge upon you a speedy departure for those provinces, so that good government may be restored by your tact and experience."

This document, which is of the widest conceivable scope, covers absolutely all that Gordon did at Khartoum, all that he designed to do and all that he might have done. It included his decree permitting slavery; it included all his military operations; it included his refusals to retire before the accomplishment of his full work unless his Firman were revoked; it included his attempt to smash the Mahdi, and it would have included, if he had succeeded in so doing, his remaining on at Khartoum and "Sarawaking" the Soudan to the end of his days; or he might have ceded the whole Soudan to the Mahdi, or, as far as I can see, made any other arrangement for its future he might think fit. I repeat that thus enlarged I do not approve of the mission. Also it was one bound to fail. But I affirm that Cromer, who was the man responsible for the enlargement of the mission, who procured the Firman's signature authorizing it, and who almost certainly dictated the instructions it contained, should have been of all

## *Yet Gordon is Accused*

men the last to blame Gordon because he held these instructions binding on him and refused to obey anything less direct than a counter-firman ordering him not to carry them out. Cromer's dispatch to the Foreign Office, enclosing the Firman, admits his responsibility and the largeness of its scope. "It was thought desirable," he says, "after full discussion here that the widest discretionary powers should be given to General Gordon as regards the manner of carrying out the policy and as to the best time and mode for announcing it at Khartoum. . . . Although he takes his instructions from me, the widest discretionary power has been left to him. His visit to Cairo was most useful as it will enable the Egyptian authorities to be of much greater service to him than would have been otherwise possible. His views differ in no sort of way from those entertained by Nubar Pasha and myself."

Yet Lord Cromer to-day has the face now to come forward and charge Gordon with overstepping his authorized programme! That he was so understood to have overstepped them in the summer of 1884 I know, for I myself thought he had done so, but the full facts had not yet been made public, and we knew only what the Government chose to tell us. But the Government itself already knew all, and yet it accused him; and Cromer, who knew and knows the truth better than any one, accuses him still!

As to what happened after the mission left Cairo the history is too well known for there to be any necessity for my recapitulating it here. All now depended on Gordon's being able to inspire such confidence in the Khartoum garrison as to hold the fort till succour should come. This was expected to be, if at all, from Valentine Baker at Souakin, Sir



## *Valentine Baker*

Samuel's brother. The position at Souakin was this. The sending of Hicks to Khartoum to take command of the Khedivial troops in the spring of 1883 had been answered by the Mahdi by the dispatch of emissaries into the provinces between the Nile and the Red Sea to preach a religious war against the infidel; and the war broke out early in the autumn under the afterwards celebrated leader Osman Digna, who, with the fighting tribe of the Hadendowa, set themselves to occupy the caravan road from Berber to Souakin and lay siege to that seaport and to the fortified places near it. In October a force of 500 Egyptian troops sent to relieve one of these last was surprised and routed, and the English Consul, Moncrieff, a young naval officer who had gone with them, was killed by the Mahdists. The defeat of Hicks in Kordofan speedily followed, and Khartoum began to be threatened. The Souakin-Berber route was at that time the speediest mode of communication between Cairo and Khartoum, and after one or two more misadventures near the Red Sea coast it became completely blocked, and it was found necessary to attempt to reopen it, and thus towards the end of the year, there being no more regular Egyptian troops to send, Baker Pasha, who had been organizing a corps of military police at Cairo, was entrusted with the duty, his police accompanying him, strengthened with the scratch force of Turks and negroes impressed by Zebehr in Lower Egypt. Baker's duty, as defined in the Khedive's Firman appointing him, was to "take command of the operations which have for their object the pacification of the regions lying between Berber and Souakin and the maintenance of communication between these two points. . . . You should use every means of conciliation and diplomacy, with a view to

## *His Previous History*

secure the obedience and submission of the Sheikhs of the different tribes before having recourse to force."

Valentine Baker's character was one that in this double duty inspired confidence at the War Office. I remember him as long ago as the winter of 1860-61, when he was in command of the 10th Hussars at York, the hard-riding popular Colonel of a hard-riding popular cavalry regiment, the smartest in the British army, hunting, every officer of them, four days a week with the York and Ainsty or the Bramham Moor hounds—the ideal man of his cavalry type. Then he fell into trouble, and in the midst of a promising career had to leave the British army. The campaign of Plevna was just beginning in the Balkans, and he took service with the Turks and greatly distinguished himself in the famous retreat after the fall of that fortress, and thus he had become a Pasha in the Sultan's service. But, on receiving the news of Tel-el-Kebir, nothing would satisfy him but an attempt to get back into the British army, and he unceremoniously left Constantinople and came to Cairo, where he was made welcome by his former fellow soldiers and obtained from Sir Evelyn Wood the command of the *gens d'armes*, a quasi-military duty under the Khedive. Valentine Baker was essentially a soldier of fortune and a fighting man, and was burning with the desire of distinguishing himself by some action of *éclat* and so being restored to Her Majesty's service. That was his position and that the service he had been sent on, and he had taken command at Souakin on the last day of the year.

Gordon was expected to co-operate with him and do the same at Khartoum, and his original plan of passing through Souakin was in order that they

### *The Souakin-Berber Route*

might make their plans together. Gordon was to help Baker to conciliate and buy up the Souakin tribes, and he was himself to make his way to Khartoum and re-establish order there and hold the fort till the communications were free for both of them between the two places. It was a plan in which common action was essential; and then the Egyptian garrisons of the interior were to be sent down to the sea coast and Gordon was to organize his new government at Khartoum.

The success of the whole plan as a military one of evacuation depended on the possibility of a double success in reopening the Souakin-Berber route and keeping it open, the other line of retreat down the Nile to Egypt being too long and too difficult, in face of the disturbed state of the country and the absence of transport, for it to have been possible to convey the garrisons and the civilians who were to accompany them in safety northwards. It was an essential part of Gordon's mission of evacuation that the road to the coast should be cleared, and, as we have seen, Gordon, in his letter to Sir Samuel Baker, had made co-operation between him and Sir Samuel's brother a first necessity of the position. No soldier could have been blind to this.

I am inclined therefore to think that Gordon's original plan of going to Souakin to take counsel with Baker would have given Gordon a better chance of ultimate success than by changing it, as Cromer insisted on his doing, to the Nile route. Also Gordon had a perfect soldier's right to expect that, if according to the new plan he was to play his own part unassisted at Berber and Khartoum, the Government that sent him should at least have helped Baker at the other end of the evacuating line, that between the sea and the Nile, to keep this line open.

## *Effect of Baker's Defeat*

There is a passage indicative of the acknowledgement of such an obligation on the part of the Foreign Office in Fitzmaurice's "Life of Granville," to which I shall return later, a passage which would show that the British Government at the time of their dispatch of Gordon intended to defend not only the Red Sea coast against the Mahdi, but also the whole of the eastern provinces as far inland as the Nile. Had they adhered to this intention the necessary support would have been given to Gordon, and it was thus that Gordon understood the position.

The whole plan, however, lost any chance of success it might have had by the total and inglorious defeat of Baker at Teb on the 5th February. Gordon ought then, according to all strategic rule, either to have been recalled or troops of some sort ought to have been provided to reinforce him and open the road which Baker had failed to open, the road now more than ever closed for his retreat. It should have been done at once, if at all, for on the 19th of May Berber declared for the Mahdi and the chance was gone. The Government at home, however, could not make up its mind either to recall Gordon or to send the assistance needed. There was a conflict of feeling in the Cabinet which prevented anything being decided. General Graham was sent indeed to Suakin with a British force in February, but after fighting a battle or two with Osman Digna he was forbidden to go further and his force was withdrawn. Hartington and Wolseley at the War Office wanted Gordon supported, but Gladstone stuck to it that he had always understood Gordon's mission to be a mission of peace and would not consent to Graham's advance. On the other hand, nobody in the Cabinet or at Cairo seems to have had his wits sufficiently about him to get

### *Was Help Promised?*

Gordon's Firman revoked, or to have understood that without such revocation he could not in honour abandon his mission. Had he been released from his instructions, Gordon could have left the garrisons to make the best terms they could with the Mahdi, and gone on, as was his original intention, by way of the White Nile to the Congo. This would have been, if not a very glorious, at least a simple solution of the difficulty, and indeed, if troops were not to be sent, it was the only rational one.

Lastly, as to the English help promised Gordon which he is blamed for having counted on, I think it cannot be doubted that when he left London in February some such promise was made him, or at least that there was an understanding to that effect between him and the War Office. It may be gathered from his speeches that Hartington so considered it, and it is notorious that such was Wolseley's view. Gordon was to go to Khartoum, in the first place, to try his luck single-handed, but Wolseley always counted on helping him if his luck should fail. Whether the full conclave of the four Ministers who dispatched him on his mission so understood the case is open to doubt; certainly Gladstone was not a party to any such promise; and yet it must necessarily have been present in their minds if not upon their lips. The contrary is inconceivable.

Also the Queen, who cannot but have been informed of all at the time, unquestionably considered her Ministers to have promised Gordon armed support. Her view of the obligation is to be found in the letter she wrote to Gordon's sister a few days after the news of his death reached England, and which has been published. Queen Victoria's letter begins thus:

"How shall I write to you or how shall I attempt

## *The Queen's Letter*

to express *what I feel!* To *think* of your dear noble heroic brother, who served his country and his Queen so truly, so heroically, with a self-sacrifice so edifying to the world, not having been rescued; that the promises of support were not fulfilled—which I so frequently and constantly pressed on those who asked him to go—is to me *grief inexpressible!*”

This letter, drafted by no secretary, but written with the Queen's own royal hand, seems to me conclusive. Its very indignation is the best proof of its truth, its anger at a betrayal known by the writer to have been such. It is impossible that the Queen should have used the words “the promises of support were not fulfilled” without any such having been understood by her at the time to have been made. There is, of course, no written record of them in any of the papers presented to Parliament, and the promises probably were verbal only, as indeed were all the details of the mission treated departmentally between Wolseley and Gordon. But it makes it almost certain that the War Office, if not the Government as a body, had intended military support, if such should be required, and had spoken of it to Gordon. Gordon certainly counted on military help, for he alludes to it repeatedly in his diaries.

Who then, if not her Ministers, can have conveyed to the Queen the idea of a promise having been given? Who gave or implied an assurance that the mission would, if necessary, have outside help? Between Wolseley and Gordon it was certainly understood that the War Office would do its best to see that he was properly backed when the time came. It might be difficult to get Gladstone to consent, but pressure would be put. The Duke of Cam-

### *Wolseley or Cambridge?*

bridge also, in all probability, said more than this. He saw Gordon off at the station, and cannot but have recounted all to Her Majesty afterwards. However silent Granville and the rest may have been, these two, Wolseley and the Duke of Cambridge, must have promised. The Queen's letter remains its certain proof.

For the rest of the incidents of Gordon's tragic mission, having said my say on the principal points in dispute regarding it, I will now return to my interrupted diary. It will show how I at the time regarded the mission, not in the light of my now better knowledge, but as it was presented to me in part by the public voice, in part by what I learned privately from those that knew.

## CHAPTER VII

### EXCITEMENT ABOUT GORDON IN LONDON

**M**Y Indian journey over I left Bombay for England on the 1st March 1884, and arrived at Suez on the 12th, and going on by Naples to Paris reached London on the 27th, altogether too late to be of any avail in the matter of Gordon. He was already at Khartoum.

The only noticeable incident on this homeward journey was that passing through the Suez Canal we found that vessels arriving from Bombay were subject to quarantine, and so that any intention I might have had of going ashore was necessarily abandoned. Nevertheless, while I was standing with other passengers on deck, a Government boat drew alongside our ship, remaining just outside the prescribed quarantine limit, and I heard my name called with inquiry whether I was on board, and going to the gangway was accosted from the boat by an Englishman in the Khedivial uniform, who informed me that he was Lieutenant-Colonel Gibbons in the Egyptian service, and that he had been instructed on behalf of the Government to notify to me that if I attempted to land I should be subjected to arrest. The announcement mattered little to me under the circumstances, though it proved afterwards to be the first step in a course of prohibition and exile which shut me out from Egypt for the next three years, and which, as will be seen, was maintained against me as long as Lord Granville continued at the Foreign Office.

At Paris we spent a few hours in the society of our refugee friends, Sheykh Mohammed Abdu,



## *Jemal-ed-Din at Paris*

Seyyid Jemal-ed-Din and James Sanua. The first I had not seen since the war, for he had spent the first year of his exile at Damascus, where the sons of Abd-el-Kader had befriended him, and where he had lived poorly but in security with a number more of the Egyptian Nationalist exiles. We found him somewhat Europeanized already by a two months' stay in Paris. He had left off shaving his head, and wore a fez instead of a turban, which rather detracted from his dignity as Sheykh, though he was still dressed in a respectable fur pelisse. "He talks now openly against the Sultan and the Turks, complains of the tyranny in Syria, and argues of the Sherif Own as the coming Caliph. The Mahdi, he says, is the forerunner of the Arabian Caliph who will soon be." To him and to Jemal-ed-Din I related all that I had done in India, and my thought of going to Constantinople, but they warned me this would be of no use; I might try, but they expected no good to come of it. All the power there was in the hands of Osman Pasha of Plevna, who cared only to fill his own purse. Syria was becoming indoctrinated with ideas of liberty in spite of the tyranny of spies and police. At Constantinople nothing could be done. We talked of the Mahdi, who was now the chief subject of interest with Moslems, and of Gordon, who was at Khartoum. Jemal-ed-Din entirely approved of the letter I had written to Gordon, and agreed that he would perish now that he had taken the wrong side. The following occurs in my diary of

"*27th March.*—We found Jemal-ed-Din in a little room eight feet square at the top of a house in the Rue de Seize, where he and Abdu edit a newspaper called the 'Indissoluble Link.' Almost at the same time came in a very curious party of strangers who

## *A Visit of Theosophists*

quite filled the room—a Russian lady, an American philanthropist, and two young Bengalis who announced themselves as Theosophists, come, they said, to consult the great Sheykh. They talked an extraordinary jargon about humanity, but seemed kind-hearted people, and so full of their cause as to take no notice whatever of our presence. The main object of their visit was to inquire about the Mahdi, whom they were all most anxious to believe in as a humanitarian, but their minds were perplexed about the slave trade, and they cross-questioned the Sheykh as to the Mahdi's principles on that head. The Sheykh had great difficulty in satisfying them, but explained how much slaves gained among Mohammedans in exchange for their freedom. This sent them away happy, but the poor Sheykh was put to his last shifts to hide his amusement. When they were gone we had a good talk about India, and all that we had done, which pleased him much."

I called also at the Embassy, and had an hour with Sheffield, who told me Gordon's idea had been to go straight to the Mahdi and make peace with him, but he had been prevented at Cairo. Now he considered his case hopeless. Lord Lyons, whom I also saw, acknowledged that we had got into an inextricable mess in Egypt. The same night we went on to England, arriving in London. Here I found myself once more in the thick of a political crisis, of which the main feature was the interminable Egyptian imbroglio, made more than ever acute by Gordon's peril at Khartoum. My journal deals principally with this, and indeed it occupied for ten months to come almost the whole public thought of Englishmen.

My first visits on arrival were to Button and Knowles, my threatened arrest in Egypt being upper-

## *Chenery's Death*

most in my mind. "Button still maintains his connection with the 'Times,' though poor Chenery is dead and his place as Editor has been taken by a young man, Buckle. He gave me a pathetic account of Chenery's death. He had suffered great pain for years from a cancer, of which he told no one of the 'Times' staff, though sometimes it would make him groan aloud. He was very forlorn, being without intimate friends while knowing every one. But he had an affection for Button. Then he had suddenly gone away alone and died. Button's political report was that the life of Gladstone's Cabinet was very precarious—hardly likely to last through the Session. I stood well now, he thought, with the public, as every one saw I had been right about Egypt.

To Knowles I told what had happened to me in Egypt in consequence of the encouragement given me. "Mr. Gladstone?" he said, "I should not be surprised to see him any day order our troops back and clear bodily out of Egypt; I have known him for years, and as long as he can twist his conduct into an apparent consistency of words, he will change his opinions without scruple. But he will not endure being brought face to face with a flat contradiction. It has always been the same, about art and literature and everything else. As yet, he has maintained a certain verbal consistency, but he cannot do it much longer."

A third visit was to my sister-in-law, Lady Wentworth, from whom I learnt that my exclusion from Egypt had been ordered by the Foreign Office. She knew of this from George Leveson Gower, Granville's nephew and Gladstone's private secretary. Lastly, I saw Randolph Churchill.

"30th March.—I found Randolph in bed in a little room at the top of his house in Connaught Place.

## *Churchill's Visit to India*

We had a long talk about Arabi and my visit to India. He was curious to know what I had been doing with the Mohammedans there, for Gorst had given him the idea that I had started the university at Hyderabad for revolutionary purposes. I told him I considered a revolution in India certain if changes in the system of government were not introduced. He said, 'It is hopeless to try and get the Conservatives to take up the idea of any sort of change.' He seemed taken, however, with the notion I suggested to him of playing the part of champion of the Mohammedans. I proposed that we should go together to Constantinople in the recess, but he said he was canvassing Birmingham and could not possibly find time. About my having been prevented from landing in Egypt he was especially interested, and thinks it could be made a capital point of attack on the Government. I told him the history of Knowles's message to me from Gladstone, without however mentioning Knowles's name. But he said at once: 'Oh, I know, that's Knowles, because he has told lots of people the same thing.' He advises the whole of my correspondence about it being lumped at once into the 'Times,' and that Drummond Wolff should be set at the Foreign Office to make the most of it in Parliament.

"He told me also that overtures had been made him from the Khedive for a withdrawal of the charges he had brought forward implicating him in the massacres of Alexandria, notably through the Prince of Wales, who had had a quarrel with him, nine years before, and had not spoken to him since. Now, however, the Prince had dined with him at a select dinner of people interested in Egypt, and had talked highly of the Khedive to him. 'The thing, however,' he said, 'has served its purpose, and we must go on

## *The Rothschilds Frightened*

to something fresh. I look upon the charge as proved, and I know it smashed up the Khedive and the Government policy at the time.' Wentworth has made a really good speech on the Soudan battles, and may, I think, help us much in our new campaign.

"*31st March.*—Gordon has been defeated outside Khartoum, his army of 2,500 flying from sixty of the Mahdi's men. What a hideous comedy it all is. He is now calling for English troops, he who went out to give freedom to the Soudan, peace on earth and goodwill towards men. [This is how I regarded his mission at the time.] Called on Sir Wilfrid Lawson, the only honest man in Parliament. He urges that we should make some move for the restoration of Arabi, but I doubt whether the time has come. At the present time the Mahdi is the one popular man in Egypt. Saw Lyulph Stanley.<sup>1</sup> He is now for a Protectorate in Egypt, and I can find nobody in favour of a Nationalist restoration. They all say now that I was right and Arabi was an honest man, but they treat it as a matter of history, and rather old history too. Button advises my getting a legal opinion on the case of my exclusion from Egypt before going any further. Lawson sends me some doggerel verse about the war, not so good as the last he wrote, but to the point.

"*3rd April.*—Lunched with Button at the Carlton, who tells me the Jews were never in such a fright about Egypt as they were two days ago. The Rothschilds have still four millions invested there and are working the press all they can. Lady Rosebery is nearly the only person who is allowed to see Gladstone. But they are in a terrible fright of his doing something violent, *e.g.*, withdrawing the troops from Egypt. He, Button, sees the Rothschilds nearly

<sup>1</sup> The Hon. Lyulph Stanley, now Lord Sheffield.

## *Colonel Burnaby*

daily, for the 'Times' is in their hands. To-day, however, they are more confident, and people are buying Egyptian stock. While we were talking, Burnaby<sup>1</sup> came in with Churchill and Gorst, and I had some talk with them. Burnaby looks weak and wears his arm in a sling. [He was just back from Souakin, where he had taken part in Graham's expedition and the battle of Tamanieb as a volunteer.] And I felt some disgust at shaking hands with a man who has been murdering the Arabs with his shot gun as he seems to have done. I have never liked him, for he has the most evil countenance one can imagine. I like Churchill far the best of the three. He has a light cheery manner like a boy at school.

"In the Park, where I sat for a few minutes and saw the two Lytton girls looking like roses. Their father starts for Sorrento to-night.

"*4th April.*—To Auberon Herbert at the Langham Hotel. He highly approves of the idea of letting the Egyptians choose their own ruler, and waiting for a spontaneous movement to bring back Arabi. If the British Government recalled Arabi now and proposed him, he would be looked upon with suspicion by the people. Thence to Lawson's, whom I found in high delight at having got a declaration out of the Government that they do not intend to send troops to Khartoum.

"Lunched with Labouchere. He is more practical, and we have discussed every detail of the policy to be suggested to Gladstone. He will feel the ground through Herbert Gladstone, which is his way of consulting the oracle. He told me the history of Gordon's mission. Gordon's idea had been to go out

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Burnaby, M.P., author of "The Ride to Khiva," afterwards killed at Abu Klea.

### *Labouchere's Account*

and make friends with the Mahdi, and to have absolutely nothing to do with Baring or the Khedive, or with anybody in Egypt. He was going to Souakin straight, where he counted upon one of the neighbouring Sheykhs, whose sons' lives he had saved or spared, and his mission was to be one entirely of peace. But the Foreign Office and Baring caught hold of him as he passed through Egypt, and made him stop to see the Khedive, and so he was befooled into going to Khartoum as the Khedive's Lieutenant. Now he had failed altogether in his mission of peace, and the Government had recalled him more than once in the last few days, but he had refused to come back. Gladstone had decided absolutely to recall all the troops from Egypt when Hicks's defeat was heard of, and was in a great rage. The expedition to Souakin had been forced on him by the Cabinet, and Hartington had taken care to give Graham no special instructions, so that he might fight without orders. This Graham of course had done, and Gladstone more angry still had gone down to sulk at Coombe. [Bertram Currie's villa in Coombe Wood.] Now he would stand it no longer, and he had let Hartington in by coming up and making the speech he did last night. Nobody expected it. Labouchere thought the moment most favourable for a new move.

"7th April.—Button tells me the Rothschilds are still in a great state of anxiety about their money, and Button is for the Government guaranteeing a loan of £8,000,000. It appears that the French are quite ready to put in their oar and themselves guarantee if allowed to protect. There is a split between Nubar and Clifford Lloyd. Nubar has threatened to resign. This will bring things to a crisis.

"8th April.—At Crabbet, dawdling about among

## *Gladstone a Political Gambler*

the horses, and going to see the Vardon property, which is for sale, and which I must buy if I can. This property has for the best part of a century been a thorn in our flesh, running like a wedge into Crabbet. There is an entry in the shooting diary of 1824 in which complaint is made of 'old Vardon's poaching.' Now is the time to rectify our frontier. An estate is a kingdom, with its wars and intrigues and ambitions and thirst for new territory, and, though I have no personal wish to increase mine, I consider this purchase a duty of my reign.

"I have written to Abdu a statement of my views about India, and to Selim Faris asking him what chance I should have of being able to influence people at Constantinople, if I went there, in favour of an effort at Mohammedan regeneration.

"*9th April.*—Called on Mrs. Howard. We had a tremendous argument, I defending the Mahdi, she attacking him as a fanatic, and begging me not to talk in that way in England. She said: 'It is so stupid of you, because you have so much sense, and if you would be moderate you might have great influence.' I said: 'My influence will never be great in England, because English people care nothing for principle and everything for party, and I am not a party man. My influence lies in the East, where all understand and accept me.' We talked about Baring, and their refusal to let me land in Egypt, and she declared the Foreign Office had had nothing to do with it. But George said it was the only sensible thing they had done yet. We went on to Gladstone, and she described how he had become a political gambler. He had gambled with me by sending me to Egypt, just as he had since gambled with Gordon. If we succeeded he won; if we failed he did not intend to pay. This, I doubt not, is the position exactly.



## *Talk with Hamilton*

"Lunched at the Carlton with Button. He intends to stand for Dorchester at the General Election, which may be anywhen now. But it will depend on events in Egypt. Gordon's death would precipitate matters, but anyhow Egypt must go bankrupt in a month or two. He asked me why I did not look out for a constituency, but I said there was none in England would elect me. I could only conscientiously stand as a Home Ruler, and the Irish would not have me because I am an Englishman. Besides, I could not belong to a Party. He agreed that I was not meant for Parliament and had a stronger position outside. I had some talk with Miltown, who believes in the Sultan's Caliphal prestige. I fancy the Tories, when they find they cannot annex Egypt, will hand it over to the Sultan. Anything would be better than the present state of things. I care little now who goes to Egypt so long as the English leave and no other European Power takes their place. But things are in the most extraordinary muddle; I find people here more cordial and respectful of my opinion than they were last year.

"*10th April.*—My letter proposing a new settlement for Egypt is in the 'Times,' with a leading article in disparagement. It is all very well to bluster, but I cannot see how they are to carry on their game of brag with no soldiers to send to Egypt and the French getting angry, and bankruptcy staring them in the face.

"*11th April.*—Dined with Eddy Hamilton at the St. James's Club. He has been wanting to see me, and has written four times since I came home. In spite of his declaration that we were not to talk politics, nothing else was talked of. He began by saying that he had read my letter to the 'Times,' and agreed with most of it, but he thought it a pity

## *Egypt at the Bottom of the Sea*

that I had mentioned the Khedive's abdication as a possible thing. I must know that the English Government was committed to his support. It was committed before Mr. Gladstone came into office, and such pledges could not be withdrawn from. He himself had always regretted this, and had considered the Joint Note of January, 1882, a great mistake. But the thing was done now and there was no help for it. He was sick of the whole thing and wished Egypt at the bottom of the sea. But they could not get out of it till there was a prospect of peace. I said: 'You will never have peace as long as you insist on keeping Tewfik, and you are only at the beginning of your troubles. We will plague you in turn with all the plagues of Egypt until you let the people go. This year you will have the Mahdi, next year you will have a flood, and the next a famine.' He said: 'It is impossible to do anything for the Egyptians. They will not help themselves, they are such miserable cowards, and there is not an honest man among them.' I said: 'As for their cowardice, you have taken peasants from the fields and have sent them to fight for a man they hate against a man they love. As for their dishonesty, you have driven the honest men out of Egypt or frightened them into holes and corners. There are plenty of honest Egyptians, and I could guarantee an honest government if you would let me, only not with Tewfik, and not with the class of men you now employ.' He said: 'The rest are too stupid.' I said: 'Egypt is the easiest of all lands to govern, and it does not require cleverness to do it. It requires honesty and the consent of the people. In all Arab societies the character of the Ruler is reflected in the Ministers, and, with a ruler whom they respected, and who had the qualities they respected, you could reform the

### *Duke of Marlborough*

whole mass. But Tewfik they never can respect, and the Circassians are opposed to all reform.' We talked about Gordon and the Mahdi. Gordon it appears has written to say that the Mahdi has no power in the Soudan, and Eddy thinks the whole thing a myth. He does not want to send an army to Khar-toum, but trusts to the desert frontier as Egypt's best defence. In this he is right, but I told him he must expect raids such as the Wahhabis used to make in the last century on Bagdad and Syria; they used to make desert marches of a thousand miles. I warned him against employing Indian troops, and told him my view of the danger of mixing India up with the troubles of Egypt. He said: 'I hope there may be no occasion.' But from his tone I should judge they have the possibility of employing Indian troops in their eye, in spite of their public declarations. He said they had no reason to believe these otherwise than loyal.

"We then talked about my exclusion from Egypt, and he was glad I had not attempted to force a landing on my way home, which he had feared. He assured me the Foreign Office had nothing whatever to do with the matter (which is not true), and trusted I would let the matter rest. I told him that was out of the question, and as a public duty, if for no other reason, I must bring it before the Foreign Office. He seemed much taken aback by this, and I am sure it was to find out my intentions, amongst other things, that he proposed this dinner. We then talked about India. . . . While we were talking the Duke of Marlborough came up and talked also about India, and my success there with the Mohammedans. He knows India well, and is a cleverer man than people give him credit for, cleverer than his brother Randolph. [I ought rather to have said more intellectual,

## *A Trick on the "Times"*

for he could not compare with Randolph in readiness of wit or those qualities which made his brother a leader of men. But his mind was a broad one, and if he had lived for anything else but pleasure he might have gained a high public position in the world.]

"I am satisfied with the conversation with Eddy. It is clear they are at their wits' end for a policy. They are waiting at present upon Providence, but Providence will not help them.

"*12th April.*—An important move is noticed in to-day's telegrams. Germany and Austria have presented identical notes pressing the claims of their subjects on the Egyptian Government. This will force a financial crisis and bring all Europe into the matter.

"*13th April, Easter Sunday.*—An anxious letter from Sir Wilfrid Lawson. He is as angry as I am about Egypt. He would clear out of it bag and baggage. I would stay long enough to do justice and make reparation, no matter at what cost to England.

"*15th April.*—Abdu and Sanua have both written, delighted with my letter in the 'Times.' The French papers have taken it up and reprinted it, and I expect it will cause some trouble to Baring.

"*16th April.*—Met Button at the Carlton and talked over plans. Drummond Wolff, whom I met the other day, asked me whether it was true that Button meant to break with the Fourth Party, and I mentioned this to Button, and he said that it was so; Randolph was becoming more unscrupulous than ever, and Gorst was still worse. Not long ago they had tried to play a trick upon the 'Times,' and had all but succeeded. Gorst had written to Buckle, who is young and new to his work, to say that Sir Stafford Northcote had decided to retire after the Easter

## *Am Interviewed by Stead*

recess from the leadership of the Opposition, and Buckle had actually got the article in print, when at twelve o'clock at night the article writer had suggested that he (Button) should be consulted. Button was in bed, but he got up and succeeded in finding his uncle, Robert Bourke, who told him the whole thing was a plant, he having been with Northcote that very afternoon devising plans for the coming Session. So the article was stopped just in time. Wolff, Button thinks, is the only honest one of the lot. I expect Robert Bourke has advised him to have nothing more to do with them. Young Hamid Ullah is here.

"18th April.—Lunched with Colonel Osborn<sup>1</sup> to talk over plans connected with India. He thinks I have done a great work there, and agrees with nearly every point of my programme. But he says it is useless bringing it forward this year, as Parliament is entirely occupied with the prospect of a dissolution, and it would be impossible to get members to commit themselves to vigorous action. He is probably right.

"At three Mr. Stead, the new 'Pall Mall' Editor, called, and I had a long conversation with him about the prospects in Egypt. He tried to make me commit myself to some approval of annexation as better than the present state of things, but I would not do this, and I think he went away with the impression that I was impracticable. He is by way of knowing a great deal of the opinions of the various European Cabinets, and assured me that Germany would not interfere with anything that might be done or proposed to be done in Egypt, that Bismarck did not care what happened to the Suez Canal, and that the

<sup>1</sup> A retired Indian official and well-known friend of native India, but out of favour with the India Office.

## *How to Rescue Gordon*

question would have to be settled between France and England. He did not believe in the Mahdi having any real power in the Soudan, and Gordon ought to be reinforced. Mr. Stead is a smart intelligent pressman, very different indeed from his predecessor Morley. I do not think we are likely to agree or that he will make any use of my opinions. We are too wide apart. At any rate he promised to publish nothing as mine without letting me see what he had written.

"As he was going, Jack and Mark Napier rushed in to ask if I would help them to save Gordon.<sup>1</sup> They had an idea, which was to get together a thousand sportsmen, men they explained who would be ready 'to go a thousand miles to shoot a lion,' and try to force a passage from Suakin to Berber and carry off Gordon on the true principles of a rescue. They thought I might like to join them and show them the way. But I told them the scheme was nonsense, and even if it wasn't I would have nothing to do with armed operations against the Arabs. Much as I liked Gordon personally, I considered him to be in the wrong and the others in the right, and I would rather see him perish than cause the death of one of his opponents. If it came to sending an Embassy to the Mahdi, I might be able to help them, and I advised them to put this idea forward, rather than the other. I have written to Jemal-ed-Din to ask him what he thinks of it.

"*19th April.*—At Crabbet. Count Alfred Potocki came down with his son Roman, and Mr. Marcowski, manager of Count Branicki's stud, all Poles and breeders of Arab horses, to see our horses. They have come over to England on purpose to see them,

<sup>1</sup> The Hon. John and Mark Napier (see "Secret History"). Also see Mrs. Allnatt's letters in Appendix A.

## *Count Potocki*

and are in raptures. Count Potocki is a very distinguished man. Forty years ago he was attaché to the Austrian Embassy in London and knew everybody worth knowing, and he still keeps up a marvellous acquaintance with English politics. We talked over the whole situation with regard to Egypt. He ridicules the idea of the French being able to fight over the matter, and he considers Gladstone the most dangerous man England has ever had as minister. He tells me the new Russian Ambassador in London who has just been appointed is the same Staal<sup>1</sup> who was my friend twenty-five years ago at Athens. It is singular how many men whom I was with there, and knew intimately as colleagues, have since distinguished themselves. Haymerlé, whom I remember lamenting that he never on account of his birth could rise higher than the rank of Secretary, died Prime Minister of Austria; Nelidoff is Ambassador to the Porte; Staal is Ambassador in London; Malzen Grand Chamberlain at Munich, and Dufferin, who however was only a visitor at Athens in 1859, holds first European rank as a Diplomatist after Bismarck. We talked about Lytton, who Potocki declares will be the next Tory Foreign Secretary, and we talked about India.

"Button telegraphs that a Conference has been called!

"*20th April.*—The 'Observer' announces that the Conference will be held in London, but will confine itself to financial matters. Baring has been summoned to England. My only fear now is the re-establishment of the Dual Control, which is evidently on the cards.

"*21st April.*—Twiss has given his opinion on the case of my being prevented landing in Egypt. It is

<sup>1</sup> M. de Staal, for twenty years Russian Ambassador in London.

## *I propose Mediation*

wholly adverse to my legal position as having a right to land.' I must now treat the case diplomatically.

"*22nd April.*—Parliament met yesterday, and Gladstone has at last admitted that Gordon is 'hemmed in,' though he denies that he is 'surrounded.' The Governor of Berber<sup>1</sup> telegraphs that he must make friends with the Mahdi, and the French are writing violent articles. The 'Pall Mall' this evening predicts a war with France.

"*23rd April.*—To London. Things worse than ever in Egypt. Baring is on his way home to be hauled over the coals, and about time; Nubar talking again of resigning if Berber is not relieved; and Topsy Egerton,<sup>2</sup> who is in charge at Cairo, recommending a mixed English and Egyptian expedition of relief.

"Jack and Mark Napier came again, and I read them the draft of a letter I have written to Gladstone, proposing to act as mediator for the relief of Gordon.<sup>3</sup> This was suggested by one I received this morning from Jemal-ed-Din to the effect that for my sake he would do what he could with the Mahdi to save Gordon's life. Button advised me to take it myself to Downing Street and ask to see Gladstone. But the Prime Minister was busy with a Cabinet Council, and I was obliged to entrust it to Eddy Hamilton in the hope of getting an answer. Button says it is too late, and that they decided yesterday to send a relief expedition to Berber. But as yet they have announced no such intention. Lord De la Warr,<sup>4</sup> too, approves of

<sup>1</sup> Berber surrendered to the Mahdi on 19th May; after this Gordon had no chance of extricating himself from Khartoum.

<sup>2</sup> Edwin Egerton of the diplomatic service, afterwards Sir Edwin Egerton, G.C.M.G., His Majesty's Ambassador at Madrid.

<sup>3</sup> See Appendix C.

<sup>4</sup> A political ally during the Arabi trial (see "Secret History").



## *Terms of Proposed Mission*

the letter, and I think at least it will be an advantage to put it on record that the offer was made. I told Eddy briefly the nature of my proposal, and he said he was entirely for peace, but he could not promise me Mr. Gladstone would see me, because I was looked upon as an opponent of their Egyptian policy.<sup>1</sup>

“My idea of a solution would be either to go myself or get some one else to go, Jemal-ed-Din or Abdu or young Abd-el-Aal, first to Dongola, and thence to Obeyd. There ought not to be much difficulty about this. The condition, I fancy, which might be accepted would be the evacuation of the fortified places by Gordon and such Europeans, Turks, Copts, and others as might wish to go back to Egypt; a treaty of peace, or rather an engagement on the part of the Mahdi that he would fix his frontier at Berber and Dongola, and the Egyptian Government theirs at Assouan; a guarantee of the Red Sea from Foreign European attack; an indemnity to the Hadendowas as blood money for those slain at Teb, Tamasi, and elsewhere. For myself I should stipulate that no military operation was to be begun during my mission, that no revenge should be taken for my death, or expedition be sent for my release in case of capture, and that it should be recorded in writing that the terms of the agreement should be kept. I should also mention that I should expect Arabi to be restored in Lower Egypt should my mission prove successful. But it is extremely unlikely they will let me go.

“At the Carlton Club I met Seymour FitzGerald,<sup>2</sup> with whom I talked about India. He wonders I do

<sup>1</sup> Compare Lord Cromer's "Modern Egypt" as to my position with the Foreign Office and at 10, Downing Street.

<sup>2</sup> M.P. for Horsham.

## *Brocklehurst on Situation*

not stand at Horsham for the next elections, or as a Tory Home Ruler in Ireland. Major Napier,<sup>1</sup> too, was there, and old Ranalagh with whom I have always had a sympathy as having been once a rebel. He fought with the Carlists in Spain. De la Warr is expecting the ex-Khedive at Buckhurst.

"Later to Button's, where I met Brocklehurst, Gordon's chief friend and correspondent, and had a long talk with him about Gordon. It appears that Gordon asked repeatedly for me when he was starting for Egypt, and it is a thousand pities I did not see him (being away in India), as I could have prevented his making the mistake of going to Tewfik and neglecting to go to the Mahdi. Brocklehurst declares that Gordon, from first to last, has refused to believe in the Mahdi's influence, and does not believe in it now. He says that if he had done so he would certainly have made friends with him. But he is very angry with Baring. He does not trust much to the relief expedition, though he is in favour of trying it, and I think he is inclined to support my plan of negotiation instead. The only thing is, is it not too late?

"Dined at Pembridge Crescent to meet Arthur Godley, who has always been sympathetic with my ideas. He is now at the India Office, and can afford to talk more openly than formerly when he was Gladstone's Private Secretary. He is all for peace in Egypt, and thinks Gordon mad, which I, too, begin to think may be the real explanation of it. About India he was very ready apparently to take my views. But he considered the ill-feeling between Englishmen and natives was confined to Bengal. I am to go to him again in a day or two at the India Office to talk over Indian affairs. He agreed with me when I

<sup>1</sup> The present Lord Napier of Magdala.

## *Gladstone Speaks*

said that the end of it all would be that we should leave Egypt and only keep possession of her debt.

"*24th April.*—No answer from Downing Street, but Button says that at the Cabinet Council yesterday afternoon they changed their minds in favour of peace. Wolseley was there, and there was to be no expedition after all. He thinks perhaps my letter may have had something to do with it. Lunched at the Carlton and met Jem Lowther,<sup>1</sup> who talked about Egypt, and Robert Bourke, who is asking the question about the dispatch of troops to Berber and Khartoum. It is the opinion of both these Right Honourable Gentlemen that the Government would give its ears to learn that Gordon was dead.

"To the House of Commons and heard Gladstone make his explanation about Gordon. It is certainly most audacious. But I am convinced it means no troops, though nearly everybody seemed to understand the contrary. What he said was that 'All human means would be taken.' Button, who was in the gallery with me, whispered 'Human means means you.' Rivers Wilson<sup>2</sup> was also in the gallery, and proposes to come and see me to-morrow, a thing he has not done for the last two years. Gladstone is looking thin and old. To my mind he does not show to advantage in the House of Commons. He is argumentative, short tempered, and insincere; the reverse in fact of what he is at home. And to-day he looked like a fraudulent bankrupt trying to make his creditors believe he was paying them twenty shillings in the pound. One wonders how he can inspire confidence in his supporters, but I have never heard him on a really great occasion.

"I have written to Jemal-ed-Din, sending extracts

<sup>1</sup> The Right Hon. James Lowther, M.P.

<sup>2</sup> Sir C. Rivers Wilson (see "Secret History").

*"Pall Mall" for sending me*

from the 'Pall Mall,' which has my letter to Gordon, the one written from India, in it, and a leading article recommending that I should be sent to Obeyd to treat with the Mahdi." [It says: "If everything—Khartoum, arsenals, steamers, and munitions of war—if all these are to be handed over to the Mahdi and, the garrisons are to trust their lives to his tender mercies, our proper agent in the Soudan is not General Gordon, but Mr. Wilfrid Blunt. General Gordon was prepared to go a great length in order to conciliate the Mahdi. Mr. Blunt is prepared to go all lengths. General Gordon, as a last resort, and being a man of war from his youth up, has always avowed his readiness to fight rather than see his men cut to pieces. Mr. Wilfrid Blunt would not injure the hair of an Arab to save the lives of General Gordon and all his men. Mr. Blunt, then, is obviously the man to whom the Government should turn in this the hour of their need. He represents their policy to a nicety. If they will not relieve Berber, and if they can do nothing to assist Gordon to hold Khartoum, let them at least send Mr. Blunt in hot haste to El Obeid to arrange with the Mahdi for the escape of the abandoned garrisons. Mr. Blunt is not less brave than General Gordon, and he could be sacrificed at least as safely."]

"At Button's, where I looked in again to ask his advice about an answer which has come from Downing Street. Reginald Brett, Hartington's Secretary, called, and Button saw him in the other room. He states positively that the Government has decided not only not to send troops to Berber, but to forbid the Egyptian Government sending any. They mean to do nothing at all, and have telegraphed to Egypt to say so. He thinks they will certainly come to me. Eddy Hamilton's note is to the effect that Mr. Glad-

## *The Cabinet Wavers*

stone will answer later, but is now laying my proposal before the Cabinet. He writes, however, another private note suggesting that I should talk it over with Brand.<sup>1</sup> This, however, Button recommends me not to do, so I have written to say I can only talk to Mr. Gladstone, and will wait his convenience. What they want is, evidently, that I should take all the responsibility of the negotiation on myself, and offer terms which they might afterwards repudiate. But they won't catch me again doing this, and, if I go to Obeid, I go as British envoy. Otherwise I should only be waylaid by the Khedive on my road. Button is in high delight at the upshot of it all. He tells me it was Wolseley himself who told him what had been decided in the Cabinet.

"Dined at Pembridge Crescent to meet Captain Abney, a friend of Gordon's.

"*25th April.*—To Button's early, to talk matters over again. But there is nothing new, except that the Bisharin Arabs have joined the Mahdi, and the desert of Korusko is blocked. The telegrams in the papers don't say this. But Button had it from Wolseley, and I have written again to Jemal-ed-Din, asking him about the terms which we might ask. The Government won't say anything to me till Baring arrives; that is to say on Monday.

"Wrote a number of letters, to Jemal-ed-Din especially, and to Arabi, asking the latter whether it would be possible for him to work with Ismaïl in case such a solution should be proposed. He is to answer by telegram, the words 'Content,' or 'Refuse.' This because I think the time is come when a new settlement *must* be made; and this is not the

<sup>1</sup> The Hon. Henry Brand, M.P., Surveyor-General of the Ordnance, afterwards 2nd Viscount Hampden.

## *Harcourt for Clearing Out*

most unlikely of the many proposals that will be brought forward.

"*26th April.*—Called on Button. He tells me the Cabinet are again wavering about sending troops to Berber, or rather Khartoum, for they would probably start from Massowa if at all. The reason of this is that the Liberal M.P.s understood Mr. Gladstone's declaration yesterday in a sense exactly opposite to his real meaning, that is to say as a promise of sending troops, and half a dozen of their leaders went to him and explained how much they approved of it, and Mr. Gladstone had been unable to satisfy them by saying that all he had meant was that Gordon should be ordered home. So, to please these people, there is to be more slaughter. But we shall know when I get the answer to my letter. Button tells me that several members of the Cabinet would be glad to go out of office, notably Harcourt,<sup>1</sup> who is afraid of dynamite and is tired of being watched by the police. Three or four days ago, talking of the Conference with Natty Rothschild, Harcourt said: 'Our hope is that the Powers will refuse our proposals, which will give us an excuse for coming straight out of Egypt.' Button advises me not to send in my papers about my being refused entrance to Egypt until I get my answer about the Soudan. My own idea was to do so at once, as it is a rule of strategy to fight stronger than ever when you are negotiating for peace.

"Then to Rivers Wilson whom I found in bed with a cold and a fox terrier. He is of opinion that the Conference will meet and that it will be impossible to exclude politics. 'Ferry,'<sup>2</sup> he said, 'is be-

<sup>1</sup> The Right Hon. Sir William Harcourt, M.P., Home Secretary, always a good friend to Egypt.

<sup>2</sup> M. Jules Ferry, French Prime Minister.

## *Rivers Wilson for Annexation*

ginning to feel his legs, and he means to restore the Dual Control, and will insist on dragging in everything if he is asked to make a concession of French financial rights. You talk about altering the Law of Liquidation, but that is out of the question, and whatever happens, Egypt must pay the interest on the debt. If this was not so I should be very happy to see you set up Arabi or anybody you liked at Cairo. But what there must be is a strong Government, which can collect the taxes and pay the interest.' He believes Egypt still able to raise £9,000,000 of revenue and pay away half of it. But he spoke less positively than in former days. We talked about Ismail. He would never have anything to do with his coming back. Ismaïl was no longer any good, as he had lost all his prestige, and though clever could not maintain himself. Tewfik was good as an instrument. He himself had chosen him in preference to Halim as being the more absolutely servile of the two—but of course he could not rule. Arabi had lost all sympathy in England by his personal cowardice. Rivers in fact is all for annexation if annexation is allowed by the other Powers, which he doubts. I then told him my views for Egypt. He has a good deal of influence with the Rothschilds, and if we could get them at all on our side we should win the game.

"Then on to Labouchere, who has just written a capital letter about Egypt in the 'Times.' He wants me to get Arabi to write him a letter from Ceylon, giving his view about a possible restoration of the National Party. He considers Gordon to be a stark lunatic, and is for leaving him to his own devices.

"*28th April.*—Berber is being abandoned, the garrison having gone over to the Mahdi. Khartoum will follow.

## *Baring's Position Shaky.*

"29th April.—The 'Standard' has a telegram, saying that certain troops and tribes from Khartoum have joined the Mahdi. If so, Gordon's end has come. The 'Daily News' has a letter from O'Kelly<sup>1</sup> at Dongola, describing the Mahdi and his system in almost the same language that these were described to me at Cairo seven months ago. I wonder whether Eddy Hamilton would still maintain that the Mahdi was nobody.

"To London and found a letter from Jemal-ed-Din, giving me in detail his idea of the Mission of Peace that might be sent to the Mahdi.<sup>2</sup> Button tells me that the Government have decided *pour tout potage* to send Curly Knox to Khartoum! The idea is that he, knowing the country as a sportsman, and something of the language, could smuggle himself into the town, where he could deliver to Gordon the Government's order that he should return. The Government think that this will absolve them from all further responsibility, and that, if Gordon—as he probably would—should refuse to come back, his blood would be on his own head. I remember Curly Knox ever since the days of the Crimean war. Now he is a somewhat decayed blood, a rabid damned-nigger guardsman. And I would not be in his shoes when the Mahdi has got hold of him—only he will never go. Baring has been to the 'Times' people, which is always a sign with officials that they feel their position shaky; and Button is sure he won't go back to Egypt. He has made too absurd a hash of it there. Colvin, he said, was a clever fellow to get out of it when he did.

<sup>1</sup> Mr. O'Kelly, M.P., one of the Parnellite members who had gone to Dongola as correspondent to the "Daily News." His article, "The Mahdi and his Men," was much the best account of the Mahdist movement yet published.

<sup>2</sup> See Appendix B.



## *Fred Burnaby*

"Called on Hill, the Editor of the 'Daily News,' who has been asking me to write for him. He agreed as to re-establishing a National Government in Egypt, but it was necessary to find some formula for Mr. Gladstone which could reconcile him to it; Mr. Gladstone changed his principles constantly—but every time he needed a fresh formula, by which he could satisfy his mind that he was consistent; he had nailed his colours to Tewfik, and it would require management to get him to abandon him. As for Gordon, they were going to do nothing now except perhaps get ready for moving a small column of relief in July.

"Luncheon at the Carlton with Burnaby, whom I especially dislike. He said he did not care a rap what happened to Gordon or Khartoum, and why should he? So long as he has something to tell his electors, it will be enough. He is a dull heavy fellow in my opinion, with a dash of cunning and more than a dash of brutality. Afterwards to the House of Commons, where I had a long talk with Lawson and John Morley,<sup>1</sup> whom Mrs. Howard has written advising me to take into my councils. We three discussed the whole thing. First, about Gordon, who we agreed was past praying for. Morley said the Government were willing to bite their tongues out now for having sent him; they were very angry with him, for he had done everything he said he wouldn't do, and done nothing that they told him to do. He thought if his death had happened two months ago, it would have turned out the Ministry. Now people were tired of Gordon, and, though there would be a row, it would blow over. He thought the Government would rather do anything than accept my help, it would be very

John Morley, M.P., now Lord Morley of Blackburn.

## *A Talk with Morley*

unpopular, and, with the failure of Gordon before their eyes, they would be doubly disinclined. Still the necessity might be so great as to force them.

"About Egypt I explained my views at length, Morley insisting that I should put aside all moral arguments, and treat the case only as it might appear to regard English interests. I said, therefore, that I recognized two undoubted interests—(1) the Suez Canal, and (2) the friendship of the Mohammedan world. Both these he admitted, and said you may add a third. If things go on as they are now, we shall be at war with France in less than five years. I then explained that as regards the Suez Canal, we must either make an arrangement with Europe or with France, and secure our interest in it by sharing it with them. The friendship of the Mohammedan world could be best secured by establishing a Mohammedan Government in Egypt and withdrawing our troops. But France would only be satisfied with the establishment of a strong Government, which could keep order. This could be done by allowing the people to choose their own ruler—a ruler who would be supported by the troops. Egypt was the easiest country in the world to govern, but you must have the troops on your side. This seemed to please Morley as practical and businesslike. He asked me, however, to explain how it was that last August Sherif Pasha had declared to the Government that he was satisfied with the loyalty of the troops and begged them to withdraw; it was then decided that all the English troops should leave Egypt in the spring, except a Corporal's guard to be stationed at Alexandria, not to protect the Khedive, but to prevent interference from the French. I told him the reason was this, that the Egyptians then had no leader, and were hopeless in the hands of the Cir-

## *Gladstone Declines my Offer*

cassians. But now the Mahdi had appeared as a champion, and the army would serve him rather than Tewfik. It was necessary therefore now to consider the Mahdi, and find a ruler who could act on friendly terms with him. He asked about Arabi, saying he was out of the question now. But I told him I still considered Arabi a valuable man, as a good Moham-medan and one who would take advice. But he must not be recalled as our nominee, which would spoil his influence. 'Yes,' Morley said, 'the Egyptians must choose, and we must leave the country—but we must not make it over to France.'

"*1st May.*—Mr. Gladstone's answer has come. Her Majesty's Government cannot make use of my offer to act as mediator in the Soudan, 'in as much as it must already be known throughout that region that they in common with the Government of Egypt have no other desire than to promote the evacuation of the country—and the restoration of its liberties.' This is as pure a specimen of Gladstonese as can be found in Hansard. And the 'promotion of an evacuation' is as funny as anything since the French were reported to have 'evacuated Spiders and Worms' [an old Napoleonic joke].

"To a Peace Conference, where I arrived just in time to prevent two annexationists, Villiers Stuart and McCoan from carrying a resolution calling on England to 'take a determined course with regard to reform in Egypt,' specifying the reforms suggested by Arabi. I exposed this manœuvre as meaning the dispatch to Egypt of fifty more Clifford Lloyds and twenty more Evelyn Barings, and got an amendment passed that 'reform in Egypt should be entrusted to the only hands capable of effecting it, those of the Egyptians themselves.' McCoan went away in a huff, and Stuart talked of resigning the chair.

## *Gordon Blue Book Published*

"To the House of Commons, where I had a talk in the tea room with old Donald Currie.' He told me that Gladstone had it all his own way still in the Cabinet, and was at last anxious about Gordon. 'His one idea now,' he said, 'is to avoid more bloodshed.' Both he and Sir George Campbell,<sup>2</sup> who joined our conversation, talked of Gordon as having gone off his head. I showed him that terms must be come to at once with the Mahdi if we were not to have another bloody war. He promised to speak to Gladstone in this sense.

"Spent the evening with Button looking through the Gordon Blue Book. It is most damaging for the Government. Donald Currie and Campbell talked of Gordon as having gone off his head. But this Blue Book shows the Government went off theirs too.

"*2nd May.*—Went to see Lady C. who talked about the Prince of Wales and his political ideas. She says he is coming round a bit to Arabi.

"*3rd May.*—There has been a great split between Randolph Churchill and Lord Salisbury; and Churchill has resigned the Chairmanship of the Conservative Union. This will probably save the Government, who were threatened with a dissolution, nominally on the Reform Bill, but really on their Egyptian policy.

"*5th May.*—Sent in my case of exclusion from Egypt to Lord Granville. It is certainly a strong one, and I think it must harass them if it does no other good.

"*6th May.*—An extraordinary set of Parliamentary Papers published relating to Gordon. Reading these and the others carefully through, I have come to the

<sup>1</sup> Sir Donald Currie, an intimate friend of Gladstone.

<sup>2</sup> Sir George Campbell, M.P., had been formerly Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, a Liberal, and a strong friend of native India.

## *Percy Wyndham*

conclusion that Gordon is a very self-willed man, without fixed rule of action. In any case he has clearly lost his head, and, having failed to exercise the influence he expected over the Soudanese, has turned against them, and is now the bitterest enemy of everything he supported as good last year. He is fighting for his own hand as simply and solely as any adventurer of them all. It will lead to a new war, if he has not his head cut off and sent to Obeyd before the summer is over.

"*7th May.*—Called on Percy Wyndham,<sup>1</sup> who is much exercised against the Government, as is natural, but at the same time is reasonable about Gordon. I find most people inclined in private to think him out of his mind. Percy has acted very straight in all this Egyptian business. He was one of the minority of nine, and the only Tory who voted against the war in 1882, and he has never made a mistake on any essential point. I told him about my being refused a landing in Egypt, and he has promised, when the time comes, to take the matter up in Parliament. As my nearest relation, he is the right man to do it.

"Lunched with Dr. Leitner.<sup>2</sup> He shows great sympathy with the Mohammedans, but is one of the Conservative school, loving the Turks, and desiring no change. He wants me to make it up with the Sultan, and urges me to go to Constantinople, and thinks I might gain influence there.

"*8th May.*—Button also thinks I had better go to Constantinople and that Dufferin would be glad to see me. He, Button, has seen Wolseley, who assures him no preparations are yet made for a Soudan expedition. But he thinks, all the same, they will send a small force when the Nile rises and will have a

<sup>1</sup> The Hon. Percy Wyndham, M.P. for Cockermouth.

<sup>2</sup> The well-known Orientalist and friend of Islam.

## *Rosebery on Racing*

large force in Egypt. He wants me to call on him, but I don't think I will do this, as anything I could tell him would only make him more anxious to send troops. I wrote yesterday to Jemal-ed-Din, telling him I washed my hands of Gordon, that he had proved himself a friend neither to liberty, nor to the Arabs, nor yet to Islam.

"A long talk with Mrs. Howard. She says people will never forgive me for having given Arabi information before the war, especially about his being attacked from the Suez Canal. Lord Granville is very angry still and F. Leveson,<sup>1</sup> but she thinks not Mr. Gladstone. She says the Government could never recognize the Mahdi as a religious personage.

"*9th May.*—Mrs. Howard, talking yesterday of my article in the 'Nineteenth Century' on the proposed Arab race at Newmarket, said that Freddy Leveson had asked Rosebery the other day why he continued on the turf, and he had answered because it was the easiest way in England to be accepted as a statesman, and he had appealed to Gladstone, who quite agreed with him. She tells me that her husband, who represents the ideas of the rank and file of the Liberal Party, is infinitely disgusted with the Egyptian Policy, and says that half the party would vote against the Government but for Home Questions.

"Called on Hugh Wyndham<sup>2</sup> in Dover Street, he having asked to see me. He is Secretary of the Constantinople Embassy. We talked the Eastern Question thoroughly through, and he seemed disposed to think my policy might be adopted eventually as far as allowing the Arabs to set up a Caliphate was concerned. Constantinople, he says, is crumbling

<sup>1</sup> The Hon. Frederick Leveson-Gower, M.P.

<sup>2</sup> Of the diplomatic service, now Sir Hugh Wyndham, K.C.B.

## *Sultan Abdul Hamid*

to pieces, the Turks of Europe emigrating in a continuous stream to Asia Minor. The Germans are still supporting the Sultan. The Government of the Porte is defunct, and the Sultan rules everything through a changing set of Ministers who are all opposed to each other. The Sultan himself is a mono-maniac, fancying himself in constant danger of assassination. Hugh had seen him when Dufferin was on leave, and the Sultan had talked to him for three-quarters of an hour about a certain Armenian doctor who had been found dead in the Bosphorus, and he could be got to think of nothing else. He thought Dufferin would wish to see me if I went to Constantinople.

“*10th May.*—To Button’s. He tells me the Government scheme was to offer a remission of the English interest on the Suez Canal shares, for a reduction of interest on the bonds. This had been proposed to France, and at first was well received, but later Alphonse Rothschild had put pressure on the French Government, and now they would do nothing unless there was an international control.

“*11th May.*—The ‘Observer’ announces that a relief expedition under Wolseley will be dispatched to Khartoum in October. Jemal-ed-Din writes expressing his great confidence in me, which is satisfactory,<sup>1</sup> for it is of course difficult they should understand how I can remain on confidential terms with our officials here and yet be true to Islam. It is a strange position, but its strangeness is its strength.

“*12th May.*—Met Churchill at the Carlton. He said: ‘Well, we shall have Arabi back very soon now.’ I said: ‘I am afraid they will hand over Egypt to the Conference—and the Conference will hand it over to Italy, and Italy will hand it over to

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix.

## *Godley at the India Office*

Ismail.' He said they would like to do it perhaps, but they would be prevented. I asked him about his own affairs, saying: 'You have been in the wars since I saw you.' 'Yes, as usual,' he said, 'and I am not out of it yet.' Thence to the India Office, where I had it out with Godley about the Patna case.<sup>1</sup> I told him there had been a compact that if I did not publish the case it would be inquired into and redressed; and nothing had been done. I did not wish to annoy Lord Ripon, but I should have to bring it before Parliament before the end of the Session. He promised to write to Primrose and represent this to him, which he admitted was fair. We talked about Hyderabad affairs. Cordery, he told me, was in London, and I explained, for his private information, the whole history of the intrigue against Salar Jung and the Nizam.<sup>2</sup> He did not seem at all surprised and said everything was going on right now. And I presume Cordery is not to return there. He approved very heartily of the University scheme. Godley is a good fellow, and I hear he always speaks of me in high terms. I have always believed he left Gladstone partly because of the Egyptian war.

"After this to the House of Commons, where there was a tremendous crush to hear the debate on the Vote of Censure, the Duke of Cambridge and many another bigwig being left out in the cold. I got in through Harry Brand, who entrusted me to Ponsonby, who squeezed me into the Ambassadors' Gallery, where I had a capital place. Hicks Beach's<sup>3</sup> speech was an excellent one, very well prepared and arranged, and rising at certain points to eloquence. His best hits were when he asked if ever a British Govern-

<sup>1</sup> See "India Under Ripon."

<sup>2</sup> See *ibid.*

<sup>3</sup> Sir Michael Hicks Beach, now Lord St. Aldwyn.



## *"Look! Dumb!"*

ment received such a telegram as one of General Gordon's, and when he pointed to Mr. Gladstone and repeated, 'You will incur indelible disgrace.' It was a dignified speech, almost in the old-fashioned style, with a Latin quotation, and without the modern Parliamentary violence, and will increase Beach's reputation. Mr. Gladstone was to my mind not so happy. While Beach was speaking he had been taking notes in pen and ink, and rose to answer him more as a man might in a debating club, than as a statesman arraigned on a dishonourable charge. He was argumentative, sarcastic, petulant, but in the course of speaking he became angry, and then he spoke with effect. I was immensely pleased of course at the line he took of declining to make war on the Mahdi's followers who were 'men fighting for their country's freedom' ['rightly struggling to be free'], and Scott Holland,<sup>1</sup> who was near me in the Gallery, was equally excited. But he did not state his case quite frankly, and constantly spoilt it by drawing fine distinctions and quibbling as is his wont with words. In a speech of this sort, it was surely a mistake of oratory ever to suggest a laugh. His argument, however, was a strong one, that the Opposition had never during all the Egyptian troubles formulated an alternative policy, and he was powerful when he challenged Hicks Beach to say that he would send an army to Khartoum. Having said this he waited a moment, and then pointing to Beach, turned to the House and screamed 'Look! Dumb!' This was a great oratorical success. But as I have said before, oratory under the circumstances was rather out of place. I have been unfortunate in never hearing Gladstone quite at his best, though Lawson called this one of his best.

<sup>1</sup> The Rev. Scott Holland, Canon of St. Paul's.

## *Stanley of Alderley*

"13th May.—Talked things over with Button. He advises me certainly to go to Constantinople, but to tell nobody about it. It seems there is some chance of the Vote of Censure being carried, and all now depends on the Irish members. If they can turn the Government out, they will do so, for the sake of a dissolution. But if they doubt their power they will vote for Government. They will only make up their minds at the last moment. If the Government is not beaten on the division, the Conservatives will bring forward an address to the Crown to restrain the Ministers from sacrificing British interests in Egypt. Button says this is a quite Constitutional course.

"Called on Harry Brand, who thinks the Government will be beaten on the division. He would vote against them himself if he was not in the Government. 'There is one man,' he said, 'who will be happy if it goes against us, and that is Hartington. He is sick of office, and wants to be away amusing himself. As things go worse for the Government, his spirits rise.' We walked together in the Park. I then went on to Stanley of Alderley.<sup>1</sup>

"Stanley is quite reconciled to me now, and talks to me as Mohammedan to Mohammedan, though he warns me still not to speak evil of the Turks. 'There is a maxim,' he says, 'among Catholics, that whoever speaks ill of the Jesuits, speaks ill of the Church, and so it is with the Turks. They are the race which has carried out the teaching of the prophet in its purity more than any other.' I told him I had no quarrel with the Turks except in their relations with the Arabs, whom they always managed to corrupt, and I was come to ask his advice about going to Constantinople. I had been through India, and was

<sup>1</sup> Henry, 2nd Lord Stanley of Alderley (see "Secret History").

## *Rothschild Selling Egyptian Stock*

charged by the Indian Mohammedans to see the Sultan and lay before him the need of a social and moral reform for Islam, and to urge him to take the matter up, as Emir el Mumenin, and to warn him that, if he neglected this duty, the Indian Mohammedans would fall off from him. He thought the idea a good one, and that I would be listened to, and he has promised to come to James Street on Monday at noon, with letters he will write to Vefyk and Khair-ed-Din Pashas on the subject. I intend, if the Government is not turned out on the Vote of Censure, to leave for Paris and Constantinople on Monday evening. Stanley is a good fellow, and I have known him now for twenty-five years. He knows a great deal about Islam, but his ideas are all confused, and he has no knowledge of the Arabs. He tells me he was never in India—only in Ceylon and Siam, and knows so little of modern ideas in India, that he had not heard of Seyd Ahmed being charged with rationalism nor of the rivalry between Abd-el-Latif and Amir Ali at Calcutta.

“Lunched at the Gregorys. Later to the House of Commons. Lymington, whom I met there, said: ‘I am coming to think after all we should have done better to stick to Arabi.’ Lymington was one of Gladstone’s strongest supporters at the time of the war.<sup>1</sup>

“*14th May.*—The Government are not turned out. The Irish waited, as Button said they would, till the last minute, and then voted against the Government, but nevertheless there remained a majority of twenty-eight. I don’t know whether to be glad or sorry, but I think on the whole I am glad. The measure of their iniquity is not yet full. Called on Button. Natty Rothschild is selling

<sup>1</sup> Lord Lymington, M.P., now Earl of Portsmouth.

## *Gordon and Dr. Temple*

Egyptian stock. He sold £150,000 Preference Stock yesterday. Button thinks it will end by a partial repudiation when the Conference meets.

"Met Lascelles<sup>1</sup> in the evening at St. James's Club. Talking about Gordon, he said he had always been a man of violent temper, and what he had done lately at Khartoum was nothing more than what he had always done. Nubar said of him long ago: 'He reads the Bible all the morning—and then gets up and orders a man to be hanged.' Gordon's idea on leaving England had been to convert the Soudanese to Christianity. His (Lascelles') brother-in-law, the Bishop of Exeter (Dr. Temple), had told him that Gordon had called on him to ask whether he considered that the Soudanese converts might be allowed to keep three wives. The Bishop had thought this would be uncanonical.<sup>2</sup> Lascelles has been in Bulgaria several years superintending the growth of liberty there, and we might do worse than have him Consul General at Cairo. He says he has been much disappointed in Nubar. Sherif, he says, is a good companion, but without ideas. Riaz, when he first came into office, was under the influence of Gabriel Charmes, who when he wanted him to do anything used to tell him M. Thiers would have done it in his place. But they quarrelled at last, Charmes wanting something which Riaz would not give, and Riaz answering that M. Thiers would have said no.

"*17th May.*—Went down to Crabbet with Tommy Bowles, the Editor of 'Vanity Fair.'<sup>3</sup> He is thinking of starting a new political newspaper to be called

<sup>1</sup> Afterwards Sir Frank Lascelles, G.C.B., ambassador at Berlin (see "Secret History").

<sup>2</sup> Compare page 172.

<sup>3</sup> Thomas Gibson Bowles, M.P.

## *Story about Disraeli*

'The Statesman,' or, 'The Précis Writer,' and wants me to assist him, but I would not promise. He told a good story about Disraeli, who, having ventured some more than usually daring lie in Parliament, was walking home afterwards with Monty Corry.<sup>1</sup> Monty congratulated him on nobody having found him out, and called it a special interposition of Providence. 'Yes,' said Dizzy, 'God is great, and He seems to me to get greater and greater every day.'

[N.B.—With regard to my offer of mediation, through Jemal-ed-Din, with the Mahdi—an offer which I still believe might at that date, May, have saved the disaster of Gordon's death—it is worth noting that the decision of the Government refusing it was delayed until after Lord Cromer's arrival from Egypt in London, which seems to fix on Lord Cromer the departmental responsibility of the refusal, and with it of the loss of whatever chance there was of a peaceful solution. It was then already too late in the season to send an English army up the Nile before the rising of the river.]

<sup>1</sup> Montague Corry, Lord Beaconsfield's private secretary, afterwards Lord Rowton.

## CHAPTER VIII

### MY EXCLUSION FROM EGYPT

"19th May, 1884.

"I WAS to have gone to Paris to-day, but, besides that I am far from well, Lord Granville's answer has come, shortly refusing to interfere. This will oblige me to take action, and so I have put off my journey. Perhaps it is as well.

"20th May.—To London, and saw Stanley, who has given me good letters of introduction to Vefyk and Khair-ed-Din Pashas. In them he says he was not able to approve my ideas of two years ago about Egypt, but that I have returned now from India with saner ones, and that we are agreed as to the residence of Europeans in Africa and Asia; also that I have been prevented by the English authorities from landing in Egypt.

"Tried to find Churchill about bringing my case forward in Parliament, but he was out, and I think now I will first write to Gladstone, giving him warning of what I intend, and so leaving a last loophole for peace. Lady Gregory is all for this. She tells me Layard told Sir William that a high official of the Foreign Office had said quite recently that though it would be a bitter pill they would have to restore Arabi before long. But I doubt it while Gladstone remains in office.

"To Mrs. S.'s, a garden party. Mme. de Novikoff was there. She has been in communication with the ex-Khedive Ismail, who has got her to advocate his return to Egypt.

"21st May.—To Button's, and arranged our plan of campaign. If my letter to Gladstone comes to

## *My Exclusion from Egypt Case*

nothing, the 'Times' will print one from me telling the story of my exclusion from Egypt. He thinks it should be brought forward in the Lords instead of the Commons, and we think Marlborough would be a good man to do it. Then I went to Knowles and fortunately found him at home. I told him I was going to bring the case forward in Parliament, and might be obliged to quote Gladstone's intention last year of restoring Arabi. He did not like this, and backed out of having told me more than that it had been his impression that Mr. Gladstone had such an idea, or that he might have had it if it had become popular. This is nothing more than I had expected of Knowles; he is evidently in a great fright of being compromised. I promised not to bring his name in if I could help it—but I might be driven into doing it.

"To Crabbet with Admiral Tryon, a lovely day spent among the horses.

"*22nd May*.—Crabbet. Knowles must have gone straight to Eddy Hamilton, for by this morning's post I get a letter from Eddy evidently in a great fright, saying he cannot believe I am going to bring him into the matter, that his conversation with me last year went no farther than wishing me *bon voyage*, and that he is quite innocent of representing Mr. Gladstone in any way. I must expect both him and Knowles to swear hard. But I have got the substance of my conversation with Eddy in this journal, and of that with Knowles in my letters of the time. Moreover, I have Eddy's letter received at Bombay, speaking of himself as 'conduit pipe,' between me and head-quarters. He must have forgotten this last. Eddy won't be injured by it. They will give him a fat permanent post when they have made a scapegoat of him, but I have written to him

### *Baring unfriendly to Gordon*

to say that if he likes I will refer the whole thing to Mr. Gladstone instead of to Parliament. I hope they will accept this as I don't want to break with Mr. Gladstone if I can help it, and I should be grieved to have a row with Eddy.

"*25th May.*—Crabbet. Eddy accepts a reference to Mr. Gladstone, and I think nothing could be better. Harry Brand came down; we rode in the forest and talked politics all day. Talking about Gordon, he told me that Gladstone had not seen him before he was sent out, nor was there any Cabinet Council; the thing was settled by a committee of the Cabinet, consisting of Hartington, Northbrook, and Dilke. Gladstone was only told that an engineer officer had been sent to Khartoum to report. Harry had expostulated with Hartington about the mission, and had urged that Gordon should be stopped at Korusko, but was told it was too late. Baring was unfriendly to Gordon, having quarrelled with him four years ago when he was Controller; they had called each other names. He says nothing has been decided yet at the War Office about an expedition. They will decide nothing till they hear from Gordon. He thinks the Souakin route impossible for an army. A contractor has offered to run water in pipes, to be condensed at the sea-side.

"*26th May.*—Lunched with Lady Gregory. Gladstone has been saying that he can't understand why people find fault with the Turks, who are very good people. The 'Pall Mall Gazette' publishes 'Mr. Wilfrid Blunt on the crisis in Egypt.'

"*27th May.*—Wrote a long letter to Gladstone, giving a full account of the Knowles and Hamilton interviews last year (see Appendix).

"*28th May.*—Crabbet. Derby Day. Drove to



### *Hartington responsible for Gordon*

Epsom. Harry Brand joined us in the evening. He says it is quite untrue that any arrangement has been made with the Turks for their help in the Soudan, also I ought to have come and seen him about Gordon, as he would have brought me to speak with Hartington, who is mainly responsible for Gordon's having gone out, and so is most concerned in getting him back.

"29th May.—Frederic Harrison came down. We had a pleasant discussion at dinner and afterwards about the situation, only he takes the English instead of the Egyptian point of view. He said he was not averse to war under *all* circumstances, and thought England would lose morally if she left Egypt ruined to the French or to Europe. He says, however, annexation is the only logical result of our Egyptian policy. He approves my letter to the 'Times.'

"30th May.—The Oaks Day. Drove Harry Brand and Harrison to Epsom, an odd party, in an odd turn out—the phaeton and four Arabs. We did the sixteen and a half miles from the Lodge Gate at Crabbet to the top of Epsom Hill in one hour and thirty-two minutes, our best record yet. And one hour and thirty-three minutes coming home. Bozra had been only in harness three times before, and never in the team.

"31st May.—To London and saw Button, who says that, whatever Harry Brand may say, the Sultan proposed not long ago to send troops to the Soudan, and that his offer was accepted—but coupled with the condition, that as a proof of his sincerity he should send a thousand men to Suakin in ten days. This he declined. Gladstone has published an article signed G. in the 'Fortnightly,' which, if really his, seems dangerously like handing over Egypt to the French, or to a European administrative control, the

## *Wickedness of the Government*

very worst thing that could happen. Button highly approves of my letter to Gladstone, and I have sent it in. I went, however, first to Palace Green to get my letters to Mrs. Howard for reference. They are quite satisfactory as to my interview with Knowles. I am now in a position, if necessary, to prove my account of what he said, and I think I have them all in a wonderful fix.

"Lunched at the Club with Edward Sartoris, and passed through St. James's Square, where there was a considerable crowd looking at the effects of the dynamite explosion. [A series of dynamite explosions attributed to the Fenians.] Nothing more than a few broken windows as the material effect, but the moral ones are great. Harry was very indignant this morning when he read the account of it, and with me for saying that it was due to the wickedness of the Government.

"*1st June.*—Crabbet. Began a letter to the 'Times.' The gist of it is, that if Mr. Gladstone really hands over Egypt unconditionally to Europe, it means handing it over to the bondholders, and handing it over to the bondholders means the driving out of the Egyptians in favour of European colonists. I cannot believe Mr. Gladstone, after all his protestation of giving the Egyptians their liberty, would do this. I imagine, instead, he must be contemplating the securing of terms for them first from Europe, and establishing a Government at Cairo, strong because supported by the people, and then withdrawing his troops. I put forward the rival claims of Ismail, Halim, and Arabi. One thing is clear in Egypt. The legend of Tewfik's loyalty has been spoilt. He is loyal still perhaps—but no longer *to us*.

"*2nd June.*—Began a series of articles for the 'Fortnightly,' called 'Ideas about India.'

## *Buckle and Escott*

"3rd June.—Button has given me the whole history of the G. article in the 'Fortnightly.' It appears that Escott, the 'Fortnightly' Editor, sent it to Buckle directing his attention to it, and saying it was from the pen of one of our most prominent statesmen, and that it represented Mr. Gladstone's views. Buckle gave it to his article writer, who, before committing himself, wrote to Escott saying he concluded the author of the article to be Mr. Gladstone, and that if so, he should be happy to give it all prominence, but wished to know whether he was correct. To this Escott replied that the author was out of town, and that the article might be accepted as representing Mr. Gladstone's views. Button thinks it is Godley, but I am nearly certain it is Herbert Gladstone, who is often used to air his father's most advanced ideas. Button tells me that an expedition is to start shortly for Khartoum, as the military authorities are of opinion that it will be less dangerous now than later, when the Nile rises. They are to go from Suakin to Berber, and will lose about half their force.

"Dined with Admiral Tryon, and had a talk with Owen Burne about India. He is the head of the Secret Department at the India Office, and I fancy had his eye on me during my late journey. We talked about everything, however, very pleasantly. He expressed his opinion that the native armies ought to be made more use of than they have hitherto been. He knew Scindia and Holkar well, and they had repeatedly proposed to lend their troops on condition of being given rank in the Imperial Army. We also talked about Hyderabad. He takes Cordery's view about things there, of course. Like every one here, he is astonished to learn that Lord Ripon is a success or popular with anybody.

## *Morley's Opinions*

"*4th June.*—Down to Crabbet. The Frederic Harrisons and John Morley came and we had a long political discussion till midnight. Morley says it is a necessity of the English commercial system that the field of their enterprise should be constantly enlarged. For this reason he thinks we shall not leave Egypt, and he thinks something new must be devised there. He is for a strong Government no matter what—Riaz, if you can get no better—and he would allow the cutting off of heads or anything. Marat, he says, is his idea of a man for revolutionary times. He does not see his way to Arabi, does not understand his merits as a statesman. But I think he wishes me well. He said: 'Why don't you persuade Gladstone to send you to Egypt?' I said: 'I would do so if I could get to see him.' He and Harrison had an interesting talk about the various statesmen of the day. Chamberlain, Morley thinks, is the man of the future—a true Radical and one who would never change; he would 'put Burt<sup>1</sup> in office, if he had the chance,' he had a strong will and ideas. Dilke was only a sham Radical; Dilke was too much a man of the world, wanted to please everybody; he had seen his best political day, and would be merged in Chamberlain's individuality. The danger was that, when a Radical Cabinet came to office, the two would divide Home and Foreign policy between them, when Dilke would play every kind of Jingo prank. Morley has a great opinion of Parnell, who, he says, is a powerful man and a patriot. Gladstone thinks highly of him too. When the Phoenix Park murders took place, Parnell wrote to Gladstone to say that if he, Gladstone, thought it would do any good or relieve the situation, he would retire from

<sup>1</sup> Thomas Burt, M.P., the first Labour Member in the House of Commons.

### *Morley on various Statesmen*

public life; he was disgusted at the murders. This Mr. Gladstone told Morley himself. Dillon too was a patriot. Healy had only a blind hatred of England. The rest were second rate men. Dillon had written to Morley lately from California as follows: 'Dear Morley. You said a year ago that English troops would be out of Egypt. Yours truly.' Salisbury would be a great force if he was in the House of Commons; he would like to abolish the House of Lords so as to get into the other House. Hicks Beach was much the best man the Opposition had in the front bench; he always reasoned out his arguments. Plunket was their best speaker. Gibson was tiresome, Northcote a noodle. Gladstone had a supreme contempt for Northcote. Morley has a high opinion of Churchill; thinks he may come over yet to the Radicals; he had the talent of interesting, was industrious, kind-hearted, and wonderfully quick. Hartington was weak, had no fixed opinion or power of will or decision; he was an excellent critic, but with no initiative. He thinks Lawson and Labouchere have ruined the Egyptian cause by their jokes—people were afraid of seeming to agree with them. Trevelyan was a success, and deservedly so. Lefevre would always be unpopular. For Granville Morley has a 'supreme contempt'—he can find no other word.

"5th June.—I drove Morley to the station in the morning. He seems much in agreement with me about Egypt, and I hope he may make his agreement known to others. I gave him Lyall's letter<sup>1</sup> to read and my two letters from Egypt to Eddy Hamilton, and explained to him something of my idea how to govern Egypt. He said he was all for

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix.

## *Morley on Stead*

strong measures now, hanging if necessary. If we could only get Morley to declare himself it would be most important, but he says the weak part of our programme is Arabi. Perhaps it is.

"Lady Gregory came down in the afternoon, and the Harrisons stayed on. Harrison interests me, being a thoroughly honest good fellow. Morley told us this morning a great deal about Stead, his successor in the 'Pall Mall Gazette.' Stead was only a clerk at so many shillings a week to start with, and came straight to the 'Pall Mall' from a small northern paper. He was a man of entire belief in himself, a good deal of imagination, and not a little superstition; a believer in dreams and inspirations. On one occasion in the autumn of 1882 he sent Morley a message, saying he wanted to see him on important business. This was to tell him that, having gone for a cruise round the Isle of Wight, he had had a sudden inspiration just off the Needles to the effect that Morley would be in Parliament and have left the 'Pall Mall' by the following March. When it happened, Stead had taken it entirely as a matter of course; he has boundless ambition, and has it as a maxim that a newspaper Editor is stronger than any Minister. Morley looks upon him as a political quack. He, Morley, eschews the 'Pall Mall' now and all its works.

"6th June.—My letter is in the 'Times' and reads well, and I have written to Arabi to warn him that perhaps he will be proposed to shortly to return, and to ask him whether he would be prepared to serve as Regent for a term of years with Tewfik's son in minority. Harrison went away and has promised to write in support of me to the 'Times.'

"7th June.—The 'Times' has some polite words

## *Agreement with France*

about my letter in its leading article. Button writes that the letter has been a great success—the best I have ever written. It will have made one or two people at the Foreign Office angry. But Mrs. Gladstone asks us to her party next week, the first time since the war.

*"9th June.*—Harrison's letter is in the 'Times,' and one from Edwin Arnold in something the same sense. On the other hand, Morley publishes a letter to his constituents, which may read any way about Egypt. It does not leave a good impression.

"Button tells me that an agreement was come to on Friday between Granville and Waddington about Egypt to the following effect: (1) That an International Control Audit should be established; (2) That English troops should remain in Egypt for three years; and (3) That England should advance eight million sterling. Hartington, Dilke, and Chamberlain are violently opposed to the arrangement; and it is from Hartington that the 'Times' has lately been receiving its information as to the negotiations.

"Dined with Frank Lascelles, who has been staying at Chatsworth, and he confirms what Button says of Hartington's dislike of the arrangement. According to Button, Hartington would have left the Government but for his father, who declared that it was the boast and glory of his family that no member of it had ever voted with the Tories. Fidelity to party was his first principle. Lascelles has seen Baring lately, who tells him he is going back to Egypt after the Conference, to go on trying to prove that 'two and two make something more than four.' Lascelles was at some pains to prove to me that Arabi might yet act with Tewfik. Eddy was at the

## *Dissensions in the Cabinet*

club dining at another table, and we agreed, whatever happened in the matter of my exclusion from Egypt, we would not quarrel. I am to have an answer from Mr. Gladstone to-morrow. The 'Pall Mall' published late in the evening a special edition giving the terms of the agreement with France pretty much as Button gave them.

"10th June.—The 'Daily News' contradicts in vague language the terms of the agreement. But Button declares they are true all the same, and, what is more, that Bismarck has refused to allow any diminution on the interest of the unified debt. This he had from Natty Rothschild. He says the Government will certainly be turned out. The Opposition are doing all they can to hasten the Franchise Bill, which they will pass through the Lords, and then bring on the Egyptian Question in the form of an Appeal to the Crown. Then there will be a dissolution, and the Tories, if in office, will be able to have a redistribution of seats exactly as they like to supplement the Bill; it would be a mistake in tactics to throw out the Bill. Once passed, the Liberals would have no cry at all to go to the country on. But I fancy their cry would be the fear of an European war.

"Called on Lawson and persuaded him to oppose the Government arrangement, about which he was in doubt, I hope, successfully. There is nothing now but to turn out the Government. Lord Salisbury will not dare annex. Harry Brand writes 'Annexation and war are in the possible future.'

"Went to see Mrs. Howard. She tells me George is furious against the Government. And he has told the Government whip that, if any terms have been agreed to with France at all like those just published, he and many of his friends will vote against



### *A Party at Mrs. Gladstone's*

the Government, adding that for himself he would not present himself for re-election in case of a dissolution. She is entirely in agreement with my last letter to the 'Times,' and so it seems is George. We discussed Morley and Harrison. Morley I expect found the arrangement with France concluded when he got back to London, and has probably been told that a defeat of the Government would mean war. Hence his letter, but he is evidently a trimmer. The letter reads both ways, and they will probably give him office if they ride out the storm.

"Gladstone's answer has come. He says that 'in his opinion it is impossible that any friend of his could without the grossest error of judgement have given me any ground for the supposition that he was favourable to any restoration of the exiles to Egypt.' This is not a denial. He goes on to say that 'without questioning in any way my intentions or my honour, he has deplored my proceedings in Egypt, as alike injurious to Egyptian and British interests.' I am writing to thank him for the courteous tone of his answer, and do not propose to bring the matter before Parliament until after the present crisis. Harrison is much disgusted with Morley for backing out of his agreement with us.

"*11th June.*—To Mrs. Gladstone's party. The Grand Old Man came forward in a hearty manner, and shook me warmly by the hand, saying with emphasis, 'How do you do, Mr. Blunt. I am very glad indeed to see you.' He has a hand which reminds me of Cardinal Newman's, when seven years ago the Cardinal cured my toothache with its touch, soft, warm, and nervous. He is looking uncommonly well, and as alert and cheerful as if he was going to heaven instead of head over heels into perdition before the end of next week. I had some words

*W. G. Forster*

with Mr. Forster,<sup>1</sup> who said he had read and agreed with my letter in the 'Times.' He talked over the chances, too, of turning out the Ministry, evidently hoping to do so. He is an ugly roughish-looking man, but I can imagine may have power. I am glad to have had these few words with him, but the crowd was too great for much talk. Lady Gregory overheard Dilke saying, 'The Arabi Party is strong here to-night. I have seen both Blunt and Gregory.' Baring was there.

"*12th June.*—Saw Lascelles at the Club. He does not expect to get sent to Egypt, and thinks Baring will go back there. But it all depends on the Ministerial crisis. Dined at Lord De la Warr's. I had rather expected to meet Ismail, the ex-Khedive, but found only his representative, Broadley, who tells me that Ismail is hurt at my description of him in my 'Times' letter, but wants to see me. I have no objection, though it cannot lead to anything. Arabi will have nothing to do with him, and Ismail has hardly any chance at all of getting back to Egypt.

"*13th June.*—Called on Button. He tells me the Government mean to stand to their guns about the arrangement with France, and will be beaten. With him was a man Gordon's friends are sending to Khartoum to carry letters and newspapers. He is to have £500 and go in disguise as a Morocco merchant by way of Korosko. I cross-questioned him a good deal about his plans, which are all based on the notion that the Mahdi's movement is a 'trumpery insurrection'; so he will come to grief, unless indeed he is wise enough to put the £500 in his pocket and go off and amuse himself with it at Monaco, a result far from unlikely, to judge by his looks.

"*16th June.*—Lytton writes answering my pro-

<sup>1</sup> The Right Hon. W. G. Forster, M.P.

## *At Knebworth*

posal to go for a night to Knebworth. He says my political ideas about Egypt and India disgust him, but hopes to see me all the same. So I am going, under promise to say nothing about politics. This is quite fair. Lytton's position is a perfectly logical one, and I cannot expect him either to sympathize or tolerate.

"To Knebworth. Nobody staying in the house but Miss Lyall and Sinnett, the Apostle of Theosophy. Politics being barred, our talk has been almost all on occult sciences. Sinnett seems a worthy, if not a very wise, man, with considerable humility and naïvety. He was formerly Editor of the 'Pioneer' in India, and there became acquainted with certain Oriental mystics. Practically, however, his system is undistinguishable from ordinary spiritualism, and the real manager is Madame Blavatsky. In this lady he has a profound belief, and told us of various trifling miracles she is in the habit of working. She can make bells ring in the air—and, by holding her hand to a pane of glass, can produce tapping noises. She discovered once a cup and saucer in the ground at a picnic, and can make electric sparks pass through his head. He is distinctly of opinion that she has lived in other forms, before her present life, and that she knows her own past history. But she has not told him of it, and, such is the secrecy of these sublime adepts, that if he were to ask her about it, she would be obliged to tell him an untruth. He gave us a recipe, which he called a very simple one, for obtaining the services of a *genius*. You must make acquaintance with a sick man near his end, and persuade him that you are his best friend, and get him to entrust to you his last wishes, as also some article of property—such as a ring to which he is attached, and you must promise

## *Sinnett and the Black Art*

him to perform his wish. He must then die, with anxiety regarding it and regarding you upon his mind, and you must be careful to deceive him and leave his wish unperformed. Then he will return to you through the instrumentality of the ring in hope of urging you to fulfil your promise, and will do all your bidding. This is a black and immoral art, but he assured us exceedingly simple of execution. The high adepts scorn to practise it.

"*19th June.*—A capital speech of Churchill's to-day reported from Aylesbury. I have written to congratulate him, and exhort him to take up the mantle of honesty let drop by Mr. Gladstone.

"*20th June.*—Lunched with the Howards. George is quite converted now from his belief in Gladstone, and looks upon him as completely dishonest. He dined at Downing Street two days ago with other M.P.s, and says the party, notwithstanding all, will vote solid for the Ministry, all but a few members, himself among them. But even he is not, as I understand, going to vote against them. The fact is there is no opposition which can undertake the Government, and the Government can do as it likes.

"*22nd June.*—Our annual Lawn Tennis Tournament at Crabbet. There were there Godfrey Webb, Eddy Hamilton, Button, Sandys, Nigel Kingscote, Harry Brand and his brother Artie, Frank Lascelles, Mallock, Elcho, and others. We had a merry evening with songs. Eddy, who sat next me, talked pretty freely about Egypt, and I gather they would give a good deal to find some excuse there for getting rid of the Khedive. 'He has been cunning enough,' Eddy said, 'to stick to us, and we are bound to him.'

"*23rd June.*—To London, and lunched with Lawson, and went down with him afterwards to the

## *Bismarck and the Rothschilds*

House. Churchill, whom I met in the lobby, says that Arabi's only chance lies in the agreement with France being upset. He is pleased with the letter I wrote him. Morley still professes not to have made up his mind. Ponsonby got me into the Gallery. Gladstone was in good form, as I believe he always is when he has a statement to make, and he did it with dignity if not with any great eloquence. He talked a good deal about France's interests in Egypt, and our own interests, and Europe's interests, but never a word for good or evil of the Egyptians' interests, never a word but one, and that sounded like an afterthought, and passed without remark. But there was a great deal about the principle which would be decided at the Conference, by which I suppose he meant the principle of the European concert—for every other has been thrown to the winds. My programme has been followed on every point, except that of doing justice to the Egyptians. Egypt is to be neutralized, the Suez Canal neutralized, the Soudan separated from Egypt—all as I recommended, but no lowering of the interest on the debt, no re-establishment of popular government. Morley tells me all that it is proposed to do is to lower the interest one half per cent., and even that is not certain.

“Button declares that Bismarck will not allow any reduction. His position is this. He had a quarrel some time ago with the Frankfort Rothschilds, and he is glad now to be able to prove to them that he is real arbiter on the Nile, and they have come to him on their hands and knees, and he will support their demand for the whole pound of flesh because they demand it, caring of course nothing about the results to them, and glad to break down the Anglo-French agreement. Therefore there is good chance of the

## *Churchill Speaks*

Conference collapsing as soon as it meets. The Opposition was feebler in the Debate than anything I could have imagined. Northcote was like an old woman afraid of responsibility, and Randolph played into Gladstone's hands by making a violent and foolish speech against France. When I say foolish, I mean foolish under the circumstances, for it had some good hits, as when he compared Gladstone to Charles II kept on the throne by Louis XIV as his servant. But it was not in harmony with the feeling of the House; and Lascelles, who dined to-night with Forster, tells me they consider Churchill's speech to have gained votes for the Government. But they look to no vote being taken till after the Conference as their best chance of upsetting the agreement. Goschen made this point good.

"*24th June.*—Went down home to Crabbet. There is nothing more I can do now in Egyptian matters, and for the moment I had better pay attention to my horses. If we win the Arab race at Newmarket it will do more for my ideas than half a dozen victories of the Mahdi. Lord Bradford comes down this week with Ebrington to see the stud. He wants mares to put to his horse Chippendale.

"*25th June.*—To a party at Devonshire House where I talked principally to Mrs. Howard. She has been converted back to Gladstone by hearing the debate the other night. George, however, holds out and is likely to be alone in the cave with Forster when it comes to a division.

"*26th June.*—I hear from Button that the Opposition has decided on a new Vote of Censure before the Conference, or rather while the Conference is sitting, being moved thereto by Randolph, who had threatened to move one himself. Labouchere tells me the Government, or at least certain members of

## *The Arab Race at Newmarket*

the Cabinet, are riding for a fall, and that Randolph wants to make it impossible for the Conservatives to come in. He wants me to get Abdu over from Paris as a sort of representative of the National Party during the Conference. Bismarck, Button tells me, will agree to a reduction of the Unified if Ferry agrees, but only  $\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., and it is doubtful whether they can get even this. The Unified Stock is held in France, Germany, and Italy, the Preference in England. It is a hopeless state of things whichever way one looks.

"*28th June.*—Lunched at the Carlton with Churchill and Wolff. Churchill is very angry about something or another, and says he is going away, and shall have nothing more to do with Parliament this Session. He talked of Northcote as 'an old black-guard.'

"*30th June.*—To Newmarket for Lord Falmouth's sale. His brood mares were magnificent, the finest according to my ideas being Palmflower, Spinaway, Chevisaunce, and Jeannette. Wheel-of-Fortune is less taking. Of the stallions the one I should have chosen to breed from is Kingcraft. We dined with the Clay Seymers, Lord Wolverton and young Leigh there.<sup>1</sup>

"*1st July.*—First day of the July meeting. The racing did not interest me. After it we went to Lord Calthorpe's paddocks, and saw Petrarch, the handsomest horse in the world. We are staying with Button in St. Mary's Square. He tells me the Vote of Censure has been shelved.

"*2nd July.*—The long looked for day of the Arab race, but somehow I felt less excited about it than when years ago we ran Yellow Boy at Gibraltar. The weather was perfect, and all the world and his wife

<sup>1</sup> Leigh of Lyme, in the diplomatic service, now Lord Newton.

## *A Disastrous Defeat*

were there. They say the July course was never so crowded, and there was quite a mob to see the Arabs stripped, so that Geheimniss, who was walking over for the July Cup, passed absolutely unnoticed through the crowd. I was satisfied with the look of all the horses—and especially of Halfa, my own entry, who was much admired, but I did not see Admiral Tryon's horse at all, for he was brought in quite at the end, and as soon as they had started on their canter, we rode to the corner to see the race. Jem Lowther was there also on horseback, very genial, and, while we were waiting, we talked about the 'awful mess' in Egypt. Then we saw the horses coming in a cluster at a tremendous pace over the hill, beyond the fir trees, and we cantered back towards the paddock. They overtook us at the bottom of the hill, and to my grief and surprise I saw it was all over with Halfa, and what seemed to be the Indian horses going on alone, with Rataplan well up. I felt that I had suffered a disastrous defeat, but was a little consoled by finding that after all a home bred three year old, though not mine, had won. This was Admiral Tryon's Asil; Dictator second; Rataplan, who had been making the running for Halfa, third.

"I fear, nevertheless, the race will be considered a failure as most of the young ones were left behind, and there are suspicions with regard to Tryon's horse, whether he is really an Arab. After the race, Jousiffe, Dictator's trainer, came to me as representing his owner, and wanted me to raise an objection to Asil on this score, but I refused point blank to listen to anything of the sort. I was at Aleppo when Henderson, the Consul there, bought Asil's dam for Tryon, and though I did not see her, nor can vouch for her pedigree, I think there can be no conceivable doubt



## *Admiral Tryon's Horse*

she was an Arab; she stood 15.2, but such a height is possible, though I never saw it in the desert. She was in foal, Tryon says, to Henderson's Abeyan Sherrak horse, whom I know well, and the colt was dropped a few days after landing in England. Besides, Asil is in the Stud Book as an Arab and so is legally an Arab, whatever he may be in fact. It would in any case be fatal to have a dispute on such a question this first race, and I am glad my horse, or rather Abd-el-Rahman's, was second, so as to prevent other action—but I will see the horse.

"Dined with Button and two of the Paulets, and George Wyndham.<sup>1</sup> A very young man's party.

"*3rd July.*—The sporting papers are down on the race as childish, because the Arabs did not beat English horses, and I fear the Jockey Club will not have the courage to repeat it; but Hawfa Williams, the manager of Sandown, has promised a race there for the 22nd. We called this morning at Hopper's stables and saw Asil. Anything less like an Arab horse I never saw. He is long, low, strong, rather coarse, and very slack over the loins—like an English horse—his head plain but well set on, great hocks and arms. I don't wonder at Jousiffe wanting me to object to him."

This failure at Newmarket was a great disappointment to me at the time. I had counted on proving, by a practical demonstration, that Arab horses bred in England, and properly trained, would greatly improve in speed as compared with those bred in the desert. The race, however, seemed to show the contrary, as, with the exception of Tryon's colt, the two Arab horses brought from India had it all their own way. Moreover, a little later, Tryon matched his colt against an inferior English thoroughbred,

<sup>1</sup> The Right Hon. George Wyndham, M.P.

## *I Lose Political Credit*

and was handsomely beaten. The ultimate result, however, was not I think, as far as Arab breeding in England was affected by it, wholly a misfortune. It convinced me that I was on wrong lines in breeding Arabs for speed, and not for those more valuable qualities in which their true excellence lies. Had I continued with my original purpose, I should have lost time and money, and probably have also spoiled my breed, producing stock, taller perhaps and speedier, but with the same defects found in the English thoroughbred. Politically, however, I no doubt lost something through the publicity of my Newmarket experience. For success on the turf seems always to have been held in England as in some measure connected with political capacity, and if I had been able to prove my point with the sporting world, my opinion on Eastern affairs generally would have gained in credit.

"There seems every prospect of the Conference breaking down.

"*4th July*.—Lunched with Lady Gregory and on to the Howards. Mrs. Howard asked me why I thought that England would be obliged to see decent Government given to Egypt if we acknowledged a Protectorate, and I said, 'If you invite a young lady to dine with you at Greenwich you don't look too closely how she behaves—but when you have married her you take care she dresses respectably.'

"*7th July*.—Another letter from me in the 'Times,' and also one from Benson Maxwell (both about Egypt), and there is a leading article sufficiently polite to me. Called on Bruce,<sup>1</sup> who is expected to move the Vote of Censure—a fairly sensible man, but without go or plan of action, like all the rest of

<sup>1</sup> A Conservative M.P.

### *Sir Wilfrid Lawson and the Lords*

the Tories; yet he is the best man they can find for it. No wonder Randolph has his way with them. He is occupied over head and ears with his National Association and is tired of Egypt.

"*8th July.*—Dined at Wentworth House. Percy and Madeline were there, and Henry Cowper, and Millais grown very prosy and as dull as a breeder of cattle. I sat between Lady Wharnccliffe and Sir Wilfrid Lawson, the latter very amusing, with a fire of good stories, kept up all dinner-time. He is going to hold an open air meeting in Hyde Park against the Lords—and asked me to join in it. But the Lords to my mind are a very respectable institution, and I care nothing at all for the Franchise Bill which they are throwing out.

"*9th July.*—The Lords threw the Bill out last night, and there is likely to be a row, but no dissolution. Marlborough's first speech the other night was a failure. People were interested to hear him, but found his speech dull, and after the first ten minutes began to talk.

"*11th July.*—The Mudir of Dongola, it seems certain now, has joined the Mahdi, and Berber is as certainly taken, while there are rumours, too, of the fall of Khartoum. I have written to Hyndman, in answer to a letter of his asking me to join the Democratic Socialists. This of course I cannot do.

"*12th July.*—Luncheon with the Gregorys, where I met Rowsell, the Domains Commissioner just from Cairo. His view of the situation there is that the Mahdi will be at Cairo in the autumn. I asked him about Tewfik, and he said: 'Tewfik has intelligence enough to know that he has no friends, and is fatalistic enough to let things take their course. He will sit twiddling his thumbs from right to left, till he is told to begin twiddling them from left to right.' I

## *Sir George Trevelyan*

asked him what he would himself do when the Mahdi came to Cairo. He said: 'Turn Mussulman of course.'

"To Mrs. Buxton's, near Weybridge, to meet George Trevelyan. The place is prettily situated on the edge of Wisley Heath, now grown over with fir trees. I remember it thirty years ago, absolutely bare, when we used as boys to go to the Hut Pond from Horsley to fish. At Waterloo Station was George Howard. He has seen Goschen, who would like to talk to me in the morning about Egypt, or rather to hear me talk. Goschen says I am an imprudent person who, if you tell anything to him, and he has reason to be dissatisfied with you afterwards, repeats what you tell him. I will go to him, but I trust him as little as he trusts me.

"George Trevelyan<sup>1</sup> is a capital fellow—very lively and amusing. I had a long talk with him after dinner. He made me explain to him the whole history of the Revolution in Egypt, and especially of the Joint Note of January, 1882, as he wanted, he said, to arrive at a knowledge of the exact moment where our policy made a mistake. He was of course quite ignorant even of the general outline of the story, but seized the points with great intelligence. He is a man of energy, wit, and sympathy. I asked him if he could tell me whose idea it was sending Clifford Lloyd to Egypt, and he said: 'It was ours, in Ireland. We would have sent him anywhere to get rid of him.' His description of Lloyd was amusing. He was an energetic man of great self sufficiency. To talk to him you would think him a Clive or a Warren Hastings. But his whole thought was

<sup>1</sup> The Right Hon. Sir George Trevelyan, Chief Secretary for Ireland. He had been Under Secretary to the Admiralty during the bombardment of Alexandria.

## *Bloodhounds for Ireland*

to advertise himself by his vigour. On one occasion he had telegraphed to Vernon Harcourt, begging him to send him a couple of bloodhounds to aid his police operations in Ireland. At first they had thought the telegram a hoax, but it was nevertheless true. Besides, he was very greedy of pay and allowances, and was always bothering Lord Spencer to increase these. In the smoking room we had a general discussion about Ireland, and the possibility of its independence. Trevelyan has a mean idea of the Irish, and thinks they could not govern themselves respectably or solvably, but would relapse into barbarism. I cited the instance of Greece as at least as hopeless at starting as that of Ireland, and yet it had settled down and become prosperous. We all agreed anyhow that Ireland in its present condition was ruining England, and especially the English Parliament—but Trevelyan does not believe in any true middle term between coercion and separation.

“*13th July, Sunday.*—Had some interesting conversation with Trevelyan and Sir James Carmichael.<sup>1</sup> The latter is Childers’ private secretary at the Conference, and he says that he has had to go over the public accounts of Arabi’s time, and finds them in a great mess. He complains that, whatever Arabi’s honesty may have been, great peculation took place under him. He is, however, wholly opposed to the Turks and Circassians, and also to English administration in Egypt. He would like to keep on Tewfik, and give him an Egyptian administration. He described Nubar well for what he is, and said: ‘His days of office are numbered.’ Trevelyan described Lord Spencer as the ablest administrator he had come across, an administrator born, for he

<sup>1</sup> Sir James Carmichael, M.P.

## *Talk with Goschen*

had had no training, a man of sense and very high integrity.

"*14th July*.—Dined at the Travellers. Next table to me sat with others Staal, the new Russian Ambassador. It is twenty-three years since we met, but I knew him again directly. We were great friends in those days at Athens, and I think he was really glad to see me when I explained after dinner who I was. 'Are you any relation,' he enquired, 'to the Blunt who is a friend of the Mahdi?' He asked me to come and see him, which I shall do. Staal is an old man now, but has something of the kind honest manner of former days. This has given me great pleasure.

"*15th July*.—Button tells me that the Lords are determined to fight on the Franchise Bill. They dare not let the Bill pass, as it would mean the absolute defeat of the Conservative Party at the next elections, and Mr. Gladstone's stay in office for the rest of his natural life. They mean to hold on then till a Dissolution of Parliament, trusting to Egypt to get them a majority at the elections.

"Then to call on Goschen, whom I found much as two years ago, that is to say, very intelligent and receptive, though I do not trust him. We discussed Egypt thoroughly, agreeing on most points, and I gave him a sketch of a plan of operations. First, we must make peace with the Mahdi—we must either make peace or fight, there was no middle term. It would not be necessary for the English Government to acknowledge the Mahdi. Secondly, we must accept Egypt's debt, or a composition of the debt. If we did not want to fight France, we had better pay. This done, we could establish what Government we liked in Egypt, leave it to manage its own affairs, and withdraw our troops to Alexandria.

## *Mohammed Abdu Arrives*

Goschen thought it very likely would end in our accepting the debt, but I fancy he would like to administer the country according to Indian methods. I cannot boast, however, of having got anything very distinct out of him.

"Dined with Broadley and Marriott, M.P. for Brighton, who is anxious to take up my case of exclusion from Egypt. I do not like Marriott, but he may help in the Debate, if we can get one on it. Broadley declares that Parnell and the Irish brigade will also support me, and that Parnell wants particularly to see me. I shall be glad to make his acquaintance, as I believe him to be a man of very high calibre, and I wholly sympathize with his cause.

"*16th July.*—To Blenheim, a lovely day. The Duke very agreeable. I care for few of the pictures, but the Raphael is about the finest I have seen. The 'Charles the First' Vandyke is also splendid, and other Vandykes are good—and there are two excellent Mytens, but of all the pictures the one I should care most to have is a Reynolds, 'The Fortune Tellers.' The Rembrandts are not Rembrandts, and the Rubens are less than first rate, nor do I care for the large Reynolds. On the whole the Duke does well to sell his pictures. The house is very fine, in the style I like best.

"*21st July.*—Mohammed Abdu has just arrived from Paris. His ideas are rather changed since we last saw him. The dominant feeling now is hatred for England; and in this is merged the hatred of the Circassians. It is the old story over again. When Europe presses and threatens, they all join their ranks just as they did at the time of the Joint Note and the Ultimatum. He has not, however, abandoned Arabi, though he seems to think him played

## *Procession against the Lords*

out as a political personage in Egypt, and this is probably the case.

"I have arranged with Percy Wyndham and Sir Wilfrid Lawson that they shall bring on my case of exclusion in connection with the Vote of Supply in the Diplomatic Estimates. Lawson was much engaged with his procession to Hyde Park to protest against the Lords, and again asked me to join it, but I refused. As it happened, however, I did join it unintentionally, for I happened to be going their way, and walked with them from Pall Mall to Hyde Park Corner. They were respectable looking men, most of them, not roughs. The procession was orderly, not to say dull. I had been at the Carlton, where I had found Churchill. He promises to take up my case of exclusion when the estimates come on, and so I have written to Buckle to explain all the circumstances, and enclosing a letter about it for the 'Times.' Broadley and Marriott came to James Street very anxious to have all the fat in the fire at once, and the stoking to do themselves, but I don't mean to trust my case to them. At the corner of Hyde Park, when I arrived with the procession, I found Passmore Edwards,<sup>1</sup> and we discussed the situation. He thinks the Lords will give in at once, overwhelmed by the majesty of the people—but I don't believe this, and I extremely doubt whether the House of Lords is not as popular an institution as there is in the country. It is certainly so with the middle class in the South of England. I have arranged with Labouchere that I should bring Abdu to see the House of Commons to-morrow afternoon. He also will support me in the affair of my exclusion from Egypt.

"*22nd July.*—The Arab race at Sandown. More

<sup>1</sup> The well-known philanthropist.



## *Abdu at the House of Commons*

successful than the Newmarket one, though Halfa did not win. She ran creditably, and I am glad to say Hadramaut (a colt of my breeding) beat Asil on the post, and the Indian horses were all left behind.

"With Abdu to the House of Commons. We missed Labouchere but found George Howard, who showed us all over the place. I had made Abdu dress in his blue jibbeh and white turban, and he created quite a sensation in the lobby. Chesson came to us directly, and asked us to a public dinner there was to be given to Indians and other Orientals next week, and the photographer insisted on taking the Sheykh's portrait.<sup>1</sup> He was introduced to several M.P.s, and we listened to an Irish member, Sexton I think, declaiming on the wrongs of Ireland. From the terrace by the river we showed Abdu the police boat cruising around to prevent dynamite attempts, a sight which edified him, and we pointed out to him Mr. Bright talking on a bench to Nathaniel Rothschild.

"Parnell was walking up and down at the far end in solitary gloom, and I got George Howard to introduce us. He was really charming, having a sympathetic manner, at least to us, as fellow rebels; wanted Abdu to come and see him and give him information, and said: 'We have one of ourselves now in Egypt, Mr. O'Kelly. But we are afraid he may be kept away a long time.' I told him that it had been Abdu and Jemal-ed-Din who had given O'Kelly the letters which had enabled him to go to the Mahdi, and he seemed surprised at my knowing this. Parnell's manner of gloom and reserve seems unnatural to him, and every now and then there is

<sup>1</sup> This is the portrait which forms the frontispiece of my "Secret History," a very excellent likeness

## *Parnell and Abdu*

a twinkle in his eye and a smile which seemed to show the real man better. I should say he was a good fellow, and I am sure I could get on well with him. At parting his manner was *empressé*, and he made us a little speech, saying that he had had much honour in making the acquaintance of the Egyptian patriot and with emphasis much *pleasure* in making my own. He promised to write and propose a day for seeing the Sheykh. In appearance Parnell is tall, good-looking, pale, and with the least little touch of weakness about the mouth, such as one often sees in Irishmen, enough to show that he is more Irish than English, and enough to add a certain charm to his countenance. Altogether I was much taken with him.

"23rd July.—Mirza Bakir, a Persian Sufi (living in exile in London) came to breakfast, and went with Abdu and me after it to Sir Wilfrid Lawson's. The visit was not so successful as I had hoped. Lawson put his questions to Abdu rather too abruptly, and I think a little frightened him, at any rate he would not speak quite out, except on the point of its being absolutely necessary the English troops should be withdrawn as a first step towards re-establishing peace in Egypt. Much the same conversation took place afterwards with Labouchere, to whom we next went. Labouchere tried to convince Abdu that Mr. Gladstone wanted to get the troops out of Egypt, and that the best way to do it was for the Egyptians to refuse to pay any taxes as long as they remained there. But Abdu argued with some point that Mr. Gladstone had been talking about withdrawing for a long time, but that instead of taking troops away, he was sending more and filling the country with English officials. He complained that, were the taxes to be refused, it would be taken

### *Abdu delighted with Churchill*

as an excuse for annexation. It was impossible to convince him that this was not so. Neither Lawson nor Labouchere affected Abdu with any sense of their sincerity. This is because they do not know how to talk to Orientals; their abruptness appears like hostility.

"Dinner at home with Abdu and Bakir, who had a long discussion as to whether it was permitted by the traditions (hawadith) to talk at meals, a point which they solved *ambulando*; also as to whether the Koran was originally a book, or only a compilation of oral sentences. Abdu holds the latter opinion, and I am quite with him, but the old Mirza is stiff as to its being a miraculous *book*. This is curious considering how very latitudinarian he is on most points.

"*24th July.*—My letter about my exclusion is in the 'Times,' with a splendid leading article supporting it, and demanding an inquiry. I have arranged with Lawson that he should bring it forward—and he has put down a notice regarding it. Percy Wyndham will say something if he finds something to say, and Churchill will push it to an issue. We called on Churchill and had a much more satisfactory conversation with him than with the others yesterday. Churchill's manner was just right, and Abdu came away highly delighted. 'That young man,' he said, 'has more sense than the other two'—meaning Lawson and Labouchere—'and he has a better heart.' As I am going to write the whole of this conversation for the 'Pall Mall,' I will not repeat it here. Churchill promised to speak to Chamberlain about Abdu and try to get him an audience through him of Gladstone. I am sure that if Abdu were to see Gladstone it would go far towards a settlement. Went down to the House at question time and

## *A Punch Dinner*

arranged things definitely with Lawson about bringing my case forward. I do not intend anything to be said about Eddy Hamilton or Knowles, or Gladstone, unless my hand is forced—but if I am attacked I shall know how to defend myself. My letter in the 'Times' has evidently been a success, and I am sure the Government, when it decreed my exclusion, thought me too friendless to be a danger; they cannot have been prepared for the 'Times' taking it up.

"*26th July*.—The day of our Arab horse sale at Crabbet. There were quite three hundred people there.

"*27th July*.—Dined at Sambourne's, a party of jocose literary people connected with 'Punch'—Burnand, Du Maurier, Boughton, Black, Boehm, and Reed. Burnand is amusing, but Du Maurier told a story three times over during the dinner, and I cannot remember it now, although it was also told once again on rather different lines by Boughton. During the fourth telling I went to sleep, much to Sambourne's distress, who is one of those excellent hosts whose care and pride it is that their guests should be amused, but I find it difficult now that I drink no wine to keep my spirits up long to the level of a convivial occasion. After dinner Cumberland, the thought reader, and others came, but I went home to bed, drunk for the want of wine. [I had been a tea-totaller since 1883.]

"*28th July*.—Talking to Abdu, he told me the names of the three men who, bought by Sultan Pasha, betrayed the army at Tel-el-Kebir. They were Ali Yusuf, a Turk in command of a division, the middle division of the three, who had retired and so let Wolseley in; secondly, Abd-el-Rahman Hasan in command of the cavalry scouts, an Egyptian, who

*William Morris*

had neglected to give notice of the English approach; and thirdly, Ragheb Nashid, a Circassian Caimakam, who held the position in advance. These were the only traitors. Nadim fled to the Soudan. Ali Fehmy was beaten at Kassasin because Mahmud Sami failed to keep his rendezvous. In reconstructing a Nationalist Government, he says Ali Fehmy should be Minister of War, Yakub Sami Minister of the Interior, and Arabi President of the Chamber, Abd-el-Aal to command the army. I have engaged Mirza Bakir as Secretary at £1 a week.

"Called on Churchill and found him in bed. He will take up my case with Lawson, and I gave him a copy of my private correspondence for use if we are pushed to it, but I explained to him my position towards Downing Street, and that I did not wish to quarrel with Gladstone. He has already bestirred himself about Abdu, and will take him to see Hartington to-morrow. Robert Bourke will also take up my case. Mrs. Howard gives me leave to quote my letters to her as written to a political friend.

"*29th July.*—Took Abdu and Bakir to the Carlton where we met Churchill, and I handed them over to him, and he took them to see Hartington. They came back highly delighted. Hartington had shown them great politeness and intelligence, and Abdu thinks he has created a good impression.

"Spent a couple of hours at Hammersmith with Mrs. Morris and her husband, who is a democratic socialist. We discussed the merits of his scheme of the universe, but I cannot make it fit in with my ideas. Still, we agree on many points. He calls Gladstone a confirmed Tory, too old to change. The Morris's house has a nice old-fashioned garden full of flowers, pinks especially. I like these suburban

## *The Ex-Khedive Ismaïl*

gardens, they have more character than others, and the space is all made use of. [This was the first time I saw William Morris. I had made Mrs. Morris's acquaintance the summer before, 1883, at Naworth, for she was a friend of Mrs. Howard's, but, though I had been once or twice to see her at Hammersmith, I had not before met him.]

"*1st August.*—To a party at Mrs. S.'s, where I found the ex-Khedive, Ismaïl Pasha. She asked me whether I should like to be introduced to him, but I would not make any advance in that direction, though I have no special quarrel now with Ismaïl. He is a repulsive-looking man, a worthy son of the butcher Ibrahim. Philip Currie was there, more amiable than the last time we met, also Malkum Khan. I reminded Malkum of our first meeting in Grosvenor Place four years ago, when he suggested to me the ideas I have since worked out. I asked him what he thought of Ismaïl. He said: 'He has learned much during his exile, and might carry out reforms now.' I said: 'He is without belief. He could not help us.' 'He is without belief,' he said, 'but not an unbeliever. He has not strength of mind enough for that.' Another old acquaintance there was Madame de Novikof.

"*2nd August.*—Interviewed Abdu for the 'Pall Mall Gazette.'<sup>1</sup>

"*3rd August, Sunday.*—Crabbet. De Winton is here, who has been in Egypt for the last fifteen years. Among other things he told me of interest, was that he was present when the twenty thousand pounds were paid over by Gill to Palmer at Suez, and he says that Palmer had unlimited credit over and above this sum. Lionel Moore came in the afternoon. He says he always suspected the Khedive

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix.

## *Debate on my Exclusion Case*

must have had something to do with the Alexandria riots.

"4th August.—A 'great day of milling.' My case came up in the House of Commons this afternoon. I went with Abdu, and Anne went with Lady Wentworth. The F.O. had published a Blue Book in the morning on the case, from which it appears that I am charged by Sherif Pasha with various things, every one of which I am fortunately able to deny. The Government in fact had not a word to say, and as far as the debate went, it was altogether a victory for us, though it leaves things where they were. The most satisfactory point is that the Government were afraid to attack me, although Randolph blurted out the whole story of my conversations with Knowles and Hamilton. Mr. Gladstone had gone out of the House after Lawson had finished his opening speech, thinking no doubt that the thing was over, but when Churchill got up they sent for him back. I was afraid at first the attack would set his back up, but he took the thing very good humouredly, spoke of me handsomely, and told his little story without wincing. Knowles he said had persuaded me 'in the interests of his review.' I don't suppose he feels equivocation at all, and he had got a paper from Eddy, which he read out, declaring our conversation had been wholly exclusive of politics, so I hope no harm has been done for I can't afford to quarrel with him yet, and I have written to Eddy to explain that I did not intend Churchill to mention him or Knowles, *unless I was attacked*. Robert Bourke came in well at the end on the legal aspect of the case, and Sir Henry James's defence of the Government was a very lame one. On the whole I think it has strengthened my position, not only with the public, but with the Government. The House was decidedly favourable to me in the debate.

## *Collapse of the Conference*

"5th August.—The collapse of the Conference occupies all minds. It was announced on Sunday in the 'Observer,' and of course we are delighted. It puts everything back into its old impossible groove, and I shall continue to hope as long as England remains solely responsible in Egypt. Egyptian Stocks have all gone up, for they take the failure of the Conference to mean some sort of Protectorate and guarantee by England. Button telegraphs that Northbrook goes to Egypt.

"6th August.—Broadley writes proposing an accidental interview with Ismail Pasha at Escott's house, and I shall go to it, though I feel sure I shall not like Ismail, but it is time I should know him, and Broadley promises *monts et merveilles* for the National cause if he ever gets back to Egypt. Abdu went to see him last week, but they did not talk politics.

"7th August.—A political breakfast given by Indians at the Westminster Palace Hotel, Sir Wilfrid Lawson presiding. I had not expected to make a speech, but made one to the satisfaction of the Indians and the wrath of the newspapers, 'St. James's' and 'Globe.'

"8th August.—The 'Times' correspondent at Cairo, Moberly Bell, telegraphs that I am looked upon there as leader of a powerful party opposed to the Khedive, etc.

"In the afternoon by appointment to tea at Escott's, to meet the ex-Khedive 'by accident' because neither Ismail nor I have been willing to make first advance towards acquaintance. He was there when I arrived, with his secretary Lavison. The tone of our interview throughout was polite and even friendly. Disagreeable subjects were avoided, such as the evils of Turkish and Circassian rule, and



## *Talk with the Ex-Khedive*

Ismail's past dealings with the Jews. Ismail's is certainly a repulsive countenance, and I fail to find in him that charm of conversation I have always heard him credited with. Nor did he show any special shrewdness of observation. He uttered the usual platitudes of progress and civilization, the necessity of considering the religious prejudices of the people, and the influence which could be exercised by a good ruler—but in no original way. As to practical matters, the fellahin, he said, if well governed were quite able to pay the interest on the Egyptian debt. The Soudan was a rich country which should be developed by extending the railway from Wady Halfa to Khartoum. He asked about India and the peasantry there, and seemed pleased to learn my opinion that they were worse off than in Egypt. On my side, I explained my views of Mohammedan regeneration, and especially that of the Arabs. I told him of my conversation with Nubar [at Paris in 1878], and how he had tried to persuade me that the English was the only Government which was likely to befriend them. This amused him. We had been speaking in French, but now he talked a little Arabic to see what I knew of the language, and he said: 'At least you speak it better than Nubar.' He himself speaks Arabic with a strong Turkish accent, and he complimented me on mine. But we soon went back to French, where I fancy he is more at home. He threw a fly over me twice as if to begin more special matters, saying that he intended spending next summer also in London. I did not however respond by any hope that next summer would see him in Egypt. We spoke a little of Mohammed Abdu, but Arabi was not mentioned. My impression of Ismail decidedly is, that he is not the saviour of our society. There is nothing differ-

## *His Soudan Views*

ent in him from the common run of Europeanized Turks. I am glad, nevertheless, to have seen the old despot, if only to assure myself once more that he is not our man.

"This has been the hottest and driest summer I ever spent at home. From the 28th of March till now there has not been one really rainy day, though a few attempts at such. The ground has always been like iron and the ponds are half empty. But Sussex is at its best in such weather, and the corn is splendid, most of it already cut.

"*10th August.*—Broadley writes that Ismail is enchanted with me.

"To Scotland in the evening, and found in the same carriage our friend Eddy, who is going to Taymouth Castle for grouse shooting. We talked about the Debate. He said he had met Randolph Churchill the next day at dinner and seemed quite satisfied with the turn things had taken. It is evident we need not quarrel."

From the 11th to the 16th of August I stayed at Lude House near Blair Atholl, which had been rented by my country neighbour in Sussex, Mrs. Montefiore. On the 17th, my birthday of 44, I went on to Naworth Castle to stay with the Howards, Frank Lascelles among others being there. I stayed at Naworth till the 23rd, but my journal contains almost nothing political. The only entries worth transcribing are:

"*19th August.*—A letter has come from Arabi approving the scheme of Abbas and a protectorate. I shall send this to Gregory to show to Gladstone, with whom he is invited to stay next week at Dalmeny.

"*20th August.*—It is announced that Sami-Ullah of Aligarh is to join Lord Northbrook's staff in Egypt,

### *Lord Shaftesbury's Warning*

recommended for the post by Sir Auckland Colvin; also that there is talk of Tewfik's abdication in favour of Abbas and a protectorate.

"*21st August.*—George is away at Newcastle, staying at Sir William Armstrong's with the Prince of Wales. The Prince, it appears, has been frightened by the agitation against the House of Lords and thinks the Throne, too, is in danger, and he wishes to dissociate himself from Lord Salisbury's tactics. For this reason he went to see the procession to Hyde Park last month and now is paying a visit to the Radicals of Sheffield and making himself generally agreeable. He asked to have George Howard and his wife invited to the Festival, and Morley and Cowan have both made speeches and joined in the loyalty. It was Lord Shaftesbury who long ago warned the Prince never to separate himself from the people. The Newcastle Festival has been a great success. It is wonderful how these democrats of the north love a king.

"*22nd August.*—I have written to Gregory, who is to be at Dalmeny for Gladstone's campaign in Midlothian, to post him up to the latest phase of the Egyptian situation. I have told him that Arabi will have nothing to do with Ismail or Tewfik, but could return to Egypt with Abbas or any one else.

"*24th August, Sunday.*—I spent the day at Sir Wilfrid Lawson's at Brayton, and on the 25th went on to Lord Stanley at Alderley. Alderley is the sort of place I like. It reminds me somewhat of Crabbet, but is altogether larger. The house, though comfortable, is unworthy of the rest, having been built early in the present century, when the original house was burnt down. The best thing is the kitchen garden, which is the quaintest and most beautiful I ever saw, sloping down on three sides to a large

## *Troops ordered to Khartoum*

square pond or tank, on the fourth side a high wall overgrown by a great copper beech. There is also a very fine beech wood overhanging another pond of, I should say, sixty acres.<sup>1</sup> Many fine trees in the park, but terribly undermined by rabbits. Stanley and I fished in the wood and caught two little trout. He is a thoroughly honest good fellow, and works all he can for the Mohammedans.

"*27th August.*—To London, where I saw Button for a few minutes and heard from him of Wolseley's appointment to command the troops in Egypt. They are really going to Khartoum at last, having persuaded the Grand Old Man that Gordon is in danger.

"*2nd Sept.*—We have settled to go to Constantinople on the 12th or 15th. Button has just got a letter from Wolseley, who says that he hopes to get everything done at Khartoum without fighting, perhaps without an expedition—more bloodshed would be unpopular, and so must be avoided. Dined with Bertram Currie at Coombe. He has put up a temple in his garden to the Grand Old Man, containing his bust, in honour of a visit paid to him by the Prime Minister.

"*8th Sept.*—Saw Lady C. She told me about the Prince of Wales, that although he is pretending to join the Radicals over the Franchise Bill, he really hates Gladstone worse than poison.

"*9th Sept.*—I have engaged young Hope as my private secretary at £80 a year. He is to do all that Button's private secretary does for him, keep my correspondence, newspaper cuttings, etc., etc., etc. I go to Paris on Saturday.

"*11th Sept.*—It is announced that Lord Ripon comes home from India in December, and is succeeded by Lord Dufferin."

<sup>1</sup> This is where Lord Stanley was afterwards buried.

## CHAPTER IX

CONSTANTINOPLE IN 1884

"13<sup>th</sup> Sept. 1884.

"LEFT London in low spirits, aggravated by the announcement of Lord Northbrook having presented a complimentary letter from the Queen to that miserable Tewfik. I am on my way to Constantinople to try and urge the Sultan to take a lead in reform. He must do so now, or he will lose his hold over Islam for ever, but I do not expect to succeed; all is too rotten there for any solid building.

"I arrived late at the Hotel St. Romain, and dined as in old days at Bignon's with Bitters.<sup>1</sup> Bitters is looking older, and we are all sinking into the grave, whether we have worked or whether we have played. Only Henri the fat waiter is unchanged, the same tremulous mountain of flesh as of yore.

"14<sup>th</sup> Sept., Sunday.—After breakfasting with Bitters in the Rue Mazarine, I went to the races of Longchamps and saw Archiduc win a race in fine style, galloping like a machine all the way. A beautiful day, but few people, it being September. The only soul I knew there to speak to, the Duke of Fernan Nuñez. At the Embassy there is no one, even Atlee<sup>2</sup> gone to Dieppe, Lyons in England, and Sheffield and all of them.

"Abdu and Sanua came to dinner—both despondent about affairs in Egypt.

"15<sup>th</sup> Sept.—To the Wagrams at Gros Bois. I had intended only to spend the afternoon, but have

<sup>1</sup> My cousin, Francis Gore Currie.

<sup>2</sup> Consul and keeper of the Embassy archives.

## *Gros Bois*

been asked to stay on. This is a most interesting place. Gros Bois was built and enclosed with a wall by Francis I's mother, but the present house, or at least the inside of it, is of much later date. The decorations are wholly *Empire* as befits its owners, and it forms a fine monument of the Bonapartist episode. I was taken over the gallery and state rooms and shown the pictures and relics, Napoleon's bed from St. Helena and the rest, and driven out afterwards in the great wood which surrounds the house—a delightful day. All is on a large scale, but nothing is kept up. The grass grows where it wills, and there are no flowers in the vases. The servants are ancient, almost decrepit; in the stables are no fine horses. The little Princess would change all this if she could, but her father-in-law will not hear of having a chair altered. He and all the rest of the family are away, only Prince Alexander and his wife and a little son and heir a year old; they are in mourning, as his mother died this summer.

"16th Sept.—The Prince is the best fellow in the world and the best sportsman. He inherits his love of sport from his father, who, he tells me, goes out shooting every day of the year, hunting the woods with dogs for roe, even during the nesting season, and so doing endless damage to game. Gros Bois is a place, however, which can stand a deal of disturbance, and he took me out for a by-day with two old huntsman keepers and a slow hound. It was an absolutely lovely morning and as hot as July, and waiting in the green rides for roe to pass was delightful. I shot two and missed a third. The second was hunted well by the dogs and crossed a clearing twice before he came within shot, and I got him at last with a snap shot across a ride, the dog close behind. We also killed as many hares, a few

## *Malet goes to Berlin*

rabbits, and a pheasant or two. There are in the wood a number of *faisans vénérés*, the sacred pheasants of China, which have bred and multiplied since they first escaped from the *faisanderie*, when the Prussians were here. The Prussians occupied the Château and took a good many things, but on the whole did less damage than might have been expected, the property being recommended to them by the King of Bavaria, whose relative the Prince is. Altogether two most delightful days, and it was like a douche to come back to this wretched little Hotel St. Romain, with its drunken waiters. Dined and sat till late at a café on the Boulevard with Abdu and Jemal-ed-Din.

"17th Sept.—Anne arrived from England in the early morning, she tells me Malet has been appointed Ambassador at Berlin. Malet did all Lord Granville's dirty work two years ago, let them suppress his dispatches, ate dirt for them, told stories for them; and this is his fair reward. Though not a man to command, he is a good servant, and if they want a docile one at the end of a telegraph wire, they could not do better than take him. He is not likely to let his imagination run away with him, or make any scholar's mistakes on points of detail. Bismarck no doubt has asked for him, as a safe man, and because he (Bismarck) was a great friend of Malet's parents in old days at Frankfort. The only time I ever met Bismarck<sup>1</sup> was at Lady Malet's, or rather at old Lord Brougham's, where she was staying, in Dover Street some twenty years ago. Edward Malet was at Frankfort when I first went there in 1860, not actually *attaché*, but doing his

<sup>1</sup> My recollection of Bismarck on this occasion is of a tall thin man making himself very agreeable to Lady Malet and me—there was no one else present—and talking excellent English.

## *Gordon in Great Straits*

father's work with us in the chancery, always a good boy but a dull one. We neither liked him nor disliked him, Schomberg Kerr and I, and I don't remember that we ever saw much of him except in the chancery—a mouldy place it was, smelling of apples.

“Breakfasted with Bitters, and played tennis in the afternoon with Leigh, winning three sets out of four. Biboché was there looking aged, and Sérafin.

“18th Sept.—To the Embassy, and saw Walsham, the first secretary, now in charge.<sup>1</sup> There is a telegram from Gordon at Khartoum which sounds as if he were in great straits and very wild. He says the Government is responsible for all that has happened, that he expects two hundred thousand Turkish soldiers, and wants £300,000; is going to destroy Berber and send Stewart to relieve the garrisons on the White Nile and Dongola. He wants an expedition quick.

“To Vienna by evening train.

“20th Sept.—Vienna. Called at the Embassy and on Victor Drummond,<sup>2</sup> whom I had not seen since we were at Athens together. With him I found Hadji Petros, King George's *aide-de-camp*, son of the original of About's ‘Hadji Stavros’ in the ‘Roi des Montagnes.’ How things have marched since then, and they say people cannot govern themselves.

“Dined at the Embassy. Sir Augustus Paget very amiable. We talked about Egypt. He remembers Nubar when Nubar was Abbas Pasha's Dragoman, etc. (as already given in my ‘Secret History’). Lady Paget talked about Mrs. Howard

<sup>1</sup> Sir John Walsham, Bart.

<sup>2</sup> Sir Victor Drummond, K.C.M.G., afterwards Her Majesty's Minister at Munich.



## Count Gobineau

and the Stanley family, especially about Lady Amberley and her son." This was the present Lord Russell, whom I had known from a child, and had met a little while before at Naworth and liked. He had had a strange bringing up of an almost Spartan kind. I remember finding him once lying in the fender when I came to call upon his mother, his head almost under the grate. I asked whether she did not think it dangerous; she answered: 'It will be useful to him. If a coal falls out it will teach him not to lie there again.' On the other side of me was the Comtesse De la Torre, an old friend of Gobineau's, of whom we talked much."

I had known Count Gobineau well, having made his acquaintance in 1870 through Lytton. It was during the Prussian war, and Gobineau was in extremities for money, the Prussians being in occupation of his country house. He had written to Lytton about some Oriental manuscripts he was desirous of selling, and Lytton, who was at Vienna, had written to me asking me to help him. I had done what I could for him, and had earned much gratitude. After the war I went to stay with him at Trye and we became close friends. I have some thirty or forty of his letters, chiefly on literary subjects, and his own private copy of his celebrated book "*Sur l'inégalité des Races Humaines*." This book was, I think, the first to protest against the old doctrine of the essential brotherhood of man, and, as the author of it, Gobineau gained a great posthumous renown in Germany, and became the founder of a school of thought there called *Das Gobinismus*. He was a very agreeable man with much imagination, a bit of a poet and a bit of an artist, besides being an excellent talker on all subjects. He had been French Minister in Persia, and in 1870 was Minister in

### *The Potocki's at Lançut*

Brazil, and an intimate friend of the Brazilian Emperor.

"Dufferin was here only yesterday, and we have therefore just missed him, which is most provoking.

"21st Sept.—By night train to Lançut, Count Alfred Potocki's country place beyond Crakow, arriving on the 22nd. The Château is only a couple of miles from the station, a very handsome building, partly of the last century, partly older. It is very large, with one of the handsomest suites of rooms I ever saw, the furniture having been brought from Paris, at the time of the great Revolution, by the wife of the Potocki of the day. Lançut was inherited from a Princess Lubomirska, who in turn inherited it from an ancestor of the fourteenth century. These Potockis are allied to, but of a different branch from, the Potocki who with Branicki betrayed Poland to Catherine of Russia. They are very patriotic. Their family has been distinguished in Poland for many centuries, and in the long gallery there are portraits, most of them badly restored, of some dozen of them. Four were Generalissimos or Hetmans of the Polish army, and one, Stanislas, was killed before Vienna in the last siege by the Turks, 1683. The present Count is about sixty, a most distinguished man. Forty years ago he was *attaché* in London, and has since been Prime Minister and Minister of the Interior at Vienna, and for eight years Governor of Galicia. The Countess was a Princess Sanguscko from Russian Poland, where she has large estates. There are two sons, Roman, whom we met in Egypt three years ago, and Joseph, who bought our horse Pharaoh, and two daughters; one of them is here, Madame Tyschkiewicz, a charming person, as they all are.

"23rd Sept.—This is an old-fashioned place. The

## *The Jews in Poland*

Countess has two dwarfs, who follow her about wherever she goes, of the size of children of six or seven years old, but really of twenty-two and twenty-five, not misshapen or ugly, children of a Polish peasant on the estate, the father not being particularly small; the dwarfs' two brothers are tall enough to be in the army. It is the fashion with the nobility to keep these little people; they get three florins a month, everything found, and presents.

"Drove in the afternoon to a horse fair, I with Count Roman in a little carriage with four ponies—three white and a spotted one. It used to be the Polish fashion to have all spotted horses. From the high plain one can see the Russian frontier to the north ten miles away, and to the south the last ripple of the Carpathian Hills. This is a great country for Jews, Galicia containing nearly eight hundred thousand of them. They wear long gowns, with felt hats and long curls. They are disliked as money-lenders, but have not been persecuted here as they are in Russia. The rest of the population is half Polish, half Ruthenian, three millions of each. The Ruthenians are Slavs; they are Catholic, but use the Greek Ritual and have married priests. In Russian Poland the Ruthenians have been compelled to join the Orthodox Church. The Poles are all Catholic. Roman tells me the estate here is about twenty thousand hectares—forty thousand acres—none of it let, but cultivated under intendants. They are suffering from the same thing here as elsewhere, the low price of wheat. We met and overtook a number of Jews upon the road, nine and ten in a cart. It is a joke here to laugh at the Jews for going about so many together, and to count them with the fingers. This makes them angry, as they think the last one counted will die. At the fair the horses, for common

## *The Czar at Warsaw*

horses, seemed pretty good, better than you would see anywhere else out of England. The ponies of the country are like the Asiatic ponies, and were brought here they say by the Tartars. After this we drove in the forest, a great fir wood, and got home in the dark.

"The young men, Tyschkiewicz and Roman, have been talking about the meeting of the three Emperors; they declare it to have been directed entirely against the anarchists, and to have no relation either to Egypt or to England. When the Russian Emperor came through Warsaw, he received a letter from the Nihilists telling him he had nothing to fear while in Poland, as Poland had suffered too much already, and they would not bring more trouble on its people. Half the Poles in Warsaw were nevertheless arrested as a precaution. The Empress would not leave the Emperor, but followed wherever he went. The Emperor had tried to speak Polish, which is a finable offence at Warsaw.

"*24th Sept.*—We went out, Roman and I, to the forest to try and get a roebuck, but saw none but does. There was a part fenced off in which are red and fallow deer, all too tame. A stag followed us about, butting at the carriage. I was asked to shoot two young fallow deer, but missed them, and not sorry. The forest is a great fir wood, with a sprinkling of oak and birch on a sandy soil. We drove the four ponies again in a little carriage like a sledge of the date of Napoleon the First. Joseph has gone away to Antonin, their place in Russian Poland, where we are to follow him to-morrow.

"*25th Sept.*—Before going away, went over the house again. It is really magnificent, with splendid Louis-Seize furniture, china, and bronzes. A grand vase with brass mounts by Goutière, a whole service

## Lemberg

of Oriental china on a large scale, a Sèvres stand valued at a hundred thousand francs, and much else, a dozen rooms *en suite*, a theatre, a chapel and a ball-room, all splendidly furnished. Of pictures some excellent Bouchers, Dutch pieces in Snyders' style, and a quantity more,—almost all good. I liked especially a woman by Vincent, a small picture, but first rate. The family lives in a corner of the house.

“To Lemberg with Countess Potocka, four hours by train, a handsome country town of four thousand inhabitants. The Diet is sitting, and Roman and his father are members. They have a house here at which we dined, and went afterwards to the Governor Zalewski's reception.

“*26th Sept.*—Father Lubienski called, and told me much about politics. He looks upon the Polish case as hopeless in Russia till there is a war, but it is probable there may be some slight change for the better in consequence of the meeting of the Emperors. The Austrian Government succeeded in conciliating the Poles, so why not the Russian? Only the Russians are altogether inferior intellectually and morally to the Poles.

“Went to see the Museum of Natural History, which is the best of the sort I ever saw. There are no fewer than twenty eagles, and every kind of bird natural to Galicia is represented with nest and young, all well stuffed. The beasts less well, but interesting. The elk is still found in some of the forests, and the aurochs, or bison, just beyond the frontier—but the last is almost extinct. There was a white roe in the collection, shot last year by Count Arthur Potocki. This young man was at dinner last night. He told me about the roe, and about the Branicki stud—which he helps its owner to manage—also of some wonderful trout fishing he had had, twelve

## *Antonine*

hundred killed with the fly in a week, and weighing four hundred pounds. Afterwards we were driven to the top of a hill where there are public gardens with a fine view in the direction of Russia.

"*27th Sept.*—Started for Antonine, Father Lubinski seeing us to the station. The fine weather is gone, and we had a disagreeable journey, first by rail crossing the Russian frontier to Czerny Ostrov, a small station in Volhynia, an eight hours' journey, then by road. We were met by two carriages and four, and drove fifty versts over fearfully muddy roads to Antonine. The country here is like Salisbury Plain or the Pampas, great rolling downs of black earth without a stone or pebble for hundreds of miles, all under plough, no fences, no trees, except where there are plantations of oak or birch. These are rare, but Antonine itself is nearly surrounded by a very handsome oak wood of about eighty years' growth—fortunately no firs. The house is not a very large one and without pretence, a good squire's residence with pleasure grounds and gardens of about forty acres. There is a large pond let to Jews at £200 a year for pike. Round this the village stands, and there are a dozen respectable houses like bungalows occupied by the administrators of the estate. This used to be a principality, and is still of thirty-five thousand acres of land in hand, but the greater part now belongs to the peasantry, who, thanks to their enfranchisement by Alexander II, are well off. All the land they cultivated was by that act given them, the Government paying the Lord of the Manor a small price for it. Their land taxes are very low, not more than a tenth of what it is in Galicia. The peasants are Ruthenians by race, but were forcibly converted a hundred years ago to the Greek church, and are now to all intents

## *Poles and Ruthenians*

and purposes Russian. Industry thrives under protection, and the estate sugar mill pays well.

"28th Sept.—As far as I can make out, all is very well managed in this part of Russia to the advantage of the Russian peasants, but the Polish landlords are vexatiously treated. Poles in Russia are not allowed to buy land, or to make wills, and are liable to confiscation at the pleasure of the Emperor. They are, in fact, outlaws, and it is the avowed policy to get rid of them. For this reason they stick closer to the lands they have, and some of them are still very rich—the richest being the Branickis, and next to them the Sangusckos. The Polish nobles were originally granted their lands when these were uninhabited steppes on the frontier liable to incursions from the Tartars, and the peasantry were their feudal retainers, but of a different race, Ruthenian, living under shelter of their castles. There are still some Catholic villagers, but these are not Ruthenians; they are the descendants of impoverished Polish nobles, and are still proud of their rank. The late Prince Sanguscko, the owner of Antonine, took part in the Polish rising of 1830, and was exiled for ten years to Siberia and to serve as a common soldier against the Circassians. He distinguished himself in the war, and so was restored to his country. Afterwards he made several journeys in the East, and brought back horses and mares from Aleppo, Damascus, and Egypt, to add to his Arab stud already existing at Slavuta since 1803. He died three years ago, leaving half his lands to his daughter, Countess Alfred Potocka, and half his stud to her son Joseph, now our host. The half of the stud was then removed here, and there are now forty-two brood mares.

"We went over the stud to-day. First, the stal-

## *The Sanguscko Stud*

lions, of which Palatine is about the handsomest horse imaginable. His fault is that he is rather shallow in girth, but his head, neck, and carriage are superb, and he has fine action, a gray with dark mane and tail. Artiste, a bay, fifteen hands two, with beautiful action and carriage and a fine head, came next. And after him Cyprian, a chestnut, of far more substance than either of the other two. They like him, however, here the best and are very likely right. Lastly, there was Pharaoh, looking more beautiful than ever, and he gave me a pang of regret. He is fully appreciated here, and has got some good colts this year of his own gorgeous dark bay colour. Colour, it appears, is a very important point here at the sales, gray being at a discount, and chestnut the favourite. The sales take place in May, but the prices are small. A lovely team of four gray stallions, fifteen hands, is now for sale at two hundred pounds, and a team of gray mares, fourteen two, for a hundred and forty; all young animals and perfectly broken. Twenty years ago Arabs were much more the fashion, but now young Austria goes in for English blood.

"The brood mares are splendid, hardly a bad one among them, and a dozen of the best are absolutely perfect. You could not find such a dozen mares together anywhere in Arabia.

"*29th Sept.*—There was Mass this morning in a funny little chapel in the garden. Afterwards we went hunting with slow hounds and greyhounds, and found two foxes in a marsh, which was drawn by black and tan hounds of the dachshund sort, but bigger. Got the old one away, a fine old gray fox, but the greyhounds were on the wrong side, and we had no run. Then we coursed three hares, a greyhound I gave Joseph Potocki running well,



## *The Potocki Brood Mares*

but the fastest was a brindled Circassian dog. The hares had no chance. The country is a great open plain, but enclosed here and there with banks and ditches.

"*30th Sept.*—Another day among the horses and the brood mares at pasture beside an oak wood, a very beautiful sight. Then to the sugar mill, which brings in a profit of £250 a day for nearly three months every year; that is £20,000, consuming 1,400 acres of beetroot, each acre thus giving about £15, but the land can only grow it once in seven years; still the profit is enormous, and they have other mills elsewhere. The director of the stud, and the late Prince's secretary, worthy men, dine with us every evening, observing, however, much etiquette with Count Joseph, after the manner of courts.

"*1st Oct.*—Again out coursing, and drew a cover for a fox blank, and then had some good runs after hares, getting four. I had a fall at one of the banks. They are dangerous fences to ride fast at as the ditches are ten feet wide.

"*2nd Oct.*—We went to-day to see the cellars. There is one bottle of Hungarian wine labelled 1683, and perhaps a thousand bottles of the last century, as well as mead of the same date, which the Poles used to get drunk on. To become intoxicating the honey must have been kept for twenty-five years. There are also many dozens of brandy a hundred years old or more, and all sorts of curious liquors and burgundies, and ancient Spanish wines. The 1683 bottle was reserved to be drunk by the King of Poland.

"Among the letters which came yesterday was one from Primrose; it contained a copy of an apology written by Dr. Kerr to Villayet Ali (the Patna case),

## Odessa

a rather lame one. But as Primrose says, 'it is a very unusual thing to get an apology at all from an Englishman to any native,' so I suppose we must be content.<sup>1</sup>

"3rd Oct.—We were to have gone to-day to the Branickis, but a telegram came in the night altering our plan. This sends us straight to Odessa. We started from Szepetovka station, thirty-two miles off, which we did in four hours twenty minutes; this country has fine woods of oak and birch, infested with swine, as in ancient Europe. These are spotted, as are sometimes the cows and as were the mediaeval horses of Poland. At Szepetovka we found that the Odessa express went in the morning, so we stayed the night at the Potocki factory.

"4th Oct.—To-day we have been travelling by train across 'the unwise, unjust, unmerciful Ukraine' as far as Kasjatin. Our way lay through fine forests, for the forest country begins here, and we are close to the great bog of the Dnieper, a marsh as large as Ireland, and one of the largest in the world.

"Further on, the country is open, and closely resembles the 'campo' of Buenos Ayres.

"5th Oct.—All night in the train, very dirty and stuffy. Russian generals with spurs on. Fat women, half undressed, eating apples. Windows nailed up for the winter.

"Found letters at Odessa, one from Rajah Emir Hassan which talks of a Madrasa being opened on my plan at Lucknow. This looks as if the scheme of a general university had been abandoned. Called on Consul-General Perry, who hates Russia and Odessa, and every country but Spain.

"6th Oct.—To the Odessa Exhibition, and saw the out of doors fair. Here horses were exhibited,

<sup>1</sup> See "India Under Ripon."

## *Quarantine in the Bosphorus*

Russian trotters—a poor lot, and *soidisant* Arabs, a poorer. The best horse was a large Russian dray stallion—white, short legged, very strong, and with extraordinary good short limbs.

"*9th Oct.*—After a disagreeable passage arrived in the Bosphorus and anchored off the Asiatic shore in quarantine, near a pretty village with two mosques, near enough to see the Mueddin in his tower, and the women who come out in the evening to sit on the beach. The weather is heavenly and consoles us for much. The quarantine is an act of reprisal by the Ottoman Government against Europe. They have been pestered with advice and remonstrance for the last hundred years about sanitary arrangements, and now they are turning the tables. This has its excuse. I remember the fiendlike action of the European Sanitary Board at Alexandria towards the unfortunate Mecca pilgrims at Wej, and how the fat Greek Sinadino boasted that they had been kept for I don't know how many days without water. Numbers died there, and it was one of the causes of the revolution of 1882.

"*10th Oct.*—I have been reading Madame de Crequy's memoirs, a delightful volume, lent me by Madame Coumarof, wife of a Russian Secretary of Embassy, on her way to her husband's post, a clever and well informed woman. She believes in dreams and that she will be crucified some day at Kief. She has told me a good bit about the Russian peasantry, which is much what I found in Volhynia; they are well off, eat meat daily, have good houses, and are able to live on their own land. It is difficult to get labour for wages, hence land is cheap, this in great Russia on the Volga.

"Hugh Wyndham came off to within speaking distance of our ship. He brought the news that one

## *News of Stewart's Death*

of Gordon's two steamers had gone ashore somewhere near Berber, and the crew with Stewart had been killed by the Arabs. I made Stewart's acquaintance at Aleppo in 1881. He was a good straightforward man, very enthusiastic about his work, but strangely unsympathetic with the Eastern people he worked amongst. I gave him letters of introduction to some of our desert friends near the Euphrates, and he made a flying journey through the Sebaa and Shammar tribes on a camel, but he distrusted the Bedouins and disliked them. I put the violent line Gordon has taken against them down to his account. I expect Gordon will be killed next—I wish it could be Wolseley or Northbrook ; it would disgust people with their unjust wars.

" 12th Oct.—Among our fellow passengers is an American named Howe, of the romantic globe trotting sort, who is in ecstasies at all things, and his fellow traveller, a Swede, Mr. Claes Lagergren, Chamberlain to the Pope. The latter is the more interesting, as with a *doucereux* ecclesiastical manner he is really well informed and sympathizes with those things in the world which are right. These two have been travelling together through Algeria, Spain, Sweden, and Russia, an oddly assorted pair. Lagergren has been at Damascus and in Egypt. There was also a Mohammedan on board from Kazan, who comes yearly to Constantinople to trade. In the third class are some thirty Jew pilgrims going to Jerusalem, very interesting people, very dirty, very devout. They read their Bibles all day long, and say their prayers turning to the east, and clothed in striped chasubles.

" 14th Oct.—Our five days' quarantine over, we were landed in the Embassy launch at Therapia, and went to see Hugh, and dined with him at the

## *Nélidof Russian Ambassador*

Embassy. Count Corti was there, an ugly little man but sensible and clever. Anne has had a good deal of conversation with him. I am more than ever sorry to have missed Dufferin, who has left the best reputation behind him in the Embassy, and would probably have been glad to see us. We intend to stay a few days here at Therapia to make acquaintance with the Ambassadors, especially Nélidof, whom I knew so well at Athens.

"15<sup>th</sup> Oct.—At Madame Petala's Hotel, where I was in 1860; spent the morning writing, and then by steamer to Buyukdereh to call on Madame Coumarof, and also on the Russian Ambassador. Nélidof received me very cordially, reminding me of many instances of our old life at Athens, which I had forgotten, jokes I had made, the name of my dog, the paper chases in the olive woods, Lady Dufferin's visit, and twenty other things which it gave me a pang to remember. He told me that Madame Ozerof had died some years ago at Athens and Ozerof, his former chief, had a post now of Grand Chamberlain at St. Petersburg, but was old and lived with his married daughter in the Crimea, and that he had kept up his intimacy with Haymerlé till the day of his death. Of Haymerlé he said that his end was caused to a certain extent by chagrin. He was a great worker and master of detail, and had made himself so necessary to everybody that at last he had become Prime Minister of Austria. But, once in power, he was unable to cope with the situation. He had married a little *bourgeoise* of Frankfort, and this had emphasized his own want of birth; and Viennese society had given him the cold shoulder. He was worried into his grave. We talked a little about politics, about the possibility of reforming Mohammedan society, which he naturally does not believe

## *De Noailles French Ambassador*

in. He said: 'What will always prevent any reform is the Caliphate.' He then talked of a movement there had been in favour of the Konieh branch of the Sultan's family, being under the impression that these were descended from the Koreysh; but I explained to him that this was a mistake, and that the Konieh people represented only an elder phase of the Turkish Sultanate, the Seljukian, not at all the Caliphate. His ideas, like those of nearly every one, are quite vague on this point. I was very much pleased with my visit.

"Later I met another old friend, Madame de Radowitz, the Prussian Ambassadors, whom I had known at Berne in 1867. She, too, reminded me of things which gave me a pang. The third old acquaintance was Mrs. Goschen. Called with Hugh on Count Corti, who is most agreeable. He remembers Constantinople in Bulwer's time, and how his Excellency got his island from the Sultan, and sold it afterwards for £20,000 to Ismail Pasha. This little transaction was the ruin of Bulwer's career. There is an *entente cordiale* between Corti and the English Embassy. We are to lunch with him on Sunday.

"Later to the French Embassy. Monsieur de Noailles is not unlike Lord Salisbury on a small scale. His wife is a Pole by birth, and acquainted with all our Polish friends, has been a beauty, and is still a *femme d'esprit*; has a salon; we found her agreeable and the house agreeable. It is an old Turkish country house, with a single fine room, comfortable and dignified—a great contrast to our own Therapia Embassy, which was built by Sir Henry Elliot, in the Swiss Gothic style one sees at Bombay, an eye-sore to the Bosphorus.

"17th Oct.—With the Wyndham children to see the Palace of Belabeg on the Asiatic shore; a modern

## *Hobart Pasha*

building in very moderate taste, with a vast deal of paint and gilding and marqueterie work and sham marble. It makes one ill to think of the millions it must have cost, and the meanness of the result. The views, however, from the windows are splendid, and in the garden there are two fine tigers and some healthy looking ostriches. We then steamed down the Bosphorus. Nothing in Stamboul is changed, except that a railway has been run through the Seraglio gardens, and the bridge of boats has become an iron one. But at Pera and Galata there are marks of time, gaps where wooden houses have been burned, and a multiplicity of tall new stucco houses.

"At Pera we are at the Hotel Royal. My first care has been to send Stanley's two letters of introduction to Achmet Vefyk and Khair-ed-Din Pashas. They are away in their villas. Next I called on Hobart Pasha;<sup>1</sup> he told us a great deal about the Sultan, who never goes out now from Yildiz Kiosk, a small palace between Pera and Hissar, and has not been in Stamboul for years. He says he likes him, that he is very intelligent and well intentioned, but the Government is as bad as ever.

"The Sultan won't hear of anything like independent administration in the Provinces, which Hobart thinks with me would be the best cure for the Empire. He talked a great deal about Halim Pasha, whose cause in Egypt he has been pleading with Gladstone. Halim is supported strongly by the Sultan. The Sultan told Hobart only the other day that if he could do anything towards getting Halim back to Egypt, he would be rendering him a great service. He urges me to see him and has promised to let Halim know I am here. Dufferin, he says, has

<sup>1</sup> Admiral the Hon. Augustus Hobart, for many years in the Sultan's service.

## *Dufferin's Diplomacy Described*

entirely destroyed English influence by the violent line he has taken against the Sultan, and the strong language he used about him. He had ended by ceasing to have any communication at all with the palace, and had not seen the Sultan for seven months when he was recalled. He escaped from all business: whenever a message came on any matter he used to slip off in his yacht and pretend he was too short-sighted to see the boats they sent out after him. He had a yacht called the 'Hermione,' ingeniously arranged so that he could be quite alone in her, managing the sails himself by a system of ropes and pulleys, his own invention. Thus he put off troublesome affairs.

"Henderson, the Consul at Aleppo, who is here, tells us the state of the Provinces is much as it always was, or worse, the Pashas eating up the people. Jamil Pasha at Aleppo has made £300,000 in the four years he has been there. He is a great favourite with the Sultan, sending him horses constantly.

"Just before sunset we rode out on hired ponies to the Okmaidan and saw the Golden Horn in its glory. There is nothing like it, or near to it, in the world.

"18th Oct.—Whittaker, the Editor of the 'Levant Herald,' called. He gave me much the same account of what is going on here. The Sultan is played upon by the palace intriguers, who frighten him with stories of plots. He is a timid man. The other day his horse reared with him in the street, and he will not ride an Arab horse again. He rides, however, 'pretty well for a Sultan,' on trained horses, and shoots at a mark in the old Turkish fashion. Khair-ed-Din he calls a wind-bag, and Vefyk a man of crotchets. Of Said Pasha, the Vizier, he said: 'He



## *Sultan Abdul Hamid*

is an honest man but quite ignorant of European affairs; knowing that he is ignorant he tries to make up by reading, and he is now in a complete muddle. He belongs to the old Turkish school, blindly hating all that is foreign; he is personally honest, but has no power, for the Sultan always interferes.'

"In the afternoon we rode round Stamboul: it is wonderfully shrunk and depopulated since I first remember it, many houses abandoned and the streets empty. The Seraglio point has been turned into a new semi-European quarter of the most wretched kind, with roads and tramways and stucco houses everywhere. The Mohammedan population seems scarcer, turbans have almost disappeared, and it is difficult to distinguish between Nazarene and Moslem. An interesting ride, but sad. Hobart called again in the evening, keen that I should see Halim *without delay*. *Khair-ed-Din's secretary* has also called, fixing my visit to that Highness for Monday morning.

"*19th Oct.*—By the half-past nine boat to Therapia. Selim Faris joined us as agreed at Ortakeui (he was afraid of being seen with me), and we travelled on with him. His information was interesting. Of the Sultan he gives much the same account as the rest, that is to say he speaks of him as a good man, sincerely anxious to further the prosperity of Islam, and immensely jealous of his position as Emir el Mumenin and Khalifa, but quite ignorant of the means through which to act, a prey to charlatans and intriguers of every kind, except the European kind. Faris has friends at the palace, and declares that the Sultan shall see me, although he tells me my name is in bad odour there. The Sultan was at one time much pleased at my letters in the 'Times,' when I defended the Egyptians before the war, but

## *Count Corti*

he was angry at my sticking to Arabi after he himself had abandoned him; and Tewfik's envoy, Sabit Pasha, is constantly telling him that I am head of a party in England bent on restoring the Arabian Caliphate. The Sultan, he assured me, supported Halim, but there would be danger in making Halim an English candidate. Arabi is quite out of favour. Faris's paper, the 'Jowaib,' was stopped last year because he had been to see Lord Granville in London, but he is forgiven now. He thought the Sultan would take an interest in Indian education, but the whole Turkish State was dying. The Caliphate would some day return to Arabia. The Sultan knew it and was doing all in his power to prevent it, but it must come. He charged me to keep this conversation secret. Lunched with Count Corti, the Italian Ambassador, agreeable but ugly, with the ugliness of Socrates, a 'great Anglomane and friend of Dufferin's. He told me he had been at one time favourite Ambassador with the Sultan, who had given him beautiful horses, but he once said something favourable about Dufferin in conversation, and from that time the Sultan would have nothing more to do with him. Dufferin was not generally liked here, Hugh tells me, and seems to have been a fiasco politically. On to the French Embassy in Corti's steam launch. Everybody here is most amiable to us, I suppose because strangers are rare.

"*20th Oct.*—To call on Khair-ed-Din Pasha at Kurujesme. He has a handsome house there, being very rich, a man of about fifty-five, tall, not very agreeable in countenance, and with dyed hair. He received me well, talked sensibly, explaining his ideas with considerable clearness, and has the manner of a man used to State affairs. He had retired, he told me, from these, but the Party he had repre-

## *Khair-ed-Din and Vefyk Pashas*

sented was for progress on Eastern lines, not in imitation of Europe. He asked me to explain to him the British policy in Egypt, which I did, and I asked him in turn to explain to me how it was that with a Sultan, who was admittedly a good man and well meaning, things only got worse in the Empire. At this he laughed, and excused himself from answering, he being he said a Tunisian born, and a stranger. 'But go to Vefyk Pasha,' he said. 'He knows everything, and will tell you.' He then gave me two volumes of 'Controversial Theology,' which he had had translated into French, and one for Stanley. And we talked about India, and the danger there was for the English of a quarrel with Islam. 'But they don't mind,' he said. 'They say the Mohammedans in India are so happy and so fond of them there is no fear.' We parted the best of friends.

"Then on to Achmet Vefyk's. This is the most remarkable Turk I have ever met, and one of the most remarkable men. He reminds me a little of old Ragunath Rao,<sup>1</sup> having the same keen intelligence, power of vivid expression, and bursts of wit. He is equally outspoken. Like the old Rajah, he is a man of the past age. He lives in a little wooden cottage, a kind of hermitage on the hill, to get to which you have to climb an almost impossible path, and he affects an extreme simplicity of life. He was out in his garden when I arrived, and I was shown upstairs to a meanly furnished ante-room, but sunny and cheerful, where I sat on the divan till he came in. He came upstairs slowly, like a man bent with rheumatism, an old man in an old-fashioned dress, a gown and slippers, with a large square fez of the time of Sultan Mahmoud. He took me into an inner room a little better furnished, with some old-fashioned

<sup>1</sup> See "India under Ripon."

## *"Our Sultans Worthless"*

painted chairs, covered with Broussa velvet. He talked about the decay of Turkey. 'The beginning of our ruin,' he said, 'was the Commercial Treaty of 1832. Before that, our people had trades and industries. Now there are one hundred and fifty thousand beggars in Stamboul alone. Look at these chairs, the velvet on them is from a manufactory that supplied all Europe. Now we buy our velvets, when we can afford to buy them, from Lyons. They forced tariffs on us, which gave all the advantage to the foreigner and broke up our trade corporations, which were the life of the people. This is what has principally ruined us. Then we have had bad luck. Our Sultans have been worthless. Formerly we should have deposed them all, till we got a good one—but Europe interferes with our rights now. You must not suppose that the deposition of a Sultan is a lawless act. It is our right. The Sultan Khalifa Emir el Mumenin is not a religious teacher, he is only the chief of the Moslems, and each of us is as good as he, and better if he observes the law better. It is for us to tell the Sultan what he is to do and not to do; and when I was young there were ten thousand men ready to tell him this. Now there are only myself and four or five others—old men; the rest have no courage except to ask for money. You have just been to Khair-ed-Din. He came here as leader of a party of reform—he has made himself rich, and he stops here to get a place or a pension. He will do any dirty work the Sultan may bid him do. I had refused to do that, and I live in this old tumble-down house. The Sultan sends for me every now and then to beg me to be his minister, but I will not be minister unless I have power. When the Russians were at the gates of Constantinople I was made Vizier, and sent to treat with them. The Grand

## *Vefyk on Abdul Hamid*

Duke Nicholas wanted the Sultan to come out and pay him a visit, that he might see how large his army was. But the Sultan shut himself up, declaring that they wanted to make him prisoner, and carry him away to Russia. I refused Nicholas point blank, and said he must come first to the Sultan, and I succeeded. The Sultan refused for twenty days, and for twenty days I put the Grand Duke off, on one pretext or another, and in the end I got the Sultan to receive him, and to pay him the return visit. The Grand Duke Nicholas was a man altogether brutal and corrupt.'

"He then talked about India. 'The English,' he said, 'have lost their political senses. Formerly I remember many men who had correct ideas about the East, and he named several, Alison and Lord Napier. Now they seem deprived of reason. What did they mean by sending that young man Bulwer to be Viceroy of India? I remember him here very many years ago, a pretty little young man he was, fond of saying pretty things to the ladies. A man with such a talent for writing poetry, how could he make a Viceroy to sit on the throne of Sultan Akbar?' I told him about the misfortunes of the Indian Mohammedans, and how they had charged me to speak to the Sultan if possible and enlist his sympathy. But he said: 'I advise you to be very cautious about this. If the Sultan was a man worthy of his position, it would be well—but in confidence I tell you, and do not repeat this even to Lord Stanley—he is mad. His is a peculiar madness. He is clever and agreeable, and all who see him go away convinced that he agrees with them, and so he does. For three days he pays attention to what he has been told. Then he begins to suspect, and then he sees a new person who tells him the other thing,

*“ Un misérable et un fou ”*

and all his ideas are changed. He is a man of fixed and violent ideas, which he changes every week.' 'He is not then,' I asked, 'the good man people say he is?' 'Do not believe it. The Sultan is *un misérable et un fou*. He is out of his mind with fear and jealousy. Sometimes, when the fit is on him, he will walk round and round in his palace for four days and nights, never sleeping, hardly sitting down, hardly eating, and all for fear of assassination. If you came to him to tell him such a thing as you propose, he would listen to you and be delighted, then he would suspect a plot, and be in a fever till you had left Stamboul. Already he is probably asking himself why you have come, and when you mean to go. I advise you to be very cautious. People will come to you from him telling you this and that. He has an army of 4,000 spies, and you must not stay long in Constantinople. Besides, if you gave him any such message from India, it is possible he might take it up and make an intrigue of it, and spoil it as he spoiled the movement in Egypt. He cares only for intrigue and for being cleverer than all those he meets, and for outwitting them—intrigue, and saving money, and fear of what is coming. You had better wait. It will come in five or six months. The movement in Bulgaria and East Roumelia will bring on the crisis, and he will be deposed. Then with the new Sultan something might be done, but with this one never. Do not forget that he is a madman and do not trust him.' I asked him what prince there was who could succeed him. 'The prince next in succession,' he said, 'is calm and reasonable. It is possible we may have better luck with him—but our State is ruined through the men of the present day, who are all corrupt. Look at the young Turkey Party, what

## *Prince Halim*

fools they are! Which of them cares for anything but folly, pleasure, and money?—and we are all becoming paupers.'

"We talked about Egypt. Vefyk has an old grudge against the Turks of Mehemet Ali, 'who were every one of them worthless.' The Egyptians he despises; 'Arabi may have been an honest man, but he was an ignorant one who did not know what Europe's power was. A couple of Turkish regiments would have settled the matter at any moment. Arabi thought that he could stand alone, without the support of the Sultan. He was a fool.' I asked him about Halim. 'Halim,' he said, 'is like them all. He is an intriguer, a man of no sense.' Then we went on to talk about Stanley, and it was agreed that I should come back with Anne and breakfast with him on Wednesday. In going out he stopped me and said in a mysterious way: 'I must tell you something which I beg you will not forget. You are going to see Halim Pasha. He is the best sportsman we have in Constantinople, he has killed more bears and more wolves than any other. Remember this, and when he asks you what I said of him, you will be able to answer with a clear conscience that I told you something to his credit.' And the old man burst into a roar of laughter at his conceit, and so I went away.

"I met Anne outside, who had come by the steamer, and we went on to Prince Halim's, which is close by—a fine house by the water side. We were received at the door by a man whom I did not recognize, but who turned out to be Ismaïl Jowdat, who had been Prefect of Police for the foreigners at Cairo during the war, and who, having kept order and saved much European life there, was exiled by Malet after Tel-el-Kebir. At the top of the stairs we were met by Halim, who in looks is not remarkable,

## *His Ideas about Egypt*

and who, if he had not said '*c'est moi*,' I should have taken for a servant. He is short and fat, but is younger looking and less obese than Ismail, and is more active and alert. His features are rough and without defined expression, his eyes small and restless, and his manner, though far from bad, is without grace or special charm. He is in fact a very plain man, made plainer by his beard being dyed. There is something frank, however, in his way of talking, and it is difficult not to see that he is far more respectable than any of his cousins. He did not ask me about Vefyk, so I was not obliged to make use of Vefyk's little stratagem, and we talked at once about Egypt.

" 'There is no solution,' he said, 'of the Egyptian question except through the Sultan. Egypt at the present moment is on strike, and so will remain as long as the Sultan is not invited to establish a new order of things. If England were to annex the country outright, she might perhaps manage it, but short of annexation she cannot get on without help—help from Europe, and help from Constantinople. The Sultan is the true solver of the riddle now, as he was in 1878, and whoever undertakes to manage Egypt must reckon with him. The simplest solution would be for the European Powers to beg the Sultan to name a new Khedive. Any one whom the Sultan named would meet with a good reception. If the Sultan were to name Ismail once more I should bow to his decision, although I should consider it a great misfortune for Egypt. Ismail's partisans are the capitalists and speculators of Europe; all those who want the reign of pillage to begin again. The people do not wish for them, and would not long endure him. But they would accept him from the Sultan, and I too. Ismail was always false from a child.



### *Khedive Ismail as a Boy*

We were at school together; he never quarrelled, but if a boy insulted him, he went quietly and stole his exercises out of his desk so as to bring him into trouble. We are both fifty-four years old, he being two months younger than me, but he is old from the life he has led. I have all my life been fond of sport, riding, moving about. This keeps a man vigorous. It is a mistake to say I do not care to go back to Egypt; I do care, and I feel sure it is my destiny, but I do not wish to make a fiasco. They say I might have come forward before the war. I was twice asked, but not through the intermediary of any one I could depend upon. Once it was through Monsieur Ninet. He is very likely a good man, but I ask you, was he a proper person to represent Egypt in a serious matter? I tried hard to get into direct relations with Arabi, but never succeeded. I will come forward if asked to do so by the Egyptians, or if named by the Sultan.' I asked him what he thought should be the form of Government for Egypt. He said: 'No constitution as yet. Egypt wants a strong Government just now. She should be ruled by a Liberal despot, a council if you will, but absolute power in the ruler. Eastern nations understand this, not the other. As to finance, I see no difficulty. I do not believe in Egypt's exhaustion. She could pay all her debts with economy. Certainly, if the *interest on the debt could be lowered for a few years*, she would recover. But the peasants' debts must be settled at once. As to the Soudan, my policy would be that of my father, to hold the whole Nile Valley as a trade route, as far as the Equator if necessary, but not to leave the river banks. The Upper Nile is quite necessary to Egypt; it must be reconquered.' I understood him to expect this to be done by Turkish troops.

### *Miss Laing on Arabi*

"On the whole my impression of Halim is favourable. He is outspoken, practical, and seems gifted with common sense. I should say he was honest; he has very little of the prince about him, much more of the *bourgeois*. Perhaps this is what Egypt requires. Ismail Jowdat and Mustafa Bey, Arabi's doctor, who are apparently living dependent on Halim, accompanied us to the door and thanked me very warmly for having saved their lives after the war.

"21st Oct.—Went to see the Yeni-Jami and St. Sophia's. In the latter the *Asr* was going on. Perhaps a hundred persons present. I wished I could have joined in this, but only looked on from the gallery.

"Miss Laing called, who had been Princess Nazli's governess, and is now living with Princess Halim. She told us much that was interesting. She had been very intimate with Arabi, and is very grateful to him for having protected her during the war. She has no doubt in the world about the Khedive's complicity in the Alexandria riot. It was never intended to go as far as it went, but was certainly planned. Dufferin extracted a promise from her not to correspond with Arabi after his exile. Arabi was a quite honest man, but no administrator, and not quite *à la hauteur de la situation*. He would have carried the revolution through, however, if Egypt alone had been concerned. The fellahin would certainly support Halim, especially if he came back with Arabi.

"22nd Oct.—Rode to Roumeli Hissar again, and breakfasted with Vefyk. He gave us eleven Turkish dishes, a very good repast, and entertained us with much historical disquisition. The word Arab and Europe he told us are identical, and signify the Unknown Land. The first Arabs, the Himyarites,

## *Vefyk on Arabian History*

were Hamites, and are the same people with the Abyssinians. Queen Belkis was an Himyarite, but they were later invaded from Chaldea by a Semitic race under Adnan. The Himyarites are the same with the Phoenicians, as their names denote, both meaning red.<sup>1</sup> Perseus and Andromeda were the Persians and the Medes, and he, Vefyk, had been shocked to find Grote, in his 'History of Greece,' repeating the old fables. He assured us that history, as he was explaining it to us, had always been taught in the Oriental schools. Abraham was a new man, and only got his nobility by marrying a daughter of the Himyarite king. From that he went on to the modern history of his own doings on the Euphrates, how he had divided the tribes, and built forts on the river and starved out the Anazeh. On Midhat he was very severe as a make-believe reformer. He himself, on the contrary, had done real good; he had rebuilt the ruins of Nissa and the Baths of Broussa, and had made roads as short cuts from village to village across the hills. Midhat only made plans, and was in the hands of adventurers. He also gave us a history of his doings with Nejd and the Ibn Rashids and the Montefiks—and repeated what he had told me before about the Sultan.

"After breakfast we went on to Halim's, and made acquaintance with his wife and son. The Princess is certainly a superior person, and took part in our conversation. The son is very like him-

<sup>1</sup> So, too, the Red Sea, or Phoenician Sea, as to the meaning of which there have been so many conjectures. The name Bahr el Ahmar was formerly applied both to the Red Sea and to the Persian Gulf, both of them originally the homes of the Phoenicians, whose Arabic tribe name, Beni Himyar, Children of the Red, was turned by the Greeks into Phoenicians from the Greek word *phoenix*, red. I offer this solution of the name puzzle to philologists, having no pretension to be one myself.

### *Eighty-Four Mile Race*

self; they are at their best on the subject of Bedouin life, horses, and sport. He told us about the eighty-four mile race between his horse and the English mare in 1864. His horse was a bay Hadban from the Anazeh, but bought by a dealer. The English mare's name was Alabama, which seems to have belonged to several owners, of whom the principal was Mr. Smart. After about sixty miles, Alabama stopped, and Hadban came in gaily. An objection was raised on the score of the jockey having lost five pounds in weight, but eventually the money was paid. The race was run from Suez to Cairo in seven hours fifty minutes. This is not very different from the account given me by Hetherington, who trained Alabama, except that according to him Alabama was some way ahead of Hadban when she stopped, and nearer home. Hetherington said that he had ridden out to meet the horses coming in, and stopped the mare to give her some gruel, after which she could not move, but it is evident he would not have stopped her if she had not been pretty nearly done. Halim assured us that he had ridden one of his Arab horses once, at trot and canter, for twenty-four hours, another for eighteen hours.

"Coming in after dark, Count Corti came. He has a poor opinion of Vefyk, whom he calls mad. Of Halim, however, his opinion is high, and he had reported it so to his Government when they had enquired about him. But the Italian Government was all for Ismail." The reason of the patronage given by the Italian Government to the ex-Khedive was, that at the time when Ismail could command money in plenty, he had lent a large sum to the King of Italy.

"We have a fancy for taking a house at Bebek, just under Roumeli Hissar.

## *General Langiewitz*

" 23rd Oct.—Went across the water to Kadikeui to see the Polish patriot Langiewitz and his horses, for he has a small Arab stud. He was at the head of the revolt of 1863, an unfortunate affair, which was not fully joined in by the nobles, and was disapproved by the Potockis and others. He is a very little man, with big beard and spectacles, more like a Professor than a General, with an English wife—worthy people, very. He has got a nice old-fashioned Turkish house, with large grounds, for which he pays a rent of £160, and one might do worse than end one's days in such a retirement. He talked sympathetically of Arabi and the Egyptian war. About Constantinople, he told us that a census of the population had recently been taken, which showed the Mohammedans already in a minority there. Here at Scutari and Kadikeui the decaying number was equally noticeable. His wife had been thirty years in the country, he nearly twenty. The state of things was wholly hopeless for the Turks.

"On coming in I found the Russian Ambassador, with whom I discussed the same point, but he would not admit the population to be diminishing, though he agreed that all lands habitable by Europeans would sooner or later be possessed by them. He talked of the progress made by the Germans in Asia Minor. We were talking about the Egyptian Revolution, as to which he was anxious to hear the truth, when we were interrupted.

"Whittaker, who came in next, told some amusing stories of the Sultan and his dealings with the Ambassadors. To avoid talking business with them, he arranges to have inconvenient people present, or to be interrupted, and when hard pressed a band of music strikes up. None of the Ambassadors are on confidential terms with the Sultan. The last who

## *The Sultan and his Ministers*

was so was Layard, and he had disgusted the Sultan with all foreign intimacy. Layard, when he was Ambassador here, had his breakfast table supplied daily by the Sultan—butter, milk, bread, and the rest—and dined with him constantly; and there was a constant flow of presents, sometimes of value. This while Disraeli was in power; but when Gladstone came into office, Layard, who had hitherto supported the Sultan at the Foreign Office, had, in the hope of keeping his place, written the dispatch against him which Granville so treacherously published. Since which the Sultan has trusted nobody. He treats his own ministers as slaves, and, when one of his Viziers wrote on some occasion resigning his office, all the answer he got was, ‘When I want you to leave me, you dog, I will let you know.’

“*24th Oct.*—Selim Faris called with great talk about my being received at the palace, and advising me to write to Munir Pasha asking an audience. I asked Faris to tell me frankly all his opinion of the Sultan’s character and of the chance of my interview having some good effect, and I think he was sincere in what he told me. He said: ‘The Sultan is a man who has really good intentions and who really wishes to serve the interests of the Mohammedans and of religion generally, and especially of the Caliphate. But he is quite ignorant of the world, and, to tell the whole truth, he is crazy. He cannot keep to any plan or line of conduct, and he is ruining the Mohammedans and religion, and his own Caliphate. The question of the Caliphate is one which is coming on now very rapidly. The English Government, from its connection with India, must eventually become its protector, whether it intends it or not, and will guard the shores of the Red Sea, for the Caliphate must return to Arabia. I should

## *The Selamlık*

advise you nevertheless to see the Sultan if possible. You might gain an influence over him, though there is nothing certain in his conduct, and things cannot be worse than they are now. There is a foundation of good in his character on which to work, and you need not believe the stories of his caring only for money. He cares rather to spend it. Send in your letter to Munir, and when the audience is agreed to we will talk over what you should say to the Sultan, or rather what you should not say.' This decides me to stay on another week here in the chance of succeeding. He also talked about Dufferin and the work Mackenzie Wallace had done for him here, and how he had written most of his Egyptian report for him. Wallace has now gone as Dufferin's regular secretary to India at £3,000 a year.

"At noon we went to the Selamlık to see the Sultan go to mosque, just outside his palace walls. It was a very simple affair, a couple of companies of rather ill-groomed soldiers, a few men on seddy horses, half a dozen dust carts filled with sand to sprinkle the road, two carriages full of ladies who did not enter the mosque, about fifty officials in uniform, including Tahir Pasha, a Grand Chamberlain, and Hafız Behram-Agha, the Sultan's chief Eunuch. This last is a grave, respectable-looking person in black clothes, with considerable dignity of manner. He stood on the doorstep outside during prayer with the rest of the courtiers. Last of all the Sultan drove up in a victoria with the hood up, two white horses of nondescript breed, two elderly officials on the back seat, and a driver in a handsome Eastern dress. The Sultan got out immediately the carriage stopped, turned an instant to salute the people, and disappeared inside the mosque door. He is small and slight, but being well shaped looks taller than

## *The French Embassy*

he is. His face is handsome, very black eyes, beard, and eyebrows, a nose of prodigious length and a calm passionless expression—a dignified apparition. But I saw it all from a considerable distance, and only for two seconds each time, going in and coming out. As he drove away there was a melancholy attempt at cheering, the hood was put down, and the Emir el Mumenin was rapidly driven away from men's sight. We occupied a little pagoda opposite the mosque, with a couple of score of sight-seers and officials. Next me were Ismaïl Jowdat and Husseyn Pasha, one of the Sultan's aides-de-camp.

"Afterwards Ismaïl Jowdat came to the hotel, and spent three hours giving me an account of the events of 1882 in Egypt." These are embodied in my "Secret History" and need not be repeated.<sup>1</sup>

"25th Oct.—Rode to the Okmaidan and found the Jews keeping Sabbath in their best clothes. Some of them were catching goldfinches in a net, and we had the satisfaction of letting a bird go. These Jews talk Spanish; one of them told me that their families had come four hundred years ago from Spain.

"26th Oct.—Count Corti came to take us in a steam launch to Therapia. We had luncheon with the Wyndhams and called on the Noailles. The arrangements of the French Embassy at Constantinople depend neither on the Sultan nor on the Ambassador, but on the fancy of his son, a youth of fifteen. Monsieur Doudou, as he is called, makes the rain and fine weather on the Bosphorus, goes out sailing in a boat by himself to the terror of his parents, who have him accompanied by another boat to pick him up. When he goes out riding two negroes run beside him for the same purpose, and when he goes out walking, he is surrounded by an Oriental

<sup>1</sup> Also see Appendix.



## *Corti on the Berlin Congress*

retinue. If Monsieur Doudou stays out late there is no dinner at the Embassy, and the Ambassador cannot return to Pera until his son consents. They are very anxious just now to gain his consent to this necessary autumnal move, but Monsieur Doudou is out of humour, having styes in his eyes, and will not be cajoled. A few nights ago, his parents being out dining, he gave a ball at the Embassy to the housemaids, and ended by smashing all the bells. When the Ambassador returned, he enquired the meaning of the rumpus, and was told that it was his son; 'Rien, que cela!' said M. de Noailles, and went off pleased to his bed.

"On our way back to Constantinople Count Corti entertained us with stories of the Berlin Congress, and of Lord Salisbury's antics there. Disraeli and Salisbury had gone there quite on their high horse to curb the territorial ambition of Russia, and the publication of the secret convention for the acquisition of Cyprus was a great shock to everybody. Salisbury broke it gently to Waddington before the news was published; and Waddington consulted his colleagues, it being generally agreed that there was no middle course between going to war and saying nothing. '*Il faut la guerre ou se taire.*' But the publication was a great blow to Disraeli, who took to his bed, and did not appear for four or five days. Lord Salisbury, however, brazened it out and came to the Congress with an air of defiance. There was no rupture between him and Waddington, and they remained on apparently friendly terms—but Waddington had his revenge. He was sitting one day with Salisbury, and, the conversation leading that way, Waddington asked what the English Government would say to France taking Tunis, and Salisbury said he did not see the harm. Whereupon

## *The Sultan's Feud with England*

Waddington communicated this to Paris, and on his return the French Ambassador in London was instructed to write to Lord Salisbury reminding him of his words. Thus Salisbury was caught; 'But,' said Corti, 'if he had known anything of his business, he would have declined to answer the note officially and would have pleaded a private conversation.' He did not believe that any arrangement of condominium was come to between Salisbury and Waddington at that time, though I told him, without mentioning names, of the letter Lytton had shown me.<sup>1</sup> Count Corti is interesting diplomatically, as he has been to more Congresses than any man in Europe. He said it was a pity the Sultan kept up his feud with the English Government, but seemed inclined to agree with me that our Government would have to come to terms with him about Egypt. He spoke very strongly in favour of Halim, and of the Sultan's wish to make him Viceroy in Tewfik's place. If it is true that Dufferin holds this view, our chances look brighter than I have imagined. There is a talk of Evelyn Baring as Ambassador here, a not unlikely thing considering what a failure his policy in Egypt has been. He, like Malet, has served the Government by holding his tongue, and letting his dispatches be mutilated and suppressed. So he will be rewarded.

"27th Oct.—Selim Faris called to ask whether I had received any answer from the Sultan, but none has come. He said it was quite necessary the English Government should come to terms with the Mohammedans for both their sakes. This must eventually happen, as England would be obliged, whether she liked it or not, to make herself their protector. With regard to the Sultan he might be

<sup>1</sup> Compare Appendix to "Secret History" (Second edition).

## *Abdul Hamid and Dufferin*

pacified by being allowed to appoint a new Viceroy in Egypt, but it would be most dangerous to allow him to administer the country. What he cared about most was to give the world some striking proof of his power. He would jump at the idea. At the same time Faris is convinced that he will never really forgive England, but will take his revenge whenever the opportunity offers. I asked him if the Sultan was on good terms with any of the foreign Ambassadors, and he said: 'Yes, with the German—and quite lately with the Russian.' There seems to be an alliance for the moment with Russia against England.

"Whittaker came in next, and I asked him the reason of Dufferin's ill success here. He explained that he had begun badly. The Sultan was wanting in politeness to him, and he resented it, and Lady Dufferin was shown no attention. During the whole of her stay at Constantinople she was only once asked to the palace, and then the Sultan did not see her. But it was almost impossible to deal with Abdul Hamid. In the negotiation about Egypt he had changed his mind constantly, telegraphing orders and counter orders to Musurus after he had agreed with Dufferin. This made Dufferin say he lied. Then Dufferin with all his outside amiability was a very hard man. Whittaker says he might be cruel if occasion offered, and the transitions between the velvet and the iron were too abrupt. The Turks did not like this. For the last eight months he was neither invited to, nor went near, the Palace. Goschen was much more successful, though he, too, gave offence by going to the Palace in a shooting jacket; but Whittaker thinks that if he had stayed longer he would have been liked on account of his frank manner.

## *An Account of Tel-el-Kebir*

"Henderson also called. He said we had been very near war over the Dulcigno business. Goschen had given him orders at one time to pack and be ready to leave the Aleppo Consulate. Next Ismail Jowdat. I read him over the account of what he had told me on Friday about the events of 1881 and he corrected it on many points (see Appendix).

"28th Oct.—Mustafa Bey, Arabi's doctor, breakfasted with us. He is the most satisfactory man of all I have yet met, and, having been with Arabi throughout the war, he is excellent evidence. Arabi's character, he said, was quite distinct from that of all those who surrounded him. He was the only one of those in high command who had real patriotism or real religion, who did not seek his personal interest, and who saw things clearly. His fault was that he was too confiding, too humane, and too little censorious of others. He, Mustafa, was with Arabi at Tel-el-Kebir to the last moment. No attack was expected, as Ali Yusuf, who commanded the *avant-garde*, had been bought by Sultan Pasha, and Saoud el Tehawi, who managed the scouting business, was also in the pay of both sides. Arabi was asleep still in his tent when they heard a sound of shots (not cannon he says) and presently soldiers running away accompanied by Bedouins. Arabi drew his sword and tried to rally them, begging them to fight for their country and their religion, but they shouted to him '*Ya rbn el kelb*'—'Why should we have ourselves killed for you?' The Bedouins, too, fired at him. It was the doctor who got Arabi to mount and ride off. He himself, after having got into a train which was stopped by the English, made his way to Zagazig on foot. He says I am quite correct in my estimate of the characters of the six exiles in Ceylon. Mahmud Fehmy and Abd-el-Aal are honest men. Mahmud

## *Mustafa Bey on the Massacres*

Sami and Yakub Sami joined the movement from personal motives of spite against the Khedive; and Toulba was never anything but a worthless *gamin*. Arabi was wrong to trust them, but he had few good men to choose from, and when men swore oaths to him he trusted them. Thus he trusted the Khedive. Ali Fehmy was only half-hearted. He was certainly acting in concert with the Khedive in the affair of Abdin, but Arabi was not in their confidence. The thing had been arranged as long before as July, and Sherif was in the plot. Riaz wanted to make himself regent, just as Sultan Pasha afterwards expected to be made regent when Tewfik was to abdicate after Arabi's trial. Sultan, at least, had told his friends this, showing them the Order of Michael and George he had received, 'The same as had been given to the Sultan of Zanzibar.'

"He then gave us the whole history of the Tantah massacre in detail, which he knew first from the official enquiry made before Arabi when it happened, and at which he assisted, and secondly from Ahmed Minshawi with whom he had lived afterwards at Beyrout, and who came here with him, and who had repeatedly told him the story. The true facts were these:

"The Mudir of Tantah, Ibrahim Adhem, with Osman Rafaat, excited the populace against the Christians, as Ismail Jowdat related, telling them that Arabi had ordered it; and the Mudir shut himself up also as related. Minshawi lived at a village called Koreyshiyeh, and happening to come in that day by train with Abd-el-Aal Pasha's son, Emir Bey, and Husseyn Wasif, a magistrate, they found Christians being killed, and Minshawi interfered. They, the populace, called out to him that Arabi had ordered it, but Minshawi had said to the effect of 'Damn

### *His Evidence about Tantah*

Arabi,' and insisted on their stopping. He had then gone with Abu Diab, who had also been trying to stop the massacre, to the Mudirieh, and had kicked in the door of his room and expostulated with him for letting the thing go on—Abu Diab using strong language, for he was very angry. Then they telegraphed to Arabi at Kafr Dawar to send soldiers to stop the massacre, but the telegram had to go round by Ramleh, and was delayed. But at last the massacre was stopped. The whole thing was enquired into at Kafr Dawar immediately, and the Mudir was sent to Cairo and there imprisoned till the end of the war, Darwish Pasha replacing him. After the war Adhem was reinstated, and when the commission was sent to Tantah, Ismail Yusri, the President, who was a comparatively honest man, ascertained the truth and informed the Khedive that he should be obliged to find him, Adhem, guilty, and so begged to be replaced by another on the Commission. This was done, and an officer less scrupulous was appointed who accepted the false evidence Ibrahim Adhem was allowed to trump up against Abu Diab. Ibrahim Adhem, however, was deposed, and Husseyn Wasif (a Circassian, not the same as the magistrate) was appointed. He it was who was made a scape-goat of for Ibrahim Adhem's sake, and was deprived by Clifford Lloyd and sent to the Soudan. Mehariz Bey, formerly sub-Mudir, is now Mudir of Boheya. Minshawi is the son-in-law of Abdallah Pasha, the English renegade, and his son Emir still goes by the name of the Englishman.

“Mustafa Bey confirms all Ismail's statements of the Khedive's connection with the Alexandrian massacres. He was at Alexandria at the time, and was the doctor employed to examine the bodies. There were fifty-one Christian bodies, twenty-three

## *Princes Osman and Kiamyl*

Mohammedan, of which eight were *mustafeczin*, all the latter killed by pistol shots. The English doctor wanted to make out the Christian bodies had wounds made by *des armes blanches*, but this was not the case. Omar Lutfi certainly gave orders to the *mustafeczin* to come unarmed. I like the worthy doctor much. In face and figure he is not unlike Lord Lyons.

"We rode in Stamboul past the bazaars and the tower and the horse market, and dined with Whitaker. Sat next to Mr. Laing, Director of the *regie*, who seems a sensible man, and had a talk with a certain Mohammed Bey, more or less of a spy I believe of the palace. I told him a good deal of what I intend him to repeat there. Sinadino has gone bankrupt at Cairo, so there is still justice in the world!

"29th Oct.—The Egyptian Princes, Osman and Kiamyl, came to see us. I never thought to like them so well, but they talked patriotically about the late war, and were really improved by the part they played. [Here follows the conversation I have recorded with Prince Kiamyl in my 'Secret History.'] About Arabi's trial Kiamyl said: 'If you had only gone on, Tewfik would have been broken. He was in a terrible fright, knowing that his crimes would have been laid bare. It is a pity you allowed the compromise.' The Sultan, the Princes told us, was mad with fear; the disease had begun fifteen years ago when a little girl he had was burned to death. The least mention in praise of any man was sufficient to arouse his suspicion. He had never received them except in public audience. To ask for a private audience was enough to ensure his displeasure. With them was Aarif Bey, who had been the Princes' tutor, the same who came with them two years ago to Crabbet. He is a Kurd of Arab origin

## *The Sultan at Yildiz*

and a man of very superior education.<sup>1</sup> We have decided to go by French boat to Marseilles on Wednesday, as there is small chance of my getting an audience with the Sultan.

"30th Oct.—With Count Corti to the Bazaars. Selim Faris came at five. He gave an amusing account of the Sultan's manœuvres to set every one by the ears, which is his system, according to the *divide et impera* rule. 'You see the palace,' he said. 'The Sultan sits here with a plan before him, showing the rooms occupied by each of his household. If he finds two together making friends, he puts them far off each other. His whole object is to put next each other those who hate each other most. His chief chamberlain and his second chamberlain would poison each other if they could; they are lodged together in this corner. There is Ghazi Osman with Deli Nuzret whom he hates, and there again Abdallah Ibn Saoud and Sheykh Ahmed Assad, both Arabs and bitter enemies. Thus the Sultan comes to know everything, and there cannot be any plot against him he thinks. It was just the same in Egypt; when he sent Dervish Pasha, he also sent Sheykh Ahmed Assad, his greatest enemy, to watch, and, after them, Kadri Bey, his secretary, to watch them both, and even that was not enough, for they had not been there a fortnight when he sent a fourth, Ahmed Bey, one of his aides-de-camp. Kadri wrote to the Sultan complaining that this last was laughing at him, and insulting him publicly, but the Sultan rewarded the aide-de-camp, and Kadri has been in disgrace ever since. The Sultan has never seen him since his return to Constantinople. The

<sup>1</sup> Mohammed Arif Bey, afterwards well known at Cairo where he played many parts, among others that of private secretary to Mukhtar Pasha Ghazi.



## *Spies Everywhere*

others told him he was bribed, but Kadri took nothing but a few jewels. Dervish took money. He got £40,000 in *consolidés* from Tewfik, besides jewels and articles of value, but he was clever enough to send presents by every post to the various members of the household. Kadri didn't. I know everything that goes on in the palace through Zaffir Bey, the Sultan's private secretary, the same who wrote to Arabi. He and his father have been friends with my father for forty years, and I have one other friend in the palace. It does not do to have more, and even these I am obliged to pretend not to know. I shall go to-morrow at six o'clock, before it is light, to find out about your letter to Munir Pasha. I will let you know at breakfast time. I should like you to see the Sultan for the sake of your friends in Ceylon and India. But the Sultan cannot help you, he is so busy and has no memory. He writes down everything that is told him in a diary, but he has no memory. He has always been very kind to me, but I have been in a mess with him several times. First because I would not write against Ismail when they were going to depose him, and for other things. But I am protected by Zaffir Bey, and he always intercedes till the Sultan forgives me and makes me presents. I have three jewelled boxes from him, and when I went to England last year he gave me £300; but I got into disgrace by dining with Lord Granville, and my newspaper was suspended. Now I am in favour again, and the *Jowair* is to go on next month as before. I am very fond of the Sultan. He is so kind, but he is a child. He does not understand, though he wants to know everything. He has spies in every house, either the cook or a slave. When he wants particularly to know about any of the Pashas, he makes them a present of one of his women, and then

## *How Ismail was Deposed*

he hears everything. I was offered one once, but I would not have her. The Sultan has not so many women as some of the Sultans have had—perhaps twenty-five or thirty at a time, but there are several hundred more in the palace, servants and slaves of these. Abdul Hamid has never been married legally. I knew him long before he came to the throne. I never heard the story about his daughter being burnt, but it was Abdul Aziz's death and Murad's dethronement that have driven him mad.'

"Faris has promised to help me with all details in my History of the Egyptian Invasion. He tells me he can tell me everything that went on between the Sultan and Egypt, but I think I know all pretty well as it is. Faris also gave a curious account of the dethronement of Ismail in 1879. Ismail had written to Abdul Hamid to say that he was threatened with dethronement by the Powers, and to ask whether he should abdicate. But the Sultan would not hear of this, and sent him word that he was never to give in and that he would support him. At the same time he called a council to discuss the matter, and hid himself in the council room behind a curtain. Khair-ed-Din was Vizier, and spoke strongly in favour of yielding to the Powers, saying that if they did not the Powers would act without them, and the prestige of the Sultan would be lost. Abdul Hamid, hearing this, changed his mind, and the Ministers were sent at once to the telegraph office, and there wrote out the order deposing Ismail. This tallies closely with what Lascelles told me of Ismail's surprise at the order. Faris was in the palace and heard everything as it happened. 'And I could have cried my eyes out,' he said, 'with vexation, for Ismail was then my patron.'

"31st Oct.—Stayed indoors. Our first visitor was

## *Aarif Bey*

Aarif Bey, and he and Ismaïl Jowdat, who came later, stayed to luncheon. Aarif is more interesting than I at all suspected in spite of his distinguished appearance and pretensions to Arab descent. He told me his history and that of his family. They are a family of Seyyids settled 700 years ago in Kurdistan, where, until sixty-five years ago, they were hereditary rulers, their capital being Mardin. But the centralization of the Empire destroyed them, and his grandfather was brought away to live at Constantinople by Sultan Mahmud. It is clear, however, that they have preserved their descent pure, and he spoke in scorn of the mongrel Turks of modern times. After lamenting the dangers and misfortunes of Islam he communicated to me the secret that all was arranged for a Kurdish rising next May, and that he was going to put himself at the head of it. They would be able to put 80,000 men under arms,—this without the help of Russia, which had offered them arms, but whose alliance they refused. They did not wish to quarrel with the Sultan, but to stand to their arms and demand the right of local self-government. Their country was abominably misruled by ignorant and corrupt Stamboulis, and they felt that if they did nothing they would one day be engulfed in the common ruin of the Empire. Every year they were becoming poorer and weaker, but the Kurds were a nation still of three millions, and warlike men. He asked me whether I thought the English Government would give them its moral support. He had seen Dilke when in London two years ago, and had asked him about it, and Dilke had told him that, though the idea was not discouraged, he considered the time an unfavourable one. This must have been about a month before the bombardment of Alexandria, and

## *A Proposed Kurdish Rising*

it tallies curiously with what Eddy Hamilton wrote to me about the projected Syrian rising a little more than a year earlier.<sup>1</sup>

"I told Aarif in return the history of my correspondence with Downing Street on just these points, and warned him not to trust to Mr. Gladstone or to England, which was far too busy in all parts of the world just now to attend to Kurdistan. Russia, too, would be sure to prevent anything like Mohammedan Nationalism on her frontier. The Russian design was to take possession of the Euphrates and the head of the Persian Gulf. To this he said that the Kurds were willing to risk a quarrel with Russia, that, if they waited, their fate would be only more certain afterwards, and that at present Russia favoured them. And he asked me to plead their cause in England. I promised him to do this, but told him very frankly that it would be almost impossible to attract sympathy in England for the Kurds. A Kurdish question would not be understood there, and all that was known with us of the Kurds was taken from the tales of travellers who had been robbed by them. I advised him therefore strongly to put his case forward as part of the Armenian question, which was already understood in England, and had attracted sympathy, and was even provided for in the Treaty of Berlin. As an Armenian rising, it would be understood, and would have a kind of legal standing. He told me that the Armenians were with the Kurds in this matter; but that there was the difficulty as to who should be their chief, for the Armenians would want a Christian, while the Kurds would have none but a Mohammedan. Anne suggested, however, that there might be two chiefs, and we looked out the position on the map and found

<sup>1</sup> See "Secret History"

## *An Audience Proposed for Me*

that in fact the country might be divided into two districts. The north with Van as capital would be Christian. The south with Diarbekr would be Mohammedan. He assured us the Arabs, too, were with them, the Shammar, the Tai, and the Jibouri—and the rising would begin for certain next May.

"Aarif's father is Seyyid Yusuf Sidki. His brother-in-law was one of the leaders of the last Kurdish revolt with Sheykh Obeidallah. They would have conquered Persia but for the Sultan's intervention.

"Selim Faris also looked in. He has been to the Palace and finds that Munir Pasha has not dared mention my name to the Sultan or forward my letter. They are all afraid.

\* "1st Nov.—Aarif Bey came again to tell me that he had arranged with Ahmed Bey, the Sultan's *Chcf de Cabinet politique*, that we should meet to-night at the theatre and have a talk, and he thinks that then Ahmed Bey, who sees the Sultan every day, will arrange for an audience Monday or Tuesday, and I have told him that I cannot and will not stay past Wednesday, when the French steamer starts. Aarif, in spite of his revolutionary projects in Kurdistan, is on confidential terms with the Sultan's Cabinet, and sends them reports on political subjects. When we saw him in England in 1882 he seems to have had something of a private mission, and has clearer ideas of English political parties than is usual with foreigners. His estimates of Gladstone, Salisbury, and Dilke were correct, and he described how, after an interview with Salisbury, in which he, Salisbury, had held language entirely favourable to the Sultan's rights in Egypt, he had gone the next day to hear him speak exactly in the opposite sense in the House of Lords. I asked him about the relations existing

## *The Sultan only Trusts Germany*

between the Sultan and Russia, and he told me that all the advances at present were on the side of Russia, that the Sultan only trusted the Germans, who, he remarked, could not possibly help him; that he still had some trust in Lord Salisbury with regard to Egypt, if he should come into power again, but that he knew perfectly well that there was no material help to be expected from England any more. I told him I was quite of that opinion. Whatever else we might do, we were quite certain never to send any more troops to help the Sultan against a European Power, and that, if I had to advise for his good, it would be to make an alliance with Russia. Russia, of course, never could be a friend, but if they could tide over the next twenty-five years, there might well be a revolution there, a European war, or heaven knew what. But Russia was the greatest danger Turkey had, for it menaced it in Asia, and the conquest of Asia Minor would be an end of all things. Aarif quite agreed with this and said that if England continued in her present line of policy, an alliance with Russia was inevitable. The only thing that prevented it was that the Russian Government was *tellement canaille*, that the Sultan would not trust them, but he would be driven to it.

"Aarif also gave us a capital account of the way Lord Dufferin had tricked the Sultan in the matter of the proclamation of Arabi's rebellion. The Sultan, he assured me, still had a kindly feeling for Arabi, and it was entirely against the grain that he had issued the proclamation. But Dufferin had bullied him by threatening to leave Constantinople, or acknowledge Abd-el-Mutaleb, the Sherif of Mecca, Caliph. Afterwards, when the Sultan wanted to sign the convention for sending troops, Dufferin went off to the Princes Islands and could not be got at.

## *Ahmed Minshawi*

There had been a great debate among the Ulema as to the legality of the proclamation, and he, Aarif himself, had pronounced strongly against it on the ground of a certain *hadith* which declared every Mohammedan justified in defending Mohammedan interests against the infidel, whether with the Caliph's sanction or without it. He also told us about his visit to the Oxford and British Museums, and the Arabic documents he had found there.

"Next we went to tea successively at the German and Russian Embassies. At the latter we made acquaintance with M. Onou, the Chancellor, who knows Syria well and something of the desert. We talked about Arabia, and I think I made some impression on Nélidof by the warmth of my pleadings. His wife has a great hatred for Lord Dufferin. She was a Princess, and her brother was the owner of that stud of 150 horses which was burnt last year.

"At half past six Aarif returned and took us to dine at a restaurant, and we went on to the theatre, but Ahmed Bey Jellal-ed-Din was not there, and had sent us a message by Ahmed Pasha, another aide-de-camp, to say that the Sultan had kept him on service. The play was, I forget what—the 'Princess Something.' I hate these things.

"I have forgotten the principal event of the day, the visit of Ahmed Minshawi. He came early in the morning, having been sent by the Syrian banker. It is clear that Ismaïl Jowdat did not intend him to see us, and they have quarrelled about something, as they all do. Minshawi is a true fellah of the Arabi type, but altogether inferior to him, a large, nervous, heavy-handed man, with his eyes rather too close together, and a general heaviness relieved by occasional flashes. He was very difficult at first to reassure, and explained that he had been so hunted for

### *His Persecution by Tewfik*

the last two years by the police that he had lost all his courage. It is not given to every one, he said, to be courageous, and he lamented his fallen fortunes. 'I used to be a man of large wealth. I lived like a prince at home, respected by all, surrounded by friends, and confident in myself. Now I am treated as a *fakir*. The Turks have no bowels of compassion. They have no charity. With us the stranger is respected. Here he is watched by the police,'—and he asked nervously whether there was any one listening, as the door creaked. 'I used to have four thousand acres of good land worth £60 or £70 each (I am not sure of the figures), and half a dozen steamers on the river. Now I receive not £20 a year from my property. I am driven out of my home and live as I can on what remains to me of the ready money I took with me.' The tears rolled down from his eyes as he spoke, and he sat for some minutes silent on the sofa weeping.

"I asked him to tell me how it all came about, and he said it was from his having interfered to save the lives of the Christians at Tantah. He had gone into Tantah that morning thinking of nothing, and when he saw the people being killed he had lost his temper and laid about him with his stick to stop them, and he had expostulated with the Mudir, and he had taken 150 of the people, Syrians, Jews, or Greeks, to his country house, and had kept them at his own cost during the war. The people who had got up the riot were Ibrahim Adhem and his wakil, Mehariz, who is now Mudir. These two were solely answerable for it. He had heard of Osman Rafaat's coming to Tantah, but had not seen him. I asked him about Abu Diab. '*Wallah!*' he said, 'if there was one innocent in the world it was Abu Diab.' I then tried to get out of him what his political views were.



### *Luncheon with Halim*

But he was very cautious, after the manner of his people. 'If,' he said, 'you were to take an ox or a camel or an ape, or even a hare, and give it to the Egyptians as their Governor, they would be grateful and loyal to it. Before the war we loved the English, but we do not love them now. They have destroyed us, and they have given us to those who have no mercy.' After much pressing, I got out of him that he would like Abbas with a regent, Riaz, or, if it were possible, Arabi. He said Riaz because he would keep order, but Arabi the people would like far better. He did not wish Ismail. He should have no objection to Halim. But any one would be acceptable so long as Tewfik went away. I urged him to come to England to give evidence, and he said he would, but what was he to do with the family? His family was here, and he had no friend to leave them with. I fear he is a rather helpless ally. Still we must make what use of him we can, and he is to come again on Monday.

"*2nd Nov., Sunday.*—By steamer to Roumeli Hissar to have luncheon with Halim Pasha, and take leave. But we unfortunately missed the boat, and did not get there till nearly two o'clock. The Princess is certainly a very charming person, and still a pretty woman. She gave us luncheon in the kiosk in the garden, a very handsome room. Some Turkish dishes, among others one of chicken with walnut sauce. Afterwards I had a long talk with Halim. Explained to him how the war had been brought about, and Mr. Gladstone's desire to be rid of Egypt, and begged him to further my design of bringing forward now the charges against the Khedive, by sending Ismail Jowdat and Mustafa Bey to England. And he promised to send them and to get them to agree with Minshawi not to quarrel. At going away

## *Monseigneur Azarian*

I said to the Prince: 'I suppose it is understood between us that if Your Highness returns to Egypt, Arabi is to return too.' He said: 'You may count upon it. I have never had any other idea, and I only regret that I have not been able sooner to put myself in direct communication with him. All the exiles shall be recalled.' I like Halim more the more I see him. He is plain spoken and direct in all he says.

"His Beatitude Stephen Peter X, Monseigneur Azarian, Patriarch of the Catholic Armenians, called on us. He is a dignified and intelligent man, to whom we had brought letters from Madame Volodkovich; and he told us in detail the Armenian situation. The desire of the Catholic Armenians was to have such a government as that of the Lebanon. They did not want to be separated from the Porte, as their greatest danger was absorption by Russia. But the administration had become worse than it had ever been, and the people would bear it no longer. With regard to the Kurds, he said they were much less fanatical than the Turks, and the accounts of their misdeeds were very much exaggerated. He was sure that, if they had a government like that of the Lebanon, they would all live together very peaceably. The Turkish Government favoured the Catholics, as they did not conspire with Russia, which the Orthodox did. But even these did not wish Armenia to be absorbed by Russia.

"Of the Sultan he gave the most favourable account I have yet heard. He says that he has known personally four Sultans, and Abdul Hamid is far the best of them, and perhaps the best Sultan there ever was. He is a good man, and works hard to know everything concerning his country, and is most intelligent. He has no vices, has few women, neither

## *Armenian Politics*

drinks nor amuses himself, and is severely economical. He has no debts, paying everything, down to the last detail of his household, every Thursday. He knew this as the Sultan's accountant is an Armenian Catholic. Only, all his servants are bad, and he trusts no one. The Government of the Porte is worse than it ever was, a mere den of corruption, and it is impossible that a catastrophe is not impending. The Greeks in Roumelia are all members of secret societies, and so are the Syrians, and one of these days it will occur. The finance will break down, for nobody is paid and the people are all coming to beggary. Everything can be bought. The new Greek Patriarch of Jerusalem is a man whose name stands first on the list of those dangerous to the Empire, as he is a head centre of Pan-slavism. Yet he procured his nomination by spending money. All was going to ruin, and would go to ruin. He, the Patriarch, was sorry for it. A worthy old man. Peace be with His Beatitude.

"*3rd Nov.*—Our first visitor was Ahmed Minshawi, from whom we got additional details, and I have drawn up a statement of the evidence he is prepared to give, which will be most valuable.<sup>1</sup> As he gets more confidence his face lights up, and he acquires even a certain eloquence. He reminds me every now and then of Arabi, typical fellahin both. He was driven away by the arrival of Doctor Dickenson. [Here follows Doctor Dickenson's account of the death of Abdul Aziz, which has been related previously in my 'Secret History,' see pages 52 to 55.] Dr. Dickenson is a very precise old gentleman, and the sort of witness whose evidence would be accepted by any jury in the world. I therefore entirely believe his account. Midhat and

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix.

## *Midhat Pasha's Death*

Damad, he told us, died in chains at Taïf, some months ago, having been starved to death. Midhat's end was hastened by a carbuncle, but he was none the less made away with. The Sheykh el Islam has also recently died there who gave the fetwa authorizing Abdul Aziz's deposition. This act of terror has given Abdul Hamid the absolute power he now holds.

"We went to the Russian Embassy again to say good-bye, and see some horses given by the Sultan to Nélidof. The horses are of no great account, a chestnut and a gray worth £50 or £60 a piece.

"Coming back we found Mustafa Bey, and we have arranged that he is to encourage Minshawi, and when we telegraph come with him to England and give his evidence. Ismail Jowdat also came in. We wrote out a *procès verbal* for Minshawi to sign. What I intend to do is to invite Mr. Gladstone to examine the evidence privately, or appoint Trevelyan or somebody of equivalent integrity to examine it. If he refuses I shall do it publicly. Ismail Jowdat will come at once with us to England.

"While we were talking, Aarif Bey came in with a message from Ahmed Bey to the effect that they had been afraid to present my request of an audience to the Sultan; but that they had spoken of my wish to see the horses, etc., and that the Sultan had been most gracious, and would send an aide-de-camp tomorrow to show us over the stables and the palace. I confess the story did not sound to me quite coherent, and Selim Faris, who looked in later, tells me that he has just been to the palace, and that the true account of it is that Munir did give my letter to the Sultan, but that he wishes to put off on others the responsibility of not answering it, that he is as usual undecided, and would like to find out a little

## *Ismail Bey Jowdat*

more about me first, and he will probably send an aide-de-camp on purpose to report concerning me to-morrow. He will see me later if I will only wait. But I can't wait. The Sultan asked Zaffir about me on Friday, but Zaffir pretended he had never heard of me. This invitation to the palace and stables is at any rate a proof that he is not ill-disposed, and we must make the most of it. The idea of the palace at present is that nothing new will come on in Egypt till next summer, and he thinks if I come back then I shall be able to do a great deal. Perhaps he is right. In any case we shall not have wasted our time here.

"Our last visitor was Mr. de Léon, formerly American Consul-General at Cairo, now agent of a company for making a ship-railway over the isthmus of Akaba. The scheme seems to me chimerical from the fact that Suez is a far easier, shorter, and more direct route.

"*4th Nov.*—Ismail Jowdat came in the morning, having written out the evidence given us by Minshawi in Arabic for him to sign. But Minshawi did not appear till too late, for we had to go out at a quarter to one to the old Seraglio, where the Sultan had appointed an aide-de-camp to meet us and show us everything. This *Serai* is a delightful old place, and the position the finest, without exception, in the world. By good luck the aide-de-camp on duty was old Vefyk Pasha's son, an extremely nice, intelligent young man, who knew the history of the various Sultans well, and so was able to explain us everything. We were received in State and conducted round by the whole staff of the Palace. The Treasury is full of interesting things which belong to the domain of Murray. But what was to me most attractive was the series of effigies of the Sultans

## *The Sultan's Coffee*

dressed in their actual clothes. This recalls past glories better than anything else could do. Mahmud's miserable hussar jacket closes the series, but there are lower depths still since, left unrepresented. The young man confessed himself ashamed of his wretched uniform and fez, a rare instance of good taste in a modern Oriental. In the kiosk we drank the Sultan's coffee, which I confess I only sipped, remembering its fatal name. The Dolmabakji to which we were next taken is without interest inside, and we were disappointed of our promised visit to the stables, as the Sultan was having the horses paraded at the Yildiz Palace in order to choose one for an Ambassador. At least such was the excuse given—but I half suspect they were afraid of our criticism. The visit to the palaces is, however, a proof of the Sultan's goodwill, and when I thanked the young man and gave him a message of thanks to the Sultan he told me that they all knew of me as a defender of Islam and a friend.

"Selim Faris, who came in the evening, tells me it was Musurus (the Turkish Ambassador in London) who set the Sultan against me, telling him that I was seeking to found an Arabian Empire; but he is now undeceived. He advises me to write a memorandum of my ideas to the Sultan.

"*5th Nov.*—Ahmed Minshawi came and signed his evidence (see Appendix). Mustafa Bey Nejdi also called, and then Count Corti, to wish us good-bye, and we went on board the French steamer, having spent three weeks at Constantinople, an interesting visit, though our main object of seeing the Sultan remained unachieved. It was a dark evening with a huge bank of black clouds to the north, signs of winter in the Black Sea, when we steamed out of the Golden Horn and passed Seraglio point and

## *A Kurdish Chief*

the city walls on our way home. Ismaïl Jowdat goes with us.

"6th Nov.—Really there never was such good fortune. On board there is an acquaintance of Ismaïl's, Mohammed Assad Bey, Muteserif of Candia, on his way to his post, uncle-in-law of our friend Aarif Bey. He is by birth one of the hereditary Kurdish chiefs, but exiled at the age of seventeen (he is now fifty-seven) on account of his father's rebellion—a most interesting man. He has been many years in Crete, and has seen many changes in the Empire, all for the worse. He lamented the quarrels between England and Islam, which he attributed to its true causes, first, the obstinacy of the Porte in effecting no reforms, and secondly, the dishonesty of England in regard to Egypt. In regard to the latter, he said what they all say and to which there is no answer, that the English caused misgovernment in Egypt so as to have an excuse for taking it. He said that all his life he had been accustomed to respect Englishmen as men of just dealing, but they were changed and he respected them no more. If he had not seen Ismaïl Jowdat with us, he should not have cared to make our acquaintance. From having the best reputation in the East the English had now the worst. About his own country, Kurdistan, he talked much in the sense that Aarif had done—only he seemed to see less hope in the trouble which was coming. The Russians he said were very busy stirring up the Christian Armenians, and the thing would break out in the spring. It would begin with the Armenians, then the Kurds would take up arms in self-defence. There would be stories of bloodshed and massacre greatly exaggerated, and the Russians would take it as a pretext for intervention. The Turks had about 150,000 Nizams

## *Back to Western Europe*

in Asia Minor, and the Kurds could put a far greater number under arms. But he augured ill for the result. The Russians wanted Mesopotamia and Bagdad and Bussora. The Turks could fight well, but they had no leader. All the Turkish commanders were corrupt and selfish, and they would be bribed again by the Russians. I asked him who was the natural Kurdish leader, and he said: 'There are several hundred Kurds in the Custom House at Galata. Yesterday, when I passed through, they all bowed.' His elder brother, however, would seem to be the man, and this agrees with Aarif's account. Obeidallah is the religious chief only. In the evening Ismaïl Jowdat gave a full account of all he knew in connection with Arabi and the events of 1881. [The substance of what I learned from him is embodied in his statement (see Appendix).]

"12th Nov.—We arrived without incident at Marseilles and went on immediately to Paris."



## CHAPTER X

GORDON'S DEATH. CHAOS

" 13<sup>th</sup> Nov. 1884.

" I HAVE been away from home just two months—it seems like six, and I shall be glad when it is over. I called to-day on Lord Lyons but found him uncommunicative. We talked a while about things at Constantinople, as to which he affected to know very little, and I told him I thought the Government would be well advised to make its peace with the Sultan. He thought this would be easy now that Dufferin had left Constantinople, and discussed possible or rather impossible appointments of a successor. Layard, he said, has been put out of all chance by the publication of his last despatch. He asked me about Goschen, though saying he certainly would not go back, as he wanted to remain in England. He also talked a little about Dufferin's chances of success in India, but said nothing that was of the least importance.

" There is a report again to-day that Khartoum is taken, and this time it seems better founded.

" 14<sup>th</sup> Nov.—We breakfasted with the Wagrams at Voisin's. They had come in on purpose from Gros Bois. Afterwards I called on Sheffield, who as usual told me a great deal. Northbrook and Baring have been concocting a report to please Gladstone. It will say that everything is going on for the best in Egypt, and propose some temporary financial arrangements, the reduction of the Egyptian army, a loan of eight millions, and a speedy evacuation; all the administration to be in Egyptian hands, and nothing at all in the shape of a protectorate. On the contrary, Egypt is to be put under international control as

## *Bismarck Angry*

before proposed. This has throughout been Mr. Gladstone's policy. Baring has insisted on all English employes in Egypt reporting in this sense, and refuses to forward their views if in contradiction. He only wants to flatter Gladstone and hopes to be transferred to an Embassy. He will very likely go to Constantinople. Hartington and Dilke, on the other hand, are determined on a Protectorate, and on pushing on to Khartoum and establishing a Government there with an English Governor—on staying in Egypt and treating the whole thing like an Indian principality. Sheffield says, however, that the Powers won't stand this. Bismarck is now hand in glove with the French and will give our Government a slap in the face. He has given them one about the Congo, and he means to give another about Egypt. He will probably propose to settle the Egyptian question over the head of England. He was very angry at the stopping of the sinking fund having been done without consulting him. It was not Northbrook's plan, who had no idea but that of conciliating the European Powers and the Europeans in Egypt. But when he telegraphed that money must be had, and proposed that the English Government should supply £300,000 for immediate necessities, Gladstone settled the matter the other way, saying that he had promised Parliament that no money should be expended without their leave. Granville, in all he does, only consults Mr. Gladstone's fancies, knowing that his only hold on office is through him. He has no policy of any kind except to obey the Old Man; he likes office and he likes his pay, and hangs on. He knows he will never be in office again. Gladstone only consults the electors. Between them the whole thing is going to indescribable pot.

"Malet's appointment to 'Berlin is simply Bis-

## *Northbrook in Egypt*

marck's nomination. He refused Morier on the ground that he was an intriguer, and insisted on having Malet, and our Government, being on their knees to him, consented. Sheffield is of opinion that we shall have the whole of Europe on our back in a very short time.

"Now we start to-night for England.

"15th Nov.—Arrived in London by the early train from Paris. My first visit as soon as it was light was to Button, who gave me all the news. Northbrook has come back from Egypt, a more complete failure than any of his predecessors. He was taken hold of there by the Greeks and other commercial residents, and wrote a report, recommending a policy of financial disinterestedness on the part of England. The coupons of the Suez Canal shares were to be cut, England was to pay the Army of Occupation, and finally to advance £20,000,000 without security. But none of his colleagues will hear of such an arrangement, and he has been made to suppress his Report—and there is some talk even of his retiring from the Cabinet. He is delighted with the Khedive and the whole gang, as was sure to be the case. Hartington and Dilke, when he came home, told him he was an ass, and Button thinks they will get their way in the end. This way is to guarantee three per cent. on all the debts, and assume a Protectorate. He says that Gladstone will certainly not listen to a word against Tewfik, but thinks I may as well write to him, and propose to bring my new evidence against him. The style of argument we may expect to be met with is that all Oriental evidence is worthless. At the time when Churchill was bringing on the case against the Khedive last year, he, Button, was staying with Northbrook in the country, and he told him how

## *Gordon Cannot Hold Out Long*

important it was that the matter should be hushed up. With regard to native evidence Northbrook said: 'I have always made it a rule to listen to all that can be produced, but I do not let it influence me, I judge by the antecedent probabilities of the case.' 'You refer I suppose to the Baroda case,' said Button maliciously. 'Well, yes,' he answered—'that was my method, and I think it the safest one.'

"Then to Gregory's. Sir William was at Dalmeny with Gladstone, and had a great deal of talk there with Eddy Hamilton about Egypt, and about me. Eddy talked nicely about me, but Gregory confirms what Button says, that Gladstone is as wrapped up in Tewfik as ever. This is our great difficulty. To Crabbet in the evening.

"19th Nov.—Again to London. Wolseley is in a mess. The Nile Expedition can't get on, and Gordon writes that he can only hold out to a certain date. Wolseley is going to make a rush for Khartoum with a few hundred men, but it is thought doubtful whether he will succeed. My letter offering to re-open the evidence against the Khedive in the matter of the Alexandrian riot has gone in to Gladstone, having been looked over by Gregory, and a sentence altered.<sup>1</sup>

"Dined at the Carlton, where I found the big-wigs of the Party very busy over the compromise of the Franchise Bill. I felt rather like a spy among them, though heaven knows I care nothing whatsoever about their politics. Only I fancy they look upon me as a damned Radical. Leconfield was there and we talked a little about horses.

"20th Nov.—Called on Stanley of Alderley, who lives in a garret, leaving all the rooms of his house empty. He says the Ottoman Empire will outlive the British. *Inshallah!*

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix C.

## *The "Times" Angry with Northbrook*

"Luncheon with Lady C., who assured me the Prince of Wales is coming round to my view of things in Egypt, but he is not Prime Minister and can do nothing. Dined at the Gregorys', and sat between Layard and the Servian Minister. The latter assured me the Servian Government was doing all it could to retain the Mohammedan population, while orderly and law-abiding, but they would not stay.

"21st Nov.—Amir Ali, who is in London and whom I saw to-day, tells me that Cordery is going on as ill as ever at Hyderabad. He talked of a dinner at the Northbrook Club, at which Dufferin had made a speech and explained to the Indian Mohammedans present what a great advantage it was for him, now he was to be Viceroy of India, to have resided so long at Constantinople, and to be in such cordial relations with the head of their religion! The Sultan was a most admirable man, and they were the greatest of friends! There never was a greater humbug than Dufferin.

"22nd Nov.—Saw Button in the City. He tells me Gordon has sent word to say he can only hold out six weeks from the fourth of November. This not on account of provisions, which are plentiful, but of ammunition. Wolseley consequently intends to make a rush across the desert from Debbah, and expects to be at Khartoum with the New Year. All the telegrams published about Gordon's recent successes are military lies. The 'Times' is very angry with Northbrook for what he said yesterday in the House of Lords, and is seeking an occasion to waylay him.<sup>1</sup> Buckle is not a revengeful man, but it is

<sup>1</sup> This relates to a personal explanation made by Lord Northbrook on the 19th, in which he had treated the "Times" correspondent in Egypt, Moberly Bell, with the greatest severity, and the "Times" also as a publisher of false news.

### *Its Tradition not to Forgive*

the 'Times' tradition not to forgive. Chencery used generally to do this himself, waiting his occasion patiently, and then himself writing the article, which he could do better than anybody else.

"25th Nov.—Wrote to Eddy to hasten on an answer from Mr. Gladstone. Called on Gregory to consult what was to be done. Churchill is going away to India and Ceylon next week, and I hardly know how to act in regard to him.

"26th Nov.—Khartoum is again surrounded by twenty-five thousand men, and the Mahdi holds the passes between that and Debbeh. If so, Wolseley's rush will be a dangerous proceeding. Button tells me he means to take three thousand men with him and artillery, but I doubt his getting through and back with so few.

"Mr. Gladstone's answer has come: 'In view of my inhibition to refer me to the Foreign Office, he can only acknowledge the receipt of my letter.' My proposal had been that he should himself examine the fresh evidence against the Khedive Tewfik.

"27th Nov.—To Robert Bourke's. We talked over affairs at Constantinople, which he understands. He is all for coming to terms with the Sultan about Egypt. 'If I had anything to do with it,' he said, 'it is the first thing I should do.' About renewing the charges against the Khedive, Bourke was very adverse to anything being done. 'If you proved the case to demonstration, it could only do harm, for Tewfik is necessary for English policy in Egypt. Besides, the case is dead now, and you could not get any one to take interest in it.' About India he was curious to know whether Lord Ripon had really *promised* Salar Jung to restore the Berar provinces, and seemed to think the Foreign Office at Calcutta

## *Rothschild means Financial Mischief*

quite right in resisting it.<sup>1</sup> There is little to choose between the two parties as to these things.

"Next to Randolph Churchill. He is going to India on Wednesday, and I found him in so open a frame of mind as to Indian politics, that I agreed to give him letters to some of my friends there so that he may hear the native side of the case. I think it quite possible he may take a right view, and if so he will be an invaluable ally. He has just published in the 'Pall Mall Gazette,' a sort of manifesto which is wildly democratic, and as popularity is his guide in politics it may well be that he will look to it in India also. He is fond of large and novel conceptions, and Tory democracy might easily be made a cry there, too. So I risk it. Nothing can be worse for India than the Whigs. Talking about Egypt, Randolph told me he had just seen Rothschild who had news from Berlin that Bismarck had declared his intention of supporting France in any answer she might give to the English finance proposals, and Randolph seemed to consider that all the fat would be in the fire. Button told me yesterday that Rothschild held an Egyptian bill for a million sterling, and had made up his mind to present it at date, that is to say about Christmas, and so make the Egyptian Government bankrupt. I said nothing to Randolph about our new evidence against Tewfik, as he is so imprudent. He is going to Ceylon, and I have promised to announce his arrival, and have warned him of the little split there is among the exiles. In spite of his faults it is impossible not to like Churchill. He has so much *bonhomie* and so little pretension. This is the secret of his success. I am depressed all the same at the aspect of things. I see no prospect now of getting back to Egypt. Randolph told me even he dared

<sup>1</sup> See "India under Ripon."

## *Interviewed by Stead*

not go there as the Government would make it too disagreeable for him, not to say dangerous. He had thought of spending the winter at Cairo, but he had decided not to risk it.

"*30th Nov.*—Stead writes that he is 'hungering and thirsting' to see me, as he hears I have all the latest news of the Mahdi, and he has an idea of sending me to make peace with him, and asks for an interview.

"*1st Dec.*—Stead came at one, and we had two hours of it. I told him peace could easily be made with the Mahdi, but it must be through the Sultan and not Tewfik. He understood, he said, that I was in constant communication with the Mahdi, and thought that when Wolseley got to Khartoum I might go and open negotiations, and a deal more which, as he is going to develop it into an interview for the 'Pall Mall,' I need not write. I heard later from Button that it was he who had suggested the thing through Reginald Brett, and it appears that he, Button, has all along been putting it about that I have communications with the Mahdi. He says that the French will accept the English financial proposals for Egypt. Malet has been a great success at Berlin. Bismarck has been pacified by concessions on the Congo. Lord Granville is to make peace with the Chinese for Mr. Ferry, who in return will accept the proposals. Italy is to be compensated in Tripoli, and the general portioning of plunder to begin. I don't believe the French will accept, as their game in Egypt is too good a one. Button tells me the proposals were drafted by Hartington and only accepted by the Cabinet on the distinct understanding that if they broke down we were to clear bodily out of Egypt. It is a toss up which way it goes.

"*11th Dec.*—(After several days' shooting in the



## *Hodgson Pratt*

country, and a visit to the Wyndhams at Wilbury.) To London and saw Button. He tells me a deal of news. The French and other Governments, he is sure, will accept the financial proposals for Egypt. Should this fail there will be a split in the Cabinet, and Gladstone will go out of office. Hartington, Northbrook, Dilke and the rest are for guaranteeing the debt. Gladstone will not do this. They will try to carry things on by letting Egypt go bankrupt, then if Europe won't stand this Mr. Gladstone will resign, Lord Salisbury will pass the Redistribution Bill, and Dissolution will follow at the end of the year. Button himself is off to Tunis for six weeks with his brother Mayo—a sporting trip.

“Dined with Bertram Currie. Bertram has the same idea as Button about the financial proposals; can't understand the French being such damned fools as to refuse them. His only wish as an Englishman is to get out of Egypt; his only fear that we may be trapped into staying. We are the only thing that stands between Egypt and anarchy, etc., etc. He is not quite so confident, however, as he used to be, and talked of Northbrook as having made a fool of himself; Northbrook is so jealous of Dilke or anybody else going to Egypt that he had insisted on going himself.

“*15th Dec.*—Dinner of the National Arbitration and Peace Association in honour of Hodgson Pratt. I was asked to return thanks on behalf of the visitors, and I brought forward the question of peace with the Mahdi, which was very well received. It is arranged I am to write a letter to Pratt, stating my views, and to have it published. There were about two hundred people at the dinner, which was given at the Criterion. Pratt is a most estimable man, and his Association has a laudable object, but I doubt

## *French to Annex Morocco*

its succeeding in the face of the growing brutality of the world, and I am not at all sure that if it did it would not be a bad thing for the East. The best chance for the East is, that the nations of Europe should destroy each other.

"*17th Dec.*—Broadley called with a long story about presents made by Ismail Pasha to the King of Italy. He, Broadley, is in Ismail's pay in respect to a lawsuit pending in Egypt. He talked also a good deal about Rochefort and the Communist party, with whom he is intimate in Paris. There is a scheme for annexing Morocco, and the Communists are doing all they can to prevent it.

"At the dinner to Pratt there was some talk of my standing for Greenwich as Home Ruler at next elections. This is the only platform I could stand on.

"*19th Dec.*—Stead and Appleton (Secretary of the Peace and Arbitration Society) came to see me, and we had two hours' discussion. Stead has just been staying with Auberon Herbert, and was in high feather—a man of genius in his way—very anxious to expound my whole plan in the 'Pall Mall.' But I would not let him do this if it was to have a chance of succeeding. It was a brilliant talk, and resulted in our deciding that a deputation should wait upon the G.O.M. with which I am to be smuggled in so as to get at him. My letter to Pratt about peace with the Mahdi is published in the 'Times' and 'Daily News,' so I am committed to action if called upon.

"Lunched at the Carlton with Wynford. That noble Lord has his own explanation of our failure in Egypt. 'You may take my word for it,' he said, 'it all comes of our officials there working on Sundays, it is a breach of the decalogue which leads to other breaches.'

"*20th Dec.*—Crabbet. Hunted in a snow storm on

## *Arbitration and Peace Committee*

the Downs. On our return found a Mr. Wheeler come to interview me for the Press Association. I declined to let him print anything of my plans. He is an Irishman and an amusing fellow, and had some good stories about people he had interviewed. He had had to hunt officially with the Empress of Austria one season in Cheshire, the Press Association keeping three horses for him for the purpose. She rode well—but did not choose her own line. Lady Rock-Savage rode much better. If Middleton, Bay Middleton, who piloted the Empress, got a fall, the Empress always stopped.

"22nd Dec.—The 'Times' has a leading article on my proposal of going to the Soudan, politer than is usual with them, but of course not favourable. Wrote an answer going up in the train, and went to the 'Pall Mall' office and gave Stead leave to write an interview, and then lunched at the Gregorys'. The only possible way to pull this thing through is by the press; not that I want at all to go to the Soudan. I have other things far more important to do. But the Soudan is the thin end of the wedge and we must drive it in if possible.

"At six o'clock to a meeting of the Arbitration and Peace Committee, where I found them quite prepared to let things alone. But Karl Blind backed me up, and it was voted 'unanimously and enthusiastically,' that Mr. Gladstone should be requested to employ my services. Afterwards I had an interview with a so-called agent of the Mahdi, whom Ismaïl Jowdat has brought to England. There is a kind of committee here in London of Oriental sympathizers with the Mahdi, consisting of thirty persons, who meet every night at a room they have hired for the purpose. Ibrahim Bey is not an attractive man, an Arabic speaking Egyptian, with

## *A Mission of Peace to Khartoum*

the true Egyptian eyes, but with a curl in his hair and a very low forehead. In Oriental dress I dare say all this would be concealed, but he wears French clothes and has discarded even the fez. He is not attractive. His conversation was more interesting than his face: he assured me there would be no difficulty in my going to the Mahdi. The best route would be by Massowa, as the road that way would be open, and he promised to send word at once, that some of the Mahdi's men should be on the look out that way for my coming. Mohammed Obeyd, he said, Arabi's right-hand man, is now the Mahdi's General, and of course would receive me well. He made his escape after Tel-el-Kebir to Tripoli, and thence to the Soudan.<sup>1</sup> The Mahdi also knows me well by name. I should have to go by Constantinople, but arrangements would be made so as to assure me a quick reception there. The whole thing would take just six weeks. Ibrahim Bey will go with us, if I like, on Wednesday as part of the Peace Deputation to Hawarden, but he is hardly a presentable man.

"23rd Dec.—My 'Times' letter is published, and in the morning Stead sent me a proof of his interview to correct, a ridiculous thing which I had to rewrite. [The proof was brought by an office boy, with a message that it was to go to press in an hour, and it was a mere accident that I was at home and able to stop it. It contained, among other extravagances put into my mouth, that Egypt would be better annexed than continue ill-governed as it was, an idea which, if Stead's, was certainly not mine. When I saw Stead later in the day and ex-

<sup>1</sup> The report of Mohammed Bey Obeyd's having escaped to the Soudan was long prevalent. But it is certain now that he was killed at Tel-el-Kebir.

## *We Try to Rush Gladstone*

postulated with him about this, his answer was characteristic. 'Well,' he said, 'if you did not say it, it is just what you ought to have said.']

"24th Dec.—Christmas Eve. By the 10.10 train to Chester with the Peace Deputation to see Mr. Gladstone. It was to have consisted of three persons, but Karl Blind and Dr. Clark missed the train, so I had Martin Wood to myself. I never had much idea that Gladstone would see any of us, and I was certain he would not see me. So we first sent a telegram from Chester to say that 'Mr. Wood had been deputed by the Arbitration Society to wait on Mr. Gladstone, and that he had brought two gentlemen conversant with Soudan affairs with him'—Jowdat, who had come with me, and me. I made Wood add something about Christmas Eve to give us a countenance, and, without waiting for an answer, we set off in a fly to Hawarden. The only chance was to rush Mr. Gladstone before he knew who we were, and we almost succeeded. We were evidently not expected, and were received at the door by a young footman new to his work, who said Mr. Gladstone was at home, and if Wood had had the presence of mind to go in all might have been well. But he fumbled about for a card, and the footman disappeared, only to be succeeded by the butler, an old hand, who promptly said 'Deputation,' and with very little ceremony turned us out. Wood weakly argued and appealed to the man's feelings. But Mr. Gladstone was 'finishing his letters for the post, and then would have his dinner,' and we were shown the door. Going back to Chester we plucked up courage, and drafted a letter, in which we endeavoured to turn the tables, or at any rate to conceal our defeat. We consoled ourselves by thinking that we were fighting in a good cause, that

## *Shade of Midlothian!*

Mr. Gladstone must feel ashamed of himself turning away a deputation of peace on Christmas Eve. It was the climax of all. Here he was making a senseless war for no object he dared avow, and afraid to look honest people in the face. Shade of Midlothian! We sat on at the Chester Hotel till two, and then took the Irish mail back to London—arriving in the gray of Christmas morning, and bitter cold.

"*25th Dec.*—Down early to Crabbet, feeling 'the satisfaction of a good conscience.' The 'Pall Mall' has published my revised interview, but of course the Government won't accept my offer.

"*26th Dec.*—Martin Wood's letter, the one we wrote to Mr. Gladstone at Chester, is in all the papers in the largest type, and the 'Daily News' has an inspired letter, placing all the blame of the situation on Bismarck.

"Hunted with Leconfield's hounds, the meet at Drungwitch, and had a good old-fashioned run of two hours, through Plaistow into Sydney wood. Kars carried me capitally. Anne rode Queen of Sheba.

"*30th Dec.*—Hunted with Leconfield at New Bridge, a run of an hour and twenty minutes, I on Rataplan, Anne on Proximo (two Arabs we had brought from India). It was a very rough bit of country, and it is really astonishing that these horses who have never been across half a dozen fences in their lives, should have gone as they did. Jowdat and Ibrahim Bey at Crabbet.

"*1st Jan., 1885.*—Jowdat and Ibrahim went away to London after I had shown Ibrahim the horses. Ibrahim is by way of being an Arab by birth—that is to say, his family was from Moeyla on the Red Sea, and he turns out to be no other than that Ibrahim Bey Moeylhy who was Ismail's private secre-

### *Ibrahim Bey Moelhy*

tary, and who was expelled from Paris by Ferry's Government a month ago in deference to the Sultan's wishes. He is an agreeable man, and extremely clever. It is arranged that we are to have a Conference with Jemal-ed-Din at Boulogne, and they explained to me the nature of the Franco-Russo-Indian Conspiracy, of which Jemal-ed-Din is the head. If the Sultan does not work with him, they say they can depose him. But he will work with them. They want to force terms of peace on England. Otherwise they say there will be a revolt in India. [N.B.—This Ibrahim El Moelhy, brother to Abd-el-Salam Pasha El Moelhy, was a well-known character who subsequently played a variety of parts in many notable intrigues both at Yildiz and Abdin. Besides his talent in this direction—and he used to remind me of Fakredin in Disraeli's novel 'Tancred'—he was acknowledged to be the finest chess player in the East. His pretence of being an 'agent of the Mahdi' had however very little reality, Jemal-ed-Din alone having influence in that direction.]

"*3rd Jan.*—A letter from Selim Faris this morning which disquiets me. It says that Hassan Pasha Fehmy's mission from the Sultan, which has been recently talked of, has for its object to make terms with the English Government, but that it is intended to support Tewfik, and that the only alternative is the restoration of Ismail, who is patronized now by Bismarck. Jowdat has got a letter from Halim Pasha's son, ordering him back to Constantinople, and warning him against mixing himself up with Irishmen or Hindus, as such a course might compromise the Prince.

"*4th Jan.*—Dined at the Club, where I had a long talk with Marlborough, who is writing an article on

### *Hassan Pasha Fehmy's Mission*

the evils wrought by Christianity. He is more intellectual than his brother Randolph, but less attractive.

"6th Jan.—Wolseley's column has reached Gakdul without accident, and people are again cock-a-hoop. Leonard Courtney tells me Gladstone is ill with anxiety about Egypt. The departure of Hassan Fehmy's mission from Constantinople is announced.

"11th Jan.—Button came back last night from Tunis, which he says the French have ruined,—trade gone, Arab peasantry gone, caravans gone, no new colonists, old ones in despair. Passing through Paris on his way home he had seen somebody belonging to the Embassy (Sheffield?), who had told him that Lord Lyons was furious at the want of policy in Egypt. He had a policy of his own which it would seem included Arabi's return, for Button had been asked whether it would not be possible to get up some popular demonstration in favour of Arabi. From what he heard at Paris the difficulty in Egypt is that the rich people evade paying their taxes and are forty per cent short this year, the peasantry only five per cent. Lord Lyons' idea is that Arabi could force the rich to disgorge. This is exactly in harmony with Knowles's suggestion to me last year.

"12th Jan.—A letter from me in the 'Times,' in the best place, and a leading article upon it." This explained my position towards the Sultan.

"Saw Button. He says the Government has decided nothing. Gladstone does not mean to retire, or Granville, or Northbrook, or any of them. They have no policy, except to wait on events. They mean nothing by coquetting with the Sultan. Hassan Fehmy's mission will lead to nothing. They look on the Khartoum expedition as a walk over. But my friends Ibrahim and Ismail are quite sure Khartoum



## *A Policy of Bounce*

has been taken long ago, and that the steamers at Shendy are in the Mahdi's hands.<sup>1</sup>

"15th Jan.—I have dispatched a letter to the Sultan through Halim Pasha.

"17th Jan.—Button tells me the fate of Egypt will be settled this week. The French counter-proposals have arrived, and Gladstone means to clear bodily out of Egypt as well as the Soudan. He will not hear of resigning alone, and Dilke and Hartington have caved in. The 'Times,' however, does not give up its policy of staying on in Egypt for lost, and a campaign is being organized of defiance to Europe. 'Dilke,' said Button, 'always said the only policy was a policy of bounce, and we are going to bounce it, at a risk of a war with France. But nobody will move a finger.' 'If you want to bounce,' I said, 'bounce behind the Sultan, and I will go with you.' Certainly I do not want to see Egypt handed over to Europe. Mr. Gladstone must remain responsible, and must do justice before he goes. Met Wolff at the Club, who urged me to bring forward the case now against Tewfik.

"18th Jan.—Prepared a memorandum about Tewfik, and tried to find Wolff to concert measures. Saw Stanley, who will put me in communication with Hassan Fehmy. Stanley tells me Musurus talks of Tewfik as 'incapable but harmless.'

"Lady C. tells me the Prince of Wales is now well disposed towards me, but says I am to be attacked as soon as Parliament meets. She does not say by whom, or for what.

"19th Jan.—There is a telegram in the 'Daily Telegraph,' explaining that Hassan Fehmy's mission to England is to show an autograph letter written

<sup>1</sup> Khartoum fell on 26th January. The news reached London on 5th February; Gordon's death not known till the 10th February

## *The Sultan's Envoy*

by the Czar to the Sultan, offering him an alliance. This is what I have suspected to be Russia's game. Presided at a meeting of the East India Association at Exeter Hall, the thing discussed being the age of entrance to the Civil Service. The meeting was a small one; Stanley spoke, and Connell, and Tom Hughes, an old twaddler of the first water.

"20th Jan.—Button's bouncing article is in the 'Times.' He says the Government will reject the French proposals, at least of a multiple control in Egypt.

"21st Jan.—Called on Hassan Fehmy, and found Stanley there. We had a long talk with the Sultan's Envoy. Stanley explained who I was, and gave me every help, for he is entirely without that small jealousy which besets most men, and cares only for 'the cause.' We both urged on Hassan Fehmy to be firm in his dealing with Lord Granville, showing him in how much need the English Government stood of the Sultan's help, as regarded both Egypt and India, and I promised to keep him informed of all that goes on. He seemed pleased at finding friends, for he is quite a stranger here, being a good Turk of the old-fashioned sort, knowing little French and no English, and never having played before at diplomacy. His face is most sympathetic, and I like him extremely. He seems honest and good, but without backbone enough for our Foreign Office rogues.

"To Bowles at the 'Vanity Fair' Office. He advises me to stand for Parliament, and has suggested Salford, where he says they want a Conservative Home Rule candidate. He has been nursing the constituency for two years, but now under the new regulations would not get in without the Irish vote. With it he says I should certainly be returned. It is perhaps worth thinking about.

## *Violent Language about Abu Klea*

"22nd Jan.—News of the battle of Abu Klea—Burnaby killed, as it serves him right, for he was a mere butcher, and eight other officers including young De Lisle. Here the bloody work begins again. But this time the butchery will not be all on one side. They have been pretending for the last four months that the Mahdi had no men with him, and behold 10,000 at the first battle; that the Western Soudanese would not fight like those of the East, and behold the British square broken by their charge and 800 men throwing their lives away! They must be under good discipline too, or they would not have waited so long without attacking. Now Stewart's<sup>1</sup> army will at any rate not attempt to reach Khartoum till Wolseley comes up, and then it will be too late.

"These English soldiers are mere murderers, and I confess I would rather see them all at perdition than that a single Arab more should die. What are they? A mongrel scum of thieves from Whitechapel and Seven Dials, commanded by young fellows whose ideal is the green room of the Gaiety—without beliefs, without traditions, without other principle of action than just to get their promotion and have a little fun. On the other side men with the memory of a thousand years of freedom, with chivalry inherited from the Saracens, the noblest of ancestors, with a creed the purest the world ever knew, worshipping God and serving him in arms like the heroes of the ancient world they are. It is over the death of these that we rejoice. No, I desire in my heart to see their blood avenged, and every man of Stewart's butchering host butchered in their turn and sent to hell. Gladstone! Great God, is there no vengeance for this pitiful man of blood, who has not even the courage to be at the same time a man of iron? What

<sup>1</sup> General Sir Herbert Stewart in command of the relief column.

## *Wolseley's Cut-throats*

is he that he should have cost the world a single life? A pedant, a babbler, an impotent old fool.

"Button tells me the idea at the War Office is that Stewart will send back his camels to Korti, and that then Wolseley will reinforce him with 2,000 men. Omdurman, Gordon's outpost, is taken, and they will push on for Khartoum at all risks.

"My idea is that Khartoum has fallen already, and that the whole thing will end as it deserves in disaster.

"They seem to have come to terms with the Sultan, at any rate about the Soudan, which they will hand over to him—when they have got it. I hope Hassan Fehmy will stand firm. He was to see Lord Granville to-day.

"Dined again at Pembroke Crescent, where John Pollen has just returned from India. Lord Ripon seems fully to have enjoyed his triumph and John with him. Stanley called in the evening in James Street. He is a good friend and a good ally, and shares all my bitter feelings against Wolseley and his cut-throats.

"*23rd Jan.*—A long list of killed and wounded published, but no more news of Stewart. Got down home to Crabbet where there is bright sun instead of the London fog. The 'Pall Mall' publishes 'from an exalted source' (Ismail's?), a fanciful programme of Hassan Fehmy's terms. I wish there was any chance of their being the true ones.

"I met Hardinge<sup>1</sup> yesterday at the Club, and talked with him about Constantinople. I said that Hugh Wyndham deserved great credit for having brought about a reconciliation between England and

<sup>1</sup> The Hon. Charles Hardinge, of the diplomatic service, private secretary to Lord Dufferin at Constantinople, now Lord Hardinge of Penshurst, Viceroy of India.

## *The World a Stupid Dull Beast*

the Sultan, but he laughed at this. 'Between ourselves,' he said, 'Wyndham had nothing at all to do with it. He had a quarrel with the Sultan two years ago, and has not been on speaking terms with the Palace since.' I said: 'I suppose our little friend Corti managed it for him.' To this Hardinge did not answer. Of course it was Corti.

"*24th Jan.*—There is no news from General Stewart, except a 'bazaar rumour' that he is surrounded, and the British public is beginning to get alarmed. Now we shall hear crying and lamentation. Great God! what a stupid dull beast the world is. It sends an army out to fight against an innocent people, and an innocent people destroy that army. One would think that not a single M.P. from Mr. Gladstone downwards had ever read a word of the history of Greece or heard of Marathon. This stupidity is more hideous even than their cruelty and lying. But if there is a God upon the earth He will this time do justice.

"The evening papers announce Hobart's arrival in London.

"*25th Jan.*—Went up to London by the early train to see Hobart. But first I saw Button, who detailed to me the military situation. It appears that on the 28th of last month [N.B.—There is a confusion here as to date. The dispatch referred to is doubtless that of 4th November] Gordon wrote to Wolseley a long dispatch, in which he said he could not hold out more than a certain number of days, and for this reason General Stewart's expedition was sent. Wolseley would have made it more numerous than it was if he could have got transport, but he sent every camel he could lay his hands on. The dispatch was a long one, and stated that Gordon had steamers at a certain point, about fifteen miles above Shendy, and pro-

### *A Dispatch from Wolseley*

posed that naval officers should be sent to man them. It particularly mentioned Charlie Beresford as the man to take charge of them, and for this reason the naval brigade was sent. Gordon had also written to explain that his reason for dispatching Colonel Stewart and the rest by river to Dongola was that he understood from Mr. Gladstone, or rather Lord Granville's telegram, that no expedition would under any circumstances be sent to relieve him. All this will be published when Parliament meets. Button thinks, all the same, that it won't turn out the Ministry. He said that the War Office were expecting news hourly, and that if it did not come to-day, they should consider things had gone wrong with Stewart. With regard to the diplomatic position, the Government had accepted the French proposals after all, only protesting against a Multiple Control; and the French Government had accepted the acceptance. This is unfortunate, as they may now think they can do without the Sultan's help. But our position is still an immensely strong one, and Button promised to help all he could in the 'Times' if we attacked Tewfik. Buckle is fortunately away, and Button will have things much more in his own hands till Parliament meets. It won't be my fault if we don't play trumps.

"Luncheon with the Gregorys. Lady Gregory has arranged with Stead that Layard shall be interviewed in support of the Sultan. At the Clubs people are in a great state of excitement, waiting news from Metemmeh which does not come. I found Godfrey Webb among others. We went together to call on George Currie, who has just bought the little Gothic House in Park Lane, a really charming one, Gothic though it be, where we found Alfred Montgomery. Then to 27 Grosvenor Street, where Hobart

## *The Sultan's Plan*

has taken a house. With Hobart I had a long conversation; he had seen the Sultan before he left, and the Sultan's idea was by hook or by crook to get a footing in Egypt. The English Government, he said, were ready to withdraw their troops to Alexandria and Port Said, and to admit Turkish troops to Cairo. And the Sultan was thinking of sending a contingent to help Wolseley in the Soudan, under the belief that half the Mahdi's people would lay down their arms at the command of the Caliph. I exhorted Hobart not to let the Sultan do anything so foolish. I know the situation, and if the Sultan were to join the English the Sultan would become as Tewfik has become. They would pay no attention to him, and he would lose all his influence. With the stream he can ride on the top of the wave; against it he can only be drowned. I urged him to get Hassan Fehmy to play a strong game and insist as a preliminary to all assistance that Tewfik should be deposed. He then told me in confidence that the Sultan had told him in confidence, that he hated Tewfik, but that he considered it politic to get a foothold in Egypt first on any terms. Hobart thought that Hassan Fehmy would not be bold enough to depart from this plan, or propose Tewfik being replaced. However, he would try, and as he had a private cypher with the Sultan, he could telegraph to him all my ideas. I asked him how I was regarded at the Palace, and he said: 'At first they could not understand what you were driving at, but now they see you are a friend and accept you as such.'

"Lady C. is making an active propaganda in my favour and in favour of my ideas. She tells me old Lucan<sup>1</sup> has been with her to-day, and has told her

<sup>1</sup> Field Marshal Lord Lucan, an ancient Crimean hero.

### *Situation in Printing House Square*

that the War Office has got news that Stewart is in fact surrounded, and he will have to capitulate. The news is not exactly official, but they seem to believe it.

"*26th Jan.*—To see Button. He says the acceptance of the French proposals has stopped the negotiations for the present with the Sultan, but they will come on again, and he strongly advises that Hassan Fehmy should declare himself against Tewfik, and promises that if he does the 'Times' will bring the matter forward. Buckle is away on his honeymoon till the 19th February, and Button will have things pretty much his own way in Printing House Square, so I have drawn up a memorandum for Hassan Fehmy of the language he should use, and shall try and get him to send in a dispatch to Lord Granville without delay.

"*27th Jan.*—Stanley came to me in the morning, and highly approves my draft memorandum, and we went together to call on Hassan Fehmy, but he was out, and I have left the memorandum with Stanley to read to him. Lady A. sent a message by him to say she wished to see me, and I had luncheon at her house in Grosvenor Street. She is very anxious about her son, who is with General Stewart, but I had little to say to comfort her. She would naturally, she told me, sympathize with the Arabs, and her son, too, had sympathized with them after the Suakin campaign. But such is the desire of military glory he had volunteered nevertheless. I also saw Pembroke yesterday, who has grown a beard, and is looking twice the man he was. He, too, is in a state of anxiety, for Reggie Talbot and Heale Phipps, both members of the Wilton Club, are with Stewart. Such are the glories of war.

"*28th Jan.*—The evening papers announce



### *Stewart arrives at Metemneh*

Stewart's arrival at last at Metemneh after more slaughter, another hundred men or so killed and wounded on the English side, and two thousand they say on the side of the Arabs. This is infinitely disgusting, and the only thing which seems to mitigate the evil is, that being now in communication with Gordon by steamer they may be willing to rescue him, and retire as they said it was their intention to do. They can perfectly well do this by river, without any more battles, and the Mahdi has still a large army on the river bank, between Metemneh and Khartoum. The Arbitration Association have elected me to their executive Committee, and have called a meeting for to-morrow.

"29th Jan.—Had a long talk with Ibrahim Bey. I asked what could be done in the way of getting up a demonstration in Egypt against Tewfik. He said petitions might be addressed to the British Government asking for his deposition. The Ulema of the Azhar would sign it, except El Abbasi, the Sheykh el Islam, who is Tewfik's creature. Some of the Notables might and a number of village Sheykh's, but not the Mudirs, as these are Government officials paid by Tewfik. If the English Government would give the least encouragement every man in Egypt would sign it. As to Arabi, he said all the poor are for him, but the rich won't hear of him. He urged me to go to Paris and talk things over with Jemaled-Din.

"Hobart, Whittaker tells me, has just been staying at Sandringham. The Prince of Wales said to him: 'I suppose we shall have to get rid of Tewfik.' Hobart's instructions from the Sultan are nothing but a programme of conciliatory language, and compliments to the Queen and Prince of Wales. He is only here to advise Hassan Fehmy. Hassan Fehmy's

### *Hartington, Brett, and Stead*

audience at Osborne was not a success. The Queen would not talk on important matters, and was not particularly gracious. I am afraid his mission will lead to nothing. His only chance was to speak out loudly and firmly, and insist on Tewfik's deposition. I have got the peace people to vote a resolution urging Gladstone to retire from Khartoum, and make peace with the Mahdi. I drafted a letter for them to Gladstone.

"30th Jan.—Bowles has published my caricature in 'Vanity Fair.' Saw Brett with Button, he and his master, Hartington, are all for smashing the Mahdi and keeping Khartoum and Eastern Soudan. If I wanted evacuation he advised me to send in a memorandum to Chamberlain who has just been declaring that the Soudan is to be handed over 'to its own noble savages.' Brett is a clever, but unprincipled<sup>1</sup> young man, and manages all Hartington's intrigues for him with the press. Button and Stead are the two he works through most, and their latest achievement has been getting Temple, who married Hartington's first cousin (Lascelles' sister) made Bishop of London. The 'Pall Mall' has been urging it for the last three weeks, and now it is done. The stupid public fancies that Stead is a wonderful prophet, when he insists on this and that policy, and when the policy is adopted. But Hartington pulls all the strings and gives him the information, and so the campaign against the Grand Old Man goes on. I am not sure whether Dilke is still in with them, but I fancy he is. Chamberlain has broken away. Brett, though of course an enemy to my ideas, sometimes

<sup>1</sup> I leave this epithet as it stands in my diary, explaining only that of course it does not apply to Lord Esher's private character, but only to his official intrigues as Lord Hartington's private secretary.

## *The Hartington Intrigue*

gives useful hints. I asked him to-day what they were going to do in Lower Egypt. He said: 'You are going to have English Administration.'

"*1st Feb.*—Dined with George Currie in Park Lane; Alfred Seymour was there, and Newton, the Police magistrate, also Walter Seymour, who is just starting on another venture to Venezuela, this time with a cargo of arms to make a revolution. Alfred Seymour has a story of Sir Peter Lumsden having resigned his mission in Afghanistan rather than carry out the Government's concessions on the frontier.

"*2nd Feb.*—Wrote the draft of a letter to Chamberlain, urging an immediate evacuation of Khartoum, but shall keep it till Wilson returns from Metemmeh with news of Gordon.

"Old Lord Mark Kerr<sup>1</sup> called in the morning, 'out of neighbourly feeling' he said, as he lives almost next door (in James Street). I had correspondence with him two years ago about Arabi.

"Lunched with Button. He has told me more particulars of the Hartington intrigue. He says that not only was Gordon sent to Khartoum without a Cabinet Council, but Wolseley also was sent without one. The whole expedition has been an executive measure, which not all the members of the Cabinet have ever agreed to. Similarly the financial proposals for Egypt have never been agreed to by Lord Northbrook, and the Cabinet has been going on in this way for a year, each minister running his own hare. Now, however, Chamberlain will break off and leave the rest, hoping to come in on the top of the wave with the new elections.

"Letters have come from India showing that Randolph, thanks to my letters, has been well received, and there is one I am specially glad to get

<sup>1</sup> General Lord Mark Kerr.

## *Lord Mark Kerr*

from Seyd Huseyn at Hyderabad.<sup>1</sup> Salar Jung has invited Randolph, and he has accepted the invitation.

*"4th Feb.*—Button says there are great things brewing all over Europe. The French Government, although it promised an answer on the Egyptian finance question last Wednesday, has remained silent. There is a hitch somewhere in the negotiations. There is a row between Germany and Russia on account of the King of Bulgaria's proposed marriage. The Portuguese have seized both banks of the Congo, being in league with France, etc. Bismarck is furious because the Congo Conference seems likely to break up as the London one did. If we have any luck, there may be a good general European war all round.

*"Dinner at Lady C.'s*, who is anxious I should go into Parliament as a follower of Churchill's. She says the Prince of Wales is angry with me because I only care about the Arabs in this infernal war. Afterwards to a party at Lady Stanley of Alderley's (Lord Stanley's mother), where I had some talk with Frederic Harrison, and hope to get him to take part in a peace meeting. Lady Stanley talked about the war, as to which they are all very cock-a-hoop now. They can't take any interest, they say, in the Arabs, because there are so many of them; when a thousand are killed, there are always thousands more to take their place. Dilke was there.

*"5th Feb.*—Went to see Lord Mark Kerr, whom I found at breakfast, walking uneasily round, and eating a mouthful from time to time. He is a good, excellent man, but vague in his ideas to the verge of insanity. His instincts are admirable, and he has glimmerings of great thoughts about the East. He

<sup>1</sup> Seyd Huseyn Bilgrami, afterwards Member of Council.

## *The Fall of Khartoum*

sympathizes with the Arabs as he does with the Indian natives, and is very angry just now at the Duke of Connaught being recalled from India instead of being made Commander-in-Chief. 'The Duke is not clever,' he said, 'but he understands how to talk to a gentleman in the East—and they should have made him Commander-in-Chief.' Lord Mark will help us at any meeting we may get up.

"Then to see Stanley, who urges me to call again on Hassan Fehmy and on Staal, the Russian Ambassador, who wants to see me. He, too, will help. On my return I found Mark Napier, who announced the unexpected and glorious news of the fall of Khartoum. This turns all our plans topsy-turvy, but to our great advantage, and I rushed off at once to see Hassan Fehmy, and had the pleasure of being the first to give him the news. There was another Englishman with him when I arrived, and the Ambassador put on a *figure de circonstance* when he heard what had happened. But as soon as the Englishman was gone he took me by both hands, and a smile of pleasure broke out over all his face. He promised me to have nothing to do with ideas of helping with Turkish troops against the Mahdi, and seemed quite disposed to follow all my advice. I left him to seek Button, and fortunately found him just come from the War Office. It seems that Wilson<sup>1</sup> was delayed by the shallowness of the river, and took four days getting up to Khartoum from Metemmeh. On arrival he found the citadel dismantled, no flag flying, and the whole place full of Arabs, who opened fire on him, and then he turned tail, and by another accident all three steamers ran aground, and there they still are, Wilson planted on an island, and the news brought

<sup>1</sup> General Sir Charles Wilson, who on the death of General Stewart had taken command of the relief expedition.

## *Gordon's Fate Unknown*

in a boat, as I understand, by Stuart-Wortley. Button says that Stewart's force at Metemneh runs no risk, as it has abundance of provisions, but I can't believe this. In any case the expedition has come altogether to grief, and the outside of what there is to hope Button says, is that Stewart can be relieved, and the British Forces concentrated for the summer at Metemneh. There is no question of an advance now on Khartoum. It is unknown what has become of Gordon. Indeed, the whole thing is conjecture, as Wilson did not land. Button tells me that the Rothschilds got a telegram this morning from their agents saying that there was no truth at all in the story. But this cannot be, as Button has seen Wolseley's dispatches at the War Office.

"Lunched with Mark Napier at St. James's Club, and have agreed to take him with me if I am sent to make peace with the Mahdi. This seems not altogether impossible. I met Austin Lee<sup>1</sup> and reminded him how I had told him they would have to come to me after all. Also Philip Currie sent me a note in the afternoon asking me to dinner for Saturday, a thing he has not done for long. I had just time to run in and see Lady Gregory that we might rejoice together, and then I was interviewed by Wheeler for the Press Association, and got away by train home to Crabbet where young Hardinge has come down to hunt. This has been a day of consolation, and I could not help singing all the way down in the train. Why had I so little faith?

"*6th Feb.*—A beautiful morning, and we went down to Shoreham, had a capital run of six miles quite straight over the Downs without a check, and

<sup>1</sup> Sir Henry Austin Lee, K.C.M.G., private secretary to Lord E. Fitzmaurice at the Foreign Office, now English representative on the Suez Canal Committee.

### *Lord Hardinge of Penshurst*

killed in Newtimber Holt. Hardinge was with us, riding Proximo, and went all the way close behind the hounds. Harry Brand was out, and we had a long talk about the Soudan. He says the Government are all for going on with the war. He himself had been in favour of sending me out to make peace. But the country would never stand anything now but war. I told him, if he had any influence with the Cabinet, to use it for the recall of Wolseley's expedition, which would certainly suffer great loss if it stayed. I am strongly of the opinion that Gordon is alive, and equally of opinion that Wolseley is the worst man in the world to negotiate for him if he is a prisoner.

"Had a good deal of talk in the evening with Hardinge. He agreed with me that Dufferin was too fond of humbugging people to succeed in the East. He had been very idle, too, at Constantinople, leaving all the work of the Embassy to Wyndham. The Turks, however, were afraid of him, and he had got a good deal out of them in the way of claims and such like, though his main policy had failed. Dufferin was sore about Egypt, where he considered himself to have been a failure. He thought he could have carried out his programme if he had been left at Cairo longer. Wyndham had quarrelled with the Sultan by accusing him of intriguing in Egypt. He had done this in a fit of temper, but the Sultan never forgave. Hardinge knew all about how Dilke had worked up the Egyptian war, and of the dirt Malet had been made to eat. He has a poor opinion of Baring.

"*7th Feb.*—To London early and saw Hassan Fehmy, whom I found in a state of entire perplexity to know what to do. I therefore had no difficulty in persuading him to write a formal dispatch to Lord

## *A Dispatch to Lord Granville*

Granville, protesting against what was going on in Egypt and Soudan. He asked me to write the draft for him, and I promised to do so. He gave me a long account of all that he had said to Lord Granville, which seems to have been very little to the point. A more hopelessly muddled old gentleman I think I never met, honest though and anxious to do his duty, which is far better than to be a clever rogue. However, we will remedy it all by a dispatch that will make old Granville rub his eyes. Button is of opinion that Wolseley will not be at all anxious to carry on the campaign at a great expense, but will rather be for negotiating. His only idea in this direction is to offer money. Harry reproached me yesterday with having gone over to the Sultan, but I said: 'If your hounds change their fox what is the huntsman to do? Is he to go on by himself or to go with them?' Down in the afternoon to Wilbury, a day of wind and rain. Percy Wyndham is staunch in opposition to the war. Wrote the draft dispatch for Hassan Fehmy.

"*9th Feb.*—At Wilbury. Hunting from Elbarrow, I enjoyed the day more than any this season.

"*10th Feb.*—Button telegraphed to me last night to come to London as there was something important going on in connection with Hassan Fehmy's mission, so I went up. He has seen Brett who tells him some new and unexpected departure is about to be taken with regard to Egypt. The Sultan's mission is once more in favour. But it may mean many things. The Sultan ought to offer mediation in the Soudan. Lunched with Lady Gregory, and in the afternoon went with Stanley to take part in the Indian Reform Association's deputation to Lord Ripon. After it was over Stanley and I had a private talk with Lord Ripon, and we begged him to expostulate with the



## *Gordon Certainly Dead*

Government against sending Indian troops to the Soudan. He said he would certainly use any influence he had in that direction, but assured us it was not necessary, as no troops would be sent. Nevertheless it is announced to-night in all the papers.

"Dined with Button at the Marlborough Club. It is announced that Gordon is certainly dead, and there are sensational accounts of the sack of Khar-toum. I am inclined to think it just as well, in the cause of peace, that the worst should have happened. It will take away the excuse of a further advance. Button says they all mean war to the knife, but I am convinced that in six weeks Gordon will be forgotten, and there will be a strong reaction against the war; then the Government will slip out of it. If Gordon was alive and a prisoner, then the excitement would be kept up till he was released.

"*11th Feb.*—George Wyndham is ordered with the Guards to Suakin, and I have asked Jemal-ed-Din to give him a talisman in case of his being taken prisoner by the Mahdi. But it is on condition that he does not use it for any *rusc de guerre*.

"Saw Hassan Fehmy, who described to me a visit he paid yesterday to Gladstone. Mr. Gladstone had been most charming, but had not, it seems, committed himself to anything definite. He, the Pasha, was very angry about the Italian occupation of Massowa, but I could not get out of him exactly what proposals he had made on the Sultan's behalf. Button declares that it was arranged positively three weeks ago that Turkish troops should occupy Cairo, but the acceptance by France of the financial proposals stopped this. Now, however, he tells me, as a great secret, that the proposals have again broken down. And that is the reason why they are anxious again to arrange matters with the Sultan. Hassan

## *Gladstone Hissed in London*

Fehmy was very cordial, and promised to come down to Crabbet as soon as these worries are off his hands. I gave him my draft of his dispatch to Lord Granville which Stanley had translated into French, but it was written on Sunday when we thought still that no arrangement could be come to with the Foreign Office. He said, however, that he would keep it to use in case the present negotiations broke down. Speaking of Ismaïl Pasha, he said I might trust him not to compromise himself in that direction, that the Sultan knew very well that Ismail was his worst enemy.

"*12th Feb.*—Down again to Wilbury, another day's hunting from Vernham Gate, and had a hard run of an hour across very steep hills, and killed in a wood. Kars carried me well, and I was again in front all the way.

"There is news of another bloody battle in the Soudan. General Earle killed this time. Morley and Courtney have come out well in favour of peace, and I am sure the Government will not be allowed to go on with this butchery. To-night's 'Pall Mall' has an article strongly for Ismaïl.

"*14th Feb.*—Hunted in Savernake Forest.

"*15th Feb.*—Wilbury. Major Poore, an old disciple of Urquhart's, called, and I had some interesting conversation with him. Urquhart doubtless was the founder of a remarkable school of political morality, but his eccentricities injured its effect, and much of his practical teaching is now old-fashioned.

"*17th Feb.*—To London early. I find everybody very angry with Gladstone for having been to the play the very night the news of Gordon's death was received, and I hear that he was hissed in St. James's Street.

"To Lymington's wedding with Miss Pease, the

## *Hassan Fehmy and Granville*

Quaker heiress. We may hope soon to get the Quakers on the side of peace. Hitherto they have been dead against it.

"Talked with Hobart Pasha at his Club, the Army and Navy. He saw Gladstone yesterday, who told him that he had never had any ill-feeling towards the Turks, indeed had rather liked them than otherwise. Harcourt told him that the Government knew that the Sultan's only wish was to restore Ismail.<sup>1</sup> As to this Hobart expressed to me his great anger. They have had nothing to do with Ismail, who has spoiled Hassan Fehmy's mission.

"*18th Feb.*—Button is very anxious to find out what is in the air. I went accordingly to Hassan Fehmy, and had a few words with him—but he is a hopeless man. Lord Granville complains of him that he, Hassan, understands nothing that he says, and that he, Lord Granville, understands very little of what Hassan says. I can well believe it. He seemed vexed at being questioned about Ismail.

"Dined with Mrs. S., where Philip Currie was. His special business now at the Foreign Office is the Afghan frontier. This he flattered himself he knew thoroughly. 'The Russians,' he said, 'have the strongest hand, but we hold half a dozen good cards which we may play well.' It will take better playing than he gave his cards in Egypt to prevent a war.

"*19th Feb.*—Looked in at Gregory's. He is writing a plea for Arabi's recall to Egypt in the 'Nineteenth Century.' It is generally admitted now in the light of the Soudan rebellion that the Egyptian war was

<sup>1</sup> The Sultan at no time wished to restore Ismail; but Ismail had come to London to push on the interests of his restoration to Egypt in the English press. He was helped in this by Broadley, Stead, and Madame de Novikof.

### *Herbert Gladstone his Father's Go-between*

a mistake, and Arabi an honest man. Jem Lowther, whom I met to-day, says the Opposition have decided on a Vote of Censure, and the declaration of an alternative policy in Egypt. It must be either Arabi or annexation. He said he himself was for annexation. There is a sensational account in the 'Pall Mall' of a retreat from Metemmeh and the recall of Wolseley. I hope Buller will get his force back without fighting, as defeat might now injure the cause of peace. People are much agitated about this at the Carlton, among others Pembroke. While at a meeting of the Peace Committee we heard Gladstone hooted on his way to Westminster. Parliament met to-day, and it must have been a gloomy business for the Grand Old Man to announce his policy of blood, especially as it will mean a policy of defeat. General Stewart is dead of his wounds.

"Labouchere sent word to say he wanted to know Ismail Jowdat's address, and I called on him to-day. He tells me Herbert Gladstone has been at him to try and find out a way of communicating with the Mahdi. We had a long talk on the subject. Herbert Gladstone is used by his father as a go-between, and communicates with the Irish through Labouchere. Labouchere assures me that many Parliamentary arrangements have in this way been made up between the Grand Old Man and Mr. Parnell. And he says it is delicious to hear Mr. Gladstone afterwards denying them in the House of Commons. I promised him to put the Government in communication with the Mahdi's agents whenever they like.

"*20th Feb.*—Labouchere writes that he has seen Herbert Gladstone again, and wants me to advise the Mahdi to constitute some one his regular agent by sending him credentials. I had already thought of doing this, and I had another long talk with him

### *Labouchere on Gladstone*

about it. The essential, he says, is that the thing should not be known, as the Government could never carry a proposal through the House to employ me in treating. But all the same they would like to treat, and we agreed that the base of negotiation might be the complete evacuation of the Soudan by the English and Egyptians, and a restoration of the Wady Halfa frontier. Suakin might be given to the Sultan, and in any case must be evacuated by us. On this basis a peace or truce might be effected and Wolseley's troops withdrawn. Labouchere was very amusing about the various little intrigues he had helped to carry on for Mr. Gladstone, and I hope this one may succeed as well as the others. He says that on one occasion Gladstone got his own side to vote against him.

"Lady Gregory has told me the whole of her husband's conversation with Mr. Gladstone (which he had not told me). It was after dinner on Tuesday. Mr. Gladstone insisted on talking to Sir William in spite of friends who tried to interrupt. He began by asking him what he would do, and Gregory said he would certainly not go to Khartoum. To this Mr. Gladstone replied: 'Oh, I think, from all the information in our possession, that the taking of Khartoum will not be a very difficult matter.' 'The difficulty you think,' said Sir William, 'will be after?' 'Ah, yes,' said Mr. Gladstone, 'a twenty times greater difficulty. If I only knew what was then to be done my mind would be easy.' He then asked Sir William whether he thought it would be possible to treat with the Mahdi. 'How can we approach such a man? Through what channel and on what terms?' 'There is,' said Sir William, 'but one man who could help you there.' 'And who is that? You don't mean Blunt?' 'No,' said Sir William, 'not

## *"I Would Jump at Him"*

Blunt. I am thinking of Arabi.' 'Ah,' said Mr. Gladstone, 'that is a point on which you and I differ. You think Arabi an honest man. I think him a *consummate blackguard*. Why, I have had in my hands letters signed by that man in which he offers to barter the liberties of his country to the Sultan!' Sir William asked him at what date these had been written, and Mr. Gladstone said about three weeks before the bombardment of Alexandria. 'At that time,' said Sir William, 'I suppose all the Egyptians had been driven into the Sultan's arms. I do not alter my opinion of him, which is what it has always been, that he is an honest man and a patriot.' 'Ah,' said Mr. Gladstone, 'what would I not give to believe it with you! If I could only believe him honest *I would jump at him*.' This we think rather hopeful, but I fear the old man's pride will be too strong for him.

"Ibrahim Bey called again, and I told him I thought it better he should not come back to James Street for the present, as it might compromise us, that the Government were in a fair way to treat and that it would not do to frighten them. He expressed his willingness to go to Suakin on a mission if required; and perhaps some day we may use him in this way.

"M. Taschaud, a Belgian dignitary, called. He is the promoter of arbitration and peace abroad, and especially I fancy of his own glory. He is the author of a pamphlet called the 'Future of Egypt, by an ex-plenipotentiary,' and seems to know people about. He assured me that he had written this pamphlet as an article for the 'Fortnightly,' but that after it was in print Escott had substituted for it the famous article signed 'G.' This, M. Taschaud says, was certainly written with Mr. Gladstone's consent, though not by himself. His ideas of Egypt I do not

## *"When Wolseley is a Prisoner"*

share, as they seem to consist of internationalizing it for the profit of Europe.

"Stanley writes that he has seen Hassan Fehmy, and that it is all right about the ex-Khedive Ismail. So I am satisfied. But I am glad all the same that they are not thinking now of employing the Sultan to mediate in the Soudan. He would only make a mess of it. Lunched at the Carlton. Dined at St. James's Club with Walter Seymour. Saw Eddy Hamilton looking pale and harassed. He acknowledged himself pretty near dead beat. I said: 'When Wolseley is a prisoner, you will know where to find me.'

"21st Feb.—Nebbi Ullah<sup>1</sup> called and I urged him to come to the Soudan Conference and protest against the employment of Indian troops against the Mahdi. He promised to do so and to get others to speak among the Indians now in London. I think that will have a good effect. After this came one Johnstone, who is getting up a large meeting in St. James's Hall for the week after next, and who has asked me to preside. Herepresents himself as having command of the working men's association, and says he can get together a good number of popular working men speakers. I have promised to preside as he wishes, and it certainly can do no harm, especially as the meeting is to ask for Arabi's recall to Egypt as well as for an abandonment of the Soudan campaign.

"Then Drummond Wolff called, who wants materials for his speech on the Vote of Censure. I gave him the text of my letter to Gladstone of last April proposing to mediate in the Soudan; and urged him strongly to get the Fourth Party to take up the cause of peace. It was sure to be the winning cause.

<sup>1</sup> Seyd Nebbi Ullah Khan of Lucknow.

## *Cardinal Manning*

"After him John Morley, who came for the same purpose and stopped to luncheon. He wanted particularly an argument against the Slave Trade cry, and to know whether the Mahdi could be induced to treat on a civilized basis. He told me that Dilke had told him yesterday that Mr. Gladstone's speech on Monday in answer to the motion of censure would be pitched in quite a different key and far more peaceable. He, Morley, is to follow immediately after Northcote, and then Mr. Gladstone will reply to both. It is all very well Morley coming forward now as the champion of peace, but it was his defection from Frederic Harrison and me last year that decided the Government to send the expedition. If he had spoken out then as he does now, he would have prevented it. But he wished to please his constituents at Newcastle with whom the legend of the Grand Old Man still survives. I did not, however, reproach him with the past, as it would have done no good.

"At the Carlton I coached a third M.P., Robert Bourke, who seems coming round now to Arabi. I should not be surprised if the Conservatives took him up after all.

"Then I called on Cardinal Manning and sat with him an hour in his private room in which he certainly looks very much in character. It is a large room, but he has made it habitable with a tall screen lined with bookcases running round the fire, and ensconced in which he sits. I never saw him looking better, and complimented him on the effect of his abstinence. This pleased him. I wanted him to take an active part in favour of peace, but he would not do this, as he said he was forbidden by his rulers to take part in politics. But he sympathizes much with my views, as he has always done, though not very



### *Buller Tied by the Leg*

understandingly. Talking of the English Catholic Laity, he said they were hopelessly dull—most of them—very old-fashioned Conservatives, and he did not think I should get much support out of them. The Irish, of course, supported me, but that was out of hatred to England—and it would not advance my cause. Cardinal Manning is a link for me with the extreme past, for I have known him nearly forty years, and I think it is a pleasure for him to see me for the same reason. He leads a very lonely life, out of harmony with those about him, and clinging to old recollections. He talked warmly about old Sussex days and the kindly relations existing there between all classes. He is very hopeless about England's prospects, and indeed the news to-day is enough to make Englishmen gloomy, for Buller and his force seem surrounded at Abu Klea, and it may well be that even Wolseley may have to capitulate before the summer is over.

"*22nd Feb.*—The 'Sunday Times' has a sensational 'victory' at Abu Klea, but it is evidently not worth much, as Buller is still tied by the leg—'want of camels.' This is just what will make all these campaigns impotent. Then, being unable to move, they will run short of provisions, and then the hot weather will come. They will be 'hemmed in' by the Arabs, and unless they make peace will have to capitulate. Button tells me the Government are ready to treat with the Mahdi on almost any terms he could ask, and advises me to go to Paris and start negotiations there. I shall go, but must first hear the opening of the Debate of Censure. With regard to that, Button tells me some of the Cabinet are very anxious to get beaten. Chamberlain told a friend of his last night that he would far rather go to the country and explain peace than have to explain war.

### *Ferid Bey Turkish Secretary*

If Morley would only accept Mr. Gladstone's speech on Monday as a peace speech and withdraw his motion, many of the Whigs would go over to the Tories and turn the Government out. I have written an article on Hassan Fehmy's mission for Button for the 'Times,' and I took it to him to-day. It is against my rule to do this, as I have only once written an unsigned thing for them, namely, the article on the Palmer expedition. But this is an exceptional case. Button says the Conservatives are all talking now of Arabi and are half disposed to take him up. They would certainly make terms with the Sultan if they came into office.

"Ferid Bey, the First Secretary of the Turkish Embassy, called. He is very much against the Mahdi, and believes that but for him the English would long ago have left Egypt. I did my best to persuade him to take a broad view, and suggested that if they wanted to treat with Lord Granville effectively they should mass 20,000 men at Gaza.

"To Crabtree by late train.

"23rd Feb.—Wrote to Morley repeating what Button had suggested about his withdrawing his amendment, so as to turn the Government out and have a good honest opposition to the war, and also about Ibrahim Bey's statement published on Thursday. Bcta, who I hear is Morier, mentions it and challenges me to say whether it is authentic, and I have begged Morley to say from me that it is so.

"We hunted with the Crawley and Horsham hounds from Patching, and had a pretty run across the down to Steyning, whence we came home, Kars having cut his fetlock with a flint.

"Up to town in the evening and dined at Lady C.'s. She says all her friends now are speaking well of

## *Conference with Jemal-ed-Din*

me. Met Henry Chaplin at the Carlton, who thinks Wolseley's army is lost.

"*24th Feb.*—To Button early. He tells me Philip Currie, with whom he talked, is anxious to get into communication with the Mahdi, but of course not through me or anybody who can really help him. The Censure Debate came on last night, and, though Mr. Gladstone was not of course outspoken, his speech was nevertheless distinctly more peaceable than the first. It seems, however, to have been a miserable exhibition of the old hair-splitting arguments, like all the rest he has made on the Egyptian business. I cannot understand his reputation as an orator. He certainly has an extreme facility and power of statement, but he neither touches nor convinces. It is a lawyer's eloquence, not a statesman's—at least this is the impression his speeches have always made on me. Button thinks nevertheless he will get his majority, but that the Government will go to pieces on some smaller issue during the Session.

"Called on Stanley to tell him something of my plans, and then went by the tidal train to Paris.

"*25th Feb.*—At the Hotel Wagram. Sanua called last night and we talked affairs over, and this morning I had two hours with Jemal-ed-Din. I find there will be more difficulty in treating with the Mahdi now than I thought, or than would have been the case last year, for the taking of Khartoum has altered the situation considerably. Also they are much elated at having killed five English generals, a thing never heard of, they say, in any war. These they count to be Hicks, Baker, Stewart, Earle, and now Gordon—and the Mahdi's terms will be correspondingly high. Still, Jemal-ed-Din says distinctly that peace can be made if the English are willing,

## *Gordon's Bible*

*first*, to abandon the Soudan, *second*, to hand over Suakin to the Sultan, *third*, to use their good offices to get the Italians out of Massowa, and *fourth*, to arrange with the Sultan for the establishment of Mohammedan Government in Egypt. The recall of Arabi would much facilitate matters, but any popular Government in Egypt could be on friendly terms with Mohammed Ahmed. With regard to the method of treating, Jemal-ed-Din says it is essential that the English Government should make the first move. The Mahdi could not under present circumstances send an Embassy to England, or even appoint him (Jemal-ed-Din) his *wakil* for that purpose. The Embassy must be sent by England, and all he can do is to forward it to its destination and recommend it as a *bona fide* mission. I asked him about Gordon's bible, which Mrs. Allnatt has been very anxious I should try and get back; but Jemal-ed-Din declines to hold out hopes of its restoration until peace is made. I begged him, however, to try to obtain it, as if he succeeded it would be a great proof to our Government of his power. There was an article on Jemal-ed-Din in yesterday's 'Times,' which is correct as far as it goes, but Jemal-ed-Din is angry at their having left out all that he said against Ismail Pasha and Prince Hassan's appointment to the Soudan.

"Had a long talk at the Embassy with Bungo Herbert<sup>1</sup> on the Mahdi question, but I don't know that it will do any good, as Lord Lyons they say has left off expressing any opinion on Egyptian affairs, as his advice has never been taken. Herbert is his private secretary now, Sheffield being away.

"26th Feb.—Jemal-ed-Din and Sanua to break-

<sup>1</sup> The Hon. Sir Michael Herbert, of the Paris Embassy, afterwards Ambassador at Washington.

## *Proposals of Negotiation*

fast. I read them my letter to the Sultan, which they highly approve of. About Afghanistan, Jemal-ed-Din assured me that the talk of a quarrel between Russia and the Amir was all nonsense; that the quarrel, whenever it came off, would be against us; that the Amir would give free passage to Russia for the invasion of India, but neither were ready yet for this.

"There is a telegram in the papers that the Nizam has offered troops for the Soudan, and at this, too, he laughed. He said they always offered troops, as they knew they would not be accepted. When Sanua was gone he told me privately that he had thought over my proposals of negotiations with the Mahdi, and was sure it could be done. But he would have nothing to do with it unless the English Government would show its sincerity by employing me or someone else he could trust to represent them. Then he would introduce the mission, which must also be accompanied by a Mohammedan, to a man of high station in Egypt who was in a position to speak as to terms. He himself was not in such position, and he could do no more than indicate the way to others who would give the necessary introductions and safe-conducts to the English agent. It must, however, be distinctly arranged beforehand that the English Government should engage itself to protect the persons through whose agency the negotiations should be carried on. They must not be allowed to suffer at the hands of the Khedive. He was of opinion that not only a peace might be made, but also a treaty of commerce, and perhaps even a slave trade convention—the latter to the extent of guaranteeing the Abyssinians from slave raids inasmuch as these were illegal. He declined, however, to enter into communication with any English official on the subject until I should be first convinced that their

## *My Letter Delivered to the Sultan*

intentions were serious, and that the protection was guaranteed to the Mahdi's *wakils*. I am well satisfied with this view of the case, and all the more so from finding Jemal-ed-Din so cautious in his promises. He does not think it would be judicious to apply for Gordon's bible just now.

"Gladstone to-day recants his declaration of abandoning the Soudan. But all this debate is selling the bear's skin before it is killed. My opinion is that the Berber railroad will never be made, except perhaps a few miles of it, and that as soon as the Nile rises Wolseley will run for it down the river to Egypt.

"*27th Feb.*—Hassan Fehmy's mission it seems is to be recalled, the fall of Khartoum having altered the situation. Prince Halim writes again, but this time not about politics, asking me to get him a pair of horses for the Sultan to drive. In his letter the other day he mentions having delivered my letter to His Majesty. The horses must be above all things 'very quiet,' as the Sultan wishes to drive them himself.

"Saw Lady Gregory, and had breakfast at the Blounts.<sup>1</sup> Afterwards to call on Lesseps, but he was not at home. Then to the Embassy, where I found Walsham, Herbert, Leigh, and another, and talked nonsense with them for an hour in the Chancery as in old days—also old Atlee, a relic of the past. Malet is dining to-night at the Embassy. I am dining with the Wagrams.

"*28th Feb.*—Came over to London by the tidal train and went at once to see Button. The Government have escaped the Vote of Censure again by the skin of their teeth—a majority of fourteen only. Button was in the House to the end, and he says the Old Man was quite overcome when the result was

<sup>1</sup> Sir Edward and Lady Blount of Paris.

### *Drummond Wolff and the G.O.M.*

announced. This is the only thing in the world that can make him feel. The most hideous failure abroad, war with every nation, India in revolt, the Empire breaking up, the colonies lost—all these things could not touch him or make him sleep a wink less sound. But an adverse vote in the House—that was a very much more serious thing. It is a defeat he is able to understand. It will be the end of him, though Button thinks he will not immediately resign. The debate, he says, was in its latter part of a high order. The first two days the Opposition made nothing of it, and Northcote was miserably weak, and John Morley a mere opportunist, but Goschen's speech was the turning point, and from that point it was brilliant. By far the best defence, curious to say, of the Government was made by Lord Derby in the House of Lords. It was Harcourt who did most damage to them, as he was put up on Thursday to explain their explanations, and did so entirely on peace principles. But this was probably arranged, as Dilke and Hartington followed suit. The great question is—will they resign? We discussed the probabilities of a new Cabinet, and agreed that Lytton ought to have a seat at one of the administrative departments. Button says public opinion would hardly stand him at the Foreign Office or India Office, though I am of opinion that for the former he is just the man. Churchill will have the India Office, he says; possibly Hicks Beach the Foreign Office; Lytton more likely the Admiralty. But I rather doubt his taking office at all. The Ministry will, however, not resign till the Vote of Supply, when they will be beaten again.

"*1st March.*—To the Carlton, where I saw Drummond Wolff. He has put a question about my peace negotiations last year, and drew an answer from the Grand Old Man which seems to have been very

*"I should have had him at my mercy"*

mixed. Mr. Gladstone excused himself for having refused to see me at Hawarden on the ground that I 'should have had him there at my mercy.' There is more truth in this than he perhaps meant.

*"2nd March.*—To Button's, who told me all that had happened on Saturday at the Cabinet Council. It appears that, Granville having explained that it was absolutely impossible for him to get on any longer with Bismarck, and in view of the other complications, all the Cabinet but two had been in favour of resignation. Mr. Gladstone had quite made up his mind to this, but Spencer and Trevelyan explained that if they resigned now Lord Salisbury would dissolve Parliament, and that Parnell would then have his seventy Home Rule members, and the result would be a revolt in Ireland; this was the true reason of the Government's decision to stay in office. The only thing that does not sound credible in the account is that it represents the Ministry as having sacrificed party interest for duty to the country. But it is perhaps easier patriotically to stay in office than patriotically to resign. The thing moreover cannot last long, and it will only end by their being kicked out on the Vote of Supply. It is thought, however, that if Salisbury found himself with a majority only of one he would carry on the Government without dissolving. Stead has been persuaded by Dilke not to publish Gordon's letters to me. The Government are helping now to get up a memorial to Gordon and it would not do to publish his private ideas about them.

*"3rd March.*—Went down to the India Office, where I had a talk with Godley about an attack made on me by Lepel Griffin in connection with my visit to India. He begged me to give him an account of my offer of negotiation made last year to



## *The Prince of Wales about Ireland*

Gladstone. He said: 'You know I have for three years past disapproved of the course that has been taken in Egypt.' Nobody knows better than Godley how easily Mr. Gladstone might have prevented the whole thing if he had listened to me.

"Lady C. tells me that the Prince of Wales is going over to Ireland, as I understand her, on a mission of pacification. I fancy the idea is to settle the Irish question eventually on the lines of the Austro-Hungarian settlement; and the idea might work. I don't suppose the Parnellites have any grudge against the Crown, though they have against the Castle, certainly not against the Prince of Wales. But we shall see.

"Dined at the Carlton next to Jem Lowther, and talked about Egypt and the Soudan. It is astonishing what crude ideas these Tory leaders have. People are not wrong in calling them the stupid Party. If I can get into Parliament I may be able to help them to new notions on Foreign politics.

"*4th March.*—Refused Escott and Bunting and Alfred Austin to write articles for them respectively in the 'Fortnightly,' 'Contemporary,' and 'National Reviews,' on the Mahdi. I think it best not to write on current politics in monthly magazines. These magazines are beginning to get past their best day as organs of publicity. There are too many of them, and nobody reads them.

"The Wentworths came to dinner, and we went on with them to a meeting in Westminster Town Hall. It was poorly attended, but the speeches were decidedly good. Wentworth spoke with something approaching to eloquence, and Harrison made a really admirable oration. My own speech was descriptive of the Mahdi and Gordon's mission. It was well received. The meeting then was invaded by some Socialists

### *Labouchere on a Mission to the Mahdi*

and became very noisy. I confess my sympathies are with them, as they speak the truth, however brutally, about governments and financiers. I have been asked to repeat my speech as a lecture at Cambridge. It was as usual quite different from the speech I had prepared.

"Met Edward Malet to-day in St. James's Park. We nodded.

"*5th March.*—Button says about the Soudan expedition that Wolseley would have to come home, first, on account of his eyes, which were suffering, and they could not afford that he should go blind, as he does all the work at the Horse Guards, even now that he is in the Soudan, telegraphing instructions daily—and, secondly, in view of war complications. The expedition is breaking up rapidly, and it will be as I said, not a regiment will remain south of Wady Halfa by midsummer's day.

"Labouchere, on whom I called, tells me the same story. He had it from one of the Government that there was no intention at all to make the railway to Berber. They would make it a few miles out from Suakin, perhaps to a hill station. But even that I doubt. We discussed the subject of the negotiations, about which he had written to me. His idea was that I might send the Mahdi a message from the Radical Party, advising him to send an agent to propose peace, and asking him what terms he would accept. But I told him this would never do. The Mahdi would require to be acknowledged, and would only treat with the Government. All they could expect of him was that the two plenipotentiaries should meet in Egypt. He said the difficulty was, that to do so would be to snub Baring and Wolseley. We finally agreed that I should once more write to Mr. Gladstone, and place a renewal of my offer on record.

## *Bismarck wants East Africa*

This I must do before the 20th, when new battles are expected with Osman Digna. I look, however, on the Mahdi as quite safe now, with the summer before him, and the certain change of public opinion here and foreign complications for our arms elsewhere.

"*6th March.*—Bismarck seems to be interfering once more as honest broker, and has sent his son Herbert to London; and I notice at the same time that the telegrams announce Hassan Fehmy as instructed to use stiffer language to Lord Granville. He is to say that the English explanations are vague and unsatisfactory. They are at their wits' ends at the Foreign Office to know what to do. But their first step will be to recall Wolseley and his army to Cairo.

"*7th March.*—To see Stanley. He has heard that Bismarck has promised Granville to use his good offices with Russia to prevent any further advance on the Afghan frontier. Talked the same matter over with Button, who is very full of the subject, and who gave me a full account of the position as it has been told him—in the greatest secrecy. It appears that Bismarck has recently come forward ostensibly to make peace. This is always the avowed motive of his interventions, but his offers generally cover some objects of his own. In the present instance he wants Zanzibar, and Button has it on his 'best authority' that in a very short time the Zanzibar question will be brought forward. The Sultan of Zanzibar has long wished the English Government to guarantee his son's succession to the throne, but we have refused, and now he is appealing to Bismarck. There is therefore likely to be question of a German protectorate, and its declaration will coincide with claims by Germany to other places on the East Coast

## *Rosebery and the Rothschilds*

of Africa. Bismarck's mode of action with Lord Granville is to bully him through Malet, for whom he professes the greatest possible affection, and whom he charges with his explosives to hurl at Granville's head. Granville replies, not through Malet, but through the German Ambassador. Malet is not thought man enough to beard the lion, though they are pleased with him for the information he gives them. He is in fact very much in the position of a 'Times' correspondent at Berlin, obliged to make himself agreeable as a condition of his receiving news.

"Herbert Bismarck's mission was suggested at New Court [the Rothschilds' house of business in the City] and carried out through Rosebery, who is Rothschild's representative in the Cabinet. At first it was proposed by the Jews that some one should be sent from London to Berlin, but failing this they suggested Herbert Bismarck's visit. The Rothschilds are very anxious that German influence should predominate as they see in it a guarantee for England's remaining in Egypt, and Granville seems to have given in to the idea, as this morning there is published an abject apology he made last night in the House of Lords. Button thinks very likely Bismarck may have promised his good offices with Russia, but does not think they are sincere, and his real object is Zanzibar and the East Coast of Africa. On the other hand the Foreign Office, as apart from Lord Granville, is for a renewal of the Anglo-Franco-Turco Alliance of 1854, with a self-denying clause regarding Egypt. This would enable us to evacuate Egypt without the fear of French occupation succeeding ours. They would also mutually oppose Germany's arrangement with Zanzibar. I am not sure that this would not be the best solution of the

### *Prussia's Claim to old Dutch Colonies*

difficulty. I told him in return about Bismarck's old scheme of renewing claims to the Dutch Colonies. [This refers to a principle of German policy, the details of which I had learned as long before as the late autumn of 1866, when I was staying with Count d'Usedom, then Prussian Envoy at Florence, at the Villa Capponi outside that city. Usedom was a man of great enlightenment, and had been the trusted friend of the old King Frederick William in his Liberal days, and the chief of Bismarck's rivals, being especially obnoxious to him on account of his English or rather Scotch wife, Olympia Malcolm, and his suspected Anglomania. I was very intimate with both of them, and as they were both very indiscreet I got to know a great deal of the inner designs of Prussian diplomacy, making, however, no use at all of my knowledge. Amongst other things that Usedom told me was this, that it was a settled plan at Berlin to bring about, in connection with the proposed revival of the German Empire, also a union with Holland, when Germany, having become a maritime power, would reassert against England, on Holland's behalf, a claim to the old Dutch Colonies.]

"We then talked about the Afghan complication. He said the whole difficulty came from an absurd habit the Foreign Office had of asking a great deal more than they were willing to take. This place, Penjdeh, was outside the real boundary of Afghanistan, but the Foreign Office had asked for it meaning to yield it later as a concession. But the Russians in the meanwhile had seized it, and the concession was rendered ten times more difficult. Button has it (but he made me promise not to repeat it as he was not even to allude to it in the 'Times') from a certain source that in view of possible accidents, or at the Amir's request, Lumsden has

## *Lumsden to occupy Herat*

received orders to occupy Herat and put it in a state of defence. I told him, however, that the Russians did not really mean war, certainly not war with the Amir, but were making a demonstration in order to detach the Amir from our alliance. This incident will not lead to war.

"In the afternoon attended a deputation to Lord Ripon given by the Indians resident in London. Anne was seated on the dais next Lord Ripon. The noble Lord made a humbugging speech in which he praised the Nizam for offering to send troops against the Soudanese. He is already corrupted by association with his Whig friends in office. Lady Ripon has asked us to her party next week.

"*8th March.*—Down to Crabbet, marking trees in Heathy Ground and Burley's Wood, and laying out a new gallop in the Upper Park. This has been a quiet day, and has done me good, for the excitement of the last week has made my heart ache. We went to see Pompey, who is very ill and cannot last long now. His illness gives him a dignity which is touching, and which I hope we may all have before we die. [Pompey was my black servant who had been with me for eighteen years.]

"*9th March.*—To London, and called on Lady A., whose son now I hope is safe, at least for the present, as the Buller Division is on its way back to Korti. I did not like to call on her before.

"*10th March.*—Leonard Courtney<sup>1</sup> writes proposing that I should breakfast with him on Thursday, to talk over possible negotiations with the Mahdi. From all I hear, the Government are ready to jump at any possible arrangement, so it is through anybody else but me. Called on Button, who says war is nearly certain with Russia. But I cannot bring my-

<sup>1</sup> Now Lord Courtney of Penwith.

## *Conversation with Staal*

self to think Russia means to quarrel with the Amir—with us very likely, but not with him. I expect it will blow over. Button advises me to call on Staal.

"*11th March.*—Saw Hobart at his club. He tells me the Sultan has telegraphed to him expressly forbidding him to do anything about sending troops against the Mahdi. He wanted to know whether the Mahdi was really opposed to the Sultan, and I satisfied him on that point, and we agreed to act together in any negotiation of peace that might be arranged.

"*12th March.*—Had a long talk at the Russian Embassy with Staal, for whom I have a great affection. We talked the whole political situation over, on my part very frankly, and I told him he must not expect a revolt in India. He of course deplored the prospect of war, which he seemed to think imminent, though I do not. I told him all about the Egyptian War and the Mahdi and Gordon, and the absurdities of our Ministers. He described having been at Walmer, and how he had found Lord Granville surrounded by dispatch boxes, tied up with different coloured string, according as they were pressing or not; the very immediately pressing were tied up with red tape. A proof that the Czar does not mean war is that the Emperor of Germany has written to him asking him to preserve peace, which he certainly would not have done unless he knew the Czar to be willing. For my own purposes I should like there to be a war with Russia, or at least an alarming demonstration. But my conversation with Staal will not have had an otherwise than deterring effect. I told him very plainly that England meant fighting. Nélidof, he said, had been very nearly recalled from Constantinople, but had now been sent back there with renewed favour.

## *Leonard Courtney*

"Breakfasted with Leonard Courtney at 15, Cheyne Walk, and discussed with him and his wife the prospects of negotiating with the Mahdi. I had brought with me the draft of a new letter I was proposing to write to Gladstone. He said it was not definite enough, and urged me to recast it, stating the exact terms which I thought might be accepted as a basis of negotiation. We also talked over the whole situation and the relations of the Mahdi with the Sultan, with the National party in Egypt, and with the Moham-medans of India. His wife is a nice woman and more enthusiastic than he is, and at leaving I urged her to use her influence with him to keep him up to the mark. These Parliament people are absurdly pusillanimous, and though Courtney is the boldest of them he is only half-hearted to speak his mind. Button tells me that he used for years to be on the staff of the 'Times,' having only left them when he took office three or four years ago. He was considered one of their very smartest leader writers, but of very dictatorial ways. He is evidently a very able man. When I came home I re-wrote my letter to Gladstone in the sense agreed upon, and, saying *ôis-millah*, sent it in.<sup>1</sup> In my covering note to Eddy, I said: 'The fate of several empires depends upon the reception it receives'—the Russian, the Turkish, the Mahdi's, and our own—also it is the 'Ides of March.'

"To a party at Mrs. Earle's and had some talk with Lytton. He is bringing out his novel in verse, 'Glenaveril.' It is to come out in parts, published by Murray.

"*13th March.*—The Gregorys are back from Paris. He approves of my letter to Gladstone. Then to Labouchere, who tells me the Government are dying

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix.



*"War with Russia a damned good thing"*

to get out of their Soudan campaign. They decided on going to Khartoum in the first excitement of their disappointment about relieving Gordon, and hardly knowing whether he was dead or alive, and they have ever since been repenting. Lately they have been hoping to get out of the Suakin campaign by some pretext of sending on the troops to Afghanistan instead, but they can't quite get up a case for it. They have never intended making the Berber railway, but only a few miles of it, as far, perhaps, as Sinkat. Now Osman Digna is stronger than ever, and insists upon making raids on Suakin.

"*14th March.*—Lady Gregory came to tea, and afterwards I walked home with her. On my return I found an answer from Downing Street. Eddy writes that 'Mr. Gladstone is obliged to me for my letter, but why does not the Mahdi send a representative to England?' This looks more like business than I had expected.

"Dined with Professor Hunter and half a dozen Radicals at the Reform Club, where it was proposed to me to make a tour of lectures in Scotland. Hunter engaged to get me good audiences at Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Glasgow, and other places. There was also much talk about my going into Parliament with them, but my connection with the Carlton Club naturally stands in my way.

"*15th March.*—Zebehr has been arrested at Alexandria by Wolseley's order, just as Button told me he would be six months ago. This is really too bad.

"The Prince of Wales is going to Berlin to try and effect a reconciliation with Bismarck. He considers war with Russia inevitable, 'and a damned good thing too.' At least such is Lady C.'s account of what he told her. He had also said that Wolseley was to come back from Korti, and that the Soudan

### *Correspondence re-opened with Gladstone*

campaign would come to a natural end in a very short time. He was all for making peace with the Mahdi.

*"16th March.*—To Button, who confirms this news.

*"17th March.*—An idle day at Crabbet, except that I attended my neighbour Sir Curtis Lampson's funeral. He was always an excellent neighbour to me, and I sincerely regret him, as I believe most do. I met the funeral just as it was coming through the Rowfant covers, where I have so often shot with him. He was a very good sportsman, and, though seventy-nine, held his gun remarkably straight to the end. He was an American, a member of the Hudson Bay Company, and bought the Rowfant estate from the Bethunes some forty years ago to breed silver rabbits on for his firm. He was made a Baronet in connection with the Atlantic Cable and the Peabody Trust, whose executor he was. R.I.P.

*"20th March.*—The Mudir of Dongola has been joined by the Kababish and Shaghiych tribes, and is going to attack Berber. This is the last we shall hear of him as Wolseley's ally, but they are such geese they suspect nothing. Ibrahim Bey told me a week ago: 'You will see that in about ten days the Mudir of Dongola will go over openly to the Mahdi.' He thought Zebchr's arrest a stupid move, as he was not really a friend of the Mahdi's.

*"22nd March.*—Eddy Hamilton writes, giving a message from Mr. Gladstone, to the effect that, 'If it is thought the Mahdi is not aware of the instructions to Wolseley about receiving offers of peace, it might possibly be arranged that the Arab gentleman should be passed through the British lines.' This in answer to a question made on the sixteenth as to whether he would facilitate Ibrahim's going to Khar-toum to arrange a mission of peace from the Mahdi.

## *They will send me to Treat*

"The 'Observer' announces severe fighting, and that Graham has retired to Souakin.

"*23rd March.*—To Courtney, to try to get him to take a lead against the Soudan war, but he said he had left the Ministry too short a time to do this. He thought Morley was the man for it.

"At five to Mrs. Howard. She is of opinion that they mean to treat, and treat through me, but of course want it to be supposed the desire is all on the Mahdi's side. She has seen Leveson, Lord Granville's brother, who is decidedly for getting out of the Soudan. So I believe is everybody. George, however, is all for war; he means to leave Parliament after this Session. There was news of another battle this morning, in which the English forces were surprised by Osman Digna.

"*24th March.*—The fighting of yesterday has been a very serious affair, and I think settles Graham's campaign at Suakin, not on account of the proof it has given of the courage, skill, and numbers of the Arabs so much as on account of the destruction of the camels, and especially of the camel drivers. No native will now dare go outside Suakin, and the English soldiers will be left to shift for themselves. Whatever else they can do, they certainly cannot manage camels without help. This will stop Graham just as it stopped Wolsey.

"Button, whom I saw to-day in the City, tells me they certainly will send me to treat with the Mahdi. Matters, he says, stand in this way: the Government has sent in an ultimatum to Russia, on the Afghan boundary question, and the answer will be given in four or five days—Button thinks it will be refused—and then the Government has made up its mind to clear straight out of the Soudan, and even out of Lower Egypt, except Alexandria, hand-

## *Ultimatum to Russia*

ing over Cairo to the Sultan who will send troops in. In return for this the Sultan will open the Dardanelles and Bosphorus to the British Fleet, which will attack Batoum, with the idea of advancing to Baku and so cut off the Caspian communications. This, however, would not be at once, the campaign being commenced in Afghanistan. They are ready to fight Russia, if necessary, for three years. The chief difficulty will be to prevent Austria from advancing on Salonica; but it has been ascertained that Bismarck will use all his influence to localize the war and prevent Austria from taking part in it. Bismarck is not ready for a solution of the Ottoman question. They will then be only too happy to employ me in making peace with the Mahdi, and my employment would now, Button says, be a popular thing, and it would not much matter whether I succeeded or not. At the end of the summer, having evacuated the Soudan, it would be out of the question their going back there. Only will Russia fight? I doubt it.

"Ibrahim has explained to us Zebehr's position. The real reason of his arrest, he said, was not so much that he had corresponded with the Mahdi, as his connection with the Senoussis. He has latterly been very intimate with Ibrahim el Senoussi, Senoussi's relative and agent at Alexandria, and in conjunction with Huseyn Pasha, the Tunisian, he has been engaged in working upon the Senoussi brotherhood to get them to join the Mahdi, and in his name to attack the French in Tunis. Ibrahim Bey says, though he naturally sympathizes with Zebehr, it is nevertheless just as well that this plan has been stopped, as the result would have been to bring about a community of interests between the French and English in smashing the Mahdi.

## *Arabi on the Fall of Khartoum*

"*25th March.*—It appears that our troops lost over three hundred men on Sunday, besides seven hundred camels and a number of mules and horses, and one hundred and fifty camp followers. Osman Digna is wielding the sword of the Lord this time in earnest, and if there is a God in Heaven he will prevail against the hosts of Mammon.

"Hunted from Barcombe, and had the best run of the season from a wood north of the Chailey brook to Lewes race-course without a check. There the fox was headed, and it took us another twenty minutes to kill him in a gorse cover; I was riding Queen of Sheba, and, though I did not get a very good start, I was first up at the check. There was some good fencing which the mare did admirably, including one very stiff timber jump with ditch beyond, which she raced over. Up the hills she passed them all but four or five, and once on top of the down she had no difficulty in going quite to the front; Anne on Dahma was also well up.

"When we came home we heard that Pompey was dying. Thus is pleasure mingled with grief; Pompey has been nearly eighteen years in my service. He was an admirable servant.

"*26th March.*—There are signs of the Suakin campaign being near an end, and I feel certain another month will see the whole thing abandoned. This will be the greatest victory of the Faith since the siege of Vienna. Arabi writes very *à propos* about the weak things of the world confounding the strong, and the triumph of justice in the Soudan.<sup>1</sup>

"To London and lunched with the Howards and sat on talking politics. George is all for war, but he thinks that Lorne, whom he had just been with, would willingly put himself forward in an agitation

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix B.

## *Hartington about the Mahdi*

for peace, and Mrs. Howard will approach him to that effect. Then I walked down with George to the House of Commons to hear Gladstone make his statement about the Egyptian Finance Convention. This he did so lamely and tamely that I went to sleep over it, as I observed others also did.

"Halim Pasha has written to Ibrahim to say that Ismail Jowdat, on his arrival at Constantinople, was met by a message that he was to come to the Palace. There he was kept twelve days and made to draw up a report of everything he had seen, heard, or done while in London, and then was sent home and kept there under arrest. Such is the Sultan's way.

"Dined at Sydney Buxton's,<sup>1</sup> where I sat next Mrs. Courtney. She talked about her work in the east of London, and said she had succeeded because she had no system. She did not seem clear that it was possible to improve the condition of the lowest class of people by anything but individual effort. She thought education might help them to help themselves; wasn't sure whether teatotalism was a good thing. To me all these matters are absolutely hopeless; system has interfered with the natural law of society, and unnatural misery is the result. Mrs. Buxton, on the other side of me, told me a story of Hartington having lately written to a friend to say he could not make out why they were fighting the Mahdi, as he, the Mahdi, seemed to be the only man who was carrying out the policy of Her Majesty's Ministers. Francis Buxton was there, and we talked about Dilke's connection with the Joint Note of January, 1882, and he cited, *à propos* of it, a conversation he had had with Dilke at the end of the previous year. He had told Dilke that the

<sup>1</sup> The Right Hon. Sydney Buxton, M.P.

### *Annexation under another Name*

Liberal party would never consent to the annexation of Egypt; to which Dilke had replied that Egypt might be annexed without calling it at all by that name. There is no doubt he played all through for annexation.

"*27th March.*—Gave Wheeler a translation of Arabi's letter; I think its publication will do good. Dined at Mrs. Charles Buxton's, and had some talk with Lord Chancellor Selborne. He was ready to admit they ought never to have gone into Egypt, but thought them bound now to stay and repair the wrong done. I told him, certainly, they had wounded the man, and must now take care he was not left to be robbed by every passer-by. This *à propos* of the Financial Convention being debated to-night.

"*28th March.*—To Button, who showed me a letter he had just got from Wolseley, dated 'Camp Korti, March 2,' narrating his vexation at being forty-eight hours too late to save Gordon, and his anger with Mr. Gladstone. He then recounted how his plan had been upset by Burnaby's death. He had intended Burnaby to succeed Stewart if anything happened to Stewart, and had told him his plan, but both of them got killed; and the rest of 'our London captains,' Wolseley said, were good for nothing to take command of the expedition, so the whole thing had broken down. History, he said, would judge where the fault lay. He was evidently sorry for himself and down on his luck. Button tells me it was all in reality Wilson's fault, as he wasted three days bombarding Metemmeh and Shendy; also he ought certainly to have sent in a man with the flag of truce offered him by the Mahdi. But Wolseley did not mention Wilson's name in the letter I saw. Button said he wished he could show me one Wolseley had written to Gordon about the Government. Wolseley

## *Wolseley on his Campaign*

was very angry now with them all. Button considers the campaign over. They can't possibly get further than Tamai, and war with Russia is almost certain.

"On to Stanley, whom I found in bed, and gave him the news; and then to Hassan Fehmy, who did not seem aware of all that was happening. But when I explained he was of course delighted. 'When we get the Ottoman troops to Cairo,' he said, 'it will be time to proclaim the Mahdi a rebel, but we have refused to have anything to do with it from Constantinople. That would not have looked well, and one should never threaten unless one can execute. We will put down the Mahdi when we are at Cairo.' This was not of course my idea, but I left him to his plans, feeling quite sure the Mahdi would be able to take care of himself.

"*30th March.*—A letter has come from Downing Street in explanation of the offer already made, and I have sent my answer to Eddy. Went to bury Pompey at Crawley and then to London, and heard Hartington announce the news of a peaceful character from Russia. This is unfortunate for our plans.

"*31st March.*—Eddy now writes that Mr. Gladstone has left London for Easter, and so it is impossible I should see him—he is really at Brighton—and proposes to communicate the substance of my last letter to Hartington, his *locum tenens*.

"Hunting again, a wonderful scent. The fox took us from Danny to the top of the hill near the Wind Mills, and along the edge of the downs to the Dyke, a very severe run, as we went up and down the downs fairly three times, the last pull up the Dyke Hill stopped every horse but Queen of Sheba and a thoroughbred carrying eleven stone and Payne the huntsman. Rode into Brighton and so up to



## *Lord Lorne*

London in time to dine at the Howards. William Morris was there in morning dress, for he eschews tail coats, and did most of the talking on his own special subjects—socialism, the evil of capital, and the rest. This he does excellently well. Mrs. Howard advises me strongly to see Hartington if I get the chance. He is quite honest, she says, being a Cavendish, and no Cavendish was ever able to lie. Humph!

"*1st April.*—Button promises to find out Hartington's ideas about peace from Brett, in case I hear any more from him.

"Lunched at the Carlton, in the vicinity of members of the Fourth Party. Wolff tells me that Randolph is expected home on Tuesday.

"*2nd April.*—Went to see Lord Lorne at Kensington Palace. I find him very pleasant, and sufficiently intelligent about Egyptian affairs, and we talked for an hour. My object was to get him to take the lead in demonstrations against the Soudan war, but I could not get him to promise anything definite. He is going to stand for a Metropolitan Borough, however, and says he will lose no occasion to oppose the war in his electioneering. This kept me so late that I almost missed my train for Birmingham, where I had to attend a meeting on the same subject. But I just hit it off, made my speech, and was back in London by midnight.

"*3rd April.*—A letter came yesterday, while I was away, from Downing Street, and I went to ask Button's advice about it. It said that the policy of the Government was one of freedom for the Soudan, and I was inclined to take it as a mere phrase, but Button strongly advised me to accept it in all seriousness, so as to pin the Government down to their declaration, and dispatch Ibrahim to carry the news

### *Sympathetic about the East*

to the Mahdi. So I have written my answer in Button's sense, and shall go to Paris to-morrow to set things going. *Bismillah!*

"To-day being a Bank Holiday, Button and I, like two clerks, rode out to Putney and Coombe and back again. The day was fine and enjoyable. We are expecting a great battle to be fought to-day at Tamai.

"*4th April.*—Osman Digna has made an April fool of Graham, who marched his whole army of twelve thousand men 'to the top of the hill,' and then found no enemy, and marched them down again. They will have to evacuate Suakin without a victory. This is just what we most want.

"To Paris by the tidal train, and travelled as far as Dover with Lord Lorne and his sister (Lady Constance Campbell), who are also going abroad. We talked on many subjects besides Egypt, such as the Crofter question in Scotland, the Land question in England, Riel's revolt in Canada, and the Irish question. Lord Lorne was very sympathetic on Eastern matters, advising me only not to mix up Arabi with the Soudan peace agitation.

"I forgot to say that Button told me yesterday that the Russian answer about the Afghan frontier is, after all, far from satisfactory. Dufferin has been given *carte blanche* to treat with the Amir, who demands a guarantee for his dynasty, as well as for his dominions.

"Dined at the Hotel Wagram with Jemal-ed-Din, to whom I read the whole of my correspondence with Downing Street. He approved the line taken, but insists that the English Government must write a letter to the Mahdi for Ibrahim to carry. He will think the matter over, however, and decide in a day or two. There is no hurry just now, as the Mahdi can much better afford to wait than Mr. Gladstone.

## *At Paris. Talk with Sheffield*

"*5th April, Easter Sunday.*—Breakfast with Bitters in the Rue Mazarine, and in the afternoon coming home I stopped at the Embassy and had a talk with Sheffield, who was communicative as usual. Among other things, he told me that Gladstone had been very much in favour of having the Turkish Pashas in Egypt made to pay up the arrears of taxation. But Baring and Northbrook had persuaded him that government would be impossible if they offended these gentry, so they have gone on screwing the money out of the fellahin, and have raised this ridiculous joint loan.

"*6th April.*—Breakfasted again with Bitters and Godfrey Webb. The French have been without a Ministry for the last week, but to-day Monsieur Brisson has formed one; I know too little about French politics to guess what it portends. Everybody, however, is very angry with Ferry, the late minister, on account of the Tonquin defeats. The lesson given to Ferry will not be lost on Gladstone, and will be in favour of peace in Africa.

"*7th April.*—Jemal-ed-Din and Sanua breakfasted with me.

"*8th April.*—Breakfasted once more with Bitters, and once more to the Jeu de paume, where there was a great gathering: old Villeplaine, Brinquant, O'Connor, and the Hennesseys, besides Elcho, Arthur Balfour, and Bungo Herbert. The Elchos are at the Hotel Mirabeau with Godfrey Webb and the Miss Tennants, Laura and Margot.

"*9th April.*—Breakfasted with the Wagrams. They say peace has been arranged between France and China. Then to the Hotel Mirabeau. Arthur Balfour was there, and we talked about the Afghan and Soudan questions, and while we were talking Elcho came in, having been at the Embassy and

## *Battle of Penjdeh*

having heard there of the Battle of Penjdeh. We all agreed that this means war. The newspaper boys on the Boulevard were calling out this evening, 'Guerre Russo-Anglaise—grande Victoire Russe.'

"13th April.—Jemal-ed-Din came early, and I read him a new and unsatisfactory letter I received last night from Downing Street. He insists that the Government must write a letter to the Mahdi if they want him to treat; and he says he will come over to England if necessary to arrange about it, if only I will guarantee his not being arrested there. I told him there was no danger of arrest, but his experience in India has made him suspicious of the English Government. He says there is no reason whatever now that Arabi should not come back to Egypt if the opportunity offered of a reconciliation with Tewfik. Tewfik is so feeble and discredited as to be no longer dangerous, and Arabi would rapidly regain all his lost influence.

"Back by the tidal train to England."

N.B.—My correspondence with 10, Downing Street of this date will be found in Appendix C, and is worth reading. It would have been still possible that spring to arrange terms of peace directly with the Mahdi, who was not the impracticable personage he has been represented to be by our official historians. Under his successor, the Khalifa Abdullah el Taishi, all negotiation became much more difficult. But, unfortunately for both Egypt and the Soudan, the opportunity was let slip and became final through the Mahdi's death in July. It was probably Lord Cromer's influence, as in the previous year, that decided it.

## CHAPTER XI

### RANDOLPH CHURCHILL AND THE FOURTH PARTY

*" 14th April, 1885.*

" **T**O see Button. He tells me there will not now be war with Russia. Jemal-ed-Din told me the same thing yesterday and I believe it, for Russia is now in the position of a man who having had an altercation with another has boxed his ears. He can afford to apologize. Button tells me Randolph has returned from India quite in harmony with my ideas. Lord Ripon's, Randolph thinks, was the only policy, though clumsily carried out, and if he had not made reforms when he did we should be now in the position of having them forced from us as the price of native loyalty. He is also wholly against the Soudan war. This accords with a letter from him I got last night.

" I asked Button his advice about my going into Parliament, and told him I was intending to ask Churchill to support me as a Fourth Party candidate. But he strongly advised me not to do so. He said, in the first place, it was doubtful whether I should get in; and, in the second, Churchill would be sure afterwards to throw it in my teeth. 'Take his advice if you like,' he said, 'but don't commit yourself as his supporter.' I said: 'Then there is nothing for me but to go to Parnell.' This Button thought would be much better. He said: 'As a Nationalist you will have a great position, and there will always be sixty or seventy members who will believe in you on Foreign affairs; I advise you to do this and have nothing to do with Randolph. Remember how O'Connell always threw it in Disraeli's teeth that he

### *Churchill approves the Ripon Policy*

had once applied to him to get him into Parliament. About my correspondence with Downing Street, he thought they would not give any written message to the Mahdi, but advised me to continue to treat their assurances as serious, and to express our readiness to send the messenger.

"At eleven I called on Randolph and found him very glad to see me, and I really like him better than any of them personally. He told me about India pretty much what Button had told me of his opinions, and he entirely took my view of the Hyderabad intrigue. He said if Lord Ripon had not appointed Salar Jung they would certainly have annexed the country, and there were still intrigues at work of the old sort. He also spoke strongly of the great intelligence and good sense of the 'natives,' especially of the Mohammedans and Mahrattas. He had seen Rajah Amir Hassan of Mahmudabad and shared my views about the Mohammedan university, and he had stayed with Lyall and talked about me with him.<sup>1</sup> The only thing he had disagreed with was my having said that Salar Jung had been poisoned; for he said that young Salar Jung had expressed his disbelief in anything of the sort, and he had talked to him very confidentially. He then asked me to write a poem for the Conservative party for Sir Arthur Sullivan to set to music. I asked: 'With something about the primrose in it?' He said: 'Yes, if you like—but it does not matter so much what it is, so long as it is patriotic.' I told him I would think about it, but feared I couldn't manage the primrose.

"Then Wolff came in and we talked about Lepel Griffin. Churchill said that he, Griffin, had shown him his article against me in proof at Indore, and he had expostulated with him about publishing it, and

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix G.

## *Churchill on Tory Democracy*

Griffin would have stopped it if he could, but it was too late. We also talked about the Soudan. Churchill promised to write a letter to be read at the Birmingham meeting if I liked. Next about Zebehr's arrest and Tewfik's intrigues. 'We must get Tewfik deposed,' he said, 'as soon as Abbas comes of age, and have Arabi back.' Then I asked to talk with him in private and Wolff went away. I said I was going to consult him about getting into Parliament; I wanted to push my ideas, but hardly knew how to set about it. He said: 'Oh! I can do that for you whenever you like. If you will come forward as my supporter you can't do better, and I am asked almost every day to recommend candidates.' I said: 'What will this bind me to? You know my foreign politics, but at home I am a Catholic and a Tory as regards the land question and education, and in Ireland I am a Nationalist.' He made a face at the word 'Nationalist.' He said: 'You could not come forward as an avowed Nationalist, but you need not say much about that. If you say that you have wide opinions on the Irish question it will be enough, and when you are once in Parliament you can take your own line.' 'But what,' I said, 'is Tory democracy? Tell me in two words, for I don't think I quite understand it.' He said: 'That is a question I am always in a fright lest some one should put it to me publicly. To tell the truth I don't know myself what Tory democracy is. But I believe it is principally opportunism. But say you are a Tory democrat and that will do.' I said: 'You know me well enough to be sure that I would not be paid to be in Parliament if I was not free to take my own line. I had thought of standing as an Irish Home Ruler with Parnell, but I was in doubt, and thought I would consult you.' He said: 'You would lose your influence if you did

### *Also on Irish Nationalism*

this. Parnell would require you to join in his policy of obstruction and you would be discredited. You had better not commit yourself to that, though you might vote with him on purely Irish questions. But you should write me out a programme of your ideas, and I will see if there is a constituency that will accept them.' I said: 'I will think it over and let you know.' Now I shall consult Mrs. Howard, who will advise me to go in as a Radical, but that I can't and won't do. I think perhaps, after all, I shall be freest with Randolph; and certainly his conversation to-day binds me to nothing.

"F. P. [a young lieutenant R.N. who had been serving with the Naval Brigade in the Nile campaign] gives me some good accounts of forced labourers courbashed and chained, under British officers. Four thousand forced labourers were supplied for the Nile Expedition, half from Dongola, half from Esneh. They were put to twelve and thirteen hours labour in the extreme heat of August, only allowed half an hour in the day to rest; they were small, weak men, and would work only under the whip. Colonel Grant, in command of the Dongolese, expostulated against their being so employed. F., who was with the naval contingent, did not have the men under his own command beaten by English sailors. His remark was: 'They did not give it them so thoroughly, but they seemed to mind it more.' Many ran away, but were brought back with chains round their necks. He had found five men one night lying flat with their mouths full of sand; they would have died if he had not kicked them up and made them eat. They were kept once five days without food. Colonel Inglefield, in command of the Esneh men, blew his brains out in a fever in the next tent to F. He says when Wolseley came up he



## *War on Women and Children*

was quite taken aback at sight of what the river was. Hammill had surveyed it all and told him of its being impracticable, and so had every one else who had seen it. He is very bitter against Wolseley.<sup>1</sup>

"15th April.—Wrote draft letters to Mr. Gladstone and Eddy Hamilton in answer to Eddy's last, and took them to Mrs. Howard, with whom and with whose daughter Mary I spent four hours talking. She thinks Gladstone is serious about negotiating with the Mahdi, and that it is paying me a great compliment to discuss affairs so delicate with me. I am not sure. She won't hear of my having anything to do with Randolph, still less with Parnell, and says that I should be doing no good going into Parliament at all. If I should render some signal service to the Government by helping them to make peace or otherwise, they would give me a seat in the House of Lords; but I should only lose my influence by going into the House of Commons.

"16th April.—There is a remarkable letter in to-day's 'Daily News,' giving the account of an Egyptian soldier who had been with Gordon in Khartoum. According to this, the Mahdi distinctly offered Gordon to evacuate, and Gordon refused. There are also tales of the capture of women and children by General Graham, and of his having sent them prisoners to Massowa. F. P. tells me that, when he was at Suakin last June, rewards of £1 were offered for the right hands of Arabs brought by friendly 'natives' into the British camp.

"Went to see Stanley, and arranged with him to bring forward the case of the Massowa prisoners, and then to Labouchere about a series of questions to be put on Monday as to military barbarities, forced labour, etc. He tells me that Chamberlain

<sup>1</sup> Compare Sir Charles Wilson and also Sir William Butler.

## *The Egyptians Hate us*

has proposed to him, as representing the Radical opposition to the Soudan War, that the Radicals should not object to the Government's making their railway as far as Sinkat on condition it goes no further. They would then hand it over to a company and retire, boasting that they had civilized Eastern Soudan. They want to be out of the thing, but must have something to show for the money they have spent.

"Hobart tells me that the arrangement being made with the Sultan is that there should be a joint English and Turkish occupation of Egypt; the Turkish general to be provided with an English staff.<sup>1</sup>

"F. tells me stories of how the English soldiers are insulted in the streets of Cairo. They all hate the Egyptians now, being hated by them. But the Egyptian soldiers are devoted to their English officers.

"*17th April.*—A letter came last night from Downing Street which seems to ask for direct communication with the Mahdi's agent. But Button assures me that an agreement was come to the day before yesterday with the Sultan of the kind spoken of by Hobart, and thinks the letter means that they want nothing more of me. It may very likely be so. George Howard thinks the whole correspondence merely humbug on Gladstone's part, and that he has never had any really serious intentions. He has become an utter unbeliever in Gladstone, and speaks more bitterly against him than any one I know out of the Carlton Club. He was for annexation, but says I prevented it by stirring up the

<sup>1</sup> This is interesting as showing that the idea of what was afterwards Wolff's Convention was already being thought of in Gladstone's time.

## *Primrose Day with Randolph*

Radicals and I have not done any good to Egypt instead. Mrs. Howard is disgusted at the arrangement with the Sultan, and half agreed that I was justified now in making any arrangement I liked with Randolph. Button is angry with Buckle for not making full use of the news he brings him, and talks of leaving the 'Times.'

"*19th April.*—Had luncheon at the Carlton Club, where they were going through the absurdity of Primrose Day. I sat with Randolph, Wolff, and Borthwick; they wanted me to put one of these flowers in my buttonhole, but I said I must draw the line somewhere. This worship of an old Hebrew gentleman under the form of a primrose is certainly one of the most ridiculous ever imagined. Randolph talked about the arrangement just made with the Sultan for sending Turkish troops into Egypt, and was all for an attack on the Government. But I persuaded him not to make any move against the Sultan. He has made an excellent beginning with the Indian Mohammedans, and this would not be understood by them. He told me of his having taken up the cause of the native water carriers at Benares, who were being impressed for the Soudan campaign, an incident which shows he has a true instinct with Orientals. I am writing him a letter stating my political views, and asking him to what extent they are in harmony with Tory democracy. It will be the manifesto of my political opinions.

"Down to Crabbet.

"*21st April.*—A telegram from Button in the evening saying that the Khartoum expedition is abandoned, and eleven millions asked for Russian and Soudan wars.

"*22nd April.*—The eleven millions seem to have taken everybody's breath away, and war with Russia

## *The Eleven Millions War Vote*

is considered certain, the garrisons to be withdrawn from the Soudan.

"Finished a letter to Churchill, giving my political views, home and foreign, and proposing them as compatible with Tory democracy, and took it to London to show to Mrs. Howard. Of course she is much against my sending it; but as I left said: 'Well, it will be amusing, anyhow, to see how you get on with him. But I call it an intrigue.' Button, whom I saw afterwards, objected on other grounds. He said I could not count on Randolph that he would not throw me over, and he could not get me into Parliament. Nobody would believe me sincere in my Home Conservatism, and Conservatives would not support me. He strongly advised me again to join Parnell rather than Randolph, people would understand that; I should have more influence, and besides be quite certain of a seat in Parliament. He is to meet Randolph, however, on Friday, and will try to find out what he really means; and in the meanwhile I withhold my letter.

"*23rd April.*—George Wyndham has written home accounts of the enormous number of the Hadendowas who have been killed. Some of these Hadendowas had shaved their heads and wore the Mahdi's uniform, 'a wonderful instance of fanaticism.' They (the English officers) are all sick, however, of the war.

"Rode in the Park with Sullivan (Sir Edward Sullivan), who tells me Mr. Gladstone dined with Bertram Currie on Tuesday after the announcement of the eleven millions war vote. He was in high spirits, and said the announcement of eleven millions was received by the House 'with solemnity.' He is to give a breakfast to Miss Mary Anderson to-day. Pembroke was also riding, and came and talked

### *The Mahdi to Stew in his Juice*

about the Soudan. He could wish, he said, that after having killed the Arabs 'we could leave them some substantial benefit in the shape of a railway.' What fools the best of them are.

"A letter has come from Eddy, giving a new opening, it seems, for correspondence. Consulted Ibrahim about it; he tells me the French are sending a secret mission to the Mahdi, *via* Tripoli, and thinks I might hint this to Downing Street.<sup>1</sup>

"*24th April.*—It appears that a dynamite explosion took place yesterday morning during Mr. Gladstone's breakfast party with Mary Anderson. Everybody talks now of war as certain, but Button says it will only be a withdrawal of Ambassadors for the present. The Turkish arrangement has fallen through, if it ever existed, through Bismarck's prohibition to the Sultan of opening the Dardanelles to our fleet. This, perhaps, accounts for Eddy's renewal of correspondence.

"To the House of Commons and saw John Morley and Leonard Courtney, and urged on them to press the Government to withdraw *immediately* from the Soudan, as otherwise the Mahdi may again advance. They said they understood the Government was intending certainly to do so, but they would endeavour to get some assurance from them during the debate. Morley, however, would have nothing to do with urging negotiations with the Mahdi, whom the Government intended to leave to 'stew in his juice.'

"Bertram, whom I called on later, tells me that Mr. Gladstone told him at dinner on Tuesday that his idea was still to neutralize Egypt under a government of its own, and that he counted on the French to aid in doing this. Bertram, who doubtless repeats

<sup>1</sup> Compare the Marchand mission of a dozen years later.

## *Gordon Betrayed by Awwam*

Mr. Gladstone's tone on these matters, complained of the *unfair* conduct of the French. 'If they go on much longer,' he said, 'Mr. Gladstone will throw the whole thing on their hands and clear bodily out of Egypt.' He also talked of perhaps handing it over to the Sultan, who after all was the legal owner; things were in a deadlock all round.

"*25th April.*—Lady Wentworth came to luncheon, and took me to the Grosvenor Gallery, private view. The exhibition is not nearly as good as last year, but there is a fine portrait of Gladstone by Millais, one of his best, with his eye fixing you like some bird of prey.

"*26th April.*—To Mark Napier's at Fulham for lawn tennis. He showed me a letter he had received from Sir Charles Wilson, saying it was Awwam who betrayed Gordon at Khartoum. This is a fine piece of retributive justice, for it was Awwam whom Colvin persecuted because he had complained of the rogueries in the Cadastral service. Colvin had him arrested and put in irons after the bombardment of Alexandria, and tried by a mock tribunal and exiled to Khartoum. I wrote, when the amnesty was promised, to Dufferin to complain especially of Awwam's treatment, and he referred my letter to Wilson, who did nothing. So Awwam remained at Khartoum, and now this very Wilson writes complaining that he betrayed Gordon. Thus is injustice sometimes requited.<sup>1</sup>

"At dinner last night at the Denbighs' Hobart was very warlike, and talked of commanding the Turkish Fleet in the Black Sea; the Turks might at first pretend neutrality, and refuse a passage to English ships, but would join later. I sat next to

<sup>1</sup> Compare Gordon's diary at Khartoum and my letter to Lord Dufferin in Appendix C.

## *Justin McCarthy*

Lady Dorothy Nevill, certainly the pleasantest old woman in London. She is a friend, she tells me, of Chamberlain's, who tells her the electors care nothing for foreign politics; she has also seen Gladstone lately, who is in the highest spirits at the prospect of a new war. On my other side was Lady Brett, Reginald Brett's mother, who says she hears from Berlin that Bismarck treats Malet like a little boy. Of course he does, he has always known him as such. Lord Salisbury was also there, but I had no opportunity of speaking to him.

"The Prince of Wales has written to Lady C., saying he is delighted with his Irish tour, and is to be back, I think, on Tuesday. I hear, however, from others, that it has been in reality a fiasco.

"*27th April.*—Called on Justin McCarthy, who has a small lodging with his son in Ebury Street, but he was not up. The Irish girl who opened the door told me he never got up till the middle of the day, but I could see him between two and three. Then to Percy Wyndham in Belgrave Square, who deploras all that is going on in public affairs. He is an upright, honest man, with ideas too—but just short of the power to lead, so he has achieved nothing, and will retire after this Parliament. Back to McCarthy in the afternoon, whom I found with his son. My object in calling was to propose an alliance with Parnell, but we talked first about the Mahdi, and I asked to be put in communication with O'Kelly. This they promised to do, and, as I found them sensible and sympathetic, I broached the real subject with them. Young Huntley was most cordial; the elder, Justin, however, had had some experience of English alliances, and said they had several times been disappointed, as notably with Lord Robert Montagu. He also was cordial but more cautious;

### *Talk about an Irish Seat*

he said my connection with Arabi was well known; Arabi was a great hero in Ireland; so was the Mahdi. He thought Mr. Parnell would be very glad to talk the matter over with me, and he would arrange a meeting. They asked had I property in Ireland, and they were glad to hear I had none. What did I think about coercion? Could they count on me to turn out the Government? I told him that I was quite prepared to follow Parnell's lead on all Irish questions short of dynamite; that in England I should expect to be free. I was a friend of Churchill's, and should probably support him. On foreign politics they knew my opinions, and those of course I could not give up. As a Nationalist I could take up the cause of Ireland with my heart in it. Also I was a Catholic and opposed to the present Government. On all these matters they expressed themselves satisfied, saying that I had given too many proofs of having the courage of my opinions for them to have any doubt about me. But the first thing would be to see Parnell.

"I am sure these two are very honest fellows, whatever the others may be, and they said they had no quarrel with England if they got self-government. They did not want separation; they did not ask me to be unloyal to my country. But they were sure to succeed. They would have a great addition of strength in the next Parliament, and counted on several English constituencies. They counted, too, on Churchill, who was in favour of Home Rule, and my being a friend of his would be a recommendation in Irish eyes. On the whole I think the thing will work, and I am highly satisfied with my visit. I feel more at home with these people than in the Carlton Club.

"Down to the House of Commons to hear Mr.



## *Gladstone's great Speech*

Gladstone's statement about the war, and on the Vote of Credit. There was a previous debate connected with it, in which Arthur O'Connor proposed an amendment, speaking moderately and well. Arthur Balfour, too, spoke with some eloquence, and there was a division which the Government won by a small majority. Then Gladstone spoke, a really fine speech, the first fine one I have heard him make. At the beginning he was not felicitous, as he involved himself in one of his hair-splitting arguments about his own consistency, and Harcourt had to pull him vigorously by the coat tails to get him in hand again. But afterwards he was very clear, to the point, and impressive. His speech was generally taken in the House as a declaration of war against Russia; but I think he will try to arbitrate first. About the Soudan he admitted everything I had been urging for the past year, and *condemned himself most emphatically*; the people at Khartoum had been really against Gordon, they really liked the Mahdi, and the Mahdi was really establishing a Government; why should they be disturbed? Why indeed! I am glad to have heard this speech, as I am sure it is one of the best he ever made—perhaps his last great speech. The delivery was very remarkable and so dramatic as to suggest the impression that he must have got it up carefully beforehand with Irving and Mary Anderson. The effect on the House was decisive, so that the eleven millions were voted without a dissentient voice. It was a scene to be remembered. But as a matter of fact, the unanimity was due, I hear, to the accident of Labouchere and Randolph Churchill being away at dinner. Both had intended to move amendments. The effect of the speech, however, was very apparent, for at the beginning the sense of the House, both on his own and the other side, had

## *De Lessar, the Russian Agent*

been distinctly against Mr. Gladstone. The triumph was due solely to his eloquence.

"Dined at the Carlton Club.

"28th April.—Rode early. Then to Mrs. Howard, to tell her my ideas about Ireland. She does not much approve.

"29th April.—Button tells me that Wolseley is very angry at the idea of abandoning the Soudan campaign, says the Mahdi will be up again shortly and wants to finish him off. To a party at Mrs. T.'s, where I met Lessar, the Russian agent. He looks his character all over, being a little, inquisitive, dark, furtive man; but in conversation he talks frankly enough. I had a few words with him about the collision between East and West. 'But what are we to do,' he asked, 'when the East won't be quiet and we come into collision?' I said, 'The West should retire.'

"30th April.—Things already look more like peace with Russia, and I am inclined to think the whole thing has been got up by Gladstone in order to get himself out of the Soudan. I met that great man this afternoon in Pall Mall; he was nearly run over by a cab crossing in front of the Athenaeum, and I followed him down the steps, past the Duke of York's Column, and along Whitehall to Downing Street. He did not see me, but walked on, black and gloomy, in black, ill-fitting clothes, like a school-master or an undertaker. He was followed at a distance of twenty yards by a detective in plain clothes, who eyed me suspiciously, especially when I crossed between him and his charge, who, taking out his latchkey, let himself in at the garden gate and disappeared.

"1st May.—Button says it is all off with the Turks now, and Hassan Fehmy wants to be away

## *A Spoke in Wolseley's Wheel*

back to Constantinople. Two days ago I wrote a violent letter to the 'Times' about the atrocities in the Soudan, and I have arranged with Labouchere that when it appears he shall follow it up in the House of Commons. I alluded in my letter to the story of the reward offered at Suakin for human hands. F. P. tells me it was C. who paid the money for them.

"Button tells me that Mr. Gladstone writes every day to Stead refuting his advocacy of Russia. But I am not sure the Government has not put Stead up to it, so as to prepare for a withdrawal from the quarrel.

"*4th May.*—My letter was printed in the 'Times' this morning. To the House of Commons, and saw Morley walking with Brett. I had begged him to put a question to Government about a plan which has been announced for surrounding and capturing Osman Digna. He told me he had not put the question publicly, but had received a private assurance that no attack on Osman Digna was intended; so I hope we have put a spoke in Wolseley's wheel. Brett told me the same thing.

"*5th May.*—It is announced that Wolseley's expedition is postponed, and so my letter seems to have succeeded. Mr. Gladstone made a statement last night entirely backing out of his quarrel with Russia, and during the debate that followed Randolph made a remarkable speech, the most important I have heard him make. It was well prepared and considered, and was very well received; but it was not oratory of the first water. As to the matter, it was a violent attack on Russia, with jingo talk about India. I did not wholly sympathize with this, but it will certainly have put him on a higher platform with his party.

"Lady C. sees old Lucan very frequently, and he

## *A Talk with Parnell*

tells her all the War Office secrets, and she told me they intended a *coup* at Suakin. But I hope we have put a stop to that. The Prince of Wales has been to see her, and she asked him about my going to the Levee and what uniform I should wear. He said that, as I had been five years in diplomacy, I was entitled to wear the diplomatic. So I shall go to it, as I am coming out as a Home Ruler. It seems he is quite pacified about me now, but is only urgent that I should attend a levee. Old Lucan is very warlike, would like—'By God!'—to go at the Russians again himself. He is the last at the Horse Guards who was a general in the Crimean War. He is eighty.

"*6th May.*—General Graham has bungled the whole campaign at Suakin. Alan Charteris, who has come home from there, says all the troops are disgusted and want the thing to end. There have been letters in the same sense from up the Nile, where the men are living, or rather dying, in bell tents. George Wyndham is enthusiastic about the Arabs, I am glad to hear. Wolseley keeps on board ship at Suakin, pretending he is unwell.

"Saw Labouchere, who was starting to lay the foundation stone of a Primitive Methodist Chapel. 'To such things,' he said, 'we are reduced at election time.'

"Met Parnell by appointment at the House of Commons, and walked up and down the central lobby with him. He told me that it would not do my standing for an Irish constituency; there were too many jealousies, and an Englishman would be looked upon as an interloper, whoever he was. Everybody was wanting to be in Parliament, and he was afraid of giving a cause of disunion. 'My countrymen,' he said, 'have the weakness of quarrel-

## *A Victory over Women and Children*

ling with each other; it is their national defect.' 'Like the Arabs,' I remarked. Then he corrected himself, as if he had said too much. 'Besides,' he said, 'we have always been betrayed by all the English who have gone with us—every one. Sometimes by our own people, but always by the English.' I said; 'I think you need not fear that in my case.' 'No,' he said, 'I do not doubt you; but it would be difficult to make the others understand. For this reason I do not propose that you should come forward in Ireland. But if you choose an English constituency I can promise you, wherever it is, the solid Irish vote. You would vote with us on all Irish questions, but we should not ask what you thought on other matters. Get Lord Randolph to nominate you where there are Irish, and I will do all I can for you.' I was struck by Parnell's frankness and straightforwardness in this conversation, and he has a special charm of manner which doubtless gives him his power.

"*7th May*.—An inordinately busy day, caused by the announcement of a new 'victory' of Graham's at Suakin. It is a very bad case, the worst that has happened, for they have surrounded a Bedouin camp, with women and children and cattle, and have fired into the lot, killing a hundred and fifty, and intending to exterminate. This has made me so angry I have not been able to eat all day, and have been galloping over the town getting up an agitation. My first act was to write to Morley. I reminded him of his share in the Alexandrian Bombardment, and called upon him to behave like an honest man and join me. I took the letter to Courtney and showed it to him and his wife, who took the matter up warmly. And they sent me on to Burt, the working-man member; he, too, promised me all assistance.

*"Am I a Tory Democrat?"*

Then I went to Randolph, who was delighted to join in the fray, and who arranged with Northbrook to support any motion for adjournment the Radicals might move. And then to Labouchere and the House of Commons, where I talked to O'Shea<sup>1</sup> and others, so that I got some of all parties to join me. The upshot of it was that at question time Morley asked for explanations, and a nice little discussion followed, and Hartington promised a definite statement of military policy for Monday. This is very satisfactory, but from all I hear we shall have to work hard to stop the war, for Wolseley and Baring<sup>2</sup> are moving heaven and earth to get the campaign renewed, and Hartington and Northbrook are with them. They fancy they can still make something commercially profitable out of the Berber railway, and, what is more important, save their own precious bacon. Gladstone in one of his answers made a quibble which looks specially ominous. He acknowledged his statement of policy made last Monday week, but qualified it by explaining that it was made in connection with the Russian imbroglio. They certainly have it in their minds to renew the war, but Button assures me nothing is yet absolutely decided.

"Randolph, when I saw him, talked over the matter of my going into Parliament. I told him of my conversation yesterday with Parnell, and showed him the paper I drew up a little while ago, headed 'Am I a Tory Democrat?' of which he approved as a possible basis of my joining his party, though he said of course he did not pledge himself to go with me on all points. He objected a little to my using

<sup>1</sup> Captain William O'Shea, M.P., of lugubrious memory. I had been at school with him.

<sup>2</sup> Compare his book "Modern Egypt."

<sup>3</sup> See Appendix.

## *Educating the Tory Party*

the word Home Rule. 'I know, of course,' he said, 'it must come to this, but we haven't educated the Party up to it yet, and it would have been better to use some vaguer expression.' Also he thought the allusion to Midlothian was unnecessary, or I might have said: 'If there was anything good in the Midlothian doctrines.' Nevertheless he was pleased with the paper as a whole, and promised me all his support and gave me Middleton's<sup>1</sup> address at St. Stephen's Chambers, and authorized me to tell him that he had sent me to arrange for a constituency, and that I should be of very great value to the Conservative Party. This is, perhaps, the very best combination I could have, for it leaves me absolutely free, and I come in as an independent Member on all points on which I care to be independent. The only question is, 'Shall I come in?' Randolph also showed me a letter he had received from Sir Frederic Roberts<sup>2</sup> about the state of the army in India, which was interesting. It urged, of course, a large increase of forces if we were to fight the Russians; but it was a sensible letter. It said that the native army was less good than it looked; some regiments were very good, but not by any means all. I feel confident I shall get on with Randolph; all his instincts are right ones, and he has courage and is absolutely the reverse of a prig.

"*8th May.*—Morley has written a line, saying he will bring on the question of Graham's victory [over the women and children] again to-night, and has appointed to meet me at one on Monday. I have decided to go to the Levee that day, as it will be necessary if I am to stand as a Conservative, especially as a Home Rule Conservative.

<sup>1</sup> The Conservative Party agent.

<sup>2</sup> Field-Marshal Lord Roberts.

## *At a Meeting in Birmingham*

"Had some conversation with Frederic Harrison in the Park. At two I went to the Peace Association, and arranged for a special meeting to-morrow to protest against a renewal of the Soudan War. There I learned that there was to be a great meeting at the Town Hall, Birmingham, and I made up my mind to go down there and move a resolution. This I did. The meeting was a fairly large one, perhaps 2,000 people, nearly all enthusiastic Gladstonians, and the object was to congratulate Mr. Gladstone on his adhering to principle in settling the Russian quarrel by arbitration. I asked the Chairman to let me move my resolution against the Soudan War, and with some difficulty he consented, for it was not in the order of the day, and he thought it might disturb the harmony of the occasion. But my speech was a great success, and I carried my resolution almost unanimously. It was as follows: 'That this Meeting deplores the renewal by Lord Wolseley of the war in the Soudan, and calls upon Mr. Gladstone to fulfil his promise of peace by recalling Lord Wolseley without delay, and opening friendly negotiations with the Soudanese leaders.' It was a bold move, but it succeeded, and I was much congratulated after it; and several persons expressed to me their sympathy with Arabi and their desire to have him back in Egypt. I came back to London by the night train.

"*9th May.*—Rode in the park, where Frederic Harrison introduced me to Lord Dalhousie, with whom I talked about the possibility of negotiating with the Mahdi. It seems he has Mr. Gladstone's ear, and it may do some good. I forgot to say that yesterday I called on Middleton, the Conservative agent, and arranged with him that I should stand for one of the Liverpool wards, if he could arrange it



## *Hartington surrenders*

with the Conservatives there. I told him my ideas freely, and he seemed quite reasonable; Randolph had seen him and explained the whole position to him. So that thing is settled. I don't know whether I shall gain most or lose most by being in Parliament, but I am determined, if I do get there, to lead the Party in their foreign politics and about India.

"10th May.—Randolph at the Carlton Club talked again about my parliamentary prospects, and suggested Southwark as a likely constituency. I hear, through John Pollen and Ripon, that it is settled to evacuate the Soudan.

"11th May.—A great and memorable Monday. The 'Daily News' gave a hint this morning that things stood as John said yesterday, and that the Government had resolved on a surrender. I went early to Wentworth to arrange with him to move an amendment to a motion Lord Wemyss is bringing on in the Lords about the Berber Railway, and then to the Courtneys'. They seemed ignorant of any pacific intention on the Government's part; as also was, or pretended to be, Morley, whom I met at half past twelve by appointment at the House of Commons. I coached him in the speech he was intending to make against a continuation of the war. But I think now he must have been prepared for what was coming, though probably not for all. Then at half-past four I went again to the House, and was fortunate enough to find Edward Ponsonby, who gave me the very best seat in the distinguished strangers' gallery. From this point of vantage I listened to every word. We were all prepared for a surrender, but nobody dreamed of its being so complete. Hartington had written his speech out beforehand and delivered it plainly, even baldly, and I don't know but what the effect was better than if he

### *Mr. Gladstone on Proteus*

had used eloquence. At any rate we believed him, as we should not have believed Mr. Gladstone. They are to clear out of the Soudan, bag and baggage, at the very first rising of the Nile; they are to abandon the Berber Railway and everything, except just Suakin, till such times as they can make other arrangements with a 'civilized Power.' Percy Wyndham asked a question about this, and whether Suakin was not part of the Ottoman Empire; and Gladstone gave him one of his roundabout answers: he thought that Suakin was generally 'conceived' to belong to Turkey. However, Hartington's declaration was a great ministerial success, and I went home feeling that at last I had won a real victory.

"Dined with Lady C., who told me that Mr. Gladstone had been to see her on Saturday, and she had attacked him on his wickedness in killing the Arabs, and told him a number of home truths. He took it all in good part however. She asked him what he thought of me, saying we were friends. He answered that I was 'personally a charming person, but on politics mad.' Mad people think others mad.

"*12th May.*—What Lady C. told me yesterday gave me the fortunate inspiration to write to Downing Street to congratulate Mr. Gladstone on the abandonment of the war, and to add a copy of the new edition of my sonnets; and two hours later I got a reply from Eddy, evidently in great good humour, saying that the gift was appreciated, and Mr. Gladstone 'would turn with pleasure from the Soudan to Proteus.' These little interchanges of courtesy in war time are agreeable, and the Old Man appreciates them, looking on all politics as he does in the light of a debating club.

"Went to the Levee to-day for the first time for fifteen or sixteen years. When it was over Staal

## *Tennis at Hampton Court*

ran out after me and warmly entreated me to come and see him. Down to Crabbet in high spirits.

"*13th May.*—Ibrahim informed me yesterday that he had received an invitation from the Sultan, conveyed to him through Jowdat, to go to Constantinople and be one of his secretaries, and he asked my advice about accepting. He said he was afraid of what might happen, it was such a very risky thing, Court favour. I said that, if he looked to his own interest he had better go and take the chance, but that if he really had ideas of patriotism he had better stay and be ready to carry a message when required to the Mahdi. I could not advise him; he must judge for himself. He says for the present he will stay.

"To London, and called on Mrs. Howard, who is very angry at my arrangement with Randolph. 'You must expect no more sympathy,' she said, 'in this house.' However, we parted friends. George, whom I met yesterday at the Levee, had told her about it. George says I am right and rejoices, and says I shall ruin the Tory Party.

"*15th May.*—Went down with Percy Wyndham to Hampton Court to see the last day of the great tennis match between Lambert and Petitt. It was worth any trouble to see, being quite a unique occasion, and I suppose the tennis court at Hampton Court has not for a hundred years seen such an assembly. Not only were the dedans and side galleries filled, but the other galleries over the pent houses had been fitted up with double rows of seats, all crammed. The play, too, was probably the strongest, if not the best, ever seen since tennis was invented. Curiously enough the young man's play, which has been described as more Lambertish than Lambert's, struck me as the less unclassic of the

## *Lambert and Petitt*

two. I have never admired Lambert's style, and Petitt has a really splendid stroke on the floor when he chooses. In return Lambert was throughout over-matched, Petitt having an astonishing judgement and precision. The game, however, to eyes used to the French style, is spoilt by the perpetual underhand service, which gives no scope to the first stroke; it consisted in a succession of these with a boasted return—boasted from the gallery wall. This is and must be ugly, but no other return is possible. Arthur Balfour, Alfred Lyttelton, Heathcote, and all the players and amateurs were there, and we came back in the train with the little American who brought Petitt over, and who told us Petitt's history. He was a Sussex boy, perhaps Kent, and had been merely engaged at fifteen to sweep out the court under one Hulse at Boston. Hulse would not even let him play, and he taught himself at odd moments. He never played with any one who could take less than thirty from him till he came to England. All which makes his success more miraculous. He is now twenty-four.

"Dined with Settna and some Indians and Indian sympathisers, Clark, Digby, Wood, Foggo, etc., at the National Liberal Club, where we indulged in some rather wild talk about Indian reform.

"*16th May.*—Button has come back from Ireland, and I am glad of it, as I find it difficult to get on without him. He tells me the Russian difficulty is not yet over. Randolph Churchill's violent letter, published yesterday in the 'Times,' was not a mere hasty ebullition, but Randolph showed it about to his friends before sending it in. These advised him to cut out the offensive passages, but he deliberately left them in as he considered they would tell with the electors.

## *A great Comedian*

"Harrison tells me that Gladstone explains his rejection of my offers of negotiation by saying he does not believe those who made them through me are really in communication with the Mahdi. Called on Staal and talked the whole situation over with him. He tells me his Government seems to be making new difficulties, more than he himself thinks justified.

"17th May, Sunday.—In my conversation with Staal yesterday we discussed the Egyptian situation. He was very curious to know if Mr. Gladstone was serious at last about evacuating the Soudan; and I told him that he was,—as serious, that is, as he ever is. 'He is a great comedian,' Staal said, 'but I was shocked, when he made his speech on Monday week, at his extraordinary statement of the position on the Afghan frontier. And I don't know what to believe now about his intentions in Egypt. There are the three questions of the Soudan, Egypt, and the Suez Canal. About Egypt, I understand that it will eventually be neutralized; and so will the Canal. But what will become of the Soudan?' I said: 'They will certainly end by coming to terms with the Mahdi; there is no other course.' 'But will not the Mahdi invade Egypt?' 'No, if you will establish a popular government.' He said he believed the European Governments would be quite willing. About the Canal, he remarked, the principal difficulty was who should garrison it. The Sultan insisted upon doing this. I said it required no garrison more than the Canal Company's police; and as for the Sultan, '*On pourrait passer outre.*' This, to which he agreed, is certainly how it will be arranged sooner or later.

"Luncheon at Lady Dorothy Nevill's. Drummond Wolff, Lord Haddington, Jeune, and Ford, just

## *Duke of Argyll's Eloquence*

named Minister at Madrid. Randolph came in late. Afterwards I looked in on Lothian,<sup>1</sup> and tried to get him to take an interest in negotiations with the Mahdi. His mind, however, is all in a muddle, though he is well disposed on the main points; and as he is rather a close friend of Lord Salisbury's we may perhaps get something from him in the debate in the Lords to-morrow. It seems odd to me to be talking seriously with him on serious political questions after all these years.

"18th May.—Anne went to the Drawing Room. In the afternoon Lord Wemyss brought on his Soudan motion in the House of Lords, and Wentworth opposed it. Wentworth's speech was good in substance, but it rather unnecessarily jarred in tone upon the noble Lords it was addressed to, and called down a thunderbolt from the Duke of Argyll who followed. The Duke's oration was splendid as a work of art, well reasoned, eloquent in every mood, and most impassioned. Though I did not agree with a word of the argument, I could not help admiring him; but the whole discussion was, as Wentworth said, academical, and will have no effect whatever on public opinion. There is no possibility now of a conquest of Africa, in the interests of civilization, being undertaken by England; the only danger is from a commercial company, to support which a promoter called upon me this afternoon. He thought I might use my influence with Osman Digna to get him to help a railway to Berber as a commercial speculation, but I of course declined to have anything at all to do with it.

"I dined after the debate, which we had listened

<sup>1</sup> Schomberg, 9th Marquess of Lothian. I had been with him as his fellow *attaché* at the Frankfort Legation in 1861-2, when we had been close friends.

## *The Foreign Office Polite*

to together, with Percy Wyndham at the Travellers. He encourages me much to go into Parliament in support of Randolph, of whom he has a high opinion. 'You two,' he said, 'if you will stick to your principle of telling the truth at all cost, may yet save England.' Only can I get into Parliament really on my own terms? Philip Currie was dining at another table, and I had some conversation with him about Egypt and the Afghan question. He is very polite to me now, and urges me also to go into Parliament. He is very scornful about the Government, but I believe a good deal of the trouble has been due to his own mismanagement at the Foreign Office.

"*19th May.*—George Wyndham, I am glad to say, is ordered home again from Suakin, and there is every reason to believe nothing more will be done against the Arabs. Down to Crabbet and dined with Locker at Rowfant. Harrison advises me to write what I have to say about negotiation to Mr. Gladstone—and publish it.

"*20th May.*—Dined at Francis Buxton's, a Radical I like particularly. He was very urgent I should stand for Parliament; Cyril Flower said he could put me into a safe seat as a Radical. I am like a donkey between two bundles of hay—very like the donkey.

"*21st May.*—Yesterday we had an Indian meeting in my house to present Mr. Settna with an address on his return to India, and it was turned into an address to myself by the Indians present. I made them a speech in reply which was well received, and advised them to agitate continually till they got their rights, as there was no party in England which would do anything for them from any other motive than fear. Some of them complained that Randolph Churchill, whom I had been extolling as a sym-

## *Churchill promises Indian Inquiry*

pathiser, had not said a word yet of his desire to help them. And I wrote to him this morning, *à propos* of a speech he made last night declaring for freedom in Egypt and Ireland, and begged him to take an opportunity soon of saying a word for India; and I met him this afternoon at the Carlton Club, and he promised me to second Slagg's motion for an inquiry into the Indian Government. This is capital, and encourages me to go on with him in earnest. Sir Robert Peel was there, very amusing, both of them cutting their jokes at the old Tories. 'There won't be half a dozen of them,' Randolph said, 'in the next Parliament.' He also declared he would contest Birmingham at all hazards, and expressed his certainty of turning the Government out at the elections. Now he is off to Paris for a run and to find out what the new French policy is. The House adjourns to-morrow. Wagram has arrived from Paris, looking for a house for the summer. We dined together at St. James's Club.

"Mr. Egmont Hake called to-day to consult me on various points connected with the 'Gordon Diaries' he is publishing. He admits that Gordon made great mistakes at Khartoum, both as to men and things. I have promised him a narrative of my efforts at negotiation for his book.

"*22nd May, and later.*—Spent the day with Wagram looking for houses at Ascot and Windsor. We drove through Windsor Park, which is certainly the finest thing of its sort in the world. Then down with him to Crabbet, where he spent Whitsuntide with us. During the week there was absolutely no move on the political chess-board except that the evacuation of Dongola is being hurried on, and the evacuation of Suakin stayed—both in accordance with my programme. Randolph has gone to Paris, where



### *Morley regrets his Action in Egypt*

Victor Hugo is dead; and Hartington and Dilke to Ireland, where Healy is very much alive. There is an absolute calm after the storm, and the only rock ahead is a threat by Chamberlain of resignation on the Crimes Act.

"*31st May.*—To London to get news. Button was away, and London nearly empty, but by great luck I hit upon Gregory just returned from Ireland, and Churchill just returned from Paris. I met Gregory in the street, and we sat together for half an hour in Hyde Park. He has seen Morley lately, and finds him quite ready to go against Tewfik, and has put him in favour of Halim and Arabi's return. Morley quite admits now that it would have been possible to get on with Arabi three years ago, and regrets the part he took against him, which he excuses on the ground of wanting information.

"Churchill, whom I found at the Carlton Club, approves of a move now in favour of Arabi, and advises me to make war on Ismail, whom the 'Pall Mall' is working for. He also tells me Middleton, the Conservative agent, is very keen about my joining the Party, and promises to see that the matter of my candidature is settled soon. He will come to Crabbet for a symposium I am proposing for one of the Sundays of June or July. The persons to be invited are Staal, Churchill, Morley, Lothian, Harrison, George Howard, Burt, Parnell, Pembroke, Gregory, Stanley of Alderley, Percy Wyndham, Hobart, and Morris. [This imagined party never came to anything on account of the political upset which immediately afterwards happened. If I remember rightly I did not even issue all the invitations.]

"*2nd June.*—To London again for the day, but it is like a city of the dead. The only person I saw was Mrs. Howard. She is half inclined now to for-

## *Chamberlain's Orchid Mania*

give me my political errors, and has invited me to Castle Howard for next month. She has been seeing something lately of Chamberlain, whom she attacked about his orchid mania. But he defends himself by saying he has had an horticultural passion all his life; when he was a little boy he used to spend his pennies in the market buying pots of daisies.

"*4th June.*—Randolph has made a capital speech, with a declaration of Conservative policy, including an inquiry into the Government of India and a sort of Home Rule for Ireland. As regards Egypt, he is for arranging matters with the Sultan, and retaining with his consent the protection of Egypt. He is educating the Tory Party, and I am educating him.

"*5th June.*—Called on Middleton, the Conservative agent, and told him I could accept Randolph's programme almost as it stood, and would write in that sense. He tells me there is a difficulty about finding me a Conservative seat with my views on Irish Home Rule. But he asked me to give him a little longer to make inquiries. He still thinks there may be an opening at Liverpool, or he might find me a place where I could stand as an independent candidate with a Tory vote.

"Dined with Whittaker at the Salisbury Club in St. James's Square. Hobart and his wife were there, and Villiers the correspondent of the 'Illustrated London News,' just back from the Nile campaign. Villiers gave me much interesting information. He considers the campaign redounds greatly to Wolseley's credit, and the credit of all concerned. Like most correspondents he is more warlike than any soldier, would have eaten the Arabs' livers if he could, and has been in all the battles. At the same time he says the power of the Mahdi is quite un-

### *Reward for Olivier Pain Dead or Alive*

broken. The Mahdi is a man of genius and has never made a mistake, and his movement is the most important there has ever been in Africa. I asked him about the reported losses of Arabs in battle, and he said they had been absurdly exaggerated. He knew how generals liked to make big things out of small ones, and he was quite sure, from first to last and including both campaigns at Suakin and the Nile, the total Arab loss was under 5,000. This has consoled me much. He was at Tamaï last year when the British square was broken, and he is sure there were not above 600 Arabs who made the charge, nor more than 5,000 altogether opposed to Graham.

"About Sir Charles Wilson's delay in reaching Khartoum, he said that Wilson's fault, if any, was in not pushing home the attack on Metemmeh. He had attacked Metemmeh, meaning to take it, but found the place too strong, and after the repulse it would have been very imprudent to send the steamers away directly, as it would have invited attack on the camp. Metemmeh, therefore, and Shendi had to be shelled; Khartoum could have been taken by the Arabs at any time. The Intelligence Department had been wrong throughout. Villiers seems an intelligent fellow, and, as I have said, a fire-eating warrior. So his evidence goes for much. He told me it was certainly true that a reward of £50 had been offered for Olivier Pain, dead or alive. It was Wolseley issued it, 'and quite right too, the man being a soldier of fortune.' He himself would have been 'delighted to put a bullet through him, and drag him into camp by the heels.' Such are the amenities of 'war which is not war.'

"6th June.—Luncheon in Belgrave Square. George Wyndham has written from Suakin, very angry with

## *Defeat of the Government*

me for saying in the 'Times' that money had been paid for dead Arabs' hands. Only one hand had been brought in, and it was not of a dead but of a live Arab whom they had gone out and brought in alive to camp, and nothing was paid for the hand. But that does not prevent C. from having done the thing last year. Met Harry Brand in Piccadilly and walked with him up Bond Street. I told him I thought Randolph the only man who would push reform. But he said the Government would be in for ever, they would get a majority of fifty more than they had now after the elections. To a great party at the Foreign Office for the Queen's birthday.

"*8th June.*—Crabtree. I have finished my letter to Randolph (the one intended for publication as a manifesto of my opinions), and have written to him to say I will bring it him to-morrow. He has made another wonderful speech at Cambridge. I am convinced he will carry the Tory Party through at the elections.

"*9th June.*—This morning the astonishing news came of the Government's defeat on the Budget. Nobody at all expected it, and it looks very like a put-up business. People in London, however, say the reason is that the Whigs and Radicals have got rusty about voting, having been sent for so often to defend motions of censure, and now they did not believe in the danger. Anyhow, the Government are out, and the Carlton Club is agog with delight.

"I went up by the early train to London, and my first visit was to Randolph, the hero of the moment (whom I found still in bed). I must say there never was a man with his head turned less by success than he. We talked for half an hour, and he read me a very curious letter which arrived while I was with him from Lepel Griffin. It contained a scheme of

## *Churchill on the Situation*

policy for Afghanistan which was briefly this: The Amir's reception at Rawal Pindi has been a failure and a mistake; too much fuss had been made with him, and it had offended the other native princes. Scindia had said it was ridiculous, and the Maharajah of Cashmere had refused to come. None of the princes of India were really loyal, except the Punjabis. The rest disliked us, 'though,' said Griffin, 'I made the most of their loyalty in my article to encourage them.' His article was one about the native army. His scheme for Afghanistan was this: he would come to an understanding with Russia for its partition, making over to her the Turcoman provinces and keeping Candahar and Kabul with the Hindoo Kush for a frontier. This was, I remember, exactly Lytton's scheme of securing a 'scientific frontier.' Griffin, however, would give Constantinople to Russia. To this Randolph objected, but he approved of keeping Candahar, or rather of taking it. I dissuaded him, however, strongly from meddling with the Afghans, and offered to find out from Jemal-ed-Din in what way we could make friends with them, and who would be the most popular Amir to succeed Abd-el-Rahman, if, as Randolph said was likely soon, he should die.

"We then talked about the prospects of a change of Government, and he told me the Conservatives would take office and that all had been arranged. But they did not wish it known, and had sent word to the 'Pall Mall' that they did not mean to come in. Randolph counts on having a voice in Foreign Affairs, and he asked me whether I would go on a mission to the Mahdi. I said I would if sent as a regular envoy. Also there will be no coercion in Ireland. He read my letter, which I had brought with me, and approved of it all. 'I agree with it all,' he said;

## *Bright's Letter to Gladstone*

but he asked me to leave out the words 'Home Rule' in what I said about Ireland, and insert the words 'than you *apparently* are *yet* prepared for.' He also assured me he was keeping Middleton up to the mark about my candidature, and again recommended Southwark. We agreed that I should send my letter to the 'Times' to-night for publication.

"Then to Button in the City, and arranged about publishing the letter; and then to Mrs. Howard. She dined last night with Hartington and Granville and Bright, and assured me they had been all as merry and unconscious of danger as men could be. Bright told her he was at the Cabinet which decided on the bombardment of Alexandria; but Lord Granville had assured him that it would not really take place, and it had long ago been settled that he was to leave the Cabinet on the first shot fired in any war. It had been a cause of grief and tears with him to watch the slaughter which had since occurred, but he had not had the heart to stand up and denounce his former friends. He had, however, written to Mr. Gladstone after the war to say that if he allowed Arabi to be tried by the Egyptian Government it would be a 'lasting infamy.' I am asked to Castle Howard for 21st July.

"Back to Crabbet. We have arranged two parties: one for Staal on the 27th, the other for Randolph on the 4th. Staal did not fancy meeting Randolph, so we have asked them for separate days. Also a third for the Club on the 11th of July.

"11th June.—Anniversary of the Alexandria riots. Arabi is very nearly now avenged. I shall send a copy of my letter to Randolph to Lothian, that he may show it to Lord Salisbury, who will probably have the Foreign Office. Barring accidents, we must win now; at least we have gained this—Granville

## *Shakespeare in Coombe Wood*

will *never* be in office again till time shall be no more.

"To London. Harry Brand professes himself in high delight at being out of office, and I fancy there was a little hocus-pocus in the Government defeat. To Coombe, where we saw 'As You Like It' acted in the open air. I cannot call it a success; I dislike Shakespeare on the stage, and especially his comedies. His long-winded Elizabethan jokes after these three hundred years are inexpressibly flat, and this 'As You Like It' is full of them. Then the open-air representation gave only the forest scenes, and was a bit monotonous. I doubt if anything is gained by its being out of doors. The *coup d'œil* was pretty enough, but in no way reminded one of a forest, and the actors looked even less real than on a regular stage. The place chosen was no part of Coombe Wood, but a suburban garden with lime trees, pretty but tame. The ground, littered with dry fern, looked like a farmyard, and the actors, wading about in it, out of place and a trifle absurd. The acting was ordinary English acting, that is to say bad—mostly professional. Lady Archie's<sup>1</sup> was certainly the best; she is a tall, graceful woman, with a good stage voice, and made herself well heard. These are my criticisms, but the day was perfect—chequered sunlight and shade, with birds singing, and I enjoyed it very much.

"Dined with Anne at the Russian Embassy. A pleasant family dinner, nobody there but ourselves, a secretary, and Monsieur de Lessar. We talked the political situation over freely, and my impression is that Lord Salisbury will have trouble in finishing the Afghan frontier dispute. Staal is evidently much roughed up, especially against Randolph; and when

<sup>1</sup> Lady Archibald Campbell.

## *Madame de Novikof*

I asked him whether he would like to meet him at Crabbet he said he would rather not. He would, however, like to meet some Conservatives of position; so I have asked Lothian and Pembroke. We talked about Madame de Novikof, and he acknowledged that she had been very useful to Russian diplomacy. There was talk also about Ismail in a tone which convinces me that Ismail is the Russian candidate. There is a Christian conspiracy against Islam here in England, consisting of Madame de Novikof, Stead, and Ismail as the Sultan's chief enemy. Staal said to me: 'What they reproach you with is that having been against the Sultan you have now gone over to him.' He must have got this from these three.

"*12th June.*—My letter to Randolph is in the 'Times.' I have sent copies of it to Lucknow, Bombay, Colombo, and Constantinople; also to Sanua and Jemal-ed-Din.<sup>1</sup>

"*14th June, Sunday.*—Crabbet. The 'Observer' has a list of the new Cabinet, which, if true, would suit me well. Randolph at the India Office, Northcote, Foreign Affairs; no mention of Pembroke, however, whom I met on Friday looking very mysterious, as people do who have been talked to about a place but are not sure of getting it.

"*16th June.*—Randolph has made a new row, voting against Northcote with Beach and others. I suppose Lord Salisbury has not recognized the claims and policy of the Fourth Party; it is unfortunate, as it seems to jeopardize the Conservative chance. But I daresay Randolph is right; he is the only man capable of leading the Tories to victory. Lady C. writes that the Prince of Wales is highly pleased with my letter to Randolph.

"*17th June.*—Randolph was right and he has won,

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix.



## *Will Salisbury take Office?*

and nothing he has done yet has given me so high an idea of his genius as a leader. He has brought Lord Salisbury to his own terms. Stafford Northcote is to go to the Lords, and Beach is to lead the Commons as Randolph's lieutenant. All the old generals are to be put on the pension list, and the young fellows to command the battle. This will give the Tory Party a chance at the elections: it would have had none under Northcote. With Randolph at the India Office and, who knows, Drummond Wolff Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, I ought to be able to pull through my programme. At the Radical meeting last night, at St. James's Hall, Vernon Harcourt incautiously mentioned Arabi's name, and it was received with vociferous cheering.

"18th June.—In London. Just saw Randolph at the Carlton Club and congratulated him. But he said: 'It is not a case for congratulations yet. Nothing is settled.' The old fogies at the Carlton are in a great taking about Lord Salisbury having accepted office, and are putting pressure on him to back out of it. It seems there are negotiations going on with Gladstone to know whether he will support the Conservatives on the Budget and other matters, and it is doubtful which way it will go. I had a long talk with Leconfield, who expressed the usual idea—rather frightened at Randolph—would sooner not come into office. Pembroke the same. I am all for a bold course, the only one to win the elections.

"Back to Crabbet; I shall stay here till the crisis is over.

"22nd June.—Had a talk with Ferid Bey, first secretary of the Turkish Embassy, who came down to Crabbet. He is very anxious to find out what Lord Salisbury's policy is likely to be. I sketched to him my idea of a settlement for Egypt; but it is

## *Salisbury a Shy Man*

clear the Turks have but one notion, to get Egypt back 'after the manner of Syria,' which, Ferid says, is 'so well governed.' I explained to him, however, that, unless they could get rid of the debt, they could not get rid of European influence, and for that reason the Sultan must act in concert with some solvent Power, which could guarantee the interest of the loans, and so undertake a joint protection. This could only be England. Acting together, peace could easily be restored in Egypt by the Sultan's appointment of a new Viceroy.

"Lord Salisbury is to come into office. Lothian, whom I met at the Carlton Club, told me it was settled this afternoon. I talked to him about Eastern policy and Lord Salisbury's foreign policy. He tells me the great difficulty with Lord Salisbury is that he is a very shy man, and hardly ever mixes with people out of his own set, so that he does not know the real turn opinion is taking. Also, with regard to Egypt, it will be difficult to get him to go against his words. He was strongly against Arabi before the war, and has always taken the line that the Government's fault was that it did not put him down soon enough. There will be the difficulty. Lothian is coming down to Crabbet next Sunday and we shall then know more about it. In the meanwhile I have written to Jemal-ed-Din, begging him to hold himself in readiness to come over here should he be wanted. The Wagrams have arrived in London.

"23rd June.—Sure enough Lord Salisbury is in office. There is talk of Drummond Wolff going to Egypt in Evelyn Baring's place. At the Carlton I found Middleton, who tells me the Conservatives of Southwark will probably ask me to stand for their division at the elections, and if I can make sure of

## *Randolph to the India Office*

the Irish vote I shall certainly be elected. This sounds well. To a party at Lady Ripon's, where I met divers Radicals—Lyulph Stanley, the Courtneys, Sir George Campbell, and others, all very angry at Randolph's success. There were Indians there too, but these were quite willing to take him as an acquisition; he would be better in any case than Kimberley. The great advantage Randolph has as a reformer is that he has no respect at all for any one older than himself; and I expect when he gets strong in his seat after the elections he will turn the old Indian Council into the street. They say now at the India Office that they know how to manage him, but we shall see. Amongst others at the party was the Duke of Argyll, to whom I was introduced. I began at once with him about his Soudan speech in the House of Lords, and we had a quarter of an hour's argument, during the course of which I told him that the only civilization he was likely to bring to the Arabs was brandy and venereal diseases. It is difficult to keep one's temper with the Duke of Argyll, he is so dictatorial and *cassant* in his manner—the very rudest man I ever talked to. Forster joined us, and I went away without finishing the conversation.

"25th June.—Robert Bourke is appointed Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and I have written to congratulate him. This is a very distinct gain. Also Drummond Wolff goes to Egypt, and Baring is to be recalled. Thus I have many friends in office, for Arthur Balfour also gets a place and Sidney Herbert.

"Called on Button in his new rooms in Northumberland Avenue. He is standing for Clapham. He tells me the Conservatives mean now to pay no attention at all to votes in the House, to be silent in face of resolutions, and if supply is refused to carry

## *Wolff to go to Egypt*

on the Government without it till the elections. They will keep quiet about their foreign policy till the recess, and then they will act vigorously. Drummond Wolff is being sent out as a stop-gap, 'to report.' Baring will certainly be recalled. Eventually the Egyptian question will be settled in accord with the Sultan. Bismarck will support England. They are talking of Lytton for Constantinople, but I advised his going to Vienna and sending Paget to Constantinople. Called also on Percy Wyndham, who is much interested in the way things are turning and my election prospects. I regret immensely that he should be leaving Parliament at the very moment when the outlook is brighter and he likely to be appreciated.

"Lunched at the Alfred Lytteltons—George Curzon, Godfrey Webb, and others there. Met Eddy Hamilton in fine feather coming out of Lord Granville's. He has been made a C.B., which he acknowledges, and given Welby's place at the Treasury, which he does not acknowledge.

"To Drummond Wolff's daughter's wedding; the bridesmaids in yellow, representing the Primrose League. Then to Fulham Palace, where Bee Lascelles, now Mrs. Bishop Temple, was holding a clerical levee, the garden 'crawling alive' with parsons like an ant's nest. I escaped to a side alley, feeling out of my element, and ran up against Frederick Leveson, who had fled there from the same motive. We had not met since the bombardment of Alexandria, but he was glad to find any one to say 'How do you do' to. 'You are the first layman I have met here,' he said; 'it is like a scene out of Trollope.'

"Dined at Frederic Harrison's and sat next Lord Justice Bowen, and talked over Lord Randolph's

### *Gordon's Diaries Published*

character. I think I can see the Radicals are getting a bit uneasy at Randolph's leadership. If he can succeed in striking terror in the enemy, confidence will come to our people and we shall carry the day. Randolph has written, asking me to call on him at the India Office early next week, which is a sign of good things. They all say he will change now he is in office, but we shall see. His note was in answer to one of mine, telling him that Godley was a friend, and asking him to look up the cases of the Civil Service examinations and Holkar's claim. Both these requests were suggested to me by Pollen on Lord Ripon's behalf. Lord Ripon supported both cases, but was thrown over by Lord Kimberley.

"Gordon's Diaries are out. They are excellent reading, and he pitches into Malct and Colvin and Dilke to my heart's content.

"*27th June.*—A party at Crabbet—the Staals and Wagrams, Harry Brand, Stanley of Alderley, and Lothian. I have had much talk with Lothian about the new Conservative policy in Egypt, and have urged him to press on Lord Salisbury the necessity of very careful dealing with the matter, as it is one which might very easily be bungled. It is curious having Lothian down here for the first time after so many years that we have known each other intimately. I find Staal much more peaceably inclined towards the present Ministry. He quite understands Churchill's irresponsibility. He seems to distrust Salisbury the more of the two. 'Now they are in office,' he said, 'I shall have to be friends with them.'

"*28th June, Sunday.*—Button came down, riding from London, and we played lawn tennis. Button rather disquiets me in what he says of Lord Salisbury's intention in Egypt. He has counter-ordered the evacuation of Dongola, and Harry Brand talks

## *Churchill's Plans for India*

of an expedition to Khartoum as an easy matter. I am afraid they may be tempted to humour Wolseley.

"I have been reading Gordon's journals, and find him perpetually calling for Turkish troops. To the last he seems to have underrated his enemy, both physically and morally. What strikes me most in these journals is Gordon's inability to see the far higher moral standing ground of his opponents. I doubt if he understood the letters sent him; they were probably not translated to him fairly, and he never would see any of the Mahdi's men himself. If he had gone to the Mahdi he could not have blinded himself to the elevation of the position the Mahdi claimed as socialistic reformer, and he is content to repeat tales, told him by Greeks and other scoundrels, of the Mahdi putting pepper under his nails to promote tears, and other like absurdities. If ever right triumphed in the world it was at the fall of Khartoum. At the same time the journals make out a far stronger case for Gordon as against the Government than I could have expected.

"*30th June.*—To London, to see Randolph at the India Office. He had just been attending his first council and seemed a little oppressed at the weight of work before him. But he soon cheered up, and talked with his old frankness and fun about his plans: 'I am doing all I can now,' he said, 'of course to humour the people in the Office and get them friendly. But they are very slow, and I can see will prove obstructive. The Secretary of State, however, can always insist, if he chooses, on having his own way; and I mean to have mine. We must do things by degrees. If I was to offer to re-open the question of the Civil Service examinations straight off there would be a howl all over the Office. But I mean to carry

### *Drummond Wolff's Mission*

the Queen's Proclamation into practice, and see that the natives get admitted into the services. I can tell them that through you, but can do no more for the present.'

"I asked him about Holkar's claim. This he professed himself quite ready to support. 'Dufferin has promised me,' he said, 'not to put the settlement of this matter into Durand's hands. All my sympathies are with Holkar.' I told him about Staal's visit and the prospects of peace with Russia, and advised him to have as little to do with the Afghans as he could help. But we did not discuss the subject at length. Then we went on to Egypt, and he said: 'I am very anxious you should see Drummond Wolff without delay. Drummond Wolff is very keen to work in the way we want, and I am beginning to get Lord Salisbury round to our ideas. Lord Salisbury and I are on the best possible terms; like father and son,' he said with a queer smile. Also he went on: 'I told Lord Salisbury we should have to get rid of Tewfik the other day, and it quite startled him. He never seems to have thought of it before, but I think he will come to it; we must do it little by little. My idea about Egypt is—only you must promise me you will not repeat it, for if it was to get about it would spoil everything—that Tewfik should be deposed by the Sultan, and his son put up under English guardianship. We would then recall Arabi, at first as a simple citizen,—afterwards, when we saw how it did, as Minister. But there must be a protectorate.' I said: 'Why not call it something else, an alliance?' 'No,' he said, 'I think it best to call a spade a spade. We will call it what it is, a protectorate.' I said: 'You will require very delicate handling to get the Sultan to do exactly what you want. He is difficult to deal with and a little mad; and whatever

## *A New Egyptian Settlement*

is done should be through his initiative.' To this he entirely agreed.

"He then asked about Dongola and Suakin, whether it would not be best to get the Sultan to occupy them with his troops. With regard to Suakin, I said, 'Certainly, yes; but not Dongola. Any troops left at Dongola would certainly be attacked.' And I strongly advise him to accept Lord Granville's line of Wady Halfa as the boundary of Egypt. If he did so there was very little chance of Egypt being invaded this year. A joint occupation with the Turks in Lower Egypt would be a smaller risk, but I would not advise it. The Sultan's intervention should be a moral one. Randolph is keen also to make peace with the Mahdi, which he said would be a feather in their caps before the election. And he approved the idea of Ibrahim going as forerunner to prepare my way before me. I am to talk all this over, however, with Drummond Wolff when he returns from Woodstock on Saturday, and afterwards see Lord Salisbury. 'You need not mind,' he said, 'putting yourself forward in this matter; you are an authority on Egypt and have a right to be heard.' Nothing could have been more satisfactory than all this conversation. With regard to Ismail, Randolph spoke very strongly: 'I will never consent,' he said, 'to his restoration. I should consider it a personal disgrace to be connected with the restoration of such a scoundrel. As to Halim I know nothing, and I prefer Tewfik's boy with a Regency.' I promised to be secret on all he had told me, and to act in concert with him and Drummond Wolff, and I have written to Wolff to propose seeing him Monday or Tuesday.

"*1st July.*—The 'Times' opens fire at Drummond Wolff, and I fear may spoil our sport, so I have



## *Talk with Drummond Wolff*

written a short letter about the charges against the Khedive, and have sent it to Churchill to know whether he approves its publication. I am for attacking Tewfik now; if they commit themselves with him they will never get rid of him. The 'Morning Post' has an article in favour of Ismaïl. Randolph has sent back word, through Hope (my private secretary), that if I had written my letter a fortnight ago he would have approved it; now he cannot approve it. So I have kept back the letter; it is useless fighting the battle by myself.

"To Argyll Lodge, where I had another talk with the Duke, but in more amicable terms. All the same, it is an uncomfortable house to visit, through the absurd pride of its inhabitants.

"*3rd July*.—Wrote to Robert Bourke giving an account of my correspondence with Downing Street about the Mahdi.

"*4th and 5th July, Sunday*.—Our annual Lawn Tennis meeting; those present were Eddy Hamilton, Wentworth, Frederic Harrison, Elcho, Jack Napier, Mark Napier, Kingscote, Sandys, Seymour, Mallock, Farquhar, Button, and George Dallas.

"Button tells me Randolph has been a great success at the India Office; he has also won his election at Woodstock most triumphantly, and the party prospects are good. Not so I fear those of Egypt. Button talks of their keeping on Tewfik there 'for a year.' If so, he will be kept on altogether.

"*6th July*.—Saw Drummond Wolff at the Carlton Club. He tells me he is going to Constantinople before he goes to Cairo, which is as it should be. He is annoyed at the set made at him in the 'Times,' and I explained to him that 'a Twenty Years' Resident' was none other than our friend Moberly

## *Randolph's First Council*

Bell. He asked me about the possibility of treating with the Mahdi, and I have agreed to bring Jemal-ed-Din from Paris to talk things over with him. We are to have another and more serious discussion of the Egyptian business as soon as he has seen Lord Salisbury.

"Saw Middleton, the Tory agent, who tells me my name is the only one before the Conservatives of Southwark, and they will probably choose me as their candidate. But there are certain 'fossilized Tories' who are suspicious of me.

"Down to Coombe Wood to see Mrs. Batten act Amaryllis in 'The Faithful Shepherdess.' As a *fêerie* it was pretty, much prettier than 'As You Like It.' Mrs. Batten looked very well, but the best was a little Indian lady, calling herself the Princess Helen of Kappartalla, very pretty, very graceful, and clever. The piece, like the other, was spoilt by the professionals. When it was over I stopped to dine with Bertram Currie [N.B.—He was member of the Indian Council], whose house was close by. Bertram gave me an account of Randolph's first council at the India Office, which took place on Tuesday just before I saw him. Bertram's account was that he was much frightened and said nothing, absolutely nothing. To him, Bertram, he was very humble in a private interview afterwards: 'There is one thing,' Randolph had said, 'of which I am profoundly ignorant, and that is finance.' And so he will be humble till the day he feels his legs and can strike them. According to Button, he has held the same language with Ashley Eden and Rawlinson and all of them.

"*7th July*.—Lord Salisbury has made his statement about Egypt, which is far from satisfactory, inasmuch as he engages himself to support Tewfik. It makes a true settlement once more impossible.

## *Sir Stafford Northcote*

Nothing, however, can be done but to accept the position, and I shall not move further in the matter till I am in Parliament. There are difficulties at Southwark, which wants a 'fossilized Tory'; still, Middleton thinks it all right. If I don't get in this time I shall leave English politics alone, as I am too old to wait for another chance. Perhaps it will be better so, and in any case I leave it to God's providence for good or for evil.

"*8th July.*—To a political meeting at East Grinstead, where I made my maiden speech as a Conservative. This commits me to party politics, a thing I have avoided all my life.

"*9th July.*—Ibrahim has received a letter from Jemal-ed-Din hinting that, if nothing is done in Egypt in the sense we hope for from Randolph, he will go off to Afghanistan to raise up trouble against England. I have consequently written to Wolff, urging him to get Lord Salisbury to commence negotiations with the Mahdi and sending him my correspondence with Downing Street.<sup>1</sup>

"Dined at the Gaskells with Anne, and took in Lady Iddesleigh, late Lady Northcote,<sup>2</sup> and she questioned me closely about the Mahdi and the Sultan and Arabi; and afterwards I had some conversation, and Anne had more, with her husband, who is now Foreign Secretary. Lady Iddesleigh professed great sympathy with Arabi, and with my ideas generally of a settlement. She also said she thought it would be a good thing to get Tewfik to retire on an honourable pension. She is a chatty old woman of the old-fashioned sort, and talked nicely and simply of her pleasure in Sir Stafford's being made an earl. His relations had always looked for a

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix.

<sup>2</sup> Stafford Northcote had just been created Earl of Iddesleigh.

### *Wolseley returns from the War*

peccage for him, and an earldom of Iddesleigh had long been an extreme ambition. His lordship seems to have talked in much the same strain to Anne about Egypt, and I augur well of their willingness to converse. My taking Lady Iddesleigh in to dinner was evidently pre-arranged, as it was not properly my place.

"The Mahdi's death is reported, and the arrival of Huseyn Khalifa at Alexandria to tender submission to Tewfik. But Ibrahim says he must have brought a summons to the Khedive to become a Moslem.

"*13th July.*—Went to see Wolseley arrive from Egypt at Victoria Station. There was no great crowd, perhaps two hundred persons on the platform and three hundred outside. There was a feeble attempt at cheering from his friends, and I heard a few hoots, certainly no enthusiasm. Wolseley looked older than when he went away, and rather careworn. Last time he came back from Egypt it was for a ridiculous triumph down Pall Mall, with the Grand Old Man waving his handkerchief like a madman from a window, fresh from Tel-el-Kebir. Now he drives away from the station with half a dozen little boys running after his carriage. I like him better as he is. I should like best of all to see him hanged.

"*14th July.*—To Middleton's at twelve o'clock to hear my fate at Southwark. I don't think it has been Middleton's fault, but the Southwark electors at a meeting last night were told I was an out and out Home Ruler, and that frightened them out of their wits, and they have selected another candidate. I see nothing for it but to put up with the disappointment. My failure to get into Parliament will put an end to my political career, as I have pretty well exhausted the good I can do with letter writing in the 'Times,' and require a new weapon.

## *To stand for Camberwell*

"16th July.—A deputation has come to me from Camberwell, which has been offered to me instead of Southwark. I told them very frankly what my position and views were: that I was a Roman Catholic and Home Ruler in Ireland, but a devout believer in Randolph and Church and State in England. They asked me whether I was in favour of Fair Trade and duties on imported manufactures. And I said that if the Conservative Government proposed such duties I would support them; but I was not clear how Fair Trade would work. They asked next about Sir Wilfrid Lawson's Local Option. I said I had no intention of voting for it. This is the only point on which I have had a doubt, but I think I am not called upon to vote for this particular Bill. After all, England is a Christian country and must have its beer.

"On Ireland they were at first a little staggered by my using the word 'Home Rule,' but I said I preferred to call a spade a spade; and I believe the Irish were right in asking a separate Parliament. I did not wish for a complete separation.

an advocate for the right of nations to govern themselves, and I could make no exception about I.

On the School Board quarrel I was entirely with them, and I think it a real good fortune for me to have this particular cause to defend of religious education, for it is one I wholly sympathize with, and it is of a piece with my Mohammedan teaching in India. Finally, after an hour and a half's talk, we parted mutually satisfied, and I am to attend a local meeting this day week and give my final answer. I am to pay my own expenses, but they have promised me an easy time of it in the way of work.

"This settled, I went at once to Randolph at the India Office and told him all, and agreed with him

### *Churchill to recommend me*

that he should write a letter to the Camberwell Committee congratulating them on their choice of me as candidate. I found Randolph very cheerful: 'They will never make an official of *me*,' he said, with a funny smile. We talked about Egypt: 'Tewfik,' I said, 'will be a terrible handicap to Lord Salisbury's programme; but I suppose you are obliged to keep him.' 'We shall see about that,' he answered; 'only we must have patience. Drummond Wolff is the man to get it done through.' Then he asked about Arabi, whether I would answer for him as honest, and he would work with us in an honest way; and I said 'he would for the good of the country, but not to prepare the way for annexation.' About his own department he told me he was in great trouble to know what sort of game the Amir was playing in Afghanistan, and he asked me to try and get him information. And I offered to bring Jemal-ed-Din from Paris, and talk that matter and Egypt over with him. He was much pleased at this, and said he would see him at my house. I expect the India Office people are a bit frightened at my coming to see Randolph, but they are extremely polite to me.

"Later I met Wolff at the Carlton Club. He wanted to know whether Arabi would come back to serve under Tewfik, and whether he would serve with Sherif or Nubar. I said I would find out, and I have written to Arabi asking him, and begging him to telegraph 'Yes' or 'No.' Wolff also wanted to hear about the Mahdi. 'Lord Salisbury will hear what Wolseley and Baring have to say,' he said, 'but he won't necessarily do what they advise; and if he wishes, he will make peace with the Mahdi in spite of them.' I promised Wolff to introduce some people at Constantinople who could be of use there. All this sounds well. Then I saw Huntley McCarthy

## Castle Howard

and arranged with him about the Camberwell Irish, of whom there seem to be a thousand or so. [N.B.—This was a great exaggeration.] And then to Cardinal Manning, who gave me his best wishes and promised to write to the Camberwell priest.

"18th July.—To Castle Howard, travelling in company with Mrs. Morris. In the carriage with us were the Speaker, his wife, and daughter. We arrived at Castle Howard in floods of rain, which made it look gloomy enough. But the site of the house is good, the chief block quite perfect, and the inside a gem. Since the house has been built, however, I suppose it has never been treated in such a way as it is now; everything is cut down to the barest necessity of existence: no one to open the gates at the lodges, not a servant to be seen except at meals, and no footman with the carriage. The gardens are neglected—they look the better for it; and the park has been railed off and is being mown for hay. On the other hand, I doubt if the house ever was cheerfuller. There were some twenty children and young persons under twenty in it, and there was a deal of boating on the large pond and tennis on the lawns. The only person to receive us at the door was Mrs. Howard. She has made up some rooms for herself in one of the wings, but the whole house is occupied from one end to the other. The men staying here are tutors or undergraduates, friends of Charley's, and all is essentially *bourgeois* and communistic. I like it the better.

"19th July, Sunday.—George took me round the house and showed me the pictures. They are an admirable collection, good specimens of every school. The Velasquez of two children, an Infanta and a Dwarf, is, I think, the most remarkable; and there is a very interesting picture of Newmarket in the

## *A Philanthropic House*

reign of Queen Anne, which shows the horses of the day to have been big sixteen hand horses, with heads of the Spanish type. There are some good marbles too, and the rooms are finely decorated. Mrs. Howard talks of doing away with the formal parterres in front of the house, but I have persuaded her that this would be sacrilege. She is very angry with me for having put on Tory armour for the election, or rather Radical armour for the Tory cause, and especially for going against the School Board, of which she and her mother and brother Lyulph are fierce champions.

*"20th July.*—Mary Howard's birthday, and I wrote her a sonnet. She is a wonderful child with her philanthropies, and has been founding a society of girls in the neighbouring villages for their mutual good and the furtherance of virtue. She preaches to them for an hour and an hour and a half at the time, and has got together about a hundred of them. She has genius and beauty and a blameless heart, and is of the sort which might convert a world. The sonnet has pleased the child, who is ready for all martyrdom. In the afternoon she entertained her village friends with a concert, and made them a little speech afterwards, very simply and nicely. I know nobody else who could do this without ridicule.

"I have been avenging myself for the political anger I have aroused in the house by writing my Tory democratic electoral address, and by threatening to date it from Castle Howard.

*"21st July.*—A bright day at last, and the place has changed as if by magic, for it is dependent on the sun for its charms. Mrs. Howard took me for a drive of four hours, visiting village parsons, in pursuance of a scheme she has for giving holidays



## *Jemal-ed-Din in London*

in the country to three or four hundred girls from Leeds. While in the carriage I read her my address, and she was so angry I thought she would have stopped the carriage and put me down to walk home. Old Lady Stanley, her mother, came in the evening; she is a valiant old lady, and fought the cause of the School Board at dinner and the cause of Gladstone and her party, which she loves above principle.

"*22nd July.*—Back to London. Sheykh Jemal-ed-Din is expected in James Street, and I went down at once to the India Office where I was fortunate enough to find Randolph just coming from the House. I met him at the door of the Office and walked with him up to his room. He looked fagged and ill and complained of the stairs, though in truth it was only one flight and not a steep one. He promised to meet Jemal-ed-Din at my house to-morrow at half-past ten, and I explained to him exactly who he was, with the history of his doings in Egypt and India. 'He is in the black book,' I said, 'of every one here, and an enemy of England. But if he was not he would be of no use to us.' I asked him about the Civil Service examinations for India in reference to a report in yesterday's 'Pall Mall' of his having decided to take the matter up. But he told me this was not true; he intended to meddle very little with details, but to push on a general inquiry into the state of the Indian Government. 'Everything here,' he said, 'is at a deadlock, owing to the uncertainty of Afghanistan and Egypt.' I did not stay with him for more than a few minutes for he seemed quite exhausted.

"*23rd July.*—Jemal-ed-Din arrived in the night, and at half-past ten punctually Randolph came to James Street; he was all right again and in his usual

## *His Talk with Churchill*

spirits. Before introducing the Afghan I read Randolph over my Electoral Address, of which he highly approved, correcting only a few words, that is to say, making me leave out the qualifications about the *South* of England in speaking of my belief in Tory popularity, and the allusion to Lord Salisbury having made 'an alliance with the Irish leaders.' He was also doubtful about my saying anything regarding an Irish Parliament. All the rest he approved, and said it was original and good. He said he was in favour of import duties on manufactured goods. I asked him whether he had any special scheme himself for ameliorating the condition of the poor, and he said 'No, but Lord Salisbury has.'

"Then I showed him Pollen's letter, communicating Lord Ripon's message about agricultural banks in India and the Oxford examinations. He said that I might tell Lord Ripon that he was favourable about both matters, and especially about the agricultural banks, and that if he would draw him up a scheme on paper he would support it. But he had not the necessary knowledge on either subject to push it without assistance, nor the time to get the questions up. He seemed pleased at Lord Ripon's having communicated with him. I also mentioned the case of Suchait Singh and the Pundit of Vizianagram, and he told me to send the details to Moore, his secretary. About Lepel Griffin he said he could not quarrel with him, but he was writing to him by this mail, and would suggest to him that he should make me some apology.

"Then we sent for Jemal-ed-Din, whom Randolph received with great politeness and made him sit by him on the sofa. They talked in French, but I soon perceived that Randolph knew very little of the

## *Churchill and Jemal-ed-Din*

language, and I had to translate for them. Randolph first asked about the Mahdi's death, whether it was true, and Jemal-ed-Din said he thought not, but even if true it would make little difference, as the Soudanese would choose a successor. Randolph asked who that would be. *Jemal-ed-Din*: 'It would not be Osman Digna, but one of the Mahdi's companions, a man of religion; Osman Digna would be the General but not the Khalifa. All would be done as on the occasion of Mohammed's death, when the most religious man was chosen.' Randolph then asked about Afghanistan, what the Amir's position was. And Jemal-ed-Din's account was briefly this: Abd-el-Rahman, he said, was a good general but he was not a great politician, though neither was he a fool. He had the majority of the Afghans with him, but nothing would be easier than to get up revolts against him. The Afghans were simple-minded people—*peuple naïf*—ignorant of politics and always ready to fight. The Russians might make a revolt through Ishak Khan or a dozen others of the sons of Shere Ali and the princely house. Nothing would be easier. The Russians had no intention of fighting the Afghans this year, but would make friends with some of these princes and raise disturbances. They would represent themselves as allies against the English and would promise the provinces of Cashmere and Peshawar if India revolted. The Afghans would believe them. *Randolph*: 'Do the Afghans hate us more than the Russians?' *Jemal-ed-Din*: 'The Russians have done no harm to the Afghans. The English have made three wars on them.' *Randolph*: 'But do not you consider that the Russians have done more harm to Islam than we have done?' *Jemal-ed-Din*: 'The Russians have swallowed up a few principalities, the Crimea, Cir-

## *A Political Dialogue*

cassia, and among the Turcomans, but England has destroyed the great empire at Delhi, it has invaded Egypt, the Soudan.' *Randolph*: 'It was the Mahrattas that destroyed the Mogul Empire.' *Jemal-ed-Din*: 'The Mahrattas came and went. Nadir Shah invaded India, but he was a Moslem. You remained and you destroyed the Empire. There are three reasons why the Mohammedans of India have hated you more than the Russians: Firstly, because you destroyed the Empire of Delhi; secondly, because you give no salaries to the *imams* and *muezzins* and keepers of the mosques, which the Russians are careful to do; and you have resigned the Wakaf property and do not repair the sacred buildings.'

*Randolph*: 'We repair some of the mosques.'

*Jemal-ed-Din*: 'Only when they are works of art, not for the sake of religion. And, thirdly, because you give no high offices of rank in the army to Mohammedans. The Russians do this.' *Randolph*: 'There are many Mohammedans in the highest offices in the Native States of India.' *Jemal-ed-Din*: 'The Native States are not British India. What the belly has not swallowed it does not digest.' (Here we laughed.)

*Randolph*: 'Then you think England a greater danger to Mohammedans than Russia?' *Jemal-ed-*

*Din*: 'I do not say so; I have spoken of the past. England has done more harm to us than Russia, but Russia is now more dangerous. If the Russians remain, I do not say at Penjeh or Tulfikar or Mervushak, but at Merv still five years, there will be no more Afghanistan and no more Persia and no more Anatolia and no more India. All will have been swallowed. They will leave Penjeh and the rest, but it will matter nothing; they will remain in Merv.'

*Randolph*: 'This is true. But what would you have us do?' *Jemal-ed-Din*: 'You must make an alliance

## *Russia and Afghanistan*

with Islam, with the Afghans, the Persians, the Turks, the Egyptians, the Arabs; you must drive the Russians back out of Merv to the Caspian Sea. To make friends with the Mohammedans you must leave Egypt. There is no danger for Egypt from foreign nations. You hold Cyprus, you hold Aden, what do you fear? Nor from the Mahdi. With a Mohammedan government in Egypt the Mahdi is not a danger. Then you must make alliance with the Mohammedans, who would believe you their friend.' *Randolph*: 'Could we send troops or officers to Afghanistan to help the Afghans against Russia?' *Jemal-ed-Din*: 'If you send troops, as for instance to Candahar, even with the Amir's consent, it will be the right of any Moslem to go to the top of a hill and raise a revolt against you. He would say you were come under pretence of a friendship to take possession; and all would believe him. You might, however, send officers, a few officers, for these could not take possession. They would be servants of the Amir. But remember, if the Russians stay five years at Merv it will be too late; you should attack them not through Afghanistan but by the other side; then the Mollahs would preach a *jehad* to join you against the Russians.'

"The conversation lasted about three-quarters of an hour, and Randolph then went away. He did not say much to Jemal-ed-Din, but to me he expressed himself, as I went with him to the door, much pleased with the Seyyid's frankness and the justness of his views. He promised to send Wolff to see him. Also he recommended me to write to Lord Salisbury, asking to be supported in my claim to return to Egypt this autumn. I am cited to appear before a Court there (in connection with my property) in October, and this gives me a good excuse.

## *The Camberwell Caucus*

"I then saw Justin McCarthy at the House of Commons, and asked him about that portion of my Electoral Address which related to Ireland. He approved. Thence I went to Cardinal Manning, who warmly approved my address which I read to him. But he objected to my declaration in favour of an Irish Parliament, assuring me that the Irish did not want one. He had just seen six Irish bishops, who all declared this to be the case; he, the Cardinal, had written to Rome in this sense. He wanted local self government for Ireland,—not a Parliament which he considered would be a prelude to separation. He has given me a card of introduction to Canon McGrath of Camberwell, who will tell me what it is the Irish of Camberwell want.

"Partly on this account, partly through what Mr. Palmer, the secretary of the Camberwell Association told me, I altered this part of my programme, making it more vague and leaving out the word 'parliament.' Palmer came while we were at dinner, and frightened us by announcing that two new Conservative candidates had been started, and complaining that Randolph had not sent the letter he promised. It was almost time for the meeting, but I sent Hope to Randolph's house and then to the House of Commons, where he saw him but could not get the letter from him, as he said my allusion to the Irish Parliament would be a Cabinet question. This very nearly upset our coach, but fortunately I had made my speech before Hope arrived at the meeting, and had won the confidence of the delegates. There was some close questioning about my Irish ideas, and I reduced my policy to one of ascertaining Irish wishes and giving Home Rule as far as possible in accordance with them. Also one old gentleman declared he could not be party to selecting a Roman Catholic.

### *Am selected Candidate*

But the rest were strongly for me. We, that is the two other candidates, local people, and myself were turned out into the street for twenty minutes while the voting was going on (a rather ridiculous proceeding, during which we compared notes as to our chances), and at the end of it I was called back and was declared selected by sixteen to one. Three had not voted, having gone round the corner to allay thirst, but they were also held to be my supporters. So I may consider it a considerable triumph."

## CHAPTER XII

THE GENERAL ELECTION OF 1885—RANDOLPH AT THE  
INDIA OFFICE—DRUMMOND WOLFF'S MISSION

FOR the next four months I was busy carrying on the work of my candidature in Camberwell, over the details of which I shall pass lightly. The constituency was a new one, having only just been created by the Redistribution Bill, and it was politically a chaos. My chief supporters were men of no position, character, or intelligence, the most active of my committee being a sweating tailor; and I had to create everything in the way of organization, and educate the voters from the first A B C of instruction on public matters. This was an advantage and a disadvantage; on the one hand there was little prejudice to overcome, and on the other extreme difficulty in getting the voters to take any interest in the matters they were called upon to decide. I began with very small meetings to very degraded audiences, sometimes in rooms obtained for the purpose, but oftener mounted on a wagon in the streets, where I found that nothing much short of pure socialism would be listened to. The division was supposed to be strongly Radical, but as time went on my Tory democracy became popular, at least in the streets; and, as will be seen, I very nearly succeeded in winning the election. Had I been properly supported from the Conservative head-quarters I have no doubt I should have succeeded altogether. But the declarations I felt bound to make in favour of Irish Home Rule, joined to the fact of my Roman Catholic status, told against me, and in the end I was defeated, but by only one hundred and sixty-two votes. I will give



## *The Mahdi's Death Confirmed*

only such extracts from my journal as take my candidature out of the ordinary rut of commonplace experience. My journal was too hastily written at this time of stress to have much interest apart from the election.

"*27th July.*—There is something exceedingly absurd in this electioneering business; one hundred frowsy fellows in a stuffy schoolroom talking nonsense to each other about things they none of them understand, or care about a straw. It is an experience, however, like another, and we must go through it if we are to achieve anything of large importance in the world. Yet it is a terrible come-down after the politics of the golden East, or even of an Arab tribe.

"*28th July.*—I have been in trepidation the last few days, for the report of the Mahdi's death seems confirmed. Went to see Lothian, who has just been staying at Hatfield. He complains that Lord Salisbury is less free spoken on affairs now than when he was out of office, but he gathers from what he heard that there is no danger at all of a new campaign. A reconciliation will be effected with Turkey, but no further alliance will be entered into for the defence of Persia or Afghanistan. 'Lord Salisbury,' Lothian said, 'still holds to his old illusion of believing the Russian advance to be geographically impossible. He still looks at the map and calls it a great way from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf.' Talking of past events, he told me that when the news came of the fall of Khartoum Hartington actually resigned office, and was out of office three days; he would not resume his position until the absurd determination of advancing still on Khartoum was agreed to. This is curious. [I believe it is also true that the pretence made by Gladstone of fighting Russia over the

## *Nebbi Ullah and his Clothes*

Penjdeh incident was nothing more than a manœuvre to persuade Hartington to agree to an evacuation of the Soudan.]

"29th July.—Wolff, whom I met at the Carlton Club, talked pretty freely about his plans in Egypt. 'I wish I knew,' he said, 'how to set up an independent Government at Dongola.' I said, 'You had much better leave it to the Mahdi.' They will end by doing this.

"To Crabbet with Nebbi Ullah, who is going back shortly to India to start a newspaper. He, like all the rest, has become spoilt by his English life. Jemal-ed-Din and I have done our best to persuade him to purge himself of it by making the pilgrimage and never to put on European dress again. But he has not the backbone for this. Indians who have lived in England are taken by our life and ways, and find it difficult to return. They generally fall in love with some English woman and abandon the ways of their people. I spoke strongly to him, but it will be of no use. 'If a man,' said Jemal-ed-Din, 'wishes to do good to himself, nothing is easier. But if he wishes to do good to his country he must deny himself.' 'I do not wish to be a martyr,' said Nebbi Ullah, 'I wish to keep my English clothes and be able to ride and play lawn-tennis and get refreshment at refreshment rooms when I travel.' I said, 'You may put on your best English clothes and go to church if you like on Sundays, the English in India will not receive you, and you will lose all influence with your fellow countrymen.'

"30th July.—Wolff came to James Street as agreed at half-past ten. Before he saw Jemal-ed-Din I had a talk with him on the general question of Egypt, the Soudan, and Turkey. With regard to Egypt he told me they would have to keep on Tewfik for

### *Wolff and Jemal-ed-Din*

the present, and that Lord Salisbury could not be got as yet to consent to Arabi's recall. In the Soudan they had no idea of any new expedition, Turkish or English. They had rather make peace with the Soudanese, but had some idea of setting up an independent government at Dongola. They were resolved to renew the alliance with the Sultan. The points Wolff principally discussed with Jemal-ed-Din were as to a possible acknowledgement by the Mahdi of the Sultan's Caliphate. This Jemal-ed-Din declared to be impossible, either for the Mahdi or his successors, but they might be got to accept each other, as the Ottoman Sultan and the Sultan of Morocco had done, if Egypt were evacuated by the English and a legal Mohammedan Government restored there. There would then be no danger from the Soudanese. The Mahdist movement was religious and the Ulema of Cairo would not permit him to invade Egypt. There ensued a long discussion about the evacuation, Wolff declaring that Bismarck had announced in writing to the Foreign Office that he should approve the French entering Egypt if we abandoned it. The French would never allow Turkish troops, and it must be occupied somehow. So it would be by the French. This the Seyyid refused to believe, as he knew from Ferry and others in France that nothing of the sort would happen. In the end, however, it was agreed between Wolff and the Seyyid that, if England consented to fix a date for evacuation, an arrangement with the Sultan might be come to. There followed the Slave Trade question in the Soudan. Jemal-ed-Din said it was impossible to stop the capture of idolatrous tribes in Central Africa, but the seizure and sale of Abyssinians might be prevented by the Mahdi. He could arrange that matter and commercial relations with England and Egypt. It would

### *A Private Cipher with Randolph*

not be difficult to get the Sultan to consent to reasonable arrangements for Egypt, and Jemal-ed-Din would go if necessary to Constantinople—this was my suggestion—nor would it be difficult to get the Sultan to propose Arabi's return. Wolff, however, said distinctly that nothing definite could be settled till after the elections. His present mission was to feel the ground and prepare for a policy. The elections would decide whether it could be carried out. Their talk lasted an hour and a half.

“Lunched with Meynell and Cox, editors of the ‘Weekly Register’ and ‘Tablet.’ They will go with me to-night to a meeting at Camberwell. Cox is to see Cardinal Manning and get a message of approval from him. Meynell told me among other things that Colonel Butler, his brother-in-law, could give evidence that the bombardment of Alexandria was forced on by Beauchamp Seymour, that they had tried to bribe the Egyptians to fire the first shot, or something of the sort. Egmont Hake was there and promised to give a lecture on Gordon at Camberwell in the interests of my candidature. Meynell tells me that Lord Salisbury has engaged Hake to lecture in all the large towns in England preparatory to the elections. Lord Salisbury is to pay the expenses.

“*4th Aug.*—Randolph, whom I met at the Carlton Club, has promised that Lewisham and Folkestone shall support me at a meeting at Camberwell, as the working men insist upon having a lord—‘no M.P.s for us’ they say. Drummond Wolff talked to me again about Jemal-ed-Din going to Constantinople. ‘He is too stiff in his ideas, however,’ he said, ‘about the Mahdi not accepting the Sultan’s Caliphate.’ Wolff will send for Jemal-ed-Din if he wants him, and will communicate with me through Randolph, with whom, he tells me, he shall have a private cipher

## *A Limit of Time in Egypt*

—a new feature, this, in our diplomacy. Gregory, who called to-day, says that Wolff told him he should explain to Tewfik that he had acted in the matter of the massacres on wrong information, and that he considered him a very honest man.

"5th Aug.—I have read over my Electoral Address to McCarthy as far as it relates to Ireland, and he highly approves it, suggesting only that I should put in the words 'Representatives of the Irish Nation,' so as to show that I accepted the Irish Parliamentary Party as being the real national leaders. This I was quite willing to do. He assured me of the Irish support at Camberwell; they all meant to vote with the Tories. He warned me not to pay attention to anything they might say about being indifferent to both parties. It was the *mot d'ordre* just now to say this, but the elections would prove which way their predilections turned. Drummond Wolff has telegraphed from Portsmouth, asking once more to see Jemal-ed-Din.

"6th Aug.—Up to London early with Jemal-ed-Din, and had another long talk with him and Drummond Wolff. Wolff is quite favourable to a Turco-Perso-Afghan alliance, but says he shall not be able to talk of this with the Sultan, except incidentally, as that would be the ambassador's business, but shall have to keep to Egypt. He was very anxious to know how an accord could be made between the Sultan and the Mahdi. Would the Mahdi acknowledge the Caliphate? Jemal-ed-Din said it would not be necessary to decide or even raise that point just yet. The thing the Sultan would really care for was a fixing of a limit of time for the English occupation. Wolff said that that could be done; and that what would be proposed would be that the Sultan should co-operate in the establishment of a permanent order

### *"A Private Cipher with Randolph"*

of things preparatory to English evacuation. On this Jemal-ed-Din said that all could be satisfactorily arranged, and that it mattered little whether it was Turkish or English troops which would compose the *ad interim* garrison. Next there was a good deal of talk as to whether Jemal-ed-Din should go to Constantinople while Wolff was there, the principal point being as to whether the Sultan would understand it rightly. Jemal-ed-Din said that the Sultan knew him only as an enemy of English policy, and, unless Wolff explained the position, he would fancy Jemal-ed-Din had come to Constantinople to counteract Wolff. Wolff, however, said that it would be difficult for him to protect Jemal-ed-Din, or seem to have anything to do with him. There was the question, too, of money, but I offered to advance the Seyyid any money that might be wanted so that no inconvenient questions should be raised. Wolff explained that he should not tell Lord Salisbury anything about the Seyyid or his arrangements with me. 'The reason I am sent,' he said, 'is that I am ready to take responsibilities of this sort on my shoulders which other men might refuse. I shall have a cipher with Randolph, and if I want the Seyyid, or have anything else to tell you, it will be through him.' He told us, however, again very distinctly, that he did not expect to be able to settle anything definitely till after the elections. The French were very adverse to Turkish troops going to Egypt, and Bismarck would give no firm support till after the elections.

"We also talked about the recall of Arabi, and Jemal-ed-Din said it would be quite easy to get the Sultan to propose it, two words from him would effect that. I repeated this to Wolff, after he had left my house, at the Carlton Club, but he said: 'It would never do to raise the question of Arabi yet; after the

## *Sir Henry Cotton*

elections we may do it, but not now.' Lord Salisbury requires educating to that as to other things.

"To a meeting at Camberwell with Napier, Meynell, and Lady Colin Campbell. Randolph sent down Lord Folkestone and Sir Henry Fletcher, as members of the Government, to support me with a message to the effect that my presence in Parliament was necessary to the party and they must get me elected.

"*7th Aug.*—Mr. Cotton,<sup>1</sup> of the Indian Civil Service, came to breakfast. He is a very enlightened man, and one with whom one can talk openly. Speaking of the late Durbar, he said that the Amir Abd-el-Rahman's unwillingness to allow English troops into Afghanistan came like a clap of thunder on Lord Dufferin, who, with the rest of the officials, was under the idea that the Afghans loved us and sought our help.

"Randolph made his statement on the Indian Budget last night in a very masterly speech; but he attacked Lord Ripon in it, as I thought, most foolishly. I met him at the Carlton Club, and told him I was sorry he had done it. And he said it was quite necessary on party grounds in view of the election. But he felt sure native opinion in India would be satisfied with his promise of inquiry into the Indian Government. Drummond Wolff was also at the Club, and we talked again about Jemal-ed-Din's visit to Constantinople. His last words were that he would write or telegraph to Randolph, who would communicate his ideas to me.

"Lunched with Button and Sidney Herbert. Button's candidature is going badly at Clapham, and his brother's at Southwark has, after all, broken down

<sup>1</sup> Afterwards Sir Henry Cotton, K.C.S.I., Chief Commissioner in Assam and M.P.

## *The Queen's Bedroom*

completely. Now he says the people all say I shall get in for Camberwell.

"*9th Aug.*—To Windsor with the Wagrams, and called on the Ponsonbys, who showed us over the Castle, including the Queen's private rooms. The long gallery in which she walks is full of interesting pictures. The series of daubs by Winterhalter of royal marriages and christenings are daubs certainly, but already interesting through time. I don't think we were intended to go into the Queen's bedroom, but I looked in and was very nearly locked in by the housekeeper for my curiosity. She had already turned the key, and thoughts of the Tower and a trial for high treason crossed my mind, but fortunately I was remembered and released.

"*13th Aug.*—Crabbet. To Newbuildings to spend the day, which, like all the rest of this summer, was heavenly. Coming home I found an important communication from Churchill enclosing a deciphered telegram from Wolff, saying that he wants the Seyyid to join him at Constantinople. The Seyyid has been in great force here for the last ten days, and has given us most valuable information about the past history of his own and other countries. 'Nadir Shah,' he says, 'was the son of a tradesman in Kelaat. He rose against the Afghan rule, and, having driven the Afghans out of Persia, conquered Afghanistan and Upper India. It was he who gave Arab horses to the Turcomans, the breed they now possess.' [We had staying with us my cousin, Arthur Chandler, an Oxford divine, who has since become a colonial bishop, and I arranged that they should have a dispute together on the fundamental grounds of religion. This was carried on in very indifferent French but with much spirit by the Seyyid, who certainly got the best of the argument.]



## *Churchill Telegraphs*

" 14<sup>th</sup> Aug.—To London with the Seyyid. I went at once to the India Office, where I found Randolph very dull and tired with the end of the Session, which is to-day. He will be off, however, to Scotland to-morrow. I told him the Seyyid would start at once, but that he insisted Wolff should give the Sultan a hint directly or indirectly that he had ceased to be an enemy of England; also that he hoped Wolff would not open negotiations till he arrived, or attempt to treat the Egyptian question separately from that of the Mohammedan alliance. Randolph with his usual quickness seized the points at once, and wrote a telegram to Wolff something as follows: 'Jemal-ed-Din starts for Constantinople on Sunday. He says, however, he is known to the Sultan only as the enemy of England, and it would be necessary to give the Sultan a hint that he is now our friend. He hopes also that you will not enter on the Egyptian question with the Sultan separately from the larger question of a Mohammedan alliance. With regard to this last he believes he can be of great service to you.'

"I also saw Ibrahim and wish I had seen him before, for he is a great support to me with the Seyyid, and is bolder than he is. I am for their starting together at once, and not waiting for an answer from Wolff. One never knows what changes of mind may take place, and the ball is at our foot now and we must play with courage. My fear is lest Wolff should be scared by the telegram which the Seyyid insisted on. If I had had my way, he should have started without conditions; Wolff could not refuse him protection when he arrived. But we shall see.

"Down again to Crabbet for the night, and for a meeting of the Primrose League at the Worth School.

### *Wolff changes his Mind*

Young Montefiore was put in the chair, to practise him for a Parliamentary candidature in London. He had learnt his little opening speech by heart and recited it nicely. My own speech dealt principally with the possibility of peasant proprietorship. It gave satisfaction to the Radicals at the end of the room.

"15th Aug.—There is a telegram from Pesth, saying that Wolff has delayed his departure till Tuesday. This will give Jemal-ed-Din time to join him there, and they will go on by the same train. Ibrahim is to go as far as Varna and there wait further orders. To London for this purpose. Parliament was adjourned yesterday and London is empty. To my horror I found a letter in James Street from Moore, Randolph's secretary, enclosing a telegram from Wolff—just what I expected—to say he had changed his mind about Jemal-ed-Din; he had better not start till he telegraphed again from Constantinople. I went first to Moore at the India Office and talked the matter over, and he agreed with me that it seemed a pity the Seyyid should not start, and that we might telegraph that it was too late to stop him. But he would not do anything without Randolph's order. So I went on to Connaught Place and saw Randolph. He has been ill with a slight congestion of the lungs, but says that he is better to-day, and we discussed the point fully. But I could not persuade him to let me send the Seyyid, so the whole thing is off. The tiresome part of it is that it is just at starting that Jemal-ed-Din would have been of most use. But there is no help. The Seyyid's ticket and Ibrahim's were already taken, and I had given them £100 for their journey, all for nothing. [I have always been of opinion that Wolff's change of mind on this occasion cost him the success of his mission,

## *Vain-glorious Anticipations*

and that its ultimate failure was due to his having commenced it on the common lines of English diplomacy without that moral support which Seyyid Jemal-ed-Din could have given him both at Constantinople and elsewhere with the secret societies.]

" 17<sup>th</sup> Aug.—My birthday of forty-five, which I spent pleasantly enough with the children and Anne. Mrs. Sellwood<sup>1</sup> and Cowie had tea with me. Mrs. Sellwood told me the history of my father's death, how she had disliked the hounds coming to Crabbet, and how they had howled, and how he had caught cold cub hunting and died. Thus the day passed.

" When I look at my life, I see that it is still progressing, and while there is progress there is happiness. I look forward to Parliament as the beginning of a new phase. I shall be Cabinet Minister in five years' time; head of my party, perhaps, in ten. But shall I get in? I think it is in my fate. [I feel some shame in transcribing these vain-glorious words, but they had more justification at the moment they were written than they can possibly seem to have now. At that date Randolph Churchill was certainly the coming man in English public life, and my position with him was one which, if I had succeeded in obtaining a seat in the House of Commons, would have made me one of his most trusted lieutenants. I may say more: I exercised over him a very considerable influence, precisely in the direction in which he needed most support. I think I could have prevented him from making some of the larger mistakes he

<sup>1</sup> Sally Shackle, daughter of the Duke of Somerset's warrenier at Bulstrode, entered my father's service at Crabbet in 1823 as cook and housekeeper, having just married Henry Sellwood, my father's valet, and lived on at Crabbet, with the exception of the few years of my elder brother's minority, till 1894, when she died, after seventy years of honourable service spent, almost all of it, in one house.

## *Auberon Herbert*

made, and which eventually caused his ruin. I have sometimes thought that I could even have maintained him faithful to Irish Home Rule, and that together we might have persuaded Lord Salisbury to adopt it as the Tory policy. It would have saved the Tories their present disaster at the hands of the Irish party. My defeat left Churchill without any adviser in the ways of political virtue.]

"18th Aug.—The Prince of Wales has sent me a message through Lady C. congratulating me on my standing for Parliament.

"19th Aug.—Down to Bocket, where Auberon Herbert, his wife and children are staying with Henry Cowper. Etty Fane is here, grown to be a very pretty and clever girl after one London season. Of all people I like Henry Cowper best as companion. He represents the Whig tradition in its most attractive form, that of the cultured politician of a hundred years ago, partly humane, partly sceptical, full of dignity and profoundly immoral. He told me innumerable stories connected with Bocket. It was outside the park at Bocket, on the high road, that Lady Caroline Lamb and her husband were riding when they met Lord Byron's funeral, and she fell straightway off her horse. There is a portrait of Lady Melbourne here, as a young woman, which is charming.

"20th Aug.—After luncheon we went to Hatfield, Herbert and I on foot, Henry and his niece, Miss Fane, in a pony chaise. On the way we discussed social questions, on which Herbert has very distinct and original ideas. He is against all State intervention, either against drink or prostitution, believing in free trade in both as the best cure; he is against State education, rates, or any kind of taxes, which should all be voluntary. He trusts to a kind of

## *Stead's Demonstration*

natural selection to bring about improvements with as little interference as may be by Government.

"Hatfield is quite the most perfect thing I have seen, there being none of those great waste places common in most parks. We drove home all together in the pony carriage. I am glad to have been here at Bocket, as it has cleared my ideas on certain points very misty to me; not that I altogether agree with Herbert, for anarchism is certainly outside the range of practical politics, but his views are large and elevated and do one good.

"22nd Aug.—To London for Stead's social demonstration. The procession was entirely of the rag-tag and bobtail, with banners of the most curious devices: one represented the Minotaur, a princely personage in a blue uniform, and his victim; another a van full of middle-aged females, labelled 'Protection for Girls.' Also there were political badges; one banner stated that its bearer had refused taxes because he had no vote; and there were socialistic and temperance vans, with 'John Bright' and 'Sir Wilfrid Lawson Associations.' In the Park I went the round of the platforms, each with male and female speakers, and was fortunate enough to hear Stead speak. This he did well, with a good deal of dramatic action, but a certain self consciousness which occasionally marred the effect. Besides the regular platform speakers, there were volunteer orators, who held forth to groups on the ground. One I listened to attacked Randolph fiercely through his brother Blandford, with whose history the speaker professed to be well acquainted. The best speech I heard, however, was from a democratic socialist; he hit the demonstration hard when he expostulated against all parties in the state, and especially against the Radical capitalists. Samuel Morley, he said, had

### *Wolff makes Difficulties*

subscribed £2,000 for the protection of girls, but when had he ever given £5 to a girl of the 5,000 in his own factories to save her from perdition? It was the capitalists who were the cause of all crime and misery, and who ground the faces of the poor. What we wanted was not social reform, but social revolution. And he took his hat and showed on its brim how a revolution should be made. When the poor, he said, have got the rich under them they will know how to keep them there. I could not help cheering.

*"27th Aug.*—A note from Moore asking me to come and see him. Randolph had told him to read me an extract from a letter of Wolff's. It was to the effect that he was in such a delicate position in regard to his mission that he dared not appear to know Jemal-ed-Din. Jemal-ed-Din, he said, was opposed to the Sultan's Caliphate in the Soudan, and if he acknowledged him as a friend, the Sultan might think that he had some design on his spiritual pretensions. For this reason he dared not mention his name. This is all nonsense. The question of the Sultan's Caliphate need never be raised, and Jemal-ed-Din is not known as its opponent. On the contrary his newspaper was always loud on the Sultan's rights. The Seyyid, however, declined to go to Constantinople without some acknowledgement from Wolff, because he says it would ruin his influence everywhere if the Sultan were to shut the door in his face. But I am to see Randolph tomorrow.

*"28th Aug.*—At half-past one I called on Randolph at the India Office; he is looking fagged and ill, and is still obliged to stay in town, but talks of going to Scotland next week. I feel convinced he will not live two years, or will be obliged to give up public life.

*"The Wasps with the Honey-pot"*

We talked over the Jemal-ed-Din affair, but as Jemal-ed-Din refuses to go to Constantinople without Wolff's support, and as Wolff refuses to commit himself with Jemal-ed-Din, we agreed the matter must remain so. Then we talked about Olivier Pain, and I told Randolph the whole story, and how Hartington had denied the proclamation issued by Wolseley offering £50 for him, dead or alive. This delighted him, and he offered to send my letter about it to Lord Salisbury at Dieppe, and I gave it to him. Lastly, I told him I had heard things were going badly at Hyderabad, and asked him to write to the Nizam and warn him. But he said that to do so would be against all rules, and that he could only communicate through the Government of India. He told me, however, but as an absolute secret, that he had already written to Lord Dufferin to suggest that Cordery should be removed from Hyderabad. I then asked him to get Moore sent there, Colonel Moore, who is now with the Duke of Connaught, and he seemed to like the idea. Poor Randolph! I fear that the attainment of his ambition, like the wasps with the honey-pot, will be his death.

"Lady Gregory sends me a sonnet on the Mahdi's death, which is very good.

"*3rd Sept.*—Last night I made my declaration about Ireland. It is the first public declaration made, since Parnell's speech, in favour of Home Rule.

"*4th Sept.*—Ibrahim Bey has received a letter from Ismail Jowdat once more pressing him to come and see the Sultan. It has been decided he shall go. The Sultan has heard of Jemal-ed-Din having seen one of the Ministers, and has sent for Ibrahim to find out what it is all about. He wants Jemal-ed-Din too, but the Seyyid says he will wait till the Sultan sends for him. For Ibrahim

## Alfred Milner

there will be no danger, and I will put him in communication with Wolff and let Randolph know.

"6th Sept.—Ibrahim left last night for Constantinople. Jemal-ed-Din will stay on in London.

"12th Sept.—Lord Salisbury has answered my letter as to my being allowed to return to Egypt with great politeness. He says he thinks it can be arranged. George Wyndham has come back from the wars, I am glad to say, with a sound skin.

"15th Sept.—Went to the 'Pall Mall' office and saw Milner,<sup>1</sup> the acting editor in Stead's place, about a letter I had written for them but wished to withdraw, and explained to him how the case stood. He agreed with me that it might be well to defer the publication, and admitted that I was fully justified in withdrawing the letter under the circumstances in which Stead was placed. He tells me that from the first he did not approve of Stead's "revelations." He was very amiable about it all. I like Milner.

"16th Sept.—Mr. Tebbutt from St. Ives is here, at Crabbet, and I took him to Newbuildings, to talk over the question of establishing small holders there on small rents. But, though a strong Liberal, he does not advise it; thinks it will not answer.

"19th Sept.—Gladstone has published a manifesto, and I have been writing to him protesting against his repetition of the plea of *honour* in excuse of the bombardment of Alexandria. George Wyndham is just back from Cyprus and the Soudan. He spoke with great admiration of the Arabs.

"20th Sept.—There has been a revolution in

<sup>1</sup> Alfred Milner, now Lord Milner. He was at that time assistant editor to Mr. Stead, who was for the moment in prison in connection with the "Purity Campaign" he had been carrying on in the "Pall Mall Gazette." My letter, if I remember rightly, was on Tory Socialism.



## *A Challenge to Gladstone*

Roumelia. This is Russian doing in answer to Wolff's mission, or rather in anticipation of the elections here. Jemal-ed-Din always said they would make a move two months before the elections, and here it is. My feeling is that it is useless attempting to retain any part of Europe for the Turks except just the city of Constantinople. I am certain Lord Salisbury will do nothing to protect them anywhere out of Asia Minor.

"*21st Sept.*—I have written to Mr. Gladstone proposing to meet him on a platform and discuss the question of Egypt with him as a 'question of honour.'

"*22nd Sept.*—William Morris was arrested two days ago at a socialist trial for hissing the magistrate, and I have written to congratulate him.

"*23rd Sept.*—A letter has arrived from Ibrahim giving an account of himself. He is staying with Jowdat, has been to the Palace, and is to see the Sultan after Beiram. They are only angry with him for not coming before. The Sultan is sending a man to Jemal-ed-Din for consultation.

"*24th Sept.*—Talked the whole question of Roumelia over with Jemal-ed-Din, and we are agreed that it is not Russia but Austria that has encouraged the movement at this moment. I told the Seyyid it was useless trying to save European Turkey for the Sultan; Lord Salisbury would not dare guarantee it. He does not like this, but seems to think me right all the same. There is a memorandum of Gordon's of 1880 recommending the partition of the Ottoman Empire, Egypt to England, Syria to France, Armenia to Russia, and European Turkey to independent Christian States. Jemal-ed-Din thinks Wolff must have had a hand in the Roumelian movement. I don't.

## *His "Plea of Honour"*

"I have been asked to deliver the inaugural address at the Tyneside lectures at Newcastle on 1st October. I have chosen for my subject 'Egyptian Aggression, an answer to the Plea of Honour.'

"*25th Sept.*—Chamberlain has been down in South London speaking. Of his three proposals, taxing the rich, free schools, and dividing the land I do not greatly quarrel with any.

"*28th Sept.*—Munif Pasha is in London and has seen the Seyyid. He wants to see Churchill. I have written about it.

"*30th Sept.*—A great Tory demonstration at Crabbet held in a large tent in the Park. Sir Walter Bartelot, Gregory, M.P., and Grantham spoke. I was chairman. Bartelot is a really good speaker.

"Mr. Gladstone has answered my letter. He declines meeting me in Midlothian and blames me for my action in Egypt.

"*3rd Oct.*—The Hugh Wyndhams, the two Hardinges, and the Wentworths are here (at Crabbet). I had a good deal of talk with Hardinge about Egyptian diplomacy. He was with Dufferin in Egypt after the war.

"*6th Oct.*—Ferid Bey has written to ask to see me, and he came to luncheon to-day. Jemal-ed-Din was there, and, as long as he was present, Ferid dealt only with generalities; but, luncheon over, we went upstairs and, after much beating about the bush, he disclosed to me his real object. The state of things, he told me, at Constantinople was hopeless, and the discontent so general that important events might be looked for. The empire was crumbling to pieces, and not only the empire but the Turkish nation too would perish if nothing was done to save it. There were therefore people who thought, and he himself was one, that the only safety lay in an at-

## *Proposed Revolution in Turkey*

tempt to restore the constitutional scheme of Midhat, and to take the absolute power out of the Sultan's hands. The present Sultan was incapable of action, and yet he had absorbed all power to himself, and the government was carried on by a gigantic system of espionage, which alone hindered a revolt. A revolt, however, might now be expected, and the power might be put into the hands of some capable general acting for the nation, while the Sultan might be deposed in favour of some other person, a member of his family or another—he would not commit himself to say exactly whom. What made men hesitate was only this: that they feared a disturbance of any sort at Constantinople would be taken as a pretext by Russia for military intervention. Bismarck, he told me, would oppose all idea of constitutional government, but he thought Lord Salisbury might not be opposed to it. He wanted me to find out whether the English Government would allow Russian intervention, and whether a change of Sultan would be acceptable to them. Abdul Hamid might throw himself into Russian hands and ask protection against his people. Would the English Government countenance a revolution? He asked whether I thought it any good his consulting any one out of office, Sir Henry Elliot for instance. I told him I thought Sir Henry Elliot would be very little good with Lord Salisbury, but that if he liked I would speak to Churchill about it. Wolff's mission was at a standstill because it was impossible to deal with the present Sultan, and perhaps they might be willing to find a government with which they could deal. He begged me to do this, only urging caution as the idea might be frustrated if the English Government took it badly; also as regards himself that I should not divulge his part in the affair. 'The state of espionage is such,' he

## *Churchill Approves*

said, 'at Constantinople that the son is spy on the father, the brother on the brother, and though I know every man of note there, there are not two I would trust as I do in talking with you.' I told him he need fear nothing on either head, that I would tell Churchill the position only if I found they were at a standstill in their negotiations, and that I would be silent as to himself. I asked him whether Musurus, the ambassador, knew of this. 'How should he?' he said. 'Musurus is a traitor.' He also forbade me to speak of it to Jemal-ed-Din, who was imprudent and also a poor man, who might some day be tempted by necessity. I have arranged with Moore to see Randolph to-morrow.

"7th Oct.—At twelve saw Randolph at the India Office, and finding things as I supposed at a standstill with Wolff, told him what I had heard. I, of course, did not say who had told me, only that it was a person of high position, in no way connected with Jemal-ed-Din or any other of my friends. He answered most decidedly that there was not the remotest danger of Russia being allowed to intervene, and seemed quite disposed to look favourably on the idea of a change of *régime* at Constantinople as favourable to the prospects of an arrangement. He promised me absolute secrecy about it, and told me something of Wolff's progress. Wolff had come to the conclusion that it was very necessary to take the Arab party at Constantinople into account, and was surprised that Ibrahim had not been to see him yet. I said he had probably been forbidden by the Sultan; and to-day a letter came from Ibrahim saying he had sent in a full report of his doings in England to the Sultan, and about myself among the rest. But the Sultan had forgotten all about Wolff and England and everything but Roumelia. Ran-

### *Jemal-ed-Din on the Caliphate*

dolph also promised to send Gorst down to support me at Camberwell, and asked me to speak with him at a meeting on Indian social reform at the Mansion House. Yesterday a letter had come from Lord Salisbury telling me that the Egyptian Government decidedly refused to allow my return to Cairo, and Randolph encouraged me to insist. I had undertaken not to meddle with political questions or projects during my stay. Randolph is looking better, and is very hearty and pleasant. He is the most agreeable and least pedantic of official men; office has not spoilt him, nor will it.

"Tea at Lady Gregory's, where I met Kinglake.

"8th Oct.—A long talk with Jemal-ed-Din about prospects at Constantinople and about the Caliphate. He is for the Mahdi or the Mahdi's successor taking the Sultan's place, or the Sherif Own, or the Imam of Sanaa—any of these he thought might now take the lead. But Constantinople must remain the seat of the Caliphate, as Arabia or Africa would be mere places of exile. Amongst other things, he told me that it was he himself who had suggested to the Sherif el Huseyn to claim the Caliphate, but El Huseyn had said it was impossible without armed support, and the Arabs could never unite except in the name of religion. Now, Jemal-ed-Din is very anxious to be away again to the East. He will not go, he says, to Constantinople unless the Sultan sends for him, and we have agreed that if I do not win my election at Camberwell we will go together to the Imam of Sanaa in Yemen and raise the standard of the Caliphate, as I intended to do four years ago. I asked him whether he thought the Sultan had had El Huseyn assassinated; and he said, 'No, but perhaps some pasha had it done.'

## *Proposed Revolution in Turkey*

"Ferid Bey came at twelve, and I told him of the answer I had received from Churchill, and that I felt very sure our Government would not be much displeased with a change of *régime* at Constantinople. At the same time I told him I thought it would be useless to kick against the union of Roumelia and Bulgaria. This had been part of his plan. He was of a different opinion, and said if they could only get free of the present hindrance in the Sultan's apathy they were quite ready to carry the war to the Danube, Turkey's true frontier. I asked him if they were ready to fight Russia alone, and he said 'Yes.' I told him, 'If so, go on, I have nothing to say; but you must not count on assistance from Lord Salisbury, or any other English Minister; public opinion in England would not allow it.' He told me that, without actually deposing Abdul Hamid, they might put pressure on him to force him to constitutional courses and a defence of the Empire. I think, nevertheless, he will discourage his friends from their plan.<sup>1</sup>

"9th Oct.—Lord Salisbury has pronounced himself in an admirable speech in Wales. It will do the Party good, for it is straightforward and strong.

"11th Oct.—I came to Newcastle last night, and made my promised speech at the theatre to about three thousand people, explaining to them the intrigues which had brought on the Egyptian War. It is the most important speech I have ever made, and it lasted two hours. Though most of the audience were devoted admirers of Gladstone, I succeeded in carrying them with me, and it was altogether a great success. What a difference between these north country men and the miserable Camberwell rabble!

<sup>1</sup> These entries about Ferid Bey are extremely interesting now in connection with what happened on precisely the same lines in Turkey twenty-three years later in 1908.

## *Zebehr Pasha at Gibraltar*

I am ashamed of my late electioneering; it is a degrading business.

"12th Oct.—Back to London. Drummond Wolff's mission is announced as having succeeded; the Sultan is to send a commissioner with Wolff to Egypt. I expect Ibrahim Bey has been instrumental in bringing this about. I hear no more of the threatened revolt at Constantinople. Lord Salisbury writes to tell me he has forced the Egyptian Government to receive me in Egypt.

"The old Cashmiri, Abd-el-Rasul, called and showed me a letter from Zebehr Pasha at Gibraltar and a correspondence he had had with Lord Granville, and I promised to ask Churchill to intercede. Also two Indian delegates with a letter from Ragunath Rao.

"Down to dine and sleep at Milford (my cousin Robert Webb's house in Surrey), and found them all in a barn hearing young Brodrick<sup>1</sup> orating on Church and State. One cannot escape meetings anywhere now. It was an absurd business: Bob in the chair, young Brodrick deadly dull; the crowd cutting their country jokes, and from time to time outside the bellow of a cow, which set all the meeting off in roars.

"13th Oct.—Back to London. Saw Randolph at the India Office at three, and told him of the success of the Newcastle meeting. He approves of my going on to another at Edinburgh if it can be arranged. Also he agrees to see Rama Swami and the other Indian delegates, who called on me a day or two ago to ask my assistance at the India Office. He has asked me to bring them to him on Thursday. Moore's face was a picture when he told him of this

<sup>1</sup> Afterwards the Right Hon. St. John Brodrick, M.P., now Lord Midleton.

## *The Foreign Office is Polite*

decision, but in his light-hearted way Randolph would hear of no objection, and so it is settled. Then I laid before him a letter I had received from Calcutta, about a native woman ravished on a steamer—the Webb case—and he sent Moore to look it up. Lastly, I asked him to intercede for the release of Zebehr Pasha at Gibraltar. This, too, he promised to see to, and said he thought it could easily be managed. There had already been talk of releasing Zebehr, because the Colonial Office and the War Office could not agree which was to pay the expense of keeping him. But Egerton had objected at Cairo—this he told me confidentially. Randolph is looking decidedly better than he did, and nothing could be nicer than our relations at present. He volunteered the information that the Austrian and Russian Governments were both backing up the Sultan to claim his rights in Roumelia.

“A letter came to-day from Lord Salisbury, saying that I should go to the Foreign Office and arrange with Pauncefote<sup>1</sup> the details of my affairs in Egypt; and I did so. Pauncefote was exceedingly polite to me, and I spoke pretty frankly to him about Baring and Granville in relation to my exclusion from Egypt. It is a great triumph to have forced this matter on the Foreign Office, and to be at last invited back to the official sanctum after all our quarrels. I met Frank Villiers<sup>2</sup> later at the club, and laughed about it with him. Rivers Wilson made a third with us, and we had a grand discussion about the advantage of truth-telling in politics. They would neither of them hear of it; but I said: ‘Look at me, if I had not

<sup>1</sup> Permanent Under-Secretary of State, afterwards ambassador in America.

<sup>2</sup> Lord Salisbury's private secretary, now Sir Francis Villiers, ambassador at Lisbon.



## *Churchill and the Indian Delegates*

made it a rule to speak the exact truth and have no secrets where should I be to-day? I have been engaged for the last four years in every kind of intrigue and yet my name stands clear.' They laughed at this. Rivers is still bitter about Arabi, but we drove home together, good friends as of old.

"15th Oct.—After luncheon at the Morrisises, I took the three delegates to the India Office, giving them a good sermon first about the folly it would be for them to hoist a Radical flag here in England. Anyhow, I think Randolph has converted them, for he was quite charming to them, putting them at their ease at once. There was nobody present but ourselves, and the face of the office messenger when he showed us in was even more comic than Moore's had been two days ago. The expression on it was exactly that of the old steward's in the 'Mariage à la Mode.' Mon Mohun Ghose did most of the talking; he asked Randolph about the Parliamentary inquiry into the Government of India and what subjects it would include. Randolph said it would depend on them to make it a useful one; they must send over their very best men to give evidence, and take care they were absolutely accurate about their facts, as there were plenty of old-fashioned people who did not want existing things disturbed, and who would pick holes where they could. He said Siva Prasad had informed him that a royal order to come to England would override caste difficulties, and that the Benares divines would decide it in this sense. But Chandar Varkar objected to this, that Benares could not lay down the law for the whole of India; still he hoped it might have some effect. Mon Mohun Ghose wanted to know whether the inquiry would include the judicial system, as that was what was giving rise just now to most ill feeling. And

### *He promises a Parliamentary Inquiry*

Randolph said that if it depended on him it should. His colleagues had been most amiable about this inquiry, and if the Conservatives were in office the inquiry would be a full and impartial one. He was against members of the Government sitting on it, but those should be chosen who had most title to consider Indian affairs, independent men of all parties. He should support the inquiry, whether he was in office or not. The inquiry would also include the revenue question, and Rama Swami explained to him the enhancement of the land revenue grievance. He begged them to address him again on any special points they required to make known connected with their respective Presidencies, and at the end of three quarters of an hour they went away highly delighted. He told me, at leaving, that I might publish the result, and I have sent a few lines to the Press Association, epitomizing the interview. The delegates will also telegraph to India. This is a great move, and will do excellent work in every way.

"18th Oct.—An ultimatum has been sent by Lord Dufferin to King Thebaw of Burmah. There is a long *communiqué* in the 'Observer' showing how rich Burmah is, and the wickedness of Thebaw; this has decided me to write to Churchill and ask explanations. He is unfortunately out of town. [This ultimatum led to the iniquitous annexation of Upper Burmah.]

"Delivered an address in the evening at Islington Hall, Frederic Harrison in the chair, on 'Reform in Foreign Policy.' [This was an appeal against secrecy and other evils in Foreign Affairs.]

"20th Oct.—Randolph telegraphs he has been to my house, and is sorry to miss me. He is just leaving for Lynn, but refers me to Moore. I travelled up from Crabbet with Frederick Locker, who says it

## *"Burmah would Pay"*

will be unfair if I succeed in Parliament, seeing that I lived idly and amused myself for forty years, and that I have succeeded too as a poet.

"A meeting at the Mansion House for Lady Dufferin's Indian Female Doctors' Fund, for which Randolph had invited me to speak. I was put up to second Sir Richard Temple; the Anglo-Indians will be very angry at this. There has been a great row about the Indian delegates, who have been sat upon by their Radical friends here for having promised to support me at a meeting in Camberwell, and they are frightened out of their wits. The Radicals say they won't allow them to have anything to do with a Conservative candidate.

"21st Oct.—Saw Moore at the India Office, who spoke frankly enough about Burmah. He said that the India Office had been opposed to intervention for a long while, that Bernard, the Resident, especially had opposed it, but now saw its necessity, that great commercial pressure had been put on the Calcutta Government to take action, and that perhaps Lord Dufferin was not sorry for so good an excuse at last to settle the matter. 'An important point,' Moore said (and he thought it would convince me), 'was that *it would pay*.' I told him this was precisely the point which disturbed me. I asked him with whom the responsibility rested. And he said, entirely with Lord Dufferin; he has had *carte blanche* given him in the matter. I said I hoped they would not imitate the late Government by starting military operations without declaration of war, and suggested they might wait till Parliament met. He told me no papers had been published during the last two years. At leaving he said: 'I think you may make your mind comfortable as to there being as much justice and reason in the case as there ever is in cases of the kind.' I

## *I Protest about Burmah*

shall attend the Peace and Arbitration Committee tomorrow.

"In the evening we had a grand meeting of the Indian Delegates at Oakley Hall. We got Jemal-ed-Din to deliver a discourse in Arabic, which no soul in the room understood, but which was much applauded. Another followed in Persian from Mirza Bakir; and Rama Swami and Chandar Varkar spoke also. [It shows the absurdity of London audiences that this was by far the most successful meeting we had during the canvass.]

"*24th Oct.*—Dinner with Hancock and a nest of Radicals at the Reform Club. I found them all less liberal than I am, especially about Ireland.

"*25th Oct.*—To Hammersmith, where I found Morris laid up with the gout. He thought things were going wonderfully well for his ideas, and only hoped the Whigs would not get in with any large majority. He was inclined to vote for the Tories, but all voting was against socialistic principles.

"*28th Oct.*—Wrote a letter to the 'Times,' in protest against the Burmese War, but shall keep it a day or two to see how Lord Salisbury answers my appeal to him for the recall of Arabi.

"*1st Nov.*—Called on Lady C. yesterday, who said the Prince of Wales had told her they were discussing the question of recalling Arabi at the Foreign Office.

"Also saw Cardinal Manning. He was sitting very feeble in his arm-chair, before the fire, with a book screen behind him. It would make a fine picture. Truly, the only old age worth having is the old age of religion. He talked to me about Urquhart, who, he said, had made great efforts to enlist him among his disciples—'a man of great personal charm and genius, but mentally not quite sound'; also

## *Manning on Gladstone*

about Gladstone, 'who has gone altogether off the track.' I told him I had hopes about Arabi's return under Lord Salisbury but none whatever under Gladstone, he was too obstinate. 'He was always like that,' the Cardinal said, 'the most obstinate man in the world; he never would admit he had ever made a mistake. To understand Gladstone you must remember he is a Scotchman on his father's and mother's side, only by accident an Englishman, born at Liverpool.'

"2nd Nov.—Randolph writes that Lord Salisbury will certainly not give me an encouraging reply about Arabi: 'Even if he was disposed, as I should be, to favour your views, he would not dare take such a step on the eve of the election.' This is bad.

"Jemal-ed-Din, who had been mysteriously absent for two or three days from James Street, turned up again this morning. He had left the house in consequence of a noisy disturbance that occurred in his room on Thursday between two of his Oriental friends, Wahbi Bey and Abd-el-Rasul; they seem to have quarrelled over politics or religion and ended by beating each other over the heads with umbrellas. I had to beg them both to leave the house, and the Seyyid followed them. One must draw the line somewhere, and I have now suggested to the Seyyid that he should take up his quarters elsewhere; he has been three months with me in the house, the full term of Arab hospitality. [N.B.—This was the last I saw of the good Seyyid that year; he took huff at my treatment of his friends, and still more at the disappointment he had had in connection with Drummond Wolff's mission, and he left England a few days later in anger against everything English and, shaking its dust from his

### *Jemal-ed-Din takes Huff*

feet, went away to Moscow, where he joined himself with Katkoff, the well-known Panslavist leader in a campaign against the British Empire. From Russia he moved on to Persia and Afghanistan with the same object, and, after much preaching and much persecution from the governments of all these countries, drifted back at last to Constantinople, where I found him many years later established in the precincts of the Yildiz Palace, half pensioner, half prisoner of the Sultan. He died of cancer there, some think of poison, in 1902, nursed, as I have heard, for sole attendant, by a Christian servant. Jemal-ed-Din was a man of genius whose teaching exercised 'an influence hardly to be overrated on the Mohammedan reform movement of the last thirty years. I feel highly honoured at his having lived three months under my roof in England; but he was a wild man, wholly Asiatic and not easily tamed to European ways. An account of my subsequent visit to him at Constantinople will be given in its place.]

"*4th Nov.*—There is a telegram from Cairo to-day which threatens a new expedition against Dongola. I don't like a speech Randolph has made on the subject; he also talks nonsense about fighting for new markets in connection with the Burmese quarrel. I don't know what to do; one party is as bad as the other. Lord Salisbury spoke last night at the Victoria Hall (where I was present on the platform as one of his chief supporters), and among other crudities he proposed this remedy of new markets as a relief for the depression of trade. What nonsense it is when men talk of 'creating' wealth by trade. English trade with Oriental nations means only the transference of Oriental money into English pockets; trade creates nothing, and one might parody the French axiom

## *The Aggression on Burmah*

and say, *Le commerce c'est le vol*. Lord Salisbury's speech was a poor affair; he does not come out well on occasions like these, having no sympathy whatever with the people and being unable to pretend it. He was evidently aware of his false position, and blundered on from one mistake to another; even in form he was bad, and it was only towards the end of his speech that he attained to anything approaching eloquence. Most of it was a House of Lords reply to his fellow lords, Granville and Hartington, about whom the South Londoners care less than for the man in the moon. A few good hits he made, and his audience were quite prepared to applaud anything, but it fell flat enough considering how great an occasion it was. The rest of the proceedings were poor, but mercifully curtailed, as his lordship was anxious to get home to Hatfield.

"5th Nov.—Guy Fawkes' Day, the guy this year being King Thebaw, a sad-looking black monarch in a turban. This Burmese War is of a piece with all these wars: hungry commercial speculators making contracts with a dishonest prince, European intrigues, British remonstrances, official interference, tales to the prince's discredit, his subjects praying for British intervention, threats from Calcutta, appeal of the prince to his people, who strangely take his side in the quarrel, ultimatum issued, arrival of fleet, massacre of Europeans, bombardment, slaughter of natives, triumph of British arms, annexation of territory, pay, prize money, pensions, peerages all round, and so *da capo*.

"6th Nov.—Sent my letter about Burmah to the 'Times,' after calling at the India Office to see if Randolph had any further explanation to make, but he is out of town. He has stupidly, as I think, identified himself with Lord Dufferin's policy of war.

## *A Last Talk with Churchill*

But I cannot keep silent on an occasion of this kind.

"11th Nov.—We have decided to have a large meeting at Camberwell in favour of Arabi's recall to Egypt, and I went to see Randolph to ask him about it and other things. He made a first-rate speech the other day at Manchester, but looks fagged and several years older than when he took office. I talked to him first about the Soudan, and asked him if anything had been done in the way of negotiations. And he said that Mukhtar, the Ottoman commissioner, and Wolff were going to do what they could to pacificate; that already something had been begun; that Wolff quite understood the necessity of dealing through Arab channels; that he had discovered that if the Sultan was influenced by anybody it was by the Arab Sheykhs, and, finally, that Mukhtar was the man Wolff himself had wished for, and that all would be done that could be done. All the same, there was imminent prospect of more fighting. I told him of the papers I had sent in to Lord Salisbury, and of the meeting we are getting up for the recall of Arabi. And he highly approved. He said: 'I am doing all I can with Lord Salisbury to get him to recall Arabi. But his prejudices are strong and I shall be glad to have support from outside.' About the Burmese war I said that I hoped he did not disapprove of my letter to the 'Times,' but I was obliged to write it, as I could not afford not to be true to my principles, which were to me what her virtue is to a woman. He said he thought it quite right, and hoped I should pull my election through."<sup>1</sup>

This proved to be my last talk with Churchill on our familiar and intimate footing as political allies. In another fortnight the elections had been fought

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix.



### *Defeated at Camberwell*

and lost and won; then came Gladstone's unexpected pronouncement in favour of Home Rule, and we followed different paths, and I saw Churchill no more that year, or at all as friends politically.

To end the story of the Camberwell election briefly: on the 12th November I finally declared for Home Rule in its full sense, avowing my intention in so many words of supporting Parnell in his demand for an Irish Parliament. I felt bound to do this, but I believe it cost me my election. All the last fortnight was occupied in heavy work, of which my wife, with her maid Cowie and my private secretary Hope, an excellent young man, took the lion's share, and I was helped by many personal friends from outside, notably by the Meynells and Pollens, and by an excellent old-fashioned Radical banker from St. Ives, Mr. Tebbutt, who came on principle to canvass for me because of my views on foreign policy, and the Rev. Hugh Chapman of St. Luke's, now chaplain to the Savoy. But their devoted labours proved of no avail, and I lost the election by 162 votes out of 6,112 votes polled.

THE END.

## NOTE ABOUT THE MAHDI'S DEATH

THE policy finally decided on by Lord Salisbury in July, 1885, of completing the evacuation of the Soudan and leaving it to "stew in its own juice" till such time as it could be reconquered in English interests, was a Macchiavellian one, and resulted successfully from the point of view of imperial ambition. The decision was come to simultaneously with Mohammed Ahmed's death, which I thought at the time, and still think, was not wholly a natural one. His death was due, according to the official account, to small-pox, but there were too many interests engaged at Cairo and Constantinople just then not to make it extremely probable that there was another agency at work to procure a solution so simple and so timely. The Mahdi's was a great personality, commanding unbounded respect in the Soudan, and inspiring the religious hopes of Mohammedan Egypt as that of a possible deliverer from Christian domination, while beyond Egypt it had become a rival influence obnoxious to the Ottoman Caliphate. There are too many examples of such deaths procured for political ends in the time of Sultan Abdul Hamid and of the Khedivate to make the suspicion in the present instance unreasonable; and it must be remembered that with the Drummond Wolff mission a new opportunity was presenting itself at Constantinople, to which the life of the Mahdi was a chief obstacle. Be this as it may, it is certain that the blow dealt by Mohammed Ahmed's death was fatal to the future of the Soudan as that of a permanently powerful theocracy. The Khalifa Abdallah el Taishi, who succeeded him in supreme rule, was a man wholly inferior intellectu-

### *The Mahdi's Death*

ally and politically to his master, and under him religious enthusiasm waned and tribal rivalries took the place of a united front against the enemy, while also the wisdom was lacking for the conclusion of an effective peace on lines of commercial intercourse with Egypt. There was always the excuse at Cairo that the Khalifa was impracticable to treat with. The story, however, of the reconquest of Khartoum twelve years later is beyond the scope of the present volume, as is any appreciation of the actual condition of the Soudan under English rule, and I leave both reluctantly for another occasion.

W. S. B.

## APPENDICES



## APPENDIX A

### UNPUBLISHED GORDON PAPERS

COLONEL DONNELLY'S CONVERSATION WITH COLONEL C. G.  
GORDON, 30TH OCTOBER 1880 (FROM AMONG SIR  
HENRY GORDON'S PAPERS)

THIS was the first time I had seen Colonel Gordon since he left England as Lord Ripon's private secretary. I asked him what was the real reason of his giving up. He gave me to understand a number of things made him feel that he was *de trop*. "For instance," he said, "just after we started, Lord Ripon gave me the minutes and evidence in the inquiry into Yakub Khan's connection with Cavagnari's murder, and asked me to make a *précis* and give him my opinion. This was difficult. But after sitting up the greater part of two nights I was able to give them back with my remarks all over them in red and black ink. He asked me what I thought of it. I said I did not see any evidence to prove Yakub guilty; he very likely was glad Cavagnari was murdered, but I could see nothing to show that he was implicated in the crime, and you know (to me, Donnelly) three out of five of the Council (mentioning their names) were of that opinion.

"Lord Ripon looked into it and told me to telegraph from Aden to his, Yakub's, keepers to meet him at Bombay. I said: 'My Lord, I think that will hardly do as you have not yet been sworn in and Lord Lytton is still Governor General and may make a great fuss.' Lord Ripon agreed, thought I was right and said the telegram was not to be sent. When we got to Bombay Lord Ripon again asked me to telegraph to Yakub's keepers to meet him at some station on the way to Simla. I had to ask White (military secretary) as I did not know the route sufficiently to fix on a station. He was awfully taken aback. Did I know what the consequences would be? Every one in India would be staggered and so on. Begged me to persuade Lord Ripon not to take such a step. I told him that it did not seem to me it would make any difference one way or the other, but as he was so very strong on the point, I said I would let Lord Ripon know before I did anything. I wrote a note and sent it in early in the morning to Lord Ripon, saying that I myself did not think it would matter, but, as White was so very anxious on the subject, believing the end of the world would come if such a step were taken, I thought

## Appendix A

it as well to let him know before I carried out his, Lord Ripon's, instructions. This was just before breakfast, and he came out in a few minutes very indignant that any one should have ventured to overrule his orders; he had no intention of being controlled, and so on. All breakfast time he looked quite hurt, and injured, and indignant. After breakfast I left White talking with him in a beseeching way, and presently he (Lord Ripon) came and asked me if I had sent the telegram. I said No, I was waiting to see White to settle the place. 'Well,' he said, 'perhaps after all it was as well not to send it.'

"Now this is only one instance," Gordon said. "There were lots of snubs of this kind. You know I shouldn't have minded getting snubbed, if there was any use in it—but I saw it was only sure to get worse. Lord Ripon was being surrounded and guided by the very people from whom Lord Northcote had begged me to keep him clear. When he got to Simla I was sure he would be completely in the hands of the Lytton party. I felt I was *de trop* and could do no good, and that it was as well to give up as soon as possible. I told Lord Ripon so. He was very nice about it, said that his regard for me had only been increased by what had happened, but he saw it was advisable I should resign, was much obliged to me for doing so, was only afraid of the awkwardness. I showed him the letter I had written. He said I was giving him too great praise and taking all the blame on myself—did not wish me to publish it. But I said I had written it; it was too much trouble to write it again. And so I sent it. We parted on the best of terms. He said he had a greater regard for me than ever, and so on. In fact I have no doubt he was much relieved by being rid of me."

The opinion Gordon gave Lord Ripon on the Afghan question was this. He said either Yakub Khan was guilty or not. If he was not, and there was no reason for saying he was (*vide* secret papers, Court of Enquiry on Yakub Khan), he ought in justice to be restored. And moreover he was the only man who was likely to be able to hold the country who had any following. "'Take him back yourself, my Lord. You can easily do it with 3,000 cavalry. If you succeed, you will be looked upon as the greatest Governor-General India ever had, and if you fail and are killed you will have a splendid marble monument put up to you.' But Lord Ripon did not seem to see the monument. I offered to do it myself with Yakub and some lakhs of rupees. But they would not have it. What was the use of my being there? There was no one who cared to look forward and have a policy, only to let things drift."

As to Candahar, Gordon's opinion was that we ought to give in

## Gordon Papers

to the Ruler of Afghanistan if we wished him to hold the country. The position of Candahar with relation to Herat and Cabul was such [here a diagram is given] that it was impossible for any man to really rule the country unless he held Candahar. But he thought we had managed our withdrawal from Cabul very badly. We had been in such a hurry as to look like running away. Our prestige in India had been much shaken by the Maimand disaster, and Roberts had only been able to get at Ayoub Khan's rearguard. As an illustration of our loss of prestige in India, he gave an incident which occurred lately. When the Russian gunboats were in the harbour of Bombay, the Parsees brought their children to see them and to be introduced to the Russian officers.

Things were constantly happening which must have made his presence—to say the least—irksome with a man of Lord Ripon's calibre of mind. For instance, the day before they started [from London], Lord Houghton was lunching with Lord Ripon, Gordon kept away till after lunch was over. But Lord Houghton was still there when he came in. On being introduced by Lord Ripon, Lord Houghton said he was delighted to hear he was going as private secretary; he could not congratulate Lord Ripon too highly on his great good luck in having such a secretary; he was very glad Lord Ripon was going as Governor-General, but almost more glad that Gordon was going as his secretary.

### EARL OF NORTHBROOK TO GENERAL C. G. GORDON

*Private.*

*Jan. 18, 1884.*

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I enclose a letter to Sir William Hewett. We have written *officially to him by this mail announcing your mission, and authorizing him to meet your demands up to £1,000 upon your receipts.* I am sure you will like Hewett. As there is no telegraphic communication with Suakin we shall arrange for the Helicon to be at Suez from Malta to take you to Suakin. If she should not be available you will have to put up with the Cygnet, but she is not nearly so comfortable as the Helicon.

I will telegraph to you to Port Said to say which arrangement has been made, to the care of the senior officer.

I was very glad to see you in such good heart about affairs this afternoon, and I trust that by God's blessing you will succeed in arranging them as satisfactorily as circumstances admit.

Yours very sincerely,

NORTHBROOK.



## Appendix A

GENERAL C. G. GORDON TO MISS GORDON

19. 1. 84.

MY DEAR AUGUSTA,

I arrived in town very tired at 6 a.m. yesterday, went with Brockenhurst to Barracks, washed and went [to] Wolseley, he said Ministers would see me at 3 p.m. I went back to Barracks and reposed. At 12.30 p.m. Wolseley came for me. I went with him and saw Granville, Hartington, Dilke and Northbrook; they said had I seen W. and did I understand their ideas. I said yes, and repeated what W. had said to me as to their ideas, which was "*they would evacuate Soudan.*" They were pleased and said, "that was their idea. Would I go?" I said "yes." They said "when?" I said "To-night." And it was over. I started at 8 p.m. H R.H. [Cambridge] and Lord W. [Wolseley] came to see me off. I saw Henry [Sir H. Gordon] and Bob [R. F. Gordon], no one else except Stokes, all very kind. I have taken Stewart with me, a nice fellow, we are now in train near Mont Cenis. I am not moved a bit, and hope to do the people good. Will you tell Sir J. Cowell all this. Lord Granville said Ministers were very much obliged to me. I said I was much honoured by going. I telegraphed King [of Belgians] at once, and told him to wait a few months. Kindest love Mina, Helen and yourself, A. Burton, and Hayter and Ellen [these two were servants at Rockstone Place].

Believe me, my dear Augusta, yr. affect. brother

C. G. GORDON.

Address—Care H.M. Consul Suez.

MEMORANDUM AS TO GENERAL GORDON'S DOINGS IN CAIRO,  
JANUARY 1884, BY COLONEL [SIR CHARLES] WATSON  
(FROM SIR HENRY GORDON'S PAPERS)

On Saturday the 19th January when I went into Sir Evelyn Wood's room at the War Office he said, "Embrace me." I said, "What has happened?" He said, "The English Government is sending General Gordon out to settle the affairs of the Soudan, and he started from London last night with Colonel Stewart by the Brindisi Mail." I said, "That is the best thing I have heard for the last year. Is it to be made public, or is it still a secret?" He said, "It is to be made as public as possible, tell everybody." Then we did some ordinary business, and I went to my own office. Colonel Bruce Campbell was there, having come as usual for the latest information. He said, "What news have you for me?" I replied, "The newest and best is that General Gordon is coming out to settle the Soudan, and is now on his way." He said, "I

## *Gordon Papers*

don't believe it. The English Government will never let him come." "Well," I said, "I think you'll see it's true." Then he went away.

That evening I had to take some papers to Nubar's house for him to sign. Soon after I went in he said, "I am to be congratulated. The weight of the Soudan is off my shoulders. If any one can manage it, Gordon can." He really did seem glad that Gordon was coming out, which was good of him considering the abusive way in which Gordon had both written and spoken of him.

The next day Nubar stopped me in the street to talk about Bashi Bazouks, who had come to Cairo and were troubling him about their pay, and he again repeated how glad he was that Gordon was coming out. The following day every one was talking about it; several Egyptians said, "Finished with the Mahdi." But that was too hopeful a view. I had to see Major Vincent about the War Office budget, in which he was very eager to make more economies, and he asked how much money was Gordon likely to want for taking all the people out of the Soudan and settling up the affairs there. I said that Gordon couldn't answer that question himself, that there was no doubt that he would do the job better and cheaper than any one else. Sir Evelyn Baring seemed hopeful and said, "That it was specially understood that Gordon was under the English and not under the Egyptian Government, and that therefore he would be under him [Baring] and not under Nubar. But," he added smiling, "not that it is very likely that Gordon will take orders from me or any one else."

The next day, the 22nd, Sir Evelyn Wood said to me, "Gordon is coming out with the intention of going straight through the Canal and on to Suakin, without coming to Cairo; I can quite understand his not liking to come to Cairo, but it is very important he should see Baring before going to the Soudan, and it would look badly if he did not call on the Khedive. I shall therefore go down to Port Said to-morrow to meet and try to bring him up to Cairo, and I want you to come with me. Nubar has arranged for a boat and train to bring him up here."

That day there was a telegram from Slatin Bey in Darfour, stating that he was constantly being attacked by the Mahdi's people, that his ammunition was running out, his soldiers were getting demoralized, and he had had to shoot several of them, and he could not hold out much longer unless ammunition and reinforcements were sent him. It was arranged to send a telegram to Dongola to be sent to him as soon as possible, telling him that General Gordon was going to the Soudan to withdraw all the Egyptian troops, and everybody else who wished to leave. This

## *Appendix A*

message was to be sent to the Mudir of Dongola with orders to send it on by several different messengers, so as to make sure of Slatin Bey getting it.

In the afternoon Sir E. Wood asked me to see Nubar to make sure that the necessary arrangements had been made for bringing Gordon quickly up from Port Said. Nubar looked very tired and spoke French, said he was too tired to talk in English. He sent for Tigrane who looked very sulky, but it was not clear whether it was because Gordon was coming out, or because he was not so important a man as in Cherif's time. Nubar gave him orders to see that everything was ready for Gordon's journey, and said that no expense would be spared to send him to Khartoum in the shortest possible time, as the sooner he got there, the sooner things would be settled. That night we dined at Sir E. Baring's, a regular Consular dinner—Austrian, Russian, Netherlands, etc. I was sitting next Tigrane, who would hardly say a word; he does not seem quite to approve of the advance of English ideas. Nubar on the contrary, who was also there, seemed very cheerful. It will be curious to see whether Tigrane will continue to work with Nubar or not. Other people came in after dinner for dancing.

The next morning Sir E. Wood sent to me to say that he was unhappy about Slatin Bey and the people in Daifour, and asked me to ask Nubar not to send the message to Dongola until Gordon had arrived. Nubar was not in his office, and I waited a good while in Tigrane's room, who was much more talkative than the night before. He said he was not let to do anything now, and that Nubar and Sir E. Baring managed everything. He seemed rather doubtful of the success of Gordon's mission to the Soudan, on account of the power that the Mahdi had up there.

At 11.30 Sir E. Wood and I started for Ismailia, and arrived there about 5 p.m. Sir Evelyn was rather uneasy in his mind about Gordon, as he thought it might be difficult to persuade him to come to Cairo. At Ismailia we were met by the Governor and other Notables, and went straight over to the pier, where a steam launch was waiting to take us to Port Said; among others who were there was Khalil Agha, an Albanian policeman, who had been with me in the campaign, and who had now charge of the roads and gardens at Ismailia. A little French red faced doctor begged for a passage as he had been telegraphed for from Port Said. We started at once and reached Port Said at 11.30 p.m. A lot of people met us, and accompanied Sir Evelyn to the Hôtel des Pays Bas, where rooms had been engaged for him by the Governor.

Next morning I went to the P. and O. Office and saw Mr. Roy, who said that the "Tanjore" from Brindisi would not be in till

## *Gordon Papers*

the afternoon, but he was proved to be wrong, for half an hour afterwards she was in sight, and, by the time we had finished breakfast, and Sir Evelyn had inspected the company of the 8th Battalion stationed at Port Said, the "Tanjore" was in the harbour close to H.M.S. "Carysfort," which had been sent from Malta to take General Gordon to Suakin, and was now waiting for him with steam up ready to start. Our steam launch was at the pier, and we went out to the "Tanjore" at once. General Gordon was on the poop talking to Col. Stewart. A minute served to make him and Sir E. Wood acquainted with one another, and at the same moment the English Consul put into General Gordon's hands a bundle of cipher telegrams from Lord Cranville and Sir E. Baring, and Col. Stewart and I went down at once into the saloon to decipher them. The Captain of the "Carysfort" came on board to report his ship ready, and Sir E. Wood seemed at first a little doubtful how to break the intelligence to General Gordon that he was expected to come to Cairo instead of going to Suakin as he intended, but the latter proved quite amenable, and as soon as he was told that the steam launch was alongside to take him to Ismailia, said he was ready to start at once; so their baggage was put in, and in five minutes we were steaming to Ismailia somewhat to the astonishment of the Captain of the "Carysfort," who expected to have taken the General with him. Stewart and I continued deciphering the telegrams, which were all to the same effect, that General Gordon had better go to Cairo while he and Sir Evelyn Wood were becoming acquainted with one another. It was curious to think that Gordon had sent Sir Evelyn to Egypt, while Sir Evelyn had really been the means of getting Gordon sent to the Soudan.

Although Gordon had started so readily for Cairo, he at first seemed of opinion it would have been better if he had gone to Suakin to make friends with the chief of the tribes who were fighting against Baker. He seemed to have little doubt of the practicability of the scheme, but, as he might not have been able to get by that road to Khartoum, and as the main thing was to get him to that place as soon as possible, there is little doubt it was better for him to go by the Nile valley. The five hours to Ismailia were employed by Sir E. Wood making Gordon fully acquainted with the state of affairs in Egypt and the Soudan. At five o'clock we reached Ismailia and went at once to the station, where a special train was ready to take Gordon to Cairo. In the carriage was Mahommed Bey Tuhami, who had formerly been Gordon's secretary in the Soudan, and who had been sent down by Gordon's request to meet him. He is jet black and now quite blind, having lost his sight on the White Nile, whither Gordon

## *Appendix A*

sent him for taking bakshish to the extent of £3,000. This did not prevent his being very glad to see his old master again, and his pleasure was increased when Gordon put £100 into his hands. He is a wonderful old man, very clear-headed about the Soudan, knowing nearly every chief by name. He said that Mousa, the chief of the Hadendowa, whom Gordon had hoped to meet at Suakin [was away] and that his son Mohammed was at Kassala with part of the tribe, while the rest of it had left him, and with the Halega tribe under Osman Digna were fighting against Baker at Suakin. It is possible, therefore, that Gordon might not have found it as easy as he thought to get through that way. Tuhami was of opinion that a great many people in the Soudan would be very glad to hear of Gordon's arrival, and that many of those who had joined the Mahdi on account of their hatred of the Egyptian Government would leave him. He repeatedly insisted that the rebellion was rather against bad Government than a religious revolt.

The train reached Cairo at 9 o'clock, but there were not many waiting to receive the General as we were not due till half an hour later. Gordon went off with Sir E. Wood. After he had started Nubar Pasha and the Khedive's first aide-de-camp came up just too late to receive him.

The next morning Mohammed Tuhami came to our house with a clerk, Abo El Melik Shai, and at once set to work to write telegrams to a number of the Notable people in the Soudan, informing them that Gordon was going up to bring peace to the country. During the morning one Arab after another came in until there were seven or eight at work. Gordon looked in for a few minutes, but spent most of the time with Sir E. Baring, Sir E. Wood and Nubar. He also went to see the Khedive, and said he had been very humble and made it up with him. He arranged with him that Abd el Shakoor, the son of Abd el Kader, one of the late Sultans of Darfour, was to be sent back to that country. This had been proposed by Gordon years ago. The Khedive would never agree to it before. In the afternoon Abd el Shakoor looked in, and the meeting between him and Tuhami was very interesting. It should be remembered that Tuhami was secretary to Ismael Pasha Ayoub when he as Governor-General of the Soudan conquered Darfour, or to speak more correctly when Zebehr Rahama conquered it for him and killed the Sultan. The young man, Abd el Shakoor, seems intelligent, but at first sight does not show the strength of character which he would require. Gordon came in and told him he was to start with him the next night. The young man asked for a few days delay to collect his family, but Gordon cut him short, saying, "Look, you want a throne, throne first,

## *Gordon Papers*

family afterwards." Tuhami and the other clerks did not finish their work until late.

After dinner I went over to Sir E. Wood's to see Gordon, who had just gone; Sir E. was sitting with Slade, and was very low. Gordon, who before he left London had protested in the strongest manner against sending Zebehr to the Soudan, had that evening written a paper to show why it would be a good thing to take Zebehr with him. Sir E. said he had a great respect for Gordon, but he really could not change his opinion entirely in twelve hours. I said it was not the least surprising, as it was very usual for Gordon to change his opinion on the smallest provocation; but in this case I was sure it would all come right, and that Zebehr would not go. In the same paper he expressed a wish that Zebehr and he might be confronted with one another in order that the former might bring any accusation against him he thought fit.

Leaving Sir E. I went home and found Gordon, who seemed equally low. He said he had been talking all day and was quite done. Speedy was also at our house, and he and Gordon had been having an argument about King John of Abyssinia. He rather took King John's part, while Gordon said he was a man on whom no reliance could be placed. Gordon said King John had never stated what he wants, and that if he had a port he wouldn't know what to do with it. He said, however, he might have Senheit and Gallabat, and free trade at Massowah.

The next morning Tuhami came again and wrote a proclamation for Gordon to distribute in the Soudan. Gordon stopped at our house for a couple of hours, during which time a great many people, principally Egyptians, came to see him. The majority were persons whom he had known before, and who wished to go up to the Soudan with him. He refused all the applications, and the only two he agreed to take with him were Ibrahim Bey Fawzi, who had formerly been with him in the Soudan, and Ibrahim Effendi Ruchdi, whom he took as clerks. Ibrahim Bey Fawzi had been promoted by Gordon to every grade from Lieutenant to Colonel, and regarded Gordon as his Father. He had also at one time been in disgrace with Gordon, and had been put in chains. During the Egyptian campaign Ibrahim Fawzi had been with the rebels at Abou Kir, and had been without employment since the disbandment of the old Egyptian army. Ibrahim Ruchdi was a Khartoum clerk, who had been temporarily employed in the Soudan office in Cairo. Gordon took him back to the Soudan at an increased rate of pay, *i.e.*, £20 a month. A little later in the morning a deputation of merchants interested in the Soudan commerce came to present Gordon with an address, and to beg that he would do what he could to protect the interests of Soudan

## Appendix A

merchants. He replied to them that he had been sent out from England by the English Government with a definite object, viz., to withdraw the Egyptian Government from the Soudan; that they all knew that the Egyptian Government in the Soudan was bad, and had been used to oppress the people; that the present state of affairs could not continue, but that he would do his best to set up some system of self-government in the Soudan. After the deputation retired, General Gordon went out, and I went to the War Office and arranged for lithographing the proclamation alluded to above.

General Gordon and Colonel Stewart lunched with us. Giegler Pasha came in afterwards and we all went to Sir E. Baring's, with whom were Nubar Pasha and Sir Evelyn Wood. Sir Evelyn Baring said that General Gordon had expressed a wish that certain matters between him and Zebehr Pasha might be discussed, and Zebehr Pasha was called in. Gordon and Zebehr sat near one another, with an interpreter between, and Zebehr Pasha was asked what he had to say. He said that Gordon without cause had confiscated his property, had put his people in chains, and had caused his son to be killed, that when Gordon had gone to the Soudan he (Zebehr) had put his hand on his (Gordon's) hand and had asked him to consider his son as his own son. Then General Gordon said that he had confiscated the property of Zebehr because he had been convicted by a court of enquiry at Khartoum of having instigated his son to revolt against the Government, that the conviction was to a certain extent based upon a letter written from Zebehr to his son and found among the latter's (Suliman's) papers. *Zebehr*: "I never wrote such a letter. You should produce it as proof of what you say." *General Gordon*: "I cannot produce the letter as it was attached to the proceedings of the court and sent with the latter to his Highness the Khedive. If the proceedings can be found the letter should be found with them." *Zebehr*: "If the letter can be found I deserve to lose my head," and he drew his hand across his throat. *Gordon*: "If the letter was not written, I was not justified in what I did." Then Sir Evelyn Baring said that he would see that the "proceedings" were looked for, and he directed Sir E. Wood to endeavour to find them. Then *Zebehr* said to Gordon: "And you killed my son, although I had specially entrusted him to your care." *Gordon*: "I did take care of your son and I had him promoted to the rank of Bey, and then afterwards he treacherously killed 200 Egyptian soldiers in the Bahr Gazal." *Zebehr* fenced with the question for some time and at last said: "I was no longer responsible for my son, you had made him a Bey, you were responsible." Then *Sir E. Baring* said that "apparently there

## *Gordon Papers*

were two questions between Zebehr and Gordon, the first concerning Zebehr himself which turned on the existence of a certain letter which would be searched for, that if Zebehr was proved not to be guilty he would see that compensation was made to him for his losses; the second question concerned Zebehr's son, for whose action it now appeared Zebehr did not hold himself responsible." Zebehr stood up and made a speech mainly to the effect that the name of England and the justice of England were known to all nations, and that he would leave all in the hands of his Excellency. Zebehr then left the room. Sir E. Baring said that the next point to discuss was whether Zebehr Pasha was to go to the Soudan or not, as General Gordon had suggested the advisability of his going. General Gordon said: "I had better not be here while you are discussing that. Hear what Watson has to say." And he went out. Sir E. Baring asked me what I had to say, and I answered that I considered it would be the greatest possible mistake to let Zebehr go to the Soudan with Gordon, and that, if my own opinion was of no value, I had been requested by one who knew the Soudan well to do all I could to prevent his going, as it was almost certain that one or the other would not come back alive. Sir E. Wood also said that he did not think it advisable for Zebehr to go, and Nubar Pasha expressed the same opinion, but more mildly. Nubar gave me the idea that for some reason or other he was annoyed at having Zebehr's affairs stirred up again and wanted it to relapse into oblivion as soon as possible. Gordon and Zebehr were then called in again, and Sir E. Baring informed the latter that it was considered desirable he should not at present go to the Soudan, but that the question of his return and of his position generally would be discussed as soon as General Gordon had returned in safety. Soon after, every one went away.

That evening there was a large dinner at Sir E. Wood's, Nubar Pasha, Abd el Kader, etc., etc. At 9 o'clock we drove to Boulac Dakrou station to see Gordon off, his train was to start at 9.30, but at the last minute it appeared that Abd el Shakoor, the Sultan of Darfour, in place of coming with two or three people as Gordon had arranged, had brought all his family and followers, nearly fifty in number. Gordon did not like to leave them behind, so fresh carriages were put on, and the people and baggage were tumbled into the train, which started at 10.30. During the following days Tuhami brought me several papers respecting affairs in the Soudan, which he asked me to send to General Gordon for his guidance.

Cairo, 10th Feb., 1884.



## Appendix A

GENERAL SIR GERALD GRAHAM TO SIR HENRY GORDON

Saxon, *Feb. 4th*, 1884.

MY DEAR SIR HENRY,

I have been accompanying your brother as far as Korusko and seen him start off on his journey across the desert. He is much more cheery and confident than he was when he left Cairo, and looks forward to constructing a government and army out of native materials as if it were the simplest thing in the world. He has certainly an extraordinary influence over the natives, the secret of which seems to me to be that he is really fond of them and enters into their feelings, while he at the same time shows an energy that must appear to them superhuman. . . .

GERALD GRAHAM.

GENERAL C. G. GORDON TO MONSIEUR DE MOUTARDIN, RUE  
ROGATE, NO. 7, PARIS (FROM SIR HENRY GORDON'S PAPERS)

(Apparently translated from the French.)

Khartoum, 5 *Novr.* 84.

MY DEAR SIR,

Thank you for your letter 25 August received yesterday by a spy, and also for your good wishes for our security. The Arabs are tranquil enough, they are at the South and S. W. and East, but otherwise they are not. We are in much vicissitude. I regret sensibly that your Consul, Mr. Harbin, who went down in a steamer with Colonel Stewart, and Mr. Power, English Consul, after an uproar were killed *en route* with the other M. M. I do not understand, for the steamer had been blinded, had a gun and a good force. They left here the 10th of September. I had them escorted below Berber, and they ought to have been at Dongola the 20th September, but an officer has informed me that on the 14th October they had not arrived there. It is very grievous. Excuse a longer letter, for I have so many things to do.

Believe me my dear M. de Moutardin, Yours sincerely,

C. G. GORDON.

P.S. You say to me, "Expedition for my relief," thank you, no,—*"Expedition for the relief of the garrisons of the Soudan," that is the title* you understand, is it not? I was sent to succour the garrisons of the Soudan, I have failed, they sent the Troops to make up for the failure on my part. Slatin Bey is with the Mahdi 8 miles distant from here, he is well and has become Muslim, as they say is the case with all the Europeans! The time of Martyrs for the faith is ended!

## *Gordon Papers*

SIR CHARLES WATSON TO SIR HENRY GORDON

War Office, Cairo, 24. 2. 1885.

MY DEAR SIR HENRY,

Since posting my letter to you I have had forwarded to me from Korti a letter from your brother dated 14. 12. 84. It is sad to get it, but I thought you would like a copy, so send one. He evidently knew there was treachery at work in Khartoum some time before it fell. The last paragraph concerns some small commissions I did for him, it is of no consequence. The letter was given to Sir Charles Wilson at Gubat by Kashim el Moos, who commanded the steamers. So Wilson must have had an anxious time going up. He would have done anything to save your brother, and must have felt there was no hope before he left Khartoum behind him. It is a sad story, but I cannot help envying your brother,

Ever yours sincerely,

C. M. WATSON.

I have shown the letter to Sir F. Stephenson and Sir E. Baring. The latter took a copy of it.

*Enclosure.*

Khartoum, 14. 12. 84.

MY DEAR WATSON,

I think the game is up and send Mrs. Watson, you and Graham my adieux. We may expect a catastrophe in the town in or after 10 days time. This would not have happened (if it does happen) if our people had taken better precautions as to informing us of their movements. But this is "spilt milk," good bye. Mind and let my brother (68, Elm Park Road, Chelsea) know what I owe you.

Yours sincerely,

C. G. GORDON.

The above was received at Gubat by Sir C. Wilson on the 22 January 1885.

SIR CHARLES WATSON TO SIR HENRY GORDON

War Office, Cairo, 10. 3. 1885.

MY DEAR SIR HENRY,

Since last writing to you I have had a second letter from your brother, but of earlier date than the one of which I sent you a

## Appendix A

copy. I am so often asked for copies of it that I have had it lithographed in facsimile, and enclose you a copy of it. You will see he speaks strongly about the government, and he had reason. Why was not General Graham allowed to go on last year? But it is not much use talking about it now. I only hope that the government will at last realize that the Soudan business is a large one that will take years to settle. I have seen young Anderson of the artillery. He started for Souakim yesterday with General Graham.

I hope you are all well,

Yours very sincerely,  
C. M. WATSON.

### *Enclosure in Facsimile.*

Kartum, 26. 11. 84.

MY DEAR WATSON,

Thanks for your letter which I received yesterday, the steamer which brought it, had to run the gauntlet of no end of rifle fire and of 6 guns, she was struck 3 times by shells, but only 7 were wounded. I hope you and Mrs. Watson are well. I am not ill-treated I consider, but the Cairo people up here they are the ill used. I will accept *nothing whatever* from Gladstone's Government. I will not even let them pay my expenses. I will get the King to pay them. I will never put foot in England again—but will (D.V. if I get out) go to Brussels and so on to Congo. How is Miss Arnott, the lady who was with me? I greatly fear for Stewart, Power and Herbin, French Consul. With kindest regards, believe me yours sincerely, with kindest regards to Mrs. Watson,

C. G. GORDON.

### LAST TELEGRAM FROM GENERAL GORDON (FROM AMONG MRS. MOFFITT'S PAPERS)

Junior United Service Club,  
London, S.W.

8 June 1886.

An Egyptian Clerk, who was taken prisoner by the rebels at the fall of Khartoum, and at last succeeded in effecting his escape from Omdurman, gave me a copy of an Arabic telegram of which he said the following was the story.

On or about the 29th December 1884, General Gordon dictated this telegram to him. It was written on a small piece of paper. General Gordon then took a cartridge, took out the bullet and shook the gunpowder out of it. He then folded up the telegram, put it in the cartridge in place of the powder, and replaced the

## *Gordon Papers*

bullet, so that the cartridge looked as if it had not been touched. General Gordon then gave it to a messenger who put it with his other cartridges and started for Dongola.

I have never heard that he arrived, neither have I any means of confirming the truth of the clerk's story. It seems, however, very unlikely that he should have invented such a tale, or have written the telegram himself.

The translation of the telegram is as follows:

"To the Sovereign of the Kingdom.

"After salutations. I would at once, calling to mind what I have gone through, inform their Majesties the Sovereigns of the actions of Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire, who appointed me as Governor-General of the Soudan for the purpose of appeasing the rebellion in that country.

"During the twelve months that I have been here, these two Powers, the one remarkable for her wealth and the other for her military force, have remained unaffected by my situation, perhaps relying too much on the news sent by Hussein Pasha Khalifa who surrendered of his own accord. Although I personally am too insignificant to be taken into account, the Powers were bound nevertheless to fulfil the engagement upon which my appointment was based, so as to shield the honor of the Governments.

"What I have gone through I cannot describe. The Almighty God will help me."

I would observe that the fact of General Gordon speaking of having been "twelve months" in the Soudan would lead to the supposition that the telegram was written later than the clerk stated. This is quite possible as Egyptians are not good at remembering dates.

C. M. WATSON.

SIR CHARLES WILSON TO SIR HENRY GORDON

Mountjoy Barracks, Phoenix Park, Dublin,  
Sep. 9 1885.

MY DEAR GORDON,

There has never been any doubt in my mind as to the manner of your brother's death. He was killed before sunrise, apparently before it was quite daylight, a short distance outside the Palace gates, where he met a party of Arabs. He fell at the first discharge, but whether killed, or severely wounded, we do not know; his body when seen afterwards had several lance wounds, and his head was cut off by a Dugaini Arab and exposed on a pole in the

## *Appendix A*

open space between the Mahdi's two camps at Omdurman. I tried to keep these details from the correspondents in the Sudan, knowing how painful they would be to you and his family, but as you have asked for them I give them now. The body was left on the ground some time, and then appears to have been buried with others in the ditch south of Khartum. One account was that the body was buried under a large cairn of stones, where it fell, by people throwing stones at it as they passed, a common Arab custom. The decapitation is also Arab and what one might naturally expect; on the other hand the Arabs never mutilate the dead as the Ethiopic tribes do. Our dead were untouched except by lance thrusts, whilst those on the Sawakin side were horribly mutilated. You may therefore be certain that no insult was offered to your brother's body.

My view is that your brother was roused up, just before daylight, by the news that the Arabs had entered the town, that he hastily collected his cavasses (armed servants) and left the Palace with the intention of reaching the stone church, where the ammunition was stored, and then of blowing up the magazine or trying to hold out till we arrived. He probably intended picking up the Austrian Consul on his way, but unfortunately was met by a party of Arabs just after he left the Palace gates. The Arabs apparently did not know it was your brother when they fired; they only saw the cavasses in their Egyptian uniform. Your brother, if he had chosen, might have made an attempt to save his own life by going on board the steamers which always had steam up; but you know as well as I do he would never have done that. The steamers tried to get down the river, but turned back when fire was opened upon them from Omdurman; had a European been on board they might have run the gauntlet. My account of your brother's death is based on two independent reports made not very long after the fall of Khartum and before the wild stories which so rapidly grow out of such an event, in semi-civilised countries, had time to obscure the truth. In all essential particulars these reports have been confirmed by later ones. The two reports I allude to were one by a cavass of Ibrahim Bey Rushdi's, whose master was killed with your brother and who was present when they were killed. This man was of Turkish origin, and bribed some Arabs to bring him across the desert; from Khartum he went down to Cairo with the Mudir of Dongola. The other was by a leading Sheikh of the Shagiyeh, whom we had sent to Khartum with letters for your brother; this man was in Khartum when it fell, and saw your brother's body not long after he had been killed; he came down to us by the Wady Bishara road. The two men were unknown to each other, of different race,

## *Gordon Papers*

and came by different roads, at an interval of a few days; there could not therefore have been any collusion

Watson is collecting all he can about the last days at Khartum; have you written to him?

Yours sincerely,  
C. W. WILSON.

NOTES FROM AN INTERVIEW WITH A REFUGEE WHO CAME FROM  
KHARTOUM ON OR ABOUT THE 3RD NOVEMBER 1887 to  
SUAKIN (FROM AMONG MRS. MOFFITT'S PAPERS)

Rank, *Sergt. Major.*

Nationality, *Turk.*

Was formerly in the Garrison at Berber, but escaped at its fall to Kartoum, where he was one of four Sergeants Orderlies to Gordon. He was "on duty" on the 26th, and was with Gordon in the "look out" on the top of the Palace. Gordon the evening before warned the people that he had seen a great deal of extra excitement going on in the rebel camp, and that unless a "good resistance was made that night the town would fall." The soldiers were in a starving state and many left the lines in search of food, the civilians armed themselves and went on to the lines. As the morning star rose the rebels made a feint at the portion of the defence under Ferag Pasha (with the black troops), but at the same time they directed their full attack at the defence commanded by Hassan Bey Benassawie (with the 5th Regt., fellahien) and succeeded in getting into the town. Gordon, when he heard the rebels in the town, said: "It is all finished; to-day Gordon will be killed ("enhardeh Gordon cassocora"), and went downstairs, followed by the four sergeants, who took their rifles with them. He took a chair and sat down on the right of the Palace door, the four sergeants standing on his left; all at once a sheikh galloped up with some Baggara Arabs; the sergeants were on the point of firing when Gordon, seizing one of their rifles, said: "No need of rifles; to-day Gordon is to be killed" (as before). The Sheikh told Gordon that he had been ordered by the Mahdi to bring him alive. Gordon refused to go, saying that he would die where he was, and adding that no harm was to be done to the four sergeants who had not fired on the rebels. The Sheikh repeated the order three times, and each time Gordon gave the same answer. After a few words the Sheikh drew his sword and rushing up to Gordon cut him in a slanting direction over the left shoulder, Gordon looking him straight in the face and offering no resistance of any kind. His head was cut off and taken to the Mahdi at Omdurman, and his body was buried close to the door

## Appendix A

of the Palace and a tomb built over it. The four sergeants were not hurt, but taken prisoners, and two have already managed to escape. The sergeant, on being questioned about the report made by Colonel Kitchener, states that food was so scarce that Gordon himself lived on a handful of doura, which was made into a thick soup, the people living chiefly on the fibre of the palm-tree made into cakes. All the animals were killed, with the exception of a donkey, over which there was a guard. Finally an officer stole it and sold its flesh at any price he asked. A fish was caught and sold in a similar manner.

Ibrahim Bey Fowsi is now at Omdurman, Farag Ullah Bey is at Galabat.

SIR CHARLES WATSON TO SIR HENRY GORDON

Cairo, 2 July 1885.

MY DEAR SIR HENRY,

Very many thanks for sending me the "Journals," which have reached me this afternoon. I have only just had time to glance at them, but write at once to catch the Italian mail. They seem most interesting. What a pity it is that he did not keep them all from the beginning of the siege instead of sending them down by Stewart, but of course he thought it safer to do the latter.

I was very glad to read your paper in the introduction about Sir Charles Wilson, who seems to be unjustly blamed. Have you seen him since he came to England? I was a little sorry to see the footnote on page 121 about Abd-el-Kader Pasha, as it does not quite convey the truth about his refusal to go to the Soudan. He agreed to go on certain conditions, the most important of which was that the abandonment of the Soudan was not to be announced, but in the instructions which were drawn up for him the abandonment was a leading feature. I made this note upon them at the time.

"N.B. Abd-el-Kader did not agree to these instructions on the ground that an immediate abandonment of Khartoum was inexpedient, and that to go to the Soudan with such an intention would lead to certain failure. The proposal to send him therefore fell through (16 Jan. 1884)."

Abd-el-Kader always remained of the same opinion that to proclaim the abandonment of the Soudan was to make the removal of the garrisons impossible. He is one of the best Pashas I have met with, *one who has not got rich*.

I shall write again when I have read the Journals.

Yours very sincerely,

C. M. WATSON.

## *Gordon Papers*

### SIR CHARLES WILSON'S ACCOUNT OF HIS EXPEDITION TO OMDURMAN SENT TO SIR H. GORDON

Mountjoy Barracks, Dublin, 27 July 1885.

1. The force under Sir H. Stewart was sent across the desert to occupy Matammeh, open up communication with General Gordon's steamers, and through them with Khartum. It was hoped that the presence of this force, which was not much larger than a battalion at war strength, on the Nile at Matammeh would withdraw some of the pressure on Khartum, but it was not sent to relieve that place.

2. My mission was to communicate with General Gordon; to deliver Lord Wolseley's letters to him; to ascertain from him the exact position of affairs at Khartum; to inform him that the forces advancing for the relief of Khartum would be concentrated at Matammeh and Shendy by the first week in March, and to have three officers in Khartum to assist General Gordon in the defence until relief came. I was then to return to Korti, bringing the English soldiers down the river with me. There was never any question of my attempting the relief of Khartum.

3. No one at Gubat, no one on the steamers of General Gordon's flotilla had the slightest suspicion that a crisis would occur at Khartum within a few days of our arrival at Matammeh. The first time that the officers and men on the steamers expressed a doubt as to the safety of Khartum was when we came under fire of the guns at Halfiyeh. There was therefore no urgent necessity for an immediate start without consideration for the position of the little force which had been more than decimated on its march to the Nile.

4. The steamers left Gubat at 8 a.m. on the 24th, and arrived off Omdurman at 2 p.m. on the 28th; they were heavily laden with grain, yet they made better time up the river as far as times can be compared, than Lord C. Beresford in the "Safieh," manned by officers and men of the Second Division of the Naval Brigade who had come across after the steamers left; this shows when once started there was no delay. Had the steamers started at 3 p.m. on the 21st, the day of their arrival, they would on the evening of the 25th have been some distance below Halfiyeh, out of sight of Khartum and unable to exert any influence over the events which occurred at Khartum at dawn on the 26th. It is absurd to suppose the Mahdi's plans would have been altered by his knowing the two steamers were coming up; he probably believed, as General Gordon did, they could not pass the batteries.



## *Appendix A*

5. The steamers were under fire from both banks, in action with the Mahdi's army, for four hours; it was impossible to land in the face of such a strong force; they came out of action a little after 4, and about 5 or soon after hauled into the bank to obtain information. We ascertained then, *i.e.* on the evening of the 28th, that Khartum had fallen through the treachery of Faraj Pasha at dawn on the 26th, and that General Gordon had been killed. These were the two capital facts which it was necessary the Government and Lord Wolseley should know; all we have learned since is matter of detail. There was frequent communication with natives on the way down; they all told essentially the same story, and there was never any doubt in my mind as to the truth of the main points.

6. It may be interesting to know that General Gordon's last great sortie was on the 17th January, the day of Abu Klea; and that it is almost certain he and his garrison had heard of the fight at Abu Klea, and possibly Gubat before the end came.

C. W. W.

MR. EDWARD HAMILTON TO SIR HENRY GORDON

10, Downing Street, 20th July 1884.

DEAR SIR,

I beg to return to you Lord Wolseley's letter, of which I have retained a copy.

Mr. Gladstone is much obliged for your further note of to-day on the subject of the position of affairs at Khartoum. He admits the force of what you say; but he was under the impression that there was a known route to the South and to the sea from Khartoum, and that there must be persons, perhaps many persons, who are acquainted with it from the course of trade or otherwise. He would be glad to know whether he is right or wrong in this impression. Faithfully yours,

E. W. HAMILTON.

MEMORANDUM BY SIR HENRY GORDON, DATED 22nd July 1884.

FORWARDED TO MR. GLADSTONE, 23rd July 1884.

GENERAL GORDON'S PRESENT POSITION

There is no proof that Khartoum is invested upon the South—on the contrary there is presumptive evidence that it is not, since the Rebels, if in position there, would find it difficult to keep up their communications for supplies of Food, while their flanks would be exposed on either side to constant attacks—by means

## *Gordon Papers*

of steamers from Khartoum. All communications that have come to hand, whether true or not, point to the country to the South as being open, and as of supplies coming in.

There is no question but what if General Gordon wished to leave with Colonel Stewart he could do so at any time, he could go to the Bahr-el-Gazelle—or he could move to the Equator (see General Gordon's own statement that he could get away to the Congo, also Sir Samuel Baker's letter to the "Times" of 30th April, and to the fact, according to Dr. Hill's book, "Colonel Gordon in Central Africa," that he was travelling to and fro on a "low Nile," in March and April 1874).

But it is equally certain that General Gordon would not desert the people who have been faithful to him.

It is not a question of the safety of the garrison, but it is one of the protection of the traders at Khartoum.

The former might be moved to Sennaar and thence transported further to the South, the latter would not leave—to do so would be worse than death (see enclosure in No. 3, Egypt, dated Khartoum, 8th April 1884, showing that General Gordon had traded with the people whom he would not desert).

The question would be the same if a force were at Khartoum.

No doubt General Gordon at this time is doing all he can to secure the safety of the inhabitants, and would not care how he accomplished it.

It is believed that he is conferring with the Mahdi, having this object in view, although he has no faith in his (the Mahdi's) power. If General Gordon could secure the safety of the people of Sennaar and Khartoum he would retire, since it may be assumed that Kassala is safe.

It seems probable that the Rebels to the North of Khartoum are instigated by Zebehr, and that the money at Berber has been too great a temptation to the Governor of that Station. It is doubtful whether Berber was not quietly given over to the rebels, and that it did not fall by assault.

The Tribes to the North of Khartoum rose in rebellion for the reasons stated in the "Times" of the 10th March, under date of Khartoum 7th March; "this is not owing to disaffection, but to fear caused by the pronounced policy of the abandonment of the Soudan, which policy has been published by sending down the widows and orphans and Cairo employées from Khartoum. We cannot blame them for rising when no definite sign is shown of establishing a permanent Government here. The Mahdi is a non-entity as to any advance on Khartoum, but all-powerful through his emissaries when backed with pronounced policy of abandonment without establishing a permanent Government."

## *Appendix A*

On the other hand while General Gordon may not, at this time, be in actual personal danger more than that incidental to disaffection at Khartoum, or from the daily contingencies which present themselves in time of war, yet the time is approaching when some steps must be taken to prove that he, as the agent of the British Government, is not to be abandoned, and to this must be coupled the fact that his ammunition is running short, and that he has not been heard of for so long a period.

It was hoped that the outbreaks among the tribes to the North of Khartoum would long ago have been put down, and that the country would have been quiet: such an expectation, however, has not been realized, and when General Gordon's ammunition fails he will be at the mercy of the Rebels.

In the absence of a Government that could secure the safety of the inhabitants, matters could not improve, it is therefore necessary, imperatively so, to reconsider General Gordon's application to have Zebehr sent up (see "Times," 5th March, dated Khartoum, 3rd March).

"It is now admitted that Zebehr Pasha is the only man connected with the Soudan, who is endowed with the ability and firmness necessary to head any Government here.

"It is out of the question that General Gordon should leave Khartoum without first having formed a Government which would in some measure stem the wave of fearful anarchy that must eventually sweep over the Soudan. The arrival of Zebehr Pasha would draw off to his side the bands of rebels which are now scattered over the Soudan, and his great knowledge of the tribes fits him more than any other man to take the place of the Egyptian Government. He would, of course, come here under certain stringent conditions. General Gordon had foreseen this ever since he left Cairo." I mentioned to Lord Granville in consequence of confidential information from Cairo, to the effect "that if Zebehr went up to Khartoum his first act would be to hang General Gordon," that it would be dangerous to send Zebehr up, and to this opinion I have adhered up to the present time.

As, however, the rebels remain in force to the North of Khartoum, and as matters have not improved, and cannot improve unless some future in the way of Government is made clear (bearing also in mind that General Gordon will not desert the people at Khartoum, unless he can leave them in safety), the time has now arrived that Zebehr should be sent up. It would be in compliance with General Gordon's own request, and Zebehr might be offered a sum of money provided he established an independent Government and so enabled General Gordon to leave Khartoum. The payment might be withheld until the object in

## *Gordon Papers*

view, viz., General Gordon's absence from Khartoum, had been secured.

It is believed that if Zebehr was sent up all danger to the peoples at Khartoum, Sennaar and Kassala would cease, and the country would be quieted.

At the same time it is necessary that other precautions should be taken the more especially as General Gordon's ammunition is daily decreased by expenditure. It would therefore seem desirable that a force should be sent to Suakim in order to open the road from that place to Berber (one of General Gordon's suggestions), but of course if Zebehr agrees to go, and is successful, then this force would not be called into action, although no delay should take place in its preparation.

It would be out of place my making any remarks upon any expedition advancing by the Nile, nevertheless I do not believe it to be practicable.

Any movement of Abyssinia upon Kassala and Sennaar would raise the whole of the Soudan, and would do an amount of harm that cannot be contemplated.

H. W. GORDON.

THE RT. HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P., TO SIR HENRY GORDON

10, Downing Street, 22 Feb. 1885.

DEAR SIR HENRY GORDON,

As long as a hope could in any way be entertained that your distinguished and excellent brother had survived the betrayal of Khartoum, I was unwilling to forgo the slender consolation it might afford; and I have also been delayed in writing this note for two or three days by an inquiry on a kindred subject. But I cannot longer forbear from addressing to you my humble tribute to his memory, insignificant as that tribute must be when rendered to one, whose fame has not only become a national possession, but gone forth throughout the world.

Though I had not the privilege of his personal acquaintance, yet his was a character of which I think many features could be plainly read even from a distance. The judgement of mankind has pronounced him a hero; and the application of that lofty name is specially marked in his case by the fact that it applies not only to his public acts, but to the man; to the spirit of self-sacrifice, such as distinguished martyrs and apostles, to a simplicity of character not less remarkable than his profound enthusiasm and his boundless courage. I cannot but add, though it is perhaps presumptuous, my admiration of his astonishing command, under circumstances

## Appendix A

so difficult of military resource, and of that inexhaustible strength of will which formed the crown of his powers, it is difficult to wish any of his virtues had been in any respect restrained; yet I reflect with pain, now that catastrophe has come, how ill his generous confidence was requited by some of those for whose welfare, though they were of a foreign race, it was his desire to live or die. I congratulate you on your close and intimate association with General Gordon, and I trust that among us there are and will be many who will strive to learn lessons in their several places from this noble example of Christian heroism. Believe me with much respect, faithfully yours,

W. E. GLADSTONE.

SIR HENRY GORDON TO MR. GLADSTONE

23rd February (1885).

DEAR MR. GLADSTONE,

I am very much obliged for your very kind note of sympathy, and for the very handsome manner in which you speak of General Gordon's character and services. It is not for me to dwell upon them, and the subject is a very painful one, and therefore I hope you will forgive the brevity of my reply.

Yours faithfully,  
H. W. GORDON.

H. M. QUEEN VICTORIA TO MISS GORDON

Osborne, 17th Feb. 1885.

DEAR MISS GORDON,

*How* shall I write to you, or how shall I attempt to express *what I feel*! To *think* of your dear, noble, heroic Brother, who served his Country and his Queen so truly, so heroically, with a self-sacrifice so edifying to the World, not having been rescued. That the promises of support were not fulfilled—which I so frequently and constantly pressed on those who asked him to go—is to me *grief inexpressible*! indeed it has made me ill! My heart bleeds for you his Sister, who have gone through so many anxieties on his account, and who loved the dear Brother as he deserved to be. You are all so good and trustful, and have such strong faith, that you will be sustained even now, when *real* absolute evidence of your dear Brother's death does not exist—but I fear there cannot be much doubt of it. Some day I hope to see you again, to tell you all I cannot express. My daughter Beatrice, who has felt quite as I do, wishes me to express her deepest sympathy

## Gordon Papers

with you. I hear so many expressions of sorrow and sympathy from *abroad*: from my eldest daughter the Crown Princess, and from my cousin the King of the Belgians—the very warmest. Would you express to your other Sisters and your elder Brother my true sympathy, and what I do so keenly feel, the *stain* left upon England, for your dear Brother's cruel, though heroic, fate.

Ever

Dear Miss Gordon,

Yours sincerely and sympathizingly,

V. R. I.

### MISS AUGUSTA GORDON TO QUEEN VICTORIA

Rockstone Place, Southampton.

MADAM,

The letter which your Majesty has so graciously honoured me with has deeply touched and gratified me. I am so thankful to know of your sympathy for, and the endeavours you so very kindly made to save my dear Brother, though *others dared* to prevent your supporting him in his just demands. Never can I cease to be deeply grateful to your Majesty for the great kindness you have shown towards him. I think he received the gracious message you sent him through me as in one of the Volumes of his Diaries he returns a little letter in which I told him of your Majesty's message. If permitted I should like to bring over the Original Diaries when I have the great honour to wait on your Majesty next month.

I am your Majesty's devoted subject and servant,

M. AUGUSTA GORDON.

### MISS AUGUSTA GORDON TO MR. BLUNT

Rockstone Place, Southampton, 11th September 1882.

Will you kindly give me a copy (two if you can spare them) of your letter on Egypt written to Mr. Gladstone and others. I am sending on by the first mail your letters and the 19th Century to my Brother at the Cape. Strange you were not listened to by those in authority. I fancy there are many of your way of thinking and there would be many more if they knew the rights and wrongs done to Egypt.

A. GORDON

## *Appendix A*

MR. BLUNT TO GENERAL C. G. GORDON

Delhi, 24<sup>th</sup> January, 1884.

MY DEAR GENERAL,

I feel obliged to write to you about your mission to the Soudan. I see it announced to-day by telegraph without explanation of its object, but I cannot wait till more definite news arrives, and I desire to warn you. It may be you are going there to make peace between the Mahdi and our troops in Egypt, to acknowledge his sovereignty in the Soudan, and arrange terms for the evacuation of Khartoum. If so, I can only wish you God speed. It is a good work, and you will accomplish it. But if, as I fear it may be, from the tradition of some of those in power, the object of your mission is to divide the tribes with a view to retaining any part of the country for the Khedive, to raise men for him and scatter money, it is bad work, and you will fail. It must be so. Neither your courage, nor your honest purpose, nor the inspiration which has hitherto guided you, will bring you success. I know enough to be able to assure you that every honest Mohammedan in Egypt and North Africa and Arabia sympathizes with the Mahdi's cause, not necessarily believing him to have a Divine mission, but as representing ideas of liberty and justice and religious government which they acknowledge to be divine. For this reason you will only have the men of Belial on your side, and these will betray you. I beg you be cautious. Do not trust to the old sympathy which united Englishmen with the Arabs. I fear it is a thing of the past, and that even your great name will not protect you with them. Also consider what your death will mean: the certainty of a cry for vengeance in England, and an excuse with those who ask no better than a war of conquest. I wish I could be sure that all those who are sending you on your mission do not foresee this end. Forgive me if I am wrong in my fears; and believe me yours, very gratefully, in memory of last year,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

MRS. SURTEES-ALLNATT TO MR. BLUNT

134, St. Owens, Hereford, Dec. 27, 1884.

DEAR SIR,

Will you allow me, personally a stranger, to tell you how interested I am in the result of your application to Mr. Gladstone respecting your mediation with the Mahdi.

You will the more readily understand my great interest, when I mention that I was in London for some weeks last spring for the purpose of devising some means for the rescue of General

## *Gordon Papers*

Gordon, and that I was about the first (I believe) to suggest the Volunteer Expedition of which I see by the "Pall Mall Gazette" you had heard.

I saw Captain Brocklehurst, having called upon him though a stranger, but knowing his friendship for General Gordon. My own scheme was in the first place to have raised a "Khartoum Fund," for which I had many promises, and would have had no difficulty in raising from £80,000 and upwards. My idea was to pay the safe conduct for General Gordon and his garrison (in fact for all his people at Khartoum) from Khartoum to Cairo, a certain sum to be paid to the chief of each tribe, the amount to be in proportion to the extent of territory over which the safe pass would be given. I saw many members of the House of Commons and other influential persons, but after discussion, though my plan was approved by many, it was waived in favour of the Volunteer Expedition, to which I promised to transfer the £100 I should have subscribed to the "safe conduct" scheme.

But the Government negatived decidedly the Volunteer movement, and my plan had fallen through. It was with much regret that I returned here, having after much anxiety and trouble effected nothing of that on which my heart was set.

If I had known you were in London I would have ventured to have called on you. I have a strong personal regard for General Gordon, and with many members of his family I am on terms of friendship. Now, I am perplexed whether to wish you success in your application to the Premier—if it would save General Gordon I would pray for it—but if you should be frustrating plans for his safety I could not. I write to you freely though a stranger, and I hope you will forgive me, but the one great interest which I think we both have in common, General Gordon, will plead my excuse.

Believe me, dear Sir, yours faithfully,

ELIZABETH SURTEES-ALLNATT.

MR. BLUNT TO MRS. ALLNATT

Crabbet Park, Dec. 29, 1884.

MY DEAR MADAM,

I am sorry that I did not know of your plans for rescuing General Gordon by peaceful means last year, as your support and that of friends so liberal and sincere in their efforts would have given great weight to my plea with Mr. Gladstone, and might perhaps have turned the scale with him in favour of negotiation. This course would, I am convinced, have been an infinitely surer and better one than that of war which our Government have chosen.

My point of view in the matter is of course rather a different



## *Appendix A*

one from yours, for you look only to General Gordon's safety, whereas I look also, and indeed primarily, to the well-being of the Nile populations; but I see no reason that our efforts should not even now be made in common.

From all the accounts I receive, Lord Wolsley's expedition will meet with determined opposition, and it is quite possible that it may be several months yet on the road—in which case the time will shortly come when necessity will compel the Government, if they would not fail altogether in their object of saving Gordon's life, to have recourse to our ideas if not to our help. My principal fear indeed is that, going to work through ignorance of the conditions before them in a blundering way, their attempts to treat will be so protracted that Khartoum will in the interval have fallen. I will not, however, be a prophet of evil, only I would urge you not to relax your efforts. Any independent appeal made just now to Mr. Gladstone would, I believe, have at least this good effect, that it would force on his attention the daily increasing gravity of Gordon's situation.

Very faithfully yours,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

MRS. SURTEES-ALLNATT TO MR. BLUNT

134, St. Owens, Hereford, *Febry.* 17, 1885.

MY DEAR SIR,

I thank you for your letter just received. I have given up (as you see) all hope of the precious life having been saved. But how cruel has been the martyrdom of his, during weeks and months, owing to the Government, of which one cannot speak with aught but the greatest contempt and indignation. Knowing the faith of the devoted Christian soldier, I have the hope or rather the consolation of thinking that as he was deserted by man so his God was nearer to him day by day.

I go tomorrow (Wednesday) till Saturday to Mr. Egmont Hake, the Biographer of "Chinese Gordon." I should like very much to talk over one or two matters with you now, respecting the recovery of his bible and journal, etc., and also of the proposed additional expedition. Is it not madness to send one of the Khedive's sons as Governor General of the Soudan? I thought the Egyptians were hated by the poor Soudanese.

Unhappy land! What will be the outcome of all this? God, who created the world out of chaos, can bring order out of the Egyptian confusion.

Believe me, My dear Sir, Yrs. sincerely,

ELIZABETH SURTEES-ALLNATT.

## *Gordon Papers*

MRS. SURTEES-ALLNATT TO MR. BLUNT

38, Montpellier Terrace, Cheltenham,  
*Feb. 21, 1885.*

MY DEAR SIR,

I am staying here till Wednesday, when I shall D.V. return to Hereford, where I shall anxiously await the result of your kind effort to procure for me the bible of dear General Gordon.

In the train to-day I read in the papers, with dismay, the reply of the Government to the questions respecting the important and precious records of Khartoum kept by its devoted Defender. They decline to say what course they will take regarding them. I have just written to Sir Henry Gordon most earnestly beseeching him, out of regard to his brother's memory, to apply for the possession of the journal, 6 volumes, on their arrival. One dreads such important and deeply interesting records getting into the hands of men so unscrupulous as those comprising the present Government. The papers would probably be cruelly mutilated before leaving their hands, if there were aught in them that would condemn those who sacrificed their devoted Envoy to paltry party devices.

I am my dear Sir, Yrs. sincerely,  
ELIZABETH SURTEES-ALLNATT

### EXTRACT FROM EDITH, LADY LYTTON'S DIARY

*June 7, Simla, 1880.*—In the evening, while we were at dinner under the Shemiana on the lawn, Lord William [Beresford] arrived, having left Lord Ripon at Umballa and come on very quickly to reach us for our last evening. He says the heat has been tremendous and worse than he has ever felt it, and he and Major White had to put ice on their heads one night, expecting every minute to succumb. But Lord Ripon and party have not complained or been ill. Lord William told us about Colonel Gordon being so odd; he says the world is not big enough for him, and that there is no king or country big enough. He hit Lord William on the shoulder, saying, "Yes, that is flesh, that is what I hate, and what makes me wish to die." He resigned the Private Secretaryship, to the Viceroy's great inconvenience, because he was asked to answer an address at Bombay saying that Lord Ripon had read it with interest and would write again at some time, and he said: "You know perfectly that Lord Ripon has never read it, and will not write, and I can't say those sort of things, so I shall resign, and you take in my resignation." Colonel Gordon received a telegram from China asking him to go and fight the Russians

## *Appendix A*

there, so he has gone off to do so, and his last word to Lord William was, "Everyone will say I am mad, but you say I am not."

COLONEL LOUIS A. GORDON TO MR. BLUNT

Carpenters, Horsham, Sussex, *Sept. 4, 1911*

DEAR MR. BLUNT,

I am glad to see that you, in your new book "Gordon at Khartoum," are undertaking the vindication of my uncle's memory against an attack on it, which Lord Cromer thought fit to make in his "Modern Egypt" so many years after the death of General Gordon and my father Sir Henry Gordon. I know that nothing that Lord Cromer could write would in the least affect General Gordon's memory; but the remarks he makes leave a nasty taste in the mouth and it is very desirable that they should be responded to in detail.

In "Modern Egypt," page 43, Vol. I, I observe a note which affects my father, Sir Henry Gordon; Lord Cromer says: "At the instance however, of General Gordon's friends and family, a good deal of violent and very foolish abuse of Lord Granville—and if I remember rightly, of others—was omitted. It is in my opinion to be regretted that this was done. The publication of the Journal, as it was originally written, would have enabled the public to judge more accurately of the value of General Gordon's criticisms, than was possible when only an expurgated edition was issued." This contains an accusation of tampering with the Journals which the facts do not warrant.

As far as Sir Henry Gordon is concerned, expurgation of the kind referred to by Lord Cromer was certainly not authorised. In his "Description of the Journals," page lxxv, my father says: "I have arranged . . . for their issue in a very nearly entire state, only some 6 or 7 pages being omitted which contain, in my opinion, no matter of public interest; while with regard to names those who are well acquainted with the affairs of Egypt can fill in the blanks without difficulty." That no fraud has been exercised on the public in the matter, and that the public has not been deprived of the opportunity of reading the Journals in full, is sufficiently plain by the fact that the Journals were deposited by my family in the British Museum plain for all folk to see; so that anyone, caring to do so, can satisfy himself on the subject.

Yrs. sincerely,  
L. A. GORDON.

## APPENDIX B

### MR. BLUNT'S ORIENTAL CORRESPONDENCE

#### I. AS TO HIS PROPOSED MEDIATION WITH THE MAHDI

MR. BLUNT TO SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU AT PARIS

London, *April 7, 1884.*

To my noble and dear friend, the learned Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, the martyr of liberty, may God continue to enlighten him.

Your letter, which Her Ladyship has now translated to me in full, has given me much pleasure except in what you say of your not being able yet to come to England; but I send you by this post the money needful for your journey and trust that you will acknowledge to me its safe arrival. I wrote four days ago to M. Sanua telling him something of the state of opinion here, and since that time I have written a letter which will be published in the 'Times' of to-morrow or Wednesday in which I have proposed a solution of the present difficulties and misfortunes in Egypt. I trust that it may meet with your approval, for in it I propose that the Egyptian question shall be referred to an European Congress, that the English army shall retire from the country and that Egypt shall be placed under the joint protection of the Powers, and so govern herself according to her own will.

I propose also that peace shall be made with the Mahdi, and General Gordon be recalled from Khartoum—nor have I forgotten to recommend that the decrees of exile against the patriots of Egypt shall be reversed. With regard to Egypt and Syria and the Arabian Caliphate you know well my views, for they are published in the book which I wrote three years ago founded on your learned instructions and your views conveyed to me through our dear friend (peace be with him) Mohammed Khalil. But with regard to the Mohammedans of India these are my views, and I beg that you will communicate them to the noble prince the Seyyid Jemal-ed-Din (to whom also I send my best compliments) that he may know them himself and communicate them to the Nawab Rasul Yar Khan and the Ulema of Hyderabad, though I have already told them of my thoughts, having spoken freely to all the Mohammedans of India whom I met. My thoughts therefore about India are these. According to the principles which I

## *Appendix B*

hold in political affairs I desire to see liberty and self government established everywhere, and in India no less than in other countries of the world now held in subjection, and I am not prejudiced by the fact that I was born an Englishman into wishing for other advantage there than to the Indians, nor should I hesitate to approve of any wise plan which should hasten their freedom. At the same time my journey in India has convinced me that the people of that country are not yet sufficiently united to form an independent nation, unprotected by some external Power. If all Indians were of one creed and one language and one race, as was the case in Egypt, I would say to them as I said to you, "Bismillah," in the name of God go forward and fear nothing. But it is not so. I see that though they might free themselves from the English domination, which is hateful to them, they are not yet prepared to set anything of profit to them in its place. I see that they must be educated and prepared for self government. Otherwise their effort would not prosper. For this reason I have said to them, and I say it again, take patience for a few years and work out your political education under a government which allows you this privilege of education, and later the moment will come when you shall be able to unite and form a Nation. To the Mohammedans I say this especially, for they are but as one to five of the population of India, and at the present moment they are also inferior to the Hindus and Parsis in education, so that it is possible their condition would be worse under native than under English rule. By advising them to found an University I desired first to give them a centre of unity which should add to their strength, for strength is in union,—and secondly to prepare them to take their full part in the regeneration of their country. At present, by standing aloof from public affairs and by remaining in ignorance of English, which is the official language, they are putting themselves at a disadvantage with the other races and religions of India. I trust therefore that the learned Seyyid, when he writes to Hyderabad will encourage them to proceed in this good work, and not to spare their efforts in the direction I have pointed out.

With regard to your newspaper I shall be happy to do what I can to help you. But I advise you strongly to be moderate in your language about the English Government—not that anything you can say about its action in Egypt can surpass my own anger and impatience,—but because I see in the friendship of England still the best hope for Islam. Believe me, though England has acted through all this matter as an enemy of religion, there are still more Englishmen who sympathise with our hopes for the nations of the East than you will find amongst all the rest of the Europeans. You cannot trust the French or the Russians or the

## *Oriental Correspondence*

Austrians or the Italians to act with you sincerely as friends—and the English being stronger at sea than all others, must always be counted with, and if possible secured as friendly. This may yet come about, and I should be sorry to see an irreconcilable breach made between the party of reform in Islam and the English people. Think this matter fairly over. For centuries England was the friend of Islam, and I find very many Englishmen now who regret and condemn the change of policy.

You see I have spoken openly all that is in my heart.

Your friend in good and bad fortune,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU TO MR. BLUNT

*(Translation from the Arabic.)*

Paris, April 11, 1884.

To H. E. my dear friend, friend of the Moslems, helper of the Arabs and defender of the Egyptian nation, etc.

After salutation to you and to the well-instructed Lady Anne Blunt—yesterday your letter reached us, and reading it we found it full of wisdom and useful counsels to the Moslems, and it confirmed our trust in you that you are their friend.

The Seyyid Jemal-ed-Din presents you his salutation and will certainly write to the people of India in Hyderabad and elsewhere, and will advise them to be quiet, and will tranquillize their minds as you suggested; and he will expound to them the idea you have so clearly set forth in your letter, and will put the details before them in the best and most lucid manner.

Next, we rejoiced at the admonition you were kind enough to give us, and at your promise to help our newspaper (the Indissoluble Link), and this was our hope in you. And indeed God the Most High created you to do good, and to assist the cause of right, and to defend the oppressed. And the true character of our newspaper is only this, and to serve those views for which you are labouring, namely, the preservation of the independence of the Eastern peoples, and the admonishing of the English Government that it may abandon its action troubling the minds of Moslems and make fast their friendship, and that so it shall have them with it on its side. And indeed we do not love those other Powers referred to in your letter, nor go with the policy of any one of them.

And so may peace be with you and the mercy of God. Your sincere friend,

MOHAMMED ABDU.

## Appendix B

SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN TO MR. BLUNT

*Privée.*

Paris le 21 *Avril*, 84.

MON CHER MONSIEUR,

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre aimable lettre dont je vous remercie et à laquelle je m'empresse de répondre.

Quoique je n'ai nullement appris pendant les dix années que j'ai passées en Egypte que M. Gordon fût, à l'époque où il était Gouverneur du Soudan, ami de la liberté et défenseur de l'Islam, je n'hésite pas cependant, étant donnée la pleine confiance que j'ai en votre parole, à plaindre son malheureux sort et à regretter qu'il soit tombé dans une situation qui devient de plus en plus critique.

Je ne vous cache pas, cher Monsieur, qu'il m'aurait été facile, vu la confiance que le Mahdi paraît vouloir avoir en moi ainsi que celle de ses principaux partisans dont un grand nombre sont de mes élèves Soudanais, de prévenir ce désastre qui menace Gordon Pacha si les dernières batailles entre Graham et Osman Digna ne s'étaient pas engagées; mais après ces batailles sanglantes qui ont coûté tant de sang Arabe, je crois que le Mahdi et ses partisans sont réduits à voir que le seul moyen de rattrapper le terrain perdu et de consolider leur prestige serait de s'emparer de Khartoum et d'arrêter M. Gordon sinon de lui arracher la vie.

Cependant, si vous voulez, cher Monsieur, m'écrire avec plus de détails et *en français* sur les bases de la paix que vous voudriez conclure et avec qui désireriez vous qu'elle soit faite pour qu'elle soit acceptable et en règle, je ne manquerais pas alors de vous fixer sur tout ce que je pourrais faire dans cette circonstance et sur les moyens efficaces dont on pourrait se servir pour sauver la vie à ce malheureux Gordon.

En attendant le plaisir de vous lire, je me mets à votre entière disposition et vous prie d'agréer mes salutations distinguées.

JEMAL-ED-DIN HUSEYNI AFGHANI.

MR. BLUNT TO SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN AFGHANI

10, James Street, le 24 *Avril*, 1884.

NOBLE ET CHER AMI,

La bonne réponse que vous avez bien voulu me faire à mes questions sur le sort de Gordon me touche profondément. Je sais combien il a dû vous coûter de prendre ainsi part à un projet qui aurait pour but de prêter aide à un homme qui malgré ses principes avoués a fait tant de tort à la cause que nous aimons; mais je vois dans cette affaire une occasion puissante pour obtenir du Gouvernement Anglais l'abandon de sa politique actuelle en

## *Oriental Correspondence*

Egypte. Je viens d'adresser formellement à M. Gladstone une lettre où je lui fais savoir qu'il serait encore possible pour lui non seulement de sauver la vie à Gordon mais d'amener la pacification de toute la vallée du Nil. Hier encore on était résolu d'envoyer une nouvelle expédition Anglo-Egyptienne au Soudan, mais il paraît que déjà ma lettre aurait produit quelque effet et qu'on soit maintenant de nouveau à la paix. Je compte donc sous peu de jours recevoir quelque communication du Gouvernement qui mènerait à un tentatif de négociations et je voudrais vous prévenir que je pourrais à tout instant vous prier de vouloir bien venir à Londres où bien d'envoyer le Sheykh Mohammed Abdu me parler.

Je vous prie de regarder d'un bon œil mes idées pacifiques. Comme je vous ai déjà dit, je vois dans l'Angleterre la seule puissance qui pourrait redevenir un ami sincère de l'Islam; et je vois dans la nécessité où est dans ce moment notre Gouvernement un puissant levier pour amener l'abandon de sa position actuelle d'hostilité. Quant aux conditions de paix je ne suis pas encore en position de vous les formuler. Mais selon moi elles devraient s'étendre jusqu'à la cession du Soudan entier au Mahdi. Je vous envoie copie d'une lettre qui j'ai eu de Gordon il y a près de deux ans qui vous sera preuve de son bon caractère.

Bien votre dévoué,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

MR. BLUNT TO SEYVID JEMAL-ED-DIN

10, James Street, 10 25 *Avril*, 1884.

NOBLE ET CHER AMI,

Depuis ma lettre d'hier je l'ai d'une source certaine que notre Gouvernement s'est décidé absolument contre l'expédition, pour le moment, de toute force militaire Anglaise ou Egyptienne à Berber. Or il est presque sûr qu'on se prépare à une négociation, et déjà on me fait entendre que je recevrai sous peu une réponse définitive à ma lettre. Que pensez vous, pourrai je aller en personne à Obeyd en qualité d'Envoyé Britannique traiter avec le Mahdi en lui reconnaissant la souveraineté du Soudan? Et croyez vous qu'à ces conditions les tribus qui assiègent Khartoum permettraient à Gordon et aux Chrétiens de la ville de retourner sous sauf-conduite en Egypte? Ou bien, si je ne pourrai pas aller en personne, croyez-vous qu'il se trouverait quelque autre envoyé capable de mener la négociation à bonne fin? Je vous prie de vouloir bien me répondre à ces questions.

En même temps je compte persuader le Gouvernement de restaurer le parti National en Egypte. Mais dites moi franche-



## Appendix B

ment votre idée. Qui devons nous proposer en place de Tewfik? Serais ce Arabi ou un autre? Les Circassiens, si je ne me trompe, voudraient Ismail. Les autres voudraient encore peut-être Halim. Mais l'opinion change si vite que je n'ose dire absolument à qui on donnerait les votes si la chose était remise à l'élection. Surtout qui pourrait agir en Egypte de concert avec le Mahdi?

Inshallah! nous menerons l'affaire cette fois ci à bonne fin.

Votre bien dévoué,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

MR. BLUNT TO ARABI PASHA

(*Sent in Arabic.*)

10, James Street, April 26th, 1884.

To my noble and dear friend Arabi Pasha, may God strengthen his patience.

After saying that it has given us extreme pleasure to have news of you and the rest of the noble Egyptian exiles—this is to inform you that the hopes of your return to Egypt are, as I think, greater now than at any previous time since you first went away in Exile. The reason of this is (after the will of Providence that truth should prevail) that the English Government has fallen into great trouble in Egypt, first on account of the finance and secondly with regard to the Mahdi. They are therefore entirely anxious to leave Egypt, and they see that it is necessary in order to do this that a stable Government should be set up at Cairo, and a prince established who should be able to live in friendship with the Mahdi.

Therefore it is probable that they will abandon Tewfik inasmuch as he is incapable of governing and will entrust the government to other hands before they withdraw their troops. And in these last days the danger to General Gordon at Khartoum obliges them to come to terms quickly, and I have proposed (with the permission of God) to go as Envoy to the Mahdi in order to make peace and to save the life of General Gordon; and, if they should accept my offer, I do not fear but that they will also accept my plan for the restoration of good government in Egypt. Now therefore tell me clearly, on what terms could you and your companions return to Egypt? I know that you could serve with Halim Pasha. But tell me, is it impossible that you could serve with Ismail? I have several times received messages from Ismail, and his friends tell me that he promises to act with you if he is restored. But do you think it would be possible to trust him? I should propose that in any case the command of the army should be in your hands. Or is there any other prince among the Princes of Islam whom you would serve and who could live at peace with the Mahdi; I ask

## *Oriental Correspondence*

you these things because the aspect of politics continually changes, and what is true to-day is not true to-morrow, and what was rejected yesterday may once again be accepted.

Also a conference is assembling at which it will be necessary that your opinion should be heard. Therefore write to me your full mind and the mind of your companions, and, if you should resolve that you could return to Egypt as Minister to Ismail, telegraph to me then one word "content," and I shall understand. If you consider that it will be impossible for you to serve under Ismail, telegraph the word "refused."

For the rest all things are going well. There are many Englishmen now who recognize your services to Egypt and I am hopeful of your return there.

Your friend,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

You must not suppose from my writing in this sense that I want you to make friends with Ismail. What I want is that you should tell me your real opinion as to whether it will be possible for you to work with him.

SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN TO MR. BLUNT

*Privée.*

Paris, *April 28, 1884.*

MON CHER MONSIEUR,

J'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir votre lettre que j'ai lue avec beaucoup d'attention et à laquelle je m'empresse de répondre.

Vous ne devez pas ignorer l'importance que les Mohamétans attachent à la mission divine avec laquelle le Mahdi a paru et qu'ils comprennent par ce mot, Mahdi: le sauveur de l'Islam des mains de ceux qui ne sont pas de leur religion. Or je ne vois pas qu'on puisse conclure un traité de paix avec le Mahdi et par conséquent arrêter sa marche tant que celui-ci voit les Anglais en Egypte. Mais si les bases de la paix supulent que l'Egypte sera aux Egyptiens et que Gordon Pacha sera sauvé avec tous les Chrétiens qui sont avec lui et que, enfin, les troupes Anglaises seront retirées de l'Egypte, je vois qu'il serait possible sinon facile de mener cette affaire à bonne fin et d'arrêter l'invasion du Mahdi jusqu'à un certain point et jusqu'à un certain temps. Dans ce cas il faudrait envoyer une commission de paix composée en grande partie de Mussulmans et de quelques Anglais. Quand aux Mussulmans ils auraient pour instruction de dire qu'ils viennent de la part de la Nation Egyptienne Mussulmane car si ils seraient envoyés de la part du Gouvernement Egyptien, je ne crois pas qu'ils réussissent dans leur mission étant donné l'aversion dont le Mahdi

## Appendix B

est animé à son égard, et de la part du Gouvernement Anglais, ils ne seront pas écoutés. Nous en avons acquis une preuve par le Cheick El Morghani. Quant aux quelques Anglais qui feront partie de la mission, il est bien entendu qu'ils iront de la part de leur Gouvernement; quoique, par le fait, tous, Mussulmans et Chrétiens seront des missionnaires Anglais.

Dans le cas qu'on décide à envoyer cette commission, et dans les conditions que je me suis permis de vous exposer, je crois que vous, cher Monsieur, vous devez être le premier nommé parmi les missionnaires, car les Mussulmans ne peuvent pas trouver beaucoup de défenseurs comme vous. Pour les Mussulmans qu'il faudrait envoyer, je les désignerai et vous en ferai connaître les noms quand le moment serait venu et qu'on se serait décidé d'une façon définitive.

Vous me demandez en qui faut-il remplacer Tewfik? Je réponds que quand le moment serait venu il ne serait difficile ni à vous ni à moi ni à qui que ce soit de le savoir. Il faudrait se prononcer pour celui que la *nation Egyptienne* veut et pas pour un autre.

Votre bien dévoué,  
JEMAL-ED-DIN HUSEYNI AFGHANI.

MR. BLUNT TO SEYYID JEMAL-ED-DIN

10, James Street, le 2 Mai, 1884.

NOBLE ET CHER AMI,

Je vous remercie bien de vos instructions sur la manière de négocier qui sont absolument d'accord avec mes idées personnelles. Pour le moment le Gouvernement se retire du tentatif proposé, mais je suis toujours en relation indirecte avec eux, et je pense bien qu'ils se trouveront encore dans la nécessité de recourir à nos bons offices. Seulement l'hésitation pourra bien coûter la vie à Gordon. Pour le moment le Gouvernement est toujours dans l'intention d'abandonner Khartoum, Berber et Dongola, mais je prévois que dans le cas que Gordon soit encore debout à Khartoum à l'époque du cru du Nil le public anglais pourra exiger une opération militaire.

Quant au général il se pourra que son intention serait de se retirer vers le Congo, quand il trouvera qu'il ne pourra plus se tenir à Khartoum, et je crois que le Mahdi serait bien avisé de lui laisser le passage libre. L'idée de Gordon au Congo paraît avoir toujours été d'y fonder un Etat indigène qui pourrait faire face à l'envahissement de l'Europe, et en tant il mériterait votre sympathie. Faites un pont d'or pour l'ennemi qui s'en fuit. Je suis cependant pleine-

## *Oriental Correspondence*

ment de votre avis qu'il soit nécessaire au Mahdi de s'emparer sans délai de Khartoum. Je vous prie de me croire bien votre ami.

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

SEYVID JEMAL-ED-DIN TO MR. BLUNT

Paris, le 7 *Mai*, 1884.

MON CHER MONSIEUR,

Je viens d'arriver de l'Italie. J'ai été à l'exposition de Turin et ce n'est que ce matin que l'on m'a remis vos deux lettres que j'ai lues avec beaucoup d'attention.

Votre dernière lettre m'a d'autant plus appris que vous ne vous intéresserez plus au sort de Gordon qu'il m'a édifié encore une fois sur la loyauté et la grandeur d'âme qui vous caractérisent. Tout en vous remerciant d'avoir bien voulu m'envoyer le livre bleu contenant certaines correspondances relatives au Général Gordon, des quelles vous avez pu constater qu'il n'était nullement ami de la liberté ni défenseur de l'Islam, j'ai la ferme conviction que votre nom sera gravé dans le cœur de chaque musulman en particulier et de chaque Arabe et Oriental en général à cause de l'intérêt immense que vous prenez pour eux et dont il ne sauraient vous être trop reconnaissant. J'espère, cher Monsieur, que vous continuerez à suivre cette voie digne d'un caractère aussi loyal que le vôtre et que le bon Dieu vous aidera à récolter les fruits du travail dur que vous faites.

Veuillez, je vous prie, me faire rappeler au bon souvenir de Madame Blunt tout en lui présentant mes respectueux hommages et soyez persuadé que je me mets à votre entière disposition pour tout ce que je pourrais faire pour vous.

Votre bien dévoué,

JEMAL-ED-DIN HUSAYNI AFGHANI.

ARABI PASHA TO MR. BLUNT

(*Sent in English.*)

Colombo, 2nd June 1884.

To my lord Mr. Wilfrid Blunt, may God preserve him.

It is with the greatest pleasure that I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 26th April 1884. I must strongly insist on the fact that Ismail Pasha is a treacherous person who is notorious for his untrustworthiness, being the causer of the destruction of Egypt. The national Debt of our country is the work of his hands. There is no one of the prince's family who possesses the requisite qualifications for the throne but Halim Pasha. He is,

## Appendix B

besides, the direct descendant of the first Khedive, being the son of Mohammed Ali. Tewfik (the present Khedive) and the others are members of a third branch, so that Halim Pasha, who is directly the ancestral representative, is the real owner of the throne. To add to his right he has the voice of all the Egyptians in Egypt to hail him, and he has for a long time undergone trials of a very grave nature, having been subjected to tyranny. Also he would be able to make a treaty between the Mahdi and the Government of Egypt, inasmuch as those whom the Mahdi trusts are able to effect this for him.

If you are resolved to go to the Mahdi, I must most earnestly entreat you to secure beforehand some letters stamped with my seal, in order that they may serve as the proof that you are a faithful friend of the Moslem world, and that you have been instrumental in saving our lives. May God preserve you. Your most faithful friend,

AHMED ARABI.

### ARABI PASHA TO LADY ANNE BLUNT

(*Translated from the Arabic.*) Colombo, March 2, 1885.

To the noble and exalted lady, Lady Anne Blunt; may God protect her. Amen.

After presenting my best salutations to your distinguished self and your illustrious husband, and in response to your two letters with inclosures relating what Mr. Blunt had written in the "Times" on Egypt and England and the Sultan, with the remarks made thereon, permit me to assure you that all that Mr. Blunt has stated in the "Times," and declared publicly in many utterances, and all that he described in his poem (kasid) "The Wind and Whirlwind," of the disasters and calamities that must ensue, all these are true, and we see them happening now, as it was necessary they should happen, and truly the Most High God inspired him with truth to speak these things, and with a just understanding. For the time has come now when God shall choose his servants, and shall deliver the weak and oppressed and abase the mighty and oppress the oppressor, and shall manifest His power and His strength to the unjust. And thus in times past He confounded men's reasoning by His wonderful judgements on the nations that are gone. Thus He destroyed Babylon the adulterous, the violent city, and thus the empires of Persia and of Rome; and I grieve with a great grief over the decline of the star of England caused by her misdeeds in Egypt and in the Soudan. But God has heard the cry of the oppressed and the voice of the blood which has been shed, and

## *Oriental Correspondence*

the terrible cry of the widow and of the young children, and surely He has taken His vengeance on the covetous. Yet, believe me, the people of Egypt used to believe good of the English nation. It was they of all others that they trusted, as the foremost among nations, and as the chief hope of those who sought to obtain their freedom; and they grieve now seeing their belief a deception, and their trust a delusion.

And what has England gained by her invasion of Egypt, and what in the Soudan? Rather let us say, what has she lost? For God knows she has gained nothing. She has lost her good name, the friendship of all Moslems, and of our Lord the Sultan. She has lost, too, Gordon Pasha, through acting on false counsels, and Hicks and Earle, and how many other officers; and she has lost the respect of all hearts by this war against free men in the Soudan. When will she cease to rush forward on her course, to send armies of revenge on men who are themselves avenging their Egyptian brothers; on men defending their country, and who delight to drink the cup of death rather than that they should see an enemy left within its borders. I tell you, *fifteen* millions of such as these occupy at this moment the Soudan country and Darfur, and all of them are partisans of the Mahdi, having made a convention with him unto death, and in accordance with the precepts of our noble Koran. Thus the Mahdi increases in strength with the English aggression, and this is God's law with his creatures, with all who have been given intelligence to see and reflect and understand.

"A decree has come forth from God. There is no escape from the judgement of God. God shall exalt whom He will, and abase whom He will. The oppressor shall repent when repentance shall not avail him. And God is not unmindful of the deeds of the unjust." (Quotations.)

My son Mohammed Bey and the family send you a thousand thousand greetings. From your friend and servant,

AHMED ARABI.

SEYVID JEMAL-ED-DIN TO MR. BLUNT

(*Translated from the Arabic.*)

Paris, May 12, 1885.

After salutations, etc. I say; I am not alone in gratitude for your distinguished efforts which have forced the Government to evacuate the Soudan. No, be certain that all Moslems, especially the Arabs, will be grateful for this your action to the end of time and they will write your name on tablets inlaid with precious stones and titles of glory and honour for your zeal and courage.

But there is left one thing still to be done and that is that you

## *Appendix B*

should say to the Government, "How can you leave this land thus without a treaty with the Mahdi and whose will be the duty of repelling the Mahdi's attacks? how also can the Government leave the roads of commerce blocked? or does it desire the destruction of trade? Is it not incumbent on the Government when it has determined to evacuate the Soudan to send a man of trust, a Moslem, to the Mahdi that he may discuss with him as to a peace and secure Egypt from his attacks and to close the gates of conflict and reopen those of Commerce." I think that if this question were presented to parliament all opinions would agree with it.

I see too that this would be easy, even apart from your own action and that when the cost has been decided on you will be only needed to complete it. But without a treaty of peace with the Mahdi the situation cannot be brought to a final conclusion. This is what I have thought it necessary to say to you.

With salutations to you and your consort,

Your friend,

JEMAL-ED-DIN HUSEYNI AFGHANI.

### ARABI PASHA TO LADY ANNE BLUNT

(*Translated from the Arabic.*) Colombo, August 14, 1885.

To my lady, dear Lady Anne Blunt. May God preserve her.

After best salutations to yourself and Mr. Blunt I was happy to receive your letter dated July 17th, and thanked God that you are in good health, of which I hope for the continuance. I sent you a telegram the same day as to my willingness to serve the country even with Tewfik and Sherif, and I now write this in confirmation.

I can assure you that I am prepared to serve my country, to work hard at reforms in it, and to labour for its advancement to the highest pitch of honour and prosperity.

Therefore I should not mind whether I served with Tewfik or another, my one only object being the establishing of just law for all men alike, giving to all security for their persons and for their civil and religious rights, and putting an end to wrong and injustice between class and class of (Egyptian) subjects, always bearing in mind the claims on me of the English people (*nation*) to whom I shall be grateful as long as I live.

I have, too, a firm trust that the English Government would aid me in carrying out reforms, and that, after establishing a strong, just, and equitable Government, it will leave Egypt to the Egyptians, thus fulfilling its promise and completing what it has commenced.

## *Oriental Correspondence*

As to Sherif, he is well disposed and anxious for the good of the country, but Nubar is not really interested in the welfare of Egypt, and the Egyptians are weary at his holding high office in the country.

Now, therefore, since you and your friends, and my friends, are of opinion that it would be fitting for me to take office even with Tewfik, I would agree also to that. I should hope for success in making those reforms of which we have already sown the seeds—notwithstanding Tewfik's remaining—if supported by the English Government, and in surmounting those difficulties, both home and foreign, which have beset Egypt in these latter times.

And God is our Helper, and in Him our trust.

Your sincere friend,

AHMED ARABI THE EGYPTIAN.

## II. EVIDENCE AS TO THE MASSACRES AT ALEXANDRIA, TANTAH, AND ELSEWHERE, IN 1882

SHEVKH MOHAMMED ABDU TO LADY ANNE BLUNT

*(Translated from the Arabic, received 5th August, 1883, from Beyrout.)*

To the Lady Anne Blunt. May God show us her countenance, etc.

Next, among those persons who have information about the riot in Alexandria in particular, there is Mustafa Abd el Rahim, who was present at the riot and stopped its rage with the regular soldiers with Suleyman Sami (may God have mercy on him). And he is prepared to bear witness on being requested to do so, as he has informed me this night.

And of those who have complete information of the conduct of the Khedive Tewfik and of his endeavours and the endeavours of his assistants to disturb the peace and tranquillity of Egypt, and to excite the Muslems against the Christians, and vice versa, there is here Ahmed Bey Minshawi, one of the Notables of Egypt, a man of wealth and of determination and of extreme straightforwardness. It was he who protected Christians in the riots of Tantah, and in other massacres in the province of Gharbiyeh, which Ibrahim Pasha Adhem, the Khedive's protégé, got up after the bombardment of Alexandria; and he is prepared to bear witness against the Khedive and against his agents before any Court or in any



## *Appendix B*

Tribunal—even in the Egyptian Tribunals—and he has no fear of anything, and is not alarmed by any danger. He has been intending to write a letter to Mr. Blunt, of his own accord, to express his readiness and his earnest wish to put before Englishmen, and before everyone inclined to justice and equity, the things known to him; and he is now with us in Beyrut, and if you wish to summon him he is ready.

Convey my salutations to Mr. Blunt and present to him on my behalf and on behalf of every Egyptian—indeed of every Englishman—exceeding thanks for his energy and noble deeds. And salute for me Mr. Sabunji. May God protect you in his keeping.

MOHAMMED ABDU.

13th Ramadan, 1300.

AHMED BEY EL MINSHAWI TO MR. BLUNT

*(Translated from the Arabic, received August 5, 1883.)*

To the high-minded Mr. Blunt. May God preserve him!

After presenting salutations and praise and thanks:

Also, I beg you will be my representative in presenting thanks from me and from all Egyptians—indeed from all Eastern people, to Lord (Randolph) Churchill and his companions—though they are all dependent on you for what they accomplished in Parliament.

Also I am prepared, with all preparation, to bear witness against the Khedive and the men of his government as to their plan, which they carried out, of shedding the blood of Christians and others. In so doing I fear not the blame of any blamer, nor do I dread the authority of any ignorant ruler in whatsoever country I may be, or before whatsoever tribunal I may appear; and whenever the indictment against Tewfik is officially brought forward and witnesses are wanted I am ready in Beyrut, and if I went elsewhere I would let you know. And I pledge myself in the name of God that I will also bring witnesses of the Egyptians who will bear witness to the crimes of the Khedive and his wicked accomplices.

And my friend the Sheykh Mohammed Abdu knows that perfectly well, and sends you salutations. Remain in God's protection.

AHMED MINSHAWI.

Beyrout, 15th Ramadan, 1300.

## *Oriental Correspondence*

TRANSLATION OF REMARKS BY SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU ON  
MAJOR MACDONALD'S STATEMENT (RECEIVED  
*Aug. 13, 1884*)

We have read a statement by Major MacDonald, published in the Blue Book (Egypt, 1884), in refutation of Mr. Blunt's letter to the "Times" newspaper, and have noticed in it certain things calling for remark.

I do not know whether a ten weeks' residence with Mr. Cameron at Tantah could have enabled him to understand the true state of matters he has written about, or not.

I shall not here discuss the history of Ibrahim Adhem's dismissal from his office as Governor; but I assert that Ibrahim Adhem was in fact, on the upper storey of the prefecture on the day of the massacre at Tantah, and that he was looking on from the window of that upper storey at the murderers and the murdered; and that these persons were murdered in the court of the Mudirieh while he looked on at them; and that he himself ordered the water carriers to wash the blood from the ground at the Government House (of which evidence was given by the water carriers before the Court of Inquiry).

As to what Macdonald says about many of the Europeans finding safety in the prefecture of police, it is true; only the person who protected them was the chief of the city police, Ali effendi Lebfi, who saved many lives, but was arrested after the war and kept in prison until the end of the Inquiry, when the Court sentenced him to hard labour for a year, after much intercession. Now what plea was there for the arrest of this Zabit, a person worthy of confidence; whose protection of Christians is testified to by Major Macdonald (who understood the whole truth in ten weeks).

Ibrahim Adhem is a Kurd—not a Circassian—and a man who, each time that they gave him a post, stipulated with the Government that he should be authorized to make use of the kurbaj on the fellahin and the omdehs of the district. Ay, when he was Mudir of Mansourah at the time of Riaz Pasha's first Ministry, Riaz learned that he was ill-treating people with the kurbaj, and wrote to him as follows: "You are bound to act according to law, governing mercifully; if you use the kurbaj you will incur the censure of the law." On receiving this communication he chose to resign his post rather than rule mercifully and according to law.

His resignation under the Mahmud Samy Ministry took place for that reason also; and when the Khedive reappointed him as Mudir of the Gharbieh, after the war, he carried on his government with his habitual severity; afterwards, when the number

## *Appendix B*

of his enemies increased and the patience of the people of his province was so exhausted that they could no longer bear with him, the Government disgraced him, and, dismissing him, appointed Husseyn Pasha Sarai in his place.

Ibrahim Adhem was one of the supporters of the first movement of Arabi, but when the massacre occurred at Tintah, Arabi learned that he had participated in it either by instigation or by deed, and ordered him to be arrested. He was not arrested for not joining in the rebellion, in fact he was arrested on the third day from the massacre, before it was known whether he would give or refuse his support. Indeed, Ibrahim Adhem's sworn official despatches to the Ministry of the Interior indicate sufficiently that he did not deserve the praises lavished on him by Major Macdonald. Possibly some of the officers of the English army may have praised him, but I do not consider this enough to exculpate him from his deeds of violence. Let anyone who would like to learn what measure of savagery Ibrahim Adhem attained, inquire of his son—Ibrahim Hafzy Bey.

As to the unhappy Yusuf Abu Diab—he arrived at the railway station on the day of the massacre about three hours after the disturbance had begun. He did not instigate riot (anything or any one), but saved a Christian girl and took her to the Mudirich; and reprimanded the Mudir, taking him to task for sitting in the Mudirieh while he allowed people to be massacred. And for this reason the unfortunate man was hanged. Those Europeans of whom Macdonald testifies were in such consternation that they did not even distinguish their own children, and were running into every hole—how then could they know Yusuf Abu Diab, and distinguish his face or his words?

The chief of the station and telegraph at the first bore witness to the innocence of Yusuf Abu Diab, but the Mudir Ibrahim Adhem threatened all the people with arrest and death unless they bore witness according to his desire; thus they altered their testimony under coercion. The statements made by people subsequently have all been under fear. But those Courts of Inquiry and their acts are part and parcel of the acts of the Anglo-Egyptian Government after the war, into which it is permissible to examine and investigate. We know indeed what has been its course and its acts. No man in his senses will believe in it, for it has been of that species in which the enemy sits in judgement on his enemy; and if we would speak of it we would have to recount the whole of the conduct of the Government after Tel-el-Kebir, and this would lead us into too great length—without profit.

Yusuf Abu Diab's innocence was confessed by the blood relations of the people massacred, and they begged his pardon from

## *Oriental Correspondence*

Lord Dufferin, who asked it from the Khedive—and the pardon was granted, but the order was issued secretly to hang him before the time fixed for the execution. The news of the pardon did not arrive till after the execution.

Possibly Macdonald can testify to the Europeans—French, English, and others—but we know the value of such testimony, and if we had a free and fair Government it would learn the truth through a different set of people.

Seyyid Osman has published a long article in the "Intransigent" (French newspaper), stating all the facts. It is also well known to a number of people that the first President of the Court of Inquiry at Tantah wanted to carry out the investigation equitably, and to interrogate the Mudir Ibrahim Adhem on his culpability as to the riot, but the Government perceiving him to be upright, dismissed him and appointed in his stead Mahmud Pasha Fellaky, who was nominally at Tantah while his administration was at Cairo.

Thus the Mudir was saved from trial, while Yusuf Abu Diab was hanged in his stead.

I could show the object of silence as to past deeds, to speak of which would open the door wide to censure on the Government of Egypt, which desires to establish justice in Egypt.

### MR. BLUNT'S NOTE OF A CONVERSATION WITH ISMAIL BEY JOWDAT AT CONSTANTINOPLE, *Oct. 24, 1884*

Ismail Jowdat spent 3 hours with me telling the events of the Egyptian Revolution, much of it new, and very interesting. With regard to the Khedive's responsibility for the massacres he was very explicit. His official position at the time of the war, as Chef du Bureau Européen de la police du Caire, gave him every opportunity of knowing the facts, and he knew them. The following is the account he gave me which I shall transcribe from notes taken while he was speaking:

"The first intrigue that he knows of in which the Khedive was concerned was in Boheyra where the Khedive employed Ibrahim Bey Towfik—he lived in the house of Hassaneyn Abu Hamza at Damanhour, Governor of the province—in the spring of 1882 to purchase the alliance of certain Sheykhs of the Oulad Ali Bedouins against the National Ministry, to make a civil war between the Bedouins and the army. They were engaged to make disturbance, and a regular agreement was drawn up in which the Arabs promised to support the Khedive against the army in the case of civil war. For this they were to receive, and actually did receive £E13,000, the signatories to the document being Ibrahim Bey Towfik, the

## *Appendix B*

Mudir, and Mahmud abu Ismail el Aluani, Mahareb abu Keshik, Abd ed Dayim Hoteiteh, Abu Shayib, Hassaneyn abu Hamza and five others (Sheykh of the Oulad Ali).

Ismail Jowdat was sent down to Boheyra semi officially by Arabi to inquire into this matter, and saw the Sheykh and the document, and persuaded them to rescind their promise to the Khedive, and obtained from them an oath of allegiance to the National Government in Arabi's room at Cairo. This same Ibrahim Tewfik was sent by the Khedive during the war to Mansourah to stir up trouble, but did not succeed there. There was a report made against him signed by all the Notables of Dakhalieh under Mohammed Bey el Hantour sub Mudir of the province, after which he was imprisoned by order of the National Assembly.

With regard to the riots of the 11th June at Alexandria the details did not come under Ismail Jowdat's official notice. But he heard the main facts at the time. He heard of the riots at 5 o'clock on the 11th, and went at once to the Palace, and heard how it had been ordered, and about the telegram sent by the Khedive, as we know them, viz.: that the disturbance was arranged by Omar Pasha Lutfi with Seyd Kandil, who, however, took to his bed to avoid being connected with its execution. He also heard at the time of a telegram having been sent by the Khedive in cypher to Omar Lutfi giving him his orders. But he did not see a copy of the telegram.

Of what happened during the war he had more certain knowledge, as he was responsible for the safety of all the Europeans in the country, and had spent some £E3,272 of his own money in finding and keeping them—sums which have never been repaid him, though he has the highest testimonials from M. de Martino the Italian Consul at Cairo of the care taken by him.

The Khedive's chief agent during the war was a certain Osman Raafat, intendant des Ecuries, who is still employed by him on various secret missions. Immediately after the evacuation at Alexandria he sent him in disguise to the house of his brother-in-law, Mohammed Bey Hellal, to concert measures with Ibrahim Pasha Adhem the Mudir; and they concerted together the riots against the Christians in order to force on an English intervention. Ismail Jowdat confirms my account given in my letter to the "Times" with regard to Ibrahim Adhem's conduct, except that the Christians killed were killed at the Mudirieh, not at the Prefecture; and Ibrahim shut himself inside the house and let the killing continue. His words were: "Il était dans une chambre en bas de la Mudirieh pendant le massacre. Les Chrétiens se sont réfugiés dans la Moudirieh. Il s'est enfermé dans sa chambre et a

## *Oriental Correspondence*

laissé faire. Les vagabonds et galériens d'Alexandrie ont fait le massacre." Abu Diab did his best to stop the trouble, and protested with the Mudir, and saved many lives. He was condemned on false testimony produced by Ibrahim Adhem, who afterwards, moved with remorse, asked his pardon before he suffered, but Abu Diab refused to forgive him. The only other mistake made by me is that I called Ibrahim a Circassian. He is a Kurd, son of the head employée of Mohammed Ali's stables.

Osman Raafat also came to Giseh during the war to raise troubles again with the Mufetish Feidun Bey. The details of this affair are known to M. de Martins. Sir Charles Wilson took notes of the Tantah affair from Ismail Jowdat. Osman Raafat then went to the Fayoum to stir up the Herabi Bedouins under their chief Abd el Kawi el Jibali and Saadawi el Jibali.

Ismail Jowdat knew these affairs at the time of their happening; but he gained positive proof of the Khedive's connection with them in the following manner: Not long ago Osman Raafat came to see him at Constantinople, and he asked him to breakfast with Husseyn Pasha Ghaleb, one of the Sultan's A.D.C.'s., the same who called on me yesterday; and then having plied him with wine he told them the whole story. He went on from Constantinople to Vienna, where he had a commission from the Khedive to invest certain sums of money and dispose of certain jewels. Osman Raafat was arrested at Wasta by a soldier, but was let go by a Circassian official, and thence fled to Helouan and Suez. After the war Osman Raafat was sent by the Khedive to get back the money taken from Palmer by the Bedouins, and he kept £2,000 out of the £3,000.

### NOTES OF CONVERSATION WITH DR. MUSTAFA BEY NEGDI. EXTRACT FROM JOURNAL, *Oct. 27, 1884*

He (Mustafa) then gave us the whole history of the Tantah massacre in detail, which he knew first from the official inquiry made before Arabi when it happened, and at which he assisted, and secondly from Ahmed Minshawi, with whom he had lived afterwards at Beyrout, and who came here with him, and who had repeatedly told him the story. The true facts were these:

The Mudir of Tantah, Ibrahim Adhem, with Osman Raafat, excited the populace against the Christians, as Ismail Jowdat related, telling them that Arabi had ordered it—and the Mudir shut himself up also as related. Minshawi lived at a village called Koreyshiyeh, and happening to come in that day by train with Abdallah Pasha's son, Emin Bey, and Husseyn Wasif, a magistrate, they found Christians being killed; and Minshawi interfered.

## *Appendix B*

They called out to him that Arabi had ordered it, but Minshawi had said to the effect of "damn Arabi," and insisted on their stopping. He had then gone with Abu Diab, who had also been trying to stop the massacre, to the Mudirich, and had kicked in the door of his room, and expostulated with him for letting the thing go on, Abu Diab using strong language, for he was very angry. Then they telegraphed to Arabi at Kafr Dowar to send soldiers to stop the massacre, but the telegram had to go round by Ramleh and was delayed. But at last the massacre was stopped. The whole thing was inquired into at Kafr Dowar immediately, and the Mudir was sent to Cairo and there imprisoned till the end of the war, Dawish Pasha replacing him. After the war he was reinstated, and when the Commission was sent to Tantah, Ismail Yusri, the President, who was a comparatively honest man, ascertained the truth and informed the Khedive that he should be obliged to find him guilty, and so begged to be superseded on the Commission. This was done, and an officer less scrupulous was appointed who accepted the false evidence Ibrahim Adhem was allowed to trump up against Abu Diab. Ibrahim Adhem, however, was deposed—and Huseyn Wasif (a Circassian, not the same as the magistrate) was appointed. He it was who was made a scapegoat of for Ibrahim Adhem's sake, and was deprived by Clifford Lloyd and sent to the Soudan. Mehariz Bey, formerly sub-Mudir, is now Mudir of Boheyra. Minshawi is the son-in-law of Abdallah Pasha the English renegade, and his son Emin still goes by the name of the Englishman.

Mustafa Bey confirms all Ismail's statements of the Khedive's connection with the Alexandrian massacres. He was at Alexandria at the time and was the Doctor employed to examine the bodies. There were 51 Christian bodies, 23 Mohammedan, of which 8 Mustafezzin, all the latter by pistol shots. The English doctor wanted to make out that the Christian bodies had wounds made by "des armes blanches," but this was not the case. It was certainly Omar Lutfi and Seyd Kandil (a blackguard he calls him), who got up the riot, and Mustafa states his conviction that Cookson also was concerned in it. About Malet he does not know—nor about Dervish. But he feels sure of Cookson. His evidence will be most valuable, and he will come to England to give it. He also says that Omar Lutfi certainly gave orders to the Mustafezzin to come unarmed. I like this worthy doctor much. In face and figure he is not unlike Lord Lyons.

DR. MUSTAFA BEY NEJDI'S FURTHER STATEMENT OF Nov. 5, 1884

"Peu de jours après le bombardment nous avons pris à Kafr

## *Oriental Correspondence*

Dowar qu'il y a eu des Chrétiens tués à Tantah; et Toulba Pacha, d'après l'ordre d'Arabi, a envoyé chercher Ahmed Minshawi pour témoigner sur ce qui y était arrivé. Celui-ci est venu avec un autre notable nommé El Arabi au camp, et Arabi Pacha lui a demandé ce qui en était. J'étais présent avec Toulba Pacha et quelques Colonels. Ahmed Minshawi a répondu qu'il était venu à Tantah et qu'il y avait sauvé la vie à un Chrétien à la gare du chemin de fer, et qu'après il a fait venir ses gens de son village et qu'il a pu étouffer les massacres. Il nous a raconté que le Mudir Ibrahim Adhem et Meheriz son adjoint s'étaient enfermés dans la Mondirieh pendant qu'on tuait le monde, même chez le Mudir. Il nous a aussi dit qu'il avait télégraphié au Khedive et à Arabi Pacha, et Arabi a fait venir le télégraphiste de Kafr Dowar qui n'en savait rien mais il a expliqué la chose en disant que les télégrammes de Tantah à Kafr Dowar devaient d'abord passer à Alexandrie avant d'être remis à destination. C'était la règle du service. Sur ce Arabi a fait une station nouvelle au camp, pour que les dépêches pourraient lui venir directement de l'intérieur. Arabi a remercié Minshawi de ce qu'il avait fait et il est retourné chez lui."

### MINSHAWI'S EVIDENCE AS GIVEN BY HIM *Nov. 3, 1884*

On the day of the massacre of Tantah I came in to Tantah by train from my own village, Koreyshiyeh, two hours distant (half-hour by train) partly to see my brother-in-law Emin Bey on his road to Cairo, partly to learn the news; and while at the station we heard a great noise and were told that it was the Christians being killed by the mob in Tantah; and I, wishing to end this, telegraphed to the Khedive at Ramleh and to the Ministry (that is to say Arabi at Kafr Dowar) asking an order to interfere. I also telegraphed to my village for men to come and help me, and I waited four hours (during that time Abu Diab arrived from Damietta) for an answer and no answer came. And while we were there waiting the tumult came near us, and a man, a Syrian Christian, the cashier of Zananiri the interpreter of the Greek Consulate, ran towards me pursued by a soldier of the Mudirieh and called to me for protection; and taking a stick from one of the bystanders I drove the soldier away, and with the help of others put a stop to what was happening at the station. Then I went with these to the door of the Mudirich to inquire what the Mudir was doing, and to call upon him to interfere and put an end to the bloodshed. And on my way I met Abu Diab at the door of the Mudirieh who had come from Damietta and was also restoring order, and who had under his protection a young Christian



## *Appendix B*

girl whom he was leading by the hand, and we went together to the Mudrieh, and when we arrived there we found in the courtyard three corpses of Christians who had just been killed there; and we asked for the Mudir and were told that he was in his room, one of the rooms adjoining the courtyard. And we called to him, but there was no answer. Then Abu Diab kicked the door in, and we found Ibrahim Adhem, the Mudir, with his wakil, Meheriz, sitting there. And Abu Diab in a loud voice asked them what they were doing there allowing these murders to be done in his house by his own men. And when they made no answer he called to Ibrahim Adhem, calling him a dog and a coward. I heard this with my ears. Next I went to the Khan where I heard the Christians had shut themselves up, and I found a mob trying to force the door, and my men having come an hour afterwards from Koreyshiyeh we drove them away and found inside a large number of Christians, Syrians, Jews, and others, huddled together like frightened sheep. And I put guards, and the next day brought them out and took them to my village, and after some days those *that wished to leave the country I took by train to Port Said*, two trains full; and those (about 120) that chose to remain I took to my own house and fed them there during the whole time of the war.

Some days later I went to Kafr Dowar and gave evidence as I now give it before Arabi Pasha when he made an inquiry into the affair, and Ibrahim Adhem was sent a prisoner to Cairo and another man (Dawish Pasha) appointed by the Government in his place. I also gave my evidence after the war when the first Commission came to Tantah (there was no Englishman on this Commission), and afterwards they gave me a paper to sign, purporting to be my evidence, but it was not what I had said but the contrary, and I refused to sign it. Much pressure was put upon me to make me do this; and one day in the Khedive's palace at Cairo, on his fête day, Bairam el Kebir, Takla Bey Bishara warned me that if I did not sign I should suffer for it. I also refused Ahmed el Sherif, sent by Sultan Pasha, when he came round the villages to take money for the sword given to Wolseley.

When a new Commission under Ismail Yusri and the English came to Tantah they did not ask me for my evidence (Ismail Yusri warned me in private not to mention that I had sent a telegram to the Khedive, of which the copy has been found in the telegraph office, to ask for an order to interfere) of what had happened at Tantah but only as to those killed at Santah. They therefore did not take my evidence.

I declare that Abu Diab was entirely innocent, and that of those hanged at Tantah for this matter only 2 were guilty, Abu Salaam

## *Oriental Correspondence*

of Santah, and a soldier of the Mudirich. Ibrahim Adhem and Mehariz were the cause of the bloodshed. The killing was done by the vagabonds from Alexandria and the soldiers of the Mudirieh. The same thing happened at three other places—at Tintah 49 killed; at Santah 3 were killed; at Mehallet el Kebir 6 or 7; at Mehallet abu Ali jem el Suk 2 or 3. Also the same thing would have happened at Dumanhour but for the Wakil Abd el Razak whom the Khedive has sent in chains for 15 years to the Soudan. I heard of Osman Raafat being at Tintah on the day of the massacre in the house of one of his brothers-in-law. He has two brothers-in-law at Tintah, Mohammed Hellal and Ibrahim Hellal.

Ibrahim Adhem was restored as Mudir after the war, and he got up the evidence against Abu Diab in revenge for the words spoken by him on the day of the massacre. Abu Diab died an innocent man. He was not discouraged to the last, but told his father not to weep and told the executioner to make haste. At the last moment Ibrahim Adhem asked his pardon. But Abu Diab said, "God will judge between us to-night, to-day for me, to-morrow for you." I assure you, Sir, by God, that Abu Diab died unjustly.

Before the Commission had left Tintah Ibrahim Adhem came one day to my village with 4 English officers, and summoned all the notables of the neighbourhood and declared to them that I was in disgrace with the Khedive and the English, and warned them to have no dealings with me, and that if any had a quarrel against me the Khedive would support him against me, and four months passed and no one came. Until the day of the massacre I was respected by all men. I had no quarrel with Ibrahim Adhem nor any one; but my action that day has been the cause of my ruin. When Ibrahim Adhem was removed from Tintah, Husseyn Pasha Wasif was appointed in his place. He received me into favour, but the Khedive wrote to him by his own secretary not to see me. Husseyn Pasha shewed me this letter—I saw it with my eyes—and begged me to excuse him if he asked me to come no more to his house. This drove me from my country. It is clear that by saving the lives of the Christians that day I have gained only anger from the Khedive and trouble.

PRINCE HALIM TO MR. BLUNT

Balta-Liman, 15 *Décembre*, 1884.

MON CHER MONSIEUR BLUNT,

Je vous remercie d'avoir pensé à m'écrire; j'aurais voulu en vous répondant vous donner des nouvelles de chez vous; mal-

## *Appendix B*

heureusement dans notre paresseux Orient les choses ne changent pas aussi souvent que dans votre actif Occident. Ici les jours se suivent et se ressemblent, il n'y a donc rien qui vaille la peine de vous être rapporté. Depuis quelques jours j'aperçois des signes non équivoques d'une tendance de rapprochement avec l'Angleterre; des communications ont eu lieu entre Monsieur Wyndham et la Porte en vue de trouver un terrain propice qui permettrait aux deux partis de traiter les affaires égyptiennes. Je crains que cette fois encore la Turquie et l'Angleterre n'aient, par leur lenteur, manqué le moment favorable de pouvoir en finir entre elles. Les puissances signataires du traité de 1841-42 paraissent vouloir se mêler de la question; elles trouveraient peut-être mauvais que la Porte traitât directement avec l'Angleterre; dans ce cas le nouvel ambassadeur d'Angleterre, quel qu'il fût, il est très douteux qu'il puisse réussir dans le sens du désir de son Gouvernement. Tout dépend de la pression plus ou moins grande qu'exercera l'Europe.

Je porterai à la connaissance du Sultan ce que je croirai lui être utile, sans cependant m'illusionner sur le résultat, car il est inutile de chercher de la vigueur, de la précision, dans les actes du Gouvernement Impérial. La peur, plus que l'intérêt même, présidera à toutes ses actions, quoiqu'on fasse. La bienveillance de Musurus Pacha pour Tewfik est sans doute le résultat du mariage de son fils avec la fille d'un certain Antoniadis, partisan d'Ismail, comme tous les voleurs.

A propos d'Ismail, je vous dirai qu'il dépense beaucoup d'argent ici, et j'en sens les effets. Le brave homme donne son or contre de la parole qu'emporte aussitôt le vent. Avant que cette lettre vous parvienne Monsieur Whittaker sera à Londres, il vous communiquera une proposition qui je crois aura votre pleine approbation.

Recevez etc.,  
HALIM.

PRINCE HALIM TO MR. BLUNT

Balta-Liman, 6 *Janvier*, 1885.

CHER MONSIEUR BLUNT,

C'est le 4 janvier seulement que j'ai reçu votre lettre du 19 Décembre.

Je suis avec intérêt dans les journaux les péripéties de vos démarches, tant près de l'association internationale d'arbitrage et de paix, que près du Premier Ministre. Je suis tout à fait de votre opinion et je dirai qu'une terminaison à l'amiable et sans violence de la question égyptienne ne peut se faire sans le concours du Sultan parcequ'il est la légalité, le droit; mais, si on veut passer outre, alors c'est l'inconnu et on ne peut savoir comment et où on

## *Oriental Correspondence*

aboutira. Je trouve que l'Angleterre a perdu comme la Turquie un temps précieux; ces deux puissances pouvaient l'arranger à l'amiable entre elles sans laisser de place à l'ingérance des autres puissances peut-être même de la France; l'Angleterre aurait beaucoup gagné et la Turquie aurait eu aussi sa part de bénéfice. Maintenant que les Puissances font mine de vouloir prendre en main la question égyptienne sous prétexte qu'elle est internationale, je crois que l'Angleterre et la Turquie ont perdu, toujours dans la prévision que les Puissances s'occuperont sérieusement de la question.

Recevez, etc.,  
HALIM.

PRINCE HALIM TO MR. BLUNT

*Balta-Liman, 19 Janvier, 1885.*

CHER MONSIEUR BLUNT,

Votre lettre du 8 janvier m'est parvenue, je veux remercier pour les nouvelles que vous voulez bien me donner.

Il est probable que Hassan Fehmi Pacha sera à Londres avant que vous receviez cette lettre. Je considère la mission de l'envoyé Ottoman comme une preuve patente de la bonne volonté de sa Majesté le Sultan de reliair les bonnes vieilles relations des deux gouvernements que les événements d'Egypte ont un peu terni. En tout cas, c'est un pas fait vers un arrangement, mais je doute que Hassan l'acha puisse arriver à une solution définitive.

Les dernières nouvelles reçues du Soudan se montrent par l'état critique de l'expédition anglaise, si les troupes qui traversent le désert entre Korli et Mutamma arrivent sans encombre à cette dernière ville la  $\frac{1}{2}$  de la besogne serait faite sans doute. Alors seulement le Gouvernement Anglais pensera peut-être sérieusement à donner une solution à la question égyptienne. Je ne serais pas étonné si Souakin et Masaoua ou tout au moins un de ces deux ports resta définitivement entre les mains de l'Angleterre.

Recevez, etc.,  
HALIM.

PRINCE HALIM TO MR. BLUNT

*Balta-Liman, 13 Février, 1885.*

CHER MONSIEUR BLUNT,

Selon votre désir j'ai remis la lettre en arabe adressée par vous à Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan; je l'ai fait accompagner par votre lettre adressée à moi; aussitôt que j'aurai une réponse je ne manquerai pas de vous le faire connaître immédiatement. Je n'ai pas jugé nécessaire de présenter au Sultan votre rapport à Hassan

## *Appendix B*

Pacha Fehmi—Sa Majesté aimant les primcurs en tout. Je n'ai pas reçu la pièce que vous m'annonciez m'être envoyé par votre secrétaire.

Rien de nouveau ici si ce n'est l'entrée en scène de l'Italie d'une manière extravagante, il en sera de même tant que la Turquie se bornera à protester chaque fois qu'on lui marchera sur le pied.

A vous, etc.

HALIM.

P.S. Personne ne peut répondre de la fermeté du Gouvernement Ottoman.

LETTER TO H.M. THE SULTAN OF TURKEY (ABDUL HAMID)

(*Sent also in Arabic.*)

Crabbet Park, Three Bridges, Sussex, *January 3, 1885.*

SIR,

The grave perils which on every side menace the Mohammedan nation and which cannot but distress Your Majesty in the discharge of your high duties towards your people must be my excuse if I venture to address you on certain points which appear to me of vital moment in the present conjuncture of affairs for Islam.

It will not be unknown to Your Majesty that for some years past I have travelled widely in Mohammedan lands and that circumstances have placed me in a position to learn the thoughts, the fears, and the aspirations of those who under various governments acknowledge Your Majesty as their chief, the supreme Head and Prince of their religion; and Your Majesty also doubtless knows the active part I took three years ago in endeavouring to prevent the great misfortune of the invasion of Egypt by my countrymen, and afterwards to set in a true light the injustice of their action and the supreme miseries which they have caused. I trust therefore that Your Majesty will accept as the ideas of one devoted in all his heart to Mohammedan interests and Your Majesty's, the view of policy which I now presume to lay before you.

1. With regard to those Mohammedans who live under other rule than Your Majesty's,—I can assert without fear of mistake that at no other period of modern history has the Caliphal authority exercised so powerful an influence on their imagination as now. In all parts of the world Mohammedans are conscious of the danger to them as a nation; and the sacred office held by Your Majesty is regarded by them as the only safeguard remaining of their political existence. Especially within the last four years have they learned the necessity of closer union under Your Majesty's com-

## *Oriental Correspondence*

mand, if they would not become altogether lost and scattered; and they are willing as they never were before to put aside the differences of opinion which have so long divided them and to accept Your Majesty as the fountain for them of authority. On this subject I have conversed with many learned men in many countries, and I find that what they practically desire is this. The evils of which they complain are a decay of sound education, a decay of morals and a decay of wealth; and they attribute these misfortunes not indeed to a defect of the sacred law, which they all hold to be sufficient, but to a defect of the power to interpret it in accordance with modern necessities, and of the authority which should enforce that interpretation and make it binding on men's practice. They desire therefore that Your Majesty should be pleased to consider in what way it would be possible to encourage the meeting of some general assembly of Ulemas of various lands under Your Majesty's supreme appointment to discuss all these matters, and devise remedies for their very urgent needs. They think that by a common agreement alone of the faithful of all lands under Your Majesty a true result could be obtained.

This they desire and also that Your Majesty should take a more open part in the exercise of your high office by issuing from time to time and publishing authoritative statements of your views regarding the many public events which arise, gravely interesting to Mohammedans at large, in order that these may be kept in closer sympathy with Your Majesty on matters concerning all. Thus it seems to me that it would be of supreme advantage at the present moment that Your Majesty should take the whole Mohammedan world into your confidence with regard to the English occupation of Egypt. The strength of Your Majesty's position lies in the moral influence you possess over the vast populations outside Your Majesty's own Empire, and this can only be exercised to its full extent by making your wishes public. Advantage has too long been taken by European Governments of Your Majesty's silence to spread false reports regarding Your Majesty's ideas; and in these modern days no Power can afford to dispense with publicity as a spiritual weapon.

2. With regard to Your Majesty's own dominions I am encouraged by the high character Your Majesty bears as a sincere Reformer, to urge upon you to take cognizance of the many abuses and breaches of the law which afflict the remoter provinces of your Empire. These to my sorrow I have noted on my many journeys; and I know that they are a scandal to the world and a cause of National weakness. I could, if Your Majesty would permit, explain in what way I think they could be remedied; and

## *Appendix B*

Your Majesty may trust me not to recommend those European remedies which Your Majesty rightly judges to be unsuited to the genius of Eastern lands and subversive of the principles of their religion. I should ask Your Majesty neither to grant concessions to Europeans, nor to employ Europeans in your Government, nor to adopt European forms of Administration. The reforms I would advocate are different from these, and are on the contrary designed to establish Mohammedan Government on its true national basis and in stricter accordance with its religious law. In this way I am confident that, God aiding Your Majesty, a sound political and financial basis could be secured for Your Empire.

Lastly—I would urge upon Your Majesty a certain course of policy towards the Great European Powers, who one and all covet your dominions. It is essential for any plan of reform and recuperation that an interval of peace should be secured you. The two Governments which most threaten the Mohammedan nation at this moment are the Russian and I grieve to say my own, and they must be dealt with vigorously each in its own manner. The present is an opportunity of the most favourable for making terms with England, but these can only be secured advantageously for Islam by courage and determination. Your Majesty must declare yourself in clear language according to certain terms as to which I could advise Your Majesty; and I think that I can assure you of success. But I venture to warn Your Majesty against any concession of principle which might separate you from the full approval of Mohammedans in various lands. The part which is yours to play in your dealings with our Government is that of the fearless exponent of the Mohammedan will. As Sultan of Turkey Your Majesty has undoubted rights in Egypt, but in this age of lawless aggression it is necessary that sovereign rights should be backed by the popular will and in Your Majesty's instance by that full exercise of your Caliphal authority which is yours as Prince of the Faithful.

If Your Majesty on the perusal of this letter will deign to hear me further I will make it my duty to lay my plan in detail before Your Majesty.

I am, with profound respect, Your Majesty, Your most faithful servant.

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

PRINCE HALIM TO MR. BLUNT

Constantinople, 17 *Juillet* 1885.

CHER MONSIEUR BLUNT,

J'ai reçu votre lettre du 3 courant qui m'annonce l'achat des

## *Oriental Correspondence*

chevaux. Je vous remercie pour la peine que vous vous êtes donnée pour cela.

Mr. Whitaker n'est pas encore de retour. En attendant, ce que je vois dans le journaux ne me paraît pas être très différent du passé. Lord Salisbury dans l'exposé de la politique du nouveau cabinet, fait à la chambre des Lords le 6 courant, déclare que l'Angleterre est liée d'honneur au Khédive. Un premier Ministre ne s'engage au fond comme cela, s'il avait l'intention de suivre une autre voie que ses prédécesseurs. Le lien d'honneur n'est pas facile à briser, comme par exemple le lien d'intérêt, où on a la faculté de se montrer désintéressé même magnanimement en le brisant. Lord Salisbury donne pour raison du lien d'honneur, l'honnêteté du Khédive, vis-à-vis du gouvernement Anglais et il n'y a que quelques jours que Tewfik Pacha protestait de son dévouement et de son inaltérable attachement à Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan, en jettant sur la pression irrésistible des Anglais tout le passé. Ces protestations du Khédive sont prises ici pour ce qu'elles valent et pour la forme on se montre content. Le grand cordon du Schafcate a été envoyé à sa femme comme preuve de la satisfaction Impériale,

Je vous renouvelle, cher Monsieur Blunt, l'expression, etc.

HALIM.



## APPENDIX C

### AUTHOR'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH DOWNING STREET

#### THE EARL OF DUFFERIN TO MR. BLUNT

*Private.*

Cairo, 16 December '82.

MY DEAR BLUNT,

Many thanks for your letter of December 8th, and especially for having sent me the pamphlet, of which I had heard, and which I have studied with the attention it seems to deserve.

I am quite alive to the importance of the question you refer to of the indebtedness of the peasantry. It is one of those evils which meet us both in India and in Ireland, and you may depend upon my doing my best to discover a remedy if any such there be.

We have induced the Government to let out of prison at once, something like 450 of those who have been shut up in jail.

Yours sincerely,  
DUFFERIN.

#### MR. BLUNT TO THE EARL OF DUFFERIN

*January 23rd, 1883.*

MY DEAR LORD DUFFERIN,

I have delayed thanking you for your letter of the 16th December informing me of the release of 450 of the political prisoners, until I had seen Napier and learned from him a little more clearly than I could by letter what were the terms of agreement come to with regard to them when the trial was compromised. I had understood from Broadley that the terms would include an amnesty, and I had hoped it would have been a general one, and that the whole of the unfortunate people detained in the prisons on charges rising out of the "rebellion" would have been set free. Now, however, it seems that, though an amnesty has been decreed, many exceptions to it have been made, that while some have been released, others are being arrested, and that the Courts are still trying and executing men on criminal charges connected with the events of June and July. I trust that the interest I take in opposing this particular form of injustice will excuse me with you if I say a few words on the matter. The world, it is true, is full of injustice which we cannot remedy, but here the remedy would seem within our hands, and the injustice is one for which every Englishman who knows the facts is responsible.

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

First, as regards the exceptions made to the amnesty, it would seem most unfair that the leaders of the "rebellion" having foregone their right of being publicly defended, any of their followers or associates should be punished for rebellion. Arabi's defence included the defence of every man in Egypt, and with the commutation of his sentence every other sentence should have been commuted. The two strongest cases I have heard of, of persons excepted from the amnesty, are Akkad's and Awwam's, men charged with no crime, but who have nevertheless been exiled, the one to Massowah and the other to the White Nile, punishments which Malet has, I think, explained in his despatches to be equivalent to death. These two cases I also recommend to your special attention from the fact that the sufferers are men whose quarrel was originally with English, not Egyptian, officials, and whose exception from the amnesty has consequently a rather compromising appearance for them. Akkad's original offence lay in his having protested in 1879 against Rivers Wilson's confiscation of the Moukabalah claims, a thing he was perfectly justified in doing, which, moreover, he had been invited to do by a notice published by Wilson in the papers. For this he was sent by Riaz on a false charge to the White Nile; the details, Napier tells me, he has laid already before you.

Awwam's case is still stronger, and it affects Colvin. Awwam was an employé under Colvin on the Cadastral survey, and was dismissed for having drawn up a report showing the incapacity of the officers conducting the survey and their waste of public money—all which is now admitted. The wrong done him made a martyr of him with the Nationalists, and when Arabi came into office in February he was appointed his secretary. For this, and presumably at Colvin's suggestion, he was arrested by the English authorities on their landing at Alexandria in July, and put in irons. He then wrote a letter to the Khedive demanding to know the reason of his arrest, and was transferred, still in irons, to the Borgho prison, where Ninet saw him seventy-four days afterwards. Then, when the disclosures relating to that prison began to be made, Awwam would seem to have been sent without trial to Khartoum, and is probably there at the present moment. These are strong cases, but I have little doubt there are many others quite as strong.

Secondly. It is surely a mockery to decree an amnesty affecting only persons who happen to be actually in prison, and omitting from its operation both men already dealt with and men to be dealt with in the future on charges connected with the past. From all I hear the reign of terror has not been diminished in the provinces by the decree—whatever may be the case at Cairo—the prisons are still full and men are being arrested daily.

## *Appendix C*

Lastly, I cannot understand how it can be the wish of our Government to make scapegoats of the rank and file of those charged with the criminal acts of June and July while the chief offenders enjoy immunity. If one thing has been proved to the satisfaction of the Government more than another, it is that Omar Lutfi was responsible for the murderous character of the riots of the 11th of June. Yet we read still of executions at Alexandria for crimes committed on that day by others, the chief culprit himself being the while at large, in honour, and holding high office under the Khedive. I say nothing of the Khedive himself, though you doubtless know how little his conduct on that day would have borne investigation.

Having thus discharged my conscience of what I consider a duty, let me now allude to the other part of your letter, that relating to the debts of the fellahin. It was the scheme of Arabi and the Nationalists last February to solve the difficulty by making it illegal to lend money on mortgage of land except with the consent of an officer to be appointed for the purpose in the chief town of each district, and then only to an amount small in proportion to land value. Thus the only borrowers would have been persons able and intending to repay. I quite understand that such a regulation might have checked the flow of capital into the country and in consequence have reduced the public revenue, but the object of the Nationalists was to prevent at all costs the passing of the land into the hands of strangers; and I repeat that this *must* be prevented if there is to be a cessation of the popular discontent in Egypt. This seems to me a far more vital matter than the form of government of the country, or even the reform of the administration. But probably it can only be effected by a reduction of the revenue, and consequently of the rate of interest on the debt. The Nationalists also intended to form a National Bank to make the required advances. But I feel that very likely it is useless my saying anything on this head, for I fear the Government at home has no serious desire to effect anything but a makeshift arrangement agreeable to the European public, and strong enough to last their time. I wish you could have seen Mohammed Abdu or some others of the Nationalist leaders before they left Egypt. They would have told you in an hour more than you could learn from all the English officials at Cairo in a fortnight. Nevertheless I beg you to believe that I still look confidently for a solution compatible with Egyptian aspirations at your hands, and I remain yours truly,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

THE EARL OF DUFFERIN TO MR. BLUNT

*Private and Confidential.*

Cairo, 12th Feb. '83.

MY DEAR BLUNT,

I hasten to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd of January. It must have been delayed en route.

You are really under a wrong impression as to what is going on here, as you will see by the enclosed memorandum from Sir Charles Wilson, to whom I referred your letter.

As for el Accad, he is quite unworthy of the interest you take in him. His complicity with Arabi is beyond doubt, and he misappropriated some funds which Halim Pasha entrusted to him for the purpose of bribing Arabi to support his, Halim's, candidature.

I have sent home a report on the reorganization of Egypt, from which you will see that I am doing what I can to promote the establishment of just principles of Government in this country.

Believe me, my dear Blunt, yours sincerely,

DUFFERIN.

P.S.—I need not remind you that there is no man who has done more to prevent this Government from exercising undue severity in the case of the rebels than Sir Charles Wilson.

MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON

10, James Street, *January 16, 1883.*

MY DEAR EDDY,

I think you will admit that the despatches published to-day, taken in connection with Colvin's reappointment as Controller in Egypt, absolve me from any duty of reticence I may have had toward Mr. Gladstone on the events of the past year. In spite of all that has been said and promised and avowed, annexation stares us in the face as unmistakably as if the word had been written. I am sorry, more than for Egypt, that it should have come to this.

Yours affec.,

WILFRID SAWEN BLUNT.

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

*Private.*

10, Downing Street, 12th March '83.

MY DEAR WILFRID,

As Campbell Bannerman has to answer a question this afternoon founded on your letter which will (I understand) amount to what he could tell you, were he to see you, perhaps an interview

## Appendix C

would be of little good. He tells me that every piece of fresh information they get at the Admiralty (*e.g.* from Lord Alcester) fully confirms his account in the House of Commons; and therefore it seems to resolve itself into a question of the known intentions of the authorities in Egypt as well as of the Government at home against what Gill and Palmer *fancied* their mission to have been.

I apologize for having perhaps expressed myself too strongly yesterday. But the Government have nothing in the world to conceal; and the organisers of the Expedition surely ought to know better the objects of it than the unfortunate men charged with the mission.

Yours as always affec.,  
E. W. HAMILTON.

MR. BLUNT TO MR. EDWARD HAMILTON

Paris, *Sept.* 14, 1883.

DEAR EDDY,

When I saw you on Wednesday I told you that I had thought of taking Sabunji with me, but had given up the idea. Since then, however, I have heard that the man I counted on to help me in Egypt is no longer there, and I have consequently determined to take Sabunji. The fact is I should be very helpless without him, and if it should so happen that I could be of any good it would be as well to have him at hand.

I shall leave him at Port Said or Suez till I have seen Baring, and as I told you, I have no intention of doing anything without Baring's countenance. If Baring will not listen to anything I have to propose I shall not waste any time in Egypt, but shall go on to Ceylon and India. I shall caution Sabunji to get into no mischief, and he has always acted as far as I am aware squarely in his service with me. We start to-night for Marseilles, and so farewell. I will write to you from Egypt.

Yours affec.,  
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON

Cairo, *September 28th*, 1883.

MY DEAR EDDY,

I promised to write to you, and I will keep my promise, but you must not expect me to say anything pleasant or flattering. I found Baring extremely amiable and willing to listen to all I had to say, and I believe he told me his own views frankly. Our ideas

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

on many of the reforms wanted in Egypt were the same. His scheme for relieving the debts of the peasantry seemed a sound one—and he struck me generally as being a man of sympathy and courage. But when I have said this I have said all. On the main point of giving Egypt back her liberty we are worlds apart. He neither wishes it, nor has the least idea of attempting it. "What Egypt wants," he told me, "is peace and order, not another revolution; we have restored the Khedive and the Circassians to power, and I shall do my best to keep them there."

With regard to Dufferin's famous Charter I find neither he nor any one else look upon it as in the least serious or in the least important—and they are right. The elections are not serious, nor were ever intended to be by those who drafted the Charter. The electoral lists are drawn up by the Government, the voting takes place under the eye of the Governor and in the Prefecture of Police—and in most instances the Governor or the Prefect of Police are the candidates chosen. It could not have been otherwise. The Circassians have been encouraged to re-establish their rule by a reign of terror. There is no protection of any kind against arbitrary arrest, arbitrary confiscation of property, and imprisonment without trial. The prisons in the country districts are still full of untried men. There is no liberty of speech, or of the press—and at Alexandria they began the elections by hanging two more men charged with instigating the riots of last year. How should any one but the Prefect of Police be chosen? Mr. Gladstone, who knows everything, doubtless knows that in India, where the people have been crushed for ages, they worship Siva the god of destruction. Here they worship the Prefect of Police. Yet less than two years ago there were both freedom of speech and of the press, elections fairly representative, and the beginning of a real Constitution. It may have been necessary for Imperial or international reasons to destroy this and to revert to a system of "peace and order" as Baring calls it, but it cannot be necessary to talk of having given the Egyptians liberty!

Baring himself is too honest to pretend that his system is anything but "Egypt for the Turks." But he fancies he can manage Tewfik and the half dozen men who form his party, and give Egypt a mitigated and not altogether inhuman despotism. If he succeeds in this he will have accomplished something, but I cannot believe that he will at all succeed. Tewfik and Sherif have no following in this country beyond the palace walls, and, even supposing them to be the absolutely supple tools Baring believes them to be, they have no kind of moral influence and very little energy. The minor English officials tell me they are unable to redress the least wrong or introduce the simplest reform in the departments in which they

## Appendix C

serve; and that Baring and Maxwell should be able, through the weak medium of Tewfik, and Sherif, and Fakri, to do more than obtain a shadow of justice and compassion for the people I cannot understand. You know how different this is from my own idea of reforming the people through men of their own race whom they respect, and are ready to work with, and you may imagine my disappointment at getting from Baring nothing better than poor Malet's stale idea of Egypt for the Turks.

I spoke to Sir Benson Maxwell, who is a really good man, about getting some kind of protection for the people from arbitrary arrest, and he has promised to do so. But he is going away on leave and nothing will be even begun before Christmas. On the whole it seems to me that no fate could possibly have been devised for Egypt more sad or more hopeless than what I see before me, and it would have been far more merciful to have put the Egyptians at once out of their misery by annexing their country last year than to play at giving them "*native* rule," under conditions which through much suffering will lead to exactly the same result a year or two years hence. I consequently leave Egypt a sadder and a wiser man than I came. I shall publish my poem—and make my protest and set out "to-morrow for fresh fields and pastures new."

Yours, etc.,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

PS.—I wonder whether Mr. Gladstone knows that there are still twelve Bedouins in prison at Suez arrested for the Palmer murder and untried. Among them a woman and two or three children kept as hostages!!

MR. BLUNT TO SIR EVELYN BARING

Cairo, Oct. 1, 1883.

MY DEAR SIR EVELYN,

I have received a letter from Abd el Razak Bey, F.R.G.S., ex-director of the Naval College, who with some four others has been in prison here for the last three months on a charge originally of connection with a political plot. He was, however, ordered to be dismissed by the Commission appointed to inquire into the matter, but was nevertheless retained by Osman Pasha Ghaleb through superior orders "on suspicion," and is still in the Zaptieh prison. He now asks me to come and see him, and as I am leaving Cairo to-morrow I shall be much obliged to you if you can kindly obtain me an order to enter the prison.

Since seeing you on Wednesday I have had opportunities of

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

ascertaining the feelings of the people here, and I am convinced that unless something is speedily done to relieve their sufferings you will have trouble.

I am, dear Sir Evelyn, yours truly,  
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

SIR EVELYN BARING TO MR. BLUNT

Cairo, Oct. 1, 1883.

DEAR MR. BLUNT,

I regret that I am unable to accede to the request contained in your letter. The decision as to permission being given to prisoners to receive visits lies entirely within the competence of the Egyptian Government. I must decline to interfere in the manner in which they exercise their discretion in dealing with the subject.

Very truly yours,  
E. BARING.

MR. BLUNT TO SIR EVELYN BARING

*Private.*

Suez, October 3rd 1883.

MY DEAR SIR EVELYN,

Your note by some accident was posted by your cavass instead of being sent by hand, and so did not reach me till just as I was leaving Cairo yesterday morning, and I think it is right you should know that receiving no answer I had already gone to the prison, and seen Abd el Razak Bey and the others. I found them comfortably lodged and in good health, with the exception of Mustapha Bey Sidki, who seemed seriously ill, and I received from them all the same account, that their release had been ordered by the Commission (which included two of the Belgians who came here as judges) more than three months ago, since which time no further inquiries had been made into their case. Abd el Razak had written to the Khedive, but without reply, and they believe themselves to be detained by the order of Osman Pasha Ghaleb. No English inspector had been to see them, and no inquiry had been made into their case. Now, however, that I have got your letter I fear that, should my visit become known to the Prefect of Police, or the fact that they wrote to me, the prisoners might be made to suffer from their and my imprudence. They believe themselves likely to be sent without further trial to the Soudan, and, as so many have suffered that fate during the past year, I trust that you will give them your protection. They were arrested on a charge which would seem to have been false, for their release was ordered by the court which examined it, and in any other country in the world they would be now at liberty.



## *Appendix C*

As far as I can learn, Lord Dufferin interfered with these matters as long as he was here, for he had promised a political amnesty at the time of Arabi's trial, but after his departure arrests were again made, and I understand on very high authority that there are at the present moment several thousand untried prisoners in the various towns of the Delta and Upper Egypt. I can speak from experience of the terror in which respectable people, in no way connected with the army, but known to have sympathized with the Liberal party, are now living in Cairo, and, as I said before, the excessive tyranny of the police and the Mudirs is goading men to new disquiet. Trusting that you will forgive me for not having waited for your answer, and that as far as the prisoners are concerned the fact of their having written to me and of my having seen them may be kept a secret, I remain, dear Sir Evelyn,

Yours very truly,  
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON

Suez, *October 3rd*, 1883.

MY DEAR EDDY,

You will have perceived that when I wrote the other day I was very angry, and I think that I had cause. But that is no reason why I should not write again. When I saw Baring I had not had any conversation with my own political friends, and I could not guess the condition of affairs. Now I have seen and talked to a great number of them, and I can speak with certainty as to their feelings and, I believe, with equal certainty as to the general feeling of the country.

The first and only obstacle that I see to a peaceable settlement of the country is the present Khedive. It is absolutely impossible he should remain, unless it is intended to occupy the country permanently with our troops—and I doubt if even that would altogether protect him. I have asked people of every class about him and I have not found one that did not despise him. The Circassians and the rest of the fanatical class look upon him as a traitor to his religion, and the liberals as a traitor to his country. You know that till the bombardment I supported him with the National party as against Halim or Ismail or other pretenders, but I am certain that no reconciliation is possible. You do not believe in his culpability in the matter of the riots of June, but all the Egyptians here do, and within the last three days I have had very important evidence on that head offered me. Now, I don't wish to make too much of this—it was a stroke of party politics.

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

But what the Nationalists will never forgive is that he has had innocent men as well as men who acted at his instigation hanged for these very acts. I have now the evidence of two men of the highest respectability, one of whom is Ahmed Bey Minshawy, the Sheykh who is so honourably mentioned in the Blue Books as having saved the lives of several hundred Christians at Tantah, to the effect that the riots there were equally the work of the Khedive's friends, and that Yusuf Abu Diab, who was hanged for the affair, was not only innocent but did his best to save lives. Innocent men have everywhere been arrested and imprisoned on charges connected with these things to gratify the spite of the Khedive and his few partisans. You will say perhaps that these tales are not true, but they are certainly believed in—and in the belief lies all the difficulty of reconciliation. For myself I believe so strongly in the Khedive's treachery that I would certainly not advise Arabi to return to Egypt, were the option given him, under Tewfik's rule.

The Circassians of course do not quarrel with him on this account (for they look on the fellahin as their proper scapegoats), but for his conduct during the war and his feebleness of character. As you know, they are very few in numbers in the country, only a few thousand, and they say they want a *man* not a woman to protect them against Europe and against another rising of the fellahin. I believe there is a strong party among them for Ismail Pasha, a few for Husseyn on account of his extreme bigotry, and a few for Hassan, his brother. Among the more liberal-minded Halim is a favourite, as he is among many of the Egyptians through Abu Nadara's advocacy, though very few people know him. His enemies say he is not a politician and cares only for cats and birds. Nobody will hear at all of Ibrahim on account of his letter to the Duke of Cambridge. The Khedive of course has a party, though he has no friends. This consists first of the Ministers who have come into power through his restoration—though all these cannot be counted on—secondly of Butros Pasha and other rich Copts, and I believe the Coptic money-lenders of the Said. The Patriarch and the mass of the Coptic clergy belong to the "Hesbu el Horiye," the party of liberty, which now occupies the place of the National party of two years ago. Also, thirdly, of the financiers, bankers, and rich Syrian and Greek merchants of Alexandria. It is, however, safe to say that there is nobody of the Khedive's party, except the Ministers, who do not support him as a natural stepping-stone to annexation.

The fellahin of the Delta, as far as I can gather, are divided in opinion, those of the remoter districts caring nothing for politics, and having still a traditional respect for Effendina—whoever he may

## Appendix C

be—the other part believing that Arabi will return. (Of this there has grown up within the last few months a very strong belief in Cairo and the towns—and there is no doubt in the world that he is popular in spite of his misfortunes. I have heard people complain of him for his conduct in the war, for his neglect of blocking the Suez Canal, for his praying when he ought to have been fighting, and for his running away at Tel-el-Kebir. But they talk kindly of him and are proud of him as the first *fellah* who ever held supreme power in Egypt, and I had abundant proofs of their goodwill to myself as his friend. Except the Khedive I see no obstacle to his recall. Sherif might, I believe, work with him again as far as the Nationalists are concerned, and Ismail Eyoub certainly could. But Ali Mubarak Pasha, Khairi Pasha, Omar Lutfi Pasha, and Osman Ghaleb, the Prefect of Police, and Sultan Pasha would have to retire from power. I cannot conceive their being any loss—and there are certain Mudirs, too, in the provinces, who have been exceptionally bloodthirsty and tyrannical, whose position would be incompatible with a return of the liberal party to office. I am of opinion that the only prince of the family of Mehemet Ali who could unite parties is Halim. But I think you would do far better to make Arabi himself the chief of the state—Halim after all is a Turk and the people only look to him as the alternative to the present regime.

The more I have seen of the people the more convinced I have become that the present reign of terror cannot continue. If you withdraw the troops without establishing something and somebody that the people like, you must have trouble. The army may be as fond of Sir Evelyn Wood as he is said to think, but that will not prevent them owning the first resolute man who proposes to dethrone the Khedive—he is too unpopular with the people to be popular with the army—and, if the Nationalists are too crushed to turn on him yet awhile, the Circassians certainly will. You will then find yourselves with some really unscrupulous adventurer at the head of a revolution, and you or your successors will annex the country. I am writing in the belief that you do not intend or wish for such a result, but to persist in thrusting Tewfik on the Egyptians is to invite annexation.

I had intended to write this to the "Times," but I write it instead to you, hoping that you may show it to Mr. Gladstone. I would rather you did not show it to the F. O., for they would only use it to my friends' disadvantage. The whole thing depends now on Mr. Gladstone. If he insists on restoring liberty to Egypt nothing is easier—but not on the present lines.

Yours affectionately,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

11addo House, Aberdeen,  
21st October, 1883.

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Your two interesting letters written from Egypt, for which many thanks, have both reached me while I am holiday making in Scotland; but I have taken steps to secure their being seen by Mr. Gladstone. Your account of affairs in Egypt is, to say the least of it, depressing. I won't make any comments on what you say. I will content myself with being the receptacle of bad news and the conduit pipe of it to headquarters. I will only say that I can't conceive how it would be possible, without the grossest breach of faith, for the English Government to countenance the ousting of Tewfik, whatever sort of fellow he may be.

Holiday making is neither conducive to letter writing, I find, nor to the catering of news, so I am afraid I shall, as far as being a correspondent is concerned, make a poor return for your budgets. Good luck to you and a pleasant trip to India.

Yours affectionately,  
E. W. HAMILTON.

SIR EVELYN BARING TO MR. BLUNT

Cairo, December 31, 1883.

SIR,

I have received a letter from Chérif Pasha informing me that the Egyptian Government intends to forbid your disembarkation in Egypt on your return journey from India—His Excellency adds: "Par courtoisie, et en vue d'empêcher tout incident fâcheux de se produire dans le cas où il entretrait dans les intentions de Monsieur Blunt de s'arrêter en Égypte, à son retour des Indes, je crois devoir vous demander Monsieur le Ministre, de vouloir bien informer d'avance votre compatriote de cette interdiction."

In compliance, therefore, with the request of the Egyptian Government, I beg to communicate their decision to you.

I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

E. BARING.

MR. BLUNT TO SIR EVELYN BARING

Delhi, January 26, 1884.

MY DEAR SIR EVELYN,

I have to acknowledge the receipt, under flying seal from Mr. Primrose, of your letter of the 31st December, which reached me

## *Appendix C*

yesterday. I confess that the contents surprised me, not merely on account of the nature of the message your letter contained for me from the Khedive's late Prime Minister, but still more from the fact that you should have transmitted it in an official form without comment, explanation, or expression of disapproval.

That the Government of which Sherif Pasha was the head should have disliked my presence in Egypt I can well understand, for I have been more than once, as you know, instrumental in bringing their abuse of power to official ears; but I am ignorant of having offended against any law which should authorize my exclusion, as the subject of a friendly Power, from Egypt; and still less am I conscious of having done what should forfeit me my right to your diplomatic protection. Indeed, the circumstances of my recent visit to Egypt would seem to entitle me to this last in an especial manner; for you will not have forgotten that I came there last September with special recommendation to you from the highest official quarter, and that my renewed interest in Egyptian politics was authorized by suggestions emanating from the same high source. But for this, I believe I may say with truth that I should not have stopped in Egypt at all on my way eastwards, and most certainly that I should not have encouraged hopes there which the sequel might fail to justify.

With equal truth I can assure you that, had you informed me in a less formal manner that the interests of Egypt would be best served by my not returning to Cairo this spring, I would have willingly consented inasmuch as at the moment of my receiving your letter I had all but abandoned my intention of so doing, partly on account of quarantine difficulties, partly because I recognized in Nubar Pasha's accession to office an adjournment by our Government of the special hopes which interested me.

Now, however, in face of your official communication, I feel myself obliged to do something towards asserting the right, which is mine as a British subject, of residing where I will abroad under British protection, and especially, because I hold property there, in Egypt. Nubar Pasha is an enlightened man, with whom I have the pleasure of being personally acquainted, and he is not likely of his own motion to renew his predecessor's threat of excluding me from the country, but I fear I must ask you, as I do most formally ask you, to be good enough to give me your written assurance either that the prohibition forwarded by you has ended with Sherif Pasha's dismissal, or that you are prepared, should I be so disposed as to wish to land in Egypt, to take all necessary measures to protect me from annoyance. Less than this would be equivalent to my abandoning a right which, as a matter of principle as well as of convenience, I am not prepared to forego.

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

I will only add that letters from you in this sense will reach me, if addressed to the Rubattino Steamer "China," at Aden on the 8th of March or at Suez on the 12th, and will prevent further misunderstanding.

I am, my dear Sir Evelyn, yours faithfully,  
WILFRID SAWEN BLUNT.

*Private.*

Bombay, *January 30, 1884.*

MY DEAR EDDY,

What, in the name of all that is blunder-headed, does Baring mean by sending me *in official form* and without explanation a threat of the late Sherif Pasha's that he would prevent my landing in Egypt? You surely explained to him the meaning of my last visit and the encouragement which had been given me (I don't mean merely through yourself) to make a move in Egyptian politics. Or what is the history of it? Of course I have been obliged to answer, but as yet have done so semi-officially only, and without putting all the dots upon the I's, and have left him a door of retreat from what you must see is quite a false position. Please don't let him force me to go any further.

Seriously, would it not be better to work with me frankly at last by telling me exactly what it is you want in Egypt. Unless you really mean annexation, you will need every honest man's help to get you out of your difficulties, and the day will come when you will not despise mine. It is only two years ago if I remember rightly that you told me Gordon was mad. But you must not drive me too far. I have a serious work to do in the East, a work of which the establishment of good government in Egypt is only a small part, and one way or other, with God's help, I mean to do it. It is a good work and you could further it greatly in Downing Street if you chose to trust me, but I am sure you cannot hinder it, certainly not by shutting me out of Egypt. I had nearly given up the idea of going back there this spring, for my thoughts were in another direction, when I got Baring's letter. But I shall most certainly fight the matter out if he insists. Only I beg of you think it carefully over and if possible let Baring be advised to send me a sensible reply.

We leave Bombay on the 1st of March.

Yours affectionately,  
WILFRID SAWEN BLUNT.

## *Appendix C*

SIR EVELYN BARING TO MR. BLUNT

Cairo, *Feb.* 26, 1884.

DEAR MR. BLUNT,

On receipt of your letter of January 26th I placed myself in communication with Nubar Pasha. I enclose for your information a copy of my letter and of Nubar Pasha's reply.

You will observe that Nubar Pasha's views are identical with those entertained by Cherif Pasha.

Very truly yours,

E. BARING.

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

10, Downing Street, 28 *Feb.*, 1884.

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Thanks for writing to me. I know nothing whatever of the steps which the Egyptian Government have taken with regard to yourself; and I am certainly not aware that they were taken at the instance of the English Government or of its representative at Cairo.

I am afraid—and my fears are confirmed by what you say in your last letter—that you have considered the fact of your corresponding with the Prime Minister's Private Secretary on Egyptian matters as an encouragement, however intentionally guarded the correspondence may have been on my side. This may lead to misunderstanding; and I feel bound to consider not so much myself (for that matters little) as my master. Moreover it is difficult for me in writing to show exactly how far I write on my own account—a difficulty which is enhanced by the impossibility of my devoting the time and care necessary for corresponding on important subjects.

Having regard then to these considerations I think it my duty not to attempt to write about such subjects, and that it will be better for you and me if we drop writing to one another on public questions. I daresay I am to blame in this matter, as it has always been an interest and pleasure to me to hear your views which you have the power of expressing so well, and I have been tempted to egg you on. I hope you will not misunderstand what I have said. I don't think I need have any fear on this account, for I am sure our friendship is strong enough not to be affected by anything I may do from a sense of public and official duty. I have been awfully busy of late, busier than ever. Whenever not wholly absorbed in work, my thoughts have of late been mainly occupied by the long and very serious illness of poor Pembroke. . . . I wish I had time to send more news; but that is not possible.

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

For the sake of your friends, if not for your own sake, I hope you won't act in the matter of the order of the Egyptian Government in such a way as to bring yourself into trouble. I hope I have said nothing which will annoy you, and you will make due allowance for the difficulties and delicacy of my position.

Yours affectionately,

E. W. HAMILTON.

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

10, Downing Street, *April 4, 1884.*

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Welcome back. I am truly glad to hear of your and Lady Anne's safe return. I shall like of all things to arrange an early meeting, etc. Thanks for taking my remarks in such good grace.

Yours affectionately,

E. W. HAMILTON.

MR. BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P.

Crabbet Park, *April 23, 1884.*

MY DEAR SIR,

A few days ago some gentlemen of the many interested in the fate of General Gordon called on me to ask my advice as to the best means of extricating him from the imminent peril in which he lies, and they suggested the formation of a band of volunteers which should endeavour to run the gauntlet of their besiegers and having forced their way to Khartoum should bring him back with them in safety by the same road. The idea seemed to me a generous but wholly impracticable one, and I told them so, frankly adding that much as I should wish to join in any reasonable attempt to save General Gordon's life, I could not with the principles I hold, be a party to an armed attempt against the Arabs whom I hold to be in the right as I hold General Gordon to be in the wrong. I promised however that should anything in the shape of peaceful negotiation be proposed I would willingly aid them to the full extent of my power.

Since then I have most opportunely received information which leads me to feel certain that if properly approached not only could terms be obtained from the besiegers of Khartoum which should include General Gordon's safe return with such of his companions as might choose to accompany him, but that a general pacification of the Upper Nile might at the same time and by the same means be effected. In view therefore of the urgency of the situation (for believe me, Sir, it is urgent), I deem it a duty to offer through



## Appendix C

you my services to H. M.'s Government as mediator in this matter. I say to H. M. Government, because it is clear that no merely private negotiations could be effectual in a case where such large public interests are involved. But I do not apprehend that any absolute departure from the general principles of policy announced by the Government would be required in conducting them to a successful termination.

With regard to my own part in the matter I will only add that, although I believe it would not be necessary for me to go myself to the Soudan, I should be ready to do so if the circumstances of the case should absolutely require it.

I am, my dear Sir, yours faithfully,  
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

*Private.* 10, Downing Street, Whitehall.  
24th April, 1884.

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Mr. Gladstone is obliged for your letter. He must to-day confine himself to saying that he is communicating its contents to his colleagues in the Cabinet.

Yours,

E. W. HAMILTON.

*Private.*

Same date.

MY DEAR WILFRID,

I add a private line. Considering all that has gone before, I can't help thinking you would do well to approach the Government by other means than those in Downing Street. Could you not take Harry Brand into confidence with a view to your viewings sifling through him to Lord Hartington?

Yours aff.

E. W. H.,

MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON

10, James Street, Buckingham Gate,  
April 24, 1884. 7 o'clock p.m.

MY DEAR EDDY,

If it was a matter concerning my own wishes or one of small importance I would willingly consult Harry Brand, who would do all he could I know to serve me. But this is the most serious step I have taken in my life and one which involves consequences not to me only but to this country and to many besides, and I dare

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

not treat it except with those wholly responsible. If Mr. Gladstone cannot see me now, perhaps he may be willing to do so later. I was in the House this afternoon and listened attentively to his declarations, and I gathered from them that he has not yet closed the door to negotiations by any absolute decision of an immediately warlike nature. So that I will wait his time, confident that if I can be of use he will not scruple, on a point of formality in connection with past events, to give me timely notice. Only I fear that perhaps the time given us all may be shorter than he thinks, for already according to my latest advices the tribes are gathering from every side in arms, and though I still think it not too late it may well be so soon. I shall be in London till Saturday when I go back to Crabbet but shall be always within reach if required.

Yours affectionately,  
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

MR. HORACE SEYMOUR TO MR. BLUNT

10, Downing Street, 30 *April* 1884.

MY DEAR BLUNT,

Mr. Gladstone desires me to thank you for your offer to act as mediator in the Soudan, of which, however, Her Majesty's Government are not able to make use, inasmuch as it must already be known throughout that region that they, in common with the Government of Egypt, have no other desire than to promote the evacuation of the country and the restoration of its liberties.

Believe me, yours truly,  
HORACE SEYMOUR.

SIR PHILIP CURRIE TO MR. BLUNT

Foreign Office, *May* 17, 1884.

SIR,

I am directed by Earl Granville to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant in which you complain of the refusal of the Egyptian Government to allow you to land in Egypt on your return from India, which refusal was communicated to you through Her Majesty's Agent and Consul-General at Cairo.

I am to inform you that the decision not to permit you to visit Egypt is one with which Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to interfere.

I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,  
PHILIP W. CURRIE.

## *Appendix. C*

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

*Private.* 10, Downing Street, 21st May 1884.  
MY DEAR WILFRID,

Rumours have reached me that you are about to found your complaint against the Government for being excluded from Egypt partly on the ground of certain "interviews" which you had with me last autumn.

I feel bound to notice these rumours by writing you a line; but I may say at the outset, knowing you as I do, that I wholly and entirely discredit them for more than one reason.

In the first place, I unfortunately saw so little of you before you left England that I know we had no "interviews" with the solitary exception of your coming to say good-bye to me, when I recollect that our conversation was limited to wishing you "bon voyage," adding as I believe I did that letters from you abroad would continue to interest me as they always had.

In the second place, I studiously avoid ever attempting to quote Mr. Gladstone's views—(and his views alone have weight)—which I have no title whatever to represent.

In the third place, had I committed any indiscretions—as to which my conscience is absolutely clear—any use of them by yourself could only have one result; and that would be, to show that I was quite unfit for my present post of confidence. Of doing this I am sure you have not the smallest intention.

You will I know excuse my bothering you on this matter. All that I want is the shortest authority from yourself to deny the truth of the rumours. For this purpose only do I ask for such an assurance, and not for my own satisfaction, because I am convinced that you would be the last person in the world to take at a disadvantage one of your oldest and sincerest friends, who occupies a place of great trust and delicacy.

Yours affectionately,  
E. W. HAMILTON.

I hope if fortune favours me to see you again soon.

MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON

Crabbet Park, May 22 1884.  
MY DEAR EDDY,

I have no wish to make a scandal of this or any other matter, unless absolutely forced into it, and still less to do you an injury; and so I have decided, before going further, to lay the whole facts privately before Mr. Gladstone. He will then be able to decide

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

whether I have or have not cause to complain. You may rely upon me to be scrupulous in not exaggerating anything that passed between us, but I have a memorandum of the circumstances written at the time, imperfect indeed but sufficient to prove to me, if I had any doubt of the accuracy of my recollection, that our conversation in Downing Street the day I saw you there before I went abroad was by no means limited, as you suppose, to "wishing me bon voyage." I do not however rely wholly upon this for what I have all along asserted, namely that I was encouraged to stop in Egypt on my way Eastwards. Unless I was altogether deceived by another person, whom you probably know, Mr. Gladstone was at that time desirous of a reasonable excuse for restoring the Exiled Nationalists, and I went to Egypt and called on Baring distinctly under this impression. You will say that I have been the subject of a mystification, but I find this very difficult to believe, and at any rate the doubt should be cleared up. I repeat, I have no wish to have it done in public, if I can have it done in private. I do not wish to make a scandal. I look upon Mr. Gladstone as in reality a friend to most of my ideas, and I would far rather not be driven into a position of antagonism to him. But the withdrawal of my right of protection in Egypt is a violent proceeding and one that I cannot accept without protest. The notice was served on me formally, publicly and I may say brutally, and Lord Granville has refused me even a reason. This is not fair, and my only resource is to force an answer through Parliament, when the whole matter will be sifted. I have fortunately made it a rule to have no political secrets as regards my own acts, and so am prepared to argue it out. But I quite understand that others are not in my free position; and, if you can assure me that Mr. Gladstone will give the matter his serious private attention and not merely put me off with an official reply I will write to him on the subject. With regard to my really going to Egypt I have no wish in the present position of affairs to do so. I could do no good there politically nor could I even if I wished it make matters worse; and I am far from well and want rest and not a new campaign. But my right to protection is a matter of principle and I have certain real, if not very large, material interests in Egypt which I may at any time require to see to. Indeed Baring's action in withdrawing his protection and preventing my landing has already cost me perhaps a couple of hundred pounds. This is exactly how things stand, and I await your answer, before taking further steps.

Yours ever,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

## *Appendix C*

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

*Private.* 10, Downing Street, 24th May 1884.  
MY DEAR WILFRID,

Thanks for your letter.

I am very sorry that your recollection of what took place last autumn should be so entirely at variance with my own recollection of it. But I cannot conceive that any private conversation between friends, whatever complexion you may put upon it, can be construed into what you call "a scandal"; and I recognize the kindness of your desire not to cause me bother.

Mr. Gladstone never fails to give his personal attention to every communication made to him; so I need hardly assure you that a statement coming from you will be fully considered by him.

I am very sorry to be the cause of adding at all to your labours, etc.

Yours as always,  
E. W. H.

MR. BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P.

Crabbet Park, May 31, 1884.

MY DEAR SIR,

The privilege you have, at various times during the last three years, accorded me of addressing you on public matters must be my excuse if I now appeal to you on a matter mainly personal, namely my recent exclusion from Egypt on my return from India, and the still more recent refusal of H. M.'s Government to afford me protection there invariably given to British subjects. The circumstances of my case are briefly as follows:

Towards the close of last session I received a visit from a gentleman well known to yourself but not otherwise connected with political life or at all with Egypt, during which he urged upon me the desirability of my "making a new move" in Egyptian politics. His idea was that public opinion in England had sufficiently changed during the previous twelve months for it to be possible to propose with some chance of success a restoration of the National party before the British troops were withdrawn from Egypt; and he furthermore suggested that the matter might best be brought forward if a popular demonstration should occur on the occasion of the Elections under Lord Dufferin's Charter. He thought that the leaders of the liberal party if such there still were at Cairo might be advised to propose Arabi as their Candidate and, if his election were secured, that there would afterwards be no difficulty in bringing about his recall from exile. The idea was a

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

new one to me, and I confess that at first it seemed to me a quite impracticable one; and I did not encourage it, especially as at the time I had abandoned all immediate thoughts of again taking an active part in Egyptian politics. It seemed to me that, without the concurrence of H. M.'s Government, it would only result in failure, and I knew how little real liberty of choice the Electors would have and how certain would be the punishment imposed upon the leaders in any such movement. I nevertheless on this suggestion wrote to an intelligent friend at Cairo, on whom I believed I could rely, to inform me what chance of success the plan would offer, and I received his answer towards the end of August. He informed me that "though there was no *party* in favour of Arabi's return, it was because it was not thought of as possible. Many regretted him, but the punishment inflicted on him and the spite wreaked on all who were mixed up with his revolution, which continued daily to be exercised, prevented any one from attempting to follow his example. There was a big party which thought of him with regret, but until quite lately my correspondent had hardly heard a word about his return at Cairo. Lord Dufferin's parliament had always been a mere toy and a thing to laugh at by all who knew Egypt. With the existing system of Palace and Ministerial supremacy, where no man dared do right because he instantly made himself a marked man, the Parliament would be a convenient tool for the Government. The bare idea of its showing independence under the existing regime would be ridiculous. At the same time if Arabi returned to Egypt, any constituency would return him, unless pressure were put on the Electors. If the elections were left alone, pressure would certainly be put on any constituency for which Arabi might present himself as Candidate. But, if Englishmen watched the ballot, he might get returned, although that constituency would most certainly be made to suffer in a hundred ways for its temerity. . . . If the people thought that a new era was dawning and they might vote fearlessly, of course Arabi would be returned by any constituency in Egypt, but they had had a severe lesson and 'a burnt child dreads the fire.'"

This letter, dated the 20th of August 1883, reached me if I am not mistaken on the 29th; and on the same day, I again called, by his invitation, on the gentleman already referred to, and he then told me that since his last talk with me he had seen you and that he could now assure me that it was your personal wish to find an excuse for restoring the exiles, and he advised me strongly to go to Cairo, where I should be well received by Sir Evelyn Baring and where I could talk the matter over with him. "Sir Evelyn Baring," he said, "will arrive in a few days at Cairo and he had *carte blanche* to begin a new policy in place of Sir Edward Malet's

## *Appendix C*

which had failed." This put the matter in a more hopeful light, and I at once determined to stop in Egypt on my way to India, and, if I found Sir Evelyn Baring in reality favourable to the idea, to propose Arabi's Election to the Liberals of Cairo. Although I will not say that the communication was delivered to me in terms as a message from you, I certainly accepted it as in some sort such, and I find it difficult to believe that it was wholly unauthorised by you or at least that you were unaware that it would be made. Nor can I doubt that a restoration of the National Party was a most natural and wise resolve, for it was only by such a course that the promised evacuation of Egypt could with any prudence have been effected, or the Charter of Egyptian liberty been made a reality.

I therefore began to prepare my plans of action, as well as it was possible to do so beforehand, and arranged to leave England on the 12th of September, for Suez, whence I could visit Cairo and learn how matters really lay and whether my stay there could with any advantage be prolonged.

Moreover on the day of my departure I received a note from Mr. Hamilton, your private secretary, asking to see me before I left, and I went to call on him in Downing Street and talked the matter of my visit to Egypt over with him. I told him of my plan with regard to the Cairo Elections, and he approved of it or seemed to approve, and assured me of Sir Evelyn Baring's readiness to confer with me, and we discussed certain details regarding my visit and he gave me advice on other political matters. Although Mr. Hamilton and I are old friends, I had not seen him for some time previously to this visit and we did not talk, as far as I am aware, at all on private matters; nor had I been to Downing Street for nearly a year, and, notwithstanding his reserve which I noticed as to yourself, I remained distinctly under the impression that his language on the occasion was authorised by you. You had left England some days before for Norway; and Mr. Hamilton, if anyone, was there to represent you. Thus I was and still am convinced that my journey was made with your sanction, and that on that account I had special claims on Sir Evelyn Baring for his protection in case my visit should give rise to annoyance.

As a matter of fact I only stayed ten days in Egypt, and meddled in no way at Cairo with the Elections. I found them half over when I arrived; and on calling on Sir Evelyn Baring found him with quite other views from what I had been led to expect. He received me indeed most amiably and discussed with me the whole situation; but when I talked of a Nationalist restoration we no longer agreed. I spoke my mind perhaps rather

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

too freely to him about his policy which I felt certain must end, as it has ended, in failure; but I have nothing else to reproach myself with in my communications with him, and beyond giving some advice and a very qualified encouragement to the friends and relations of the Exiles as to their eventual return and ascertaining some valuable facts with regard to the history of the previous two years, I did little while there that had a political significance. It was therefore with real surprise that I received Sir Evelyn's notice delivered officially and without explanation excuse or remark four months later that I was not to disembark in Egypt on my return from India.

This, Sir, is the principal point in the case which I would lay before you. A second is that the decision to exclude me from Egypt seems to have been come to simultaneously with a determination to inflict certain petty annoyances on me in regard to a small property I have in Egypt, annoyances which, reckoned only in money value, will represent a loss to me of perhaps a couple of hundred pounds. It is equally difficult to understand that these should have been entered on with or without Sir Evelyn Baring's knowledge, *with*, because they are an act unworthy of a public servant towards a political opponent, *without*, because they occurred precisely at the extreme plenitude of Sir Evelyn's power, when hardly a sparrow fell to the ground in Egypt without his knowledge.

A third point is the refusal of the F.O. to *assign me any reason* for declining to support my demand of admission as a British Subject into Egypt. Although I am advised that the Egyptian Government has a technical right to refuse entrance into Egypt, as far as I have been able to ascertain, it is a right which has never before been enforced there against a British Subject; and the British Government have never before refused protection *without assigning reason*. It seems to me therefore that it is a public duty with me not to let this pass without protest, for if it be admitted in my case that it depends upon the arbitrary goodwill and pleasure of the Foreign Minister of the day to decide who among British Subjects shall and shall not be protected abroad, it surely establishes a dangerous precedent, limiting criticism on foreign affairs to agreement with the Government. I have ventured to disagree with Lord Granville on his policy in Egypt. *Without assigning reason* he excludes me from Egypt, the inference seems clear that I am subjected to pains and penalties for my free speaking, a thing altogether out of accordance with English political practice. Nor can I think that the immediate convenience of excluding me from Egypt, which I presume is the unavowed motive, can be worth so very new and questionable a departure.



## *Appendix C*

Under all these circumstances I am induced to believe that by a personal appeal to you I shall be best consulting the general interests as well as my own. I have been advised that my remedy lies with Parliament and the publicity which should oblige the Foreign Office to give me a fair answer; but I have no wish, in the presence of such large public questions as are at the present moment being debated with regard to Egypt, to bring a personal grievance of my own in connection with that country unnecessarily before the public; and I feel sure that you will admit the soundness of my reasoning, and will so far favour me as to place before Lord Granville my unofficial request that he will reconsider his decision with regard to my recent application.

I am, my dear Sir, yours very faithfully,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

P.S.—I may add that should you feel any doubt as to the accuracy of my recollection of the two conversations here recorded, I possess reasonable proof of it in the shape of memorandums written at the time. These I should be happy if you required them to show you privately.

[N.B.—Sir Evelyn Baring subsequently, 1891, assured me that the annoyances complained of in this letter in regard to my property were none of his instigation, and I accepted and accept his assurance implicitly.]

My correspondent in Egypt quoted in the letter was Mr. Ardern Beaman, late official interpreter to the British Agency, and one well qualified to give the opinion quoted. The friend of Mr. Gladstone referred to was of course Sir James Knowles.]

MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON

St. James' Club, Piccadilly, W., May 31, 1884.

DEAR EDDY,

I send you my letter to Mr. Gladstone, which I have very carefully drawn up, so as to be within the limit of things which I am quite sure of, and which I could, if necessary, support by reasonable evidence. With regard especially to my conversation with you, I have kept myself well within the limit of things written. I am convinced that the little I quote will remind you of much more than was said. As to the main fact of Mr. Gladstone's having last year the thought of restoring the Nationalist party and of allowing it to be helped through my instrumentality, the more I think it over the less I doubt it. Please then forward my letter to him without delay, and let me have his answer before Parliament

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

meets again so that I may lose no further time, which in the present critical position of affairs is becoming valuable. I am sure you cannot say that I have shewn impatience.

Yours affectionately,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

MR. HORACE SEYMOUR TO MR. BLUNT

10, Downing Street, 10 *June* 1884.

DEAR BLUNT,

Mr. Gladstone has received and considered your letter of the 31st ult., and he desires me to say in reply that it is, in his opinion, impossible that any friend of his could, without the grossest error of judgment, have given you any ground for the suppositions that he was favourable (*a*) to the restoration of the exiles to Egypt, and the election of Arabi under Lord Dufferin's scheme; or (*b*) to your stopping in Egypt on your way to India for the purpose of promoting Arabi's candidature.

With regard to your account of your interview with Hamilton on the day you started for Egypt, Mr. Gladstone is convinced that you entirely mistook Hamilton.

Without, however, questioning in any way your intentions or your honour, Mr. Gladstone has deplored your proceedings in Egypt as alike injurious to Egyptian and British interests, and he has entirely concurred in the course which has been taken by the Foreign Office in reference to yourself.

I am, yours truly,

HORACE SEYMOUR.

MR. BLUNT TO MR. SEYMOUR

James Street, *June* 11, 1884.

DEAR SEYMOUR,

I beg you to thank Mr. Gladstone for me for the courteous form of his answer to my letter, and to say that I do not propose bringing the matter of my exclusion from Egypt before Parliament until after the present crisis.

Yours truly,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

10, Downing Street, 5 *Aug.* 1884.

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Thanks for your friendly note. I did not, however, need to be assured that, so far as you were yourself concerned, any allusion

## Appendix C

to our conversation last September had no unfriendly intent towards me. I am only sorry that our memories should not be more in accord; but I can honestly say two things. One that my asking you to come and say good-bye was merely the impulse of a friend who values the friendship of another. The other, that I have no recollection whatever of any announcement of your intentions in Egypt, and that the strictly private nature of our good-bye meeting is confirmed by my own diary, and by my not having reported any part of it to Mr. Gladstone.

If I was incautious, I shall try to amend my ways in future.

I am going off to Scotland almost immediately; and whatever your movements may be, pray be assured that they will always carry with them the best wishes of

Yours affectionately,  
E. W. HAMILTON.

MR. BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P.

Crabbet, *Novr.* 18, 1884.

MY DEAR SIR,

I venture once again to address you on a matter of very large importance connected with past events in Egypt, and which is still exercising a powerful influence for evil on the prospects of Government in that country and our own good name throughout the East.

You will not have forgotten the charges brought by Lord Randolph Churchill last year against the Khedive of complicity in organizing the riots of Alexandria, or the opinion which I have more than once expressed that they were well founded. My original knowledge of the matter came through my connection with Arabi's trial, and when I found that in spite of the promised amnesty men were still being tried and executed on accusations connected with that affair I did not hesitate to put in Lord Randolph's hands the few facts then at my command. At the same time I took no leading part myself in bringing the matter before the public. Since that time, however, a variety of accidents have put me into possession of a complete chain of new evidence, giving me the right to speak at last with absolute certainty on all the great events of that time. I am able now not only to trace the history of the Alexandrian riots with a sure hand, but to produce full evidence of the Khedive's orders having been given for the riots of Tintah, Dumanhour, and other towns of the Delta a month later. Moreover (and this I consider the most important feature of the case) I have ascertained and am prepared to prove that there was a total miscarriage of justice under the Commission

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

instituted to try cases connected with these massacres after the war. The chief offenders were not punished; in many instances innocent men were put forward by the Khedive's officers to suffer for the guilty; and in others those condemned were not only innocent, but had taken an active part in saving Christian life. In the case of Lord Randolph Churchill's indictment, the written statements it was objected were unsigned. But the witnesses I can now bring forward are men of acknowledged character, and much of their evidence was officially acquired, while they are ready to appear in person either publicly or in private in support of their assertions.

Such being the case I feel that I cannot do better than lay the facts privately before you, and request that you will personally examine the value of my new evidence. I have as yet communicated it to none of my political friends; and I can assure you that I had far rather keep it remote from public dispute. It is a question of justice to be done and reparation made; for there are innocent men still in prison, and the families of others who have suffered death are in distress; and it is you alone who can adequately repair the wrong or restore the honour of English justice where it has been compromised.

At the same time I am aware of the many calls upon your time, and should you consent to an inquiry I should be satisfied if you would allow yourself to be represented by deputy in all the details, begging you only to retain the responsibility in your own hands, and not to refer me to the Foreign Office, which has been throughout deaf to my representations, also as it is a question of evidence and witnesses I would suggest that persons of judicial training would best discharge the duty of representing you in an inquiry. I should ask no better than that the case should be referred for decision to ordinary English judges.

Having said this, I need hardly add that I am myself absolutely certain of all the main facts of which I propose to produce evidence, as certain as I am of any in history; nor need I assure you that I have a perfect confidence that when you too shall have been convinced of the deceptions practised upon our agents in Egypt, you will hasten to do justice. It is not too much to affirm that this initial failure of justice after the war has been the cause of all subsequent failures, and that there is little prospect of renewing honest life in Egypt through our intervention as long as so great and notorious a treachery remains unpunished.

I am, my dear sir, yours very faithfully,  
WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

## Appendix C

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

10, Downing Street, 21st Nov. 1884.

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Your note was most welcome as it gave me tidings of your whereabouts, as to which in spite of many inquiries of friends I could ascertain nothing. I send this half line in anticipation of any reply Mr. Gladstone may send you when he has been able to read your letter—which was not feasible for him to do to-day.

You don't say where you have been betaking yourself; but I hope we may soon meet.

Yours affectionately,  
E. W. H.

MR. HORACE SEYMOUR TO MR. BLUNT

10, Downing Street, 25 November, 1884.

MY DEAR BLUNT,

Mr. Gladstone desires me to say in reply to your letter of the 18th of this month, that under your inhibition to communicate with the Foreign Office, he cannot do more than acknowledge its receipt.

Yours faithfully,  
HORACE SEYMOUR.

MR. BLUNT TO MR. GLADSTONE

(*Précis.*)

London, March 12, 1885.

A letter saying that since the fall of Khartoum he has put himself once more in correspondence with those in Europe who are in correspondence with the Mahdi, with the result that he has ascertained that the road to peaceful negotiation is open. He is authorized by them to say that a preliminary discussion might be opened in Egypt, but not through the ordinary diplomatic or military channels—the basis of negotiation to be: 1. Release of captives. 2. Immunity for the tribes involved in the war. 3. Retirement of British or Egyptian forces to Wady Halfa and Souakin. 4. Evacuation of Souakin and Massowah in favour of the Sultan. 5. Recognition of the Mahdi as sovereign within these limits. 6. Establishment of diplomatic relations with England. 7. Freedom of commercial intercourse. 8. Possibly a convention limiting the Slave Trade. He is further authorized, in order to save further bloodshed, to offer the services of an Arab gentleman to convey an immediate message explaining the attitude of the English Government towards the Soudan.

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

*Confidential.*

10, Downing Street, *March 14, 1885.*

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Mr. Gladstone is obliged to you for your letter, which he wishes me to acknowledge on his behalf.

You imply that the Mahdi would not deal with Lord Wolseley and Sir E. Baring, our accredited representatives in Egypt. But why then does not the Mahdi send either some representative of his own with his views ready to be presented to the Government here, or some communication of those views, which might come to head-quarters at once? One may almost say that anything short of this is paltering with the case.

Yours always,

E. W. HAMILTON.

MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON

*(Précis.)*

London, *March 16, 1885.*

Explains the difficulty in the way of a representative being sent, the road not being open and the Mahdi being unaware whether his representative would be well received. Suggests sending an Arab gentleman under a safe conduct to Khartoum. Will Mr. Gladstone be disposed to facilitate the journey of such a gentleman, giving him a sufficient knowledge of the disposition and ideas of the British Government to enable him to arrange a formal embassy on the part of the Mahdi?

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

*Private.*

10, Downing Street, *March 19, 1885.*

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Many thanks for your note. It did not occur to me to connect Drummond Wolff's Question with your letters. It is not my fault that you have not had a further letter from me on the subject of your last communication. All I can for the moment say is that it is the subject of consideration. I am aware of what you consider the urgency of the matter to be.

Yours affectionately,

E. W. H.

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

*Confidential.*

21 *March, 1885.*

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Your letter to me of the 16th has been taken into consideration. I am to remind you that Lord Wolseley has been instructed

## Appendix C

to forward any overtures which may be made by the Mahdi, for the immediate consideration of the Government. If it is thought that the Mahdi is not aware of these instructions, it might possibly be arranged that the Arab gentleman should convey the information through the British lines. But the Government would require to be satisfied as to the gentleman's character and intentions.

Yours always,

E. W. HAMILTON.

MR. BLUNT TO MR. GLADSTONE

(*Précis.*)

March 24, 1885.

Thanking for message received through Mr. Hamilton, which, however, is not sufficiently definite to be acted on, but holds himself in readiness to give any further explanations, and suggests doing it by word of mouth.

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

*Confidential.*

10, Downing Street, March 28, 1885.

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Mr. Gladstone cannot perceive that the last letter I wrote to you by his direction was really indefinite. It practically conveyed to you an intimation that, if the Government could be assured of the Arab gentleman's character and intentions, a passage through the British lines might be arranged for him. Mr. Gladstone is afraid that he cannot suggest any other mode of proceeding.

Yours always,

E. W. HAMILTON.

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

*Private.*

10, Downing Street, March 28, 1885.

MY DEAR WILFRID,

I am sorry I cannot say more; but I must adhere to instructions.

Yours affectionately,

E. W. H.

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

10, Downing Street, March 30, 1885.

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Mr. Gladstone went out of town on Saturday night; and according to present arrangements he will not return to London before

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

the 9th of April. Under these circumstances I am afraid any interview is out of all question.

All I can do for the moment is to communicate on the subject of your letter received this morning with Lord Hartington, who is not only Mr. Gladstone's locum tenens, but who is now more directly concerned as War Minister than any other member of the Cabinet in matters affecting the Soudan.

Yours affectionately,

E. W. H.

MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON

*March 30.*

Saying it would not be worth while sending a special messenger to say that Lord Wolseley would forward communications. What is required is an explanation of what the terms might be if a mission was sent. While Mr. Gladstone says there is no intention of restoring Egyptian rule in the Soudan, Wolseley is appointing Prince Hassan Governor-General, Graham is pounding the "rebels" at Souakin, and Baring is arresting Zebehr at Cairo. Mr. Blunt is going abroad and will see those in communication with the Mahdi, and will ascertain their further views.

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

*Confidential.*

10, Downing Street, Whitehall,

*April 2nd, 1885.*

MY DEAR WILFRID,

All that I am at liberty further to say to you, before you go abroad, is to remind you that H.M. Government have again and again declared their objects to be the security of Egypt and the freedom of the Soudan; and to point out to you that the Mahdi has indicated to them nothing whatever. If it is thought that the objects of the British Government are not known to the Mahdi, why cannot steps be taken to communicate them to him? If they are known to him, surely it is for him then to make some declaration upon them in return?

Yours always,

E. W. HAMILTON.

Bon voyage and au revoir.

MR. BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P.

Paris, *April 8, 1885.*

MY DEAR SIR,

Yesterday the Mahdi's principal agent in Europe met me here, and I went through the whole subject of our recent correspond-



## *Appendix C*

ence carefully with him, and especially the draft of terms suggested in my first communication, and read to him Mr. Hamilton's last letter containing the declaration that the Government policy is that of freedom for the Soudan and security for Egypt. Of the draft of terms I am glad to say he fully approves, as a possible basis of negotiation with the Mahdi, and he is willing to accept the declaration of policy as generally compatible with that basis. Also he is prepared to send the Arab gentleman as bearer of a communication stating that England's policy is one of "freedom for the Soudan and security for Egypt," and he assures me that the Mahdi will in turn despatch a mission of peace to England, which may be expected to arrive not later than September. The Arab gentleman will, moreover, if the Government is willing, arrange in the interval for an armistice, for the better treatment of captives, and for immunity for such tribes as may have joined the English arms.

The Mahdi's agent also begged me to say that he trusted the Government would not be deceived by the reports recently circulated of defection from the Mahdi's standard, and so delay despatching the messenger to Khartoum. There was no truth at all in these reports, but on the contrary, there was every certainty that as soon as the agricultural season was over on the Upper Nile, hostilities would be resumed, nor would these permanently cease as long as a British or Egyptian army remained in the Soudan. With regard, however, to an advance upon Egypt proper, he made the remark that the Mahdi was a reformer, not a conqueror; that he had no quarrel with the Egyptians either there or elsewhere, many thousands of them being actually gathered under his flag; and that the establishment of a just and legal Egyptian Government at Cairo would at once end any danger of such an advance by depriving it of excuse in popular sympathy. The Mahdi was popular with the fellahin of Egypt, because he had rid their brethren, the Soudanese, of an intolerable tyranny, and they would continue to look on him as a possible deliverer as long as their wrongs remained unredressed. If through the means now placed at the Government's disposal a truce of two or three years was concluded, England would have time to do justice, and it would be her fault if at the end of it the war was renewed. The Mahdi had no mission of conquest in Egypt.

Finally he requested me to explain that Ministerial declarations made in England are not understood in the Soudan, and that there is a great mistrust of all military communications. If the Mahdi had understood General Gordon as having a really friendly mission towards the Soudanese he would certainly have entered into friendly communications with him. But, up to the present

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

moment, it has been the universal belief in the Soudan that England has no other object than to conquer and retain the country. For this reason it is essential that the communication of a contrary policy should be made through some one known to them and promising credit with the people.

From all I heard yesterday I am satisfied that it depends wholly now upon the Government to prolong the Mahdi's hostility, or change it into friendship; and I therefore await with much hope your answer to this letter.

Believe me, my dear Sir, yours very faithfully,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

*Confidential.*

10, Downing Street, April 11, 1885.

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Mr. Gladstone is obliged for your letter, written from Paris on the 8th, which I duly delivered to him.

He does not well see how he can add anything material to the letter which I wrote to you on the 2nd, and of which he himself was cognisant, though he was away from London. In that letter there were reiterated the declared objects of the British Government in the Soudan, objects which they are as desirous as ever of securing, and which hardly need to be enlarged upon.

Let me add a word on my own account. I cannot help thinking you must understand the delicacy and difficulty which the Government must feel about holding communications with you, on matters relating to Egypt, directly or indirectly, when it is believed that you mistrust and are opposed to the Ruler of that country whom they are bound and likewise intend to support.

Yours always,

E. W. HAMILTON.

MR. BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON. W. E. GLADSTONE, M.P.

10, James Street, April 14, 1885.

MY DEAR SIR,

I returned yesterday from Paris, and hasten to answer your last letter. The Mahdi's agent is ready now to send the messenger whenever it suits you to give him the necessary facilities. But he has impressed very strongly and repeatedly upon me the necessity there is of his having a *written* message in Arabic to deliver. This need not go beyond the sense of the words Mr.

## *Appendix C*

Hamilton has already used in writing to me, but it must be in a form intelligible to the Mahdi and others whom it concerns. Without this, he says, it will be impossible to convince the Mahdi that the message is quite sincere on the Government's part, or at any rate that his followers should be so convinced. My knowledge of Arab ideas leads me to feel sure that in this ~~he~~ is only reasonable, nor do I conceive that the Government, which has already sent written communications through their Generals to Osman Digna and other chiefs, would now find a difficulty in writing this message to their supreme chief Mohammed Ahmed. It will not be necessary that the title "el Mahdi" should be employed towards him in the letter, and I could, if desired, suggest a form of address which would be considered friendly without acknowledging this special pretension. The strictest secrecy would be maintained by the messenger until his delivery of the letter at the Mahdi's camp.

Thus the suggestion made in Mr. Hamilton's first letter to me, that the Mahdi should send a mission to England, can be conveyed to him in a way he will understand as being sincerely offered; and all that need further be done will be to instruct the military authorities to receive with scrupulous courtesy the Envoys on their arrival at the British lines.

I am, my dear Sir, yours very faithfully,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

MR. BLUNT TO MR. HAMILTON

St. James Street, *April* 15, 1885.

MY DEAR EDDY,

I have replied to the first part of your letter in the enclosed to Mr. Gladstone, and I add a few words in answer to your own remarks, as I should be sorry there should be additional difficulty through misunderstanding. For reasons which you know, and for others which you do not know, I have of course, as you say, "mistrust" of the Khedive, but the extent of my "opposition" to him you probably exaggerate. I have had very little correspondence with Egypt since my last visit there under circumstances which you will remember, and the failure of Baring's policy since has been due to its inherent weakness far more than to the action of his opponents, certainly than to mine. I believe still what I have always believed, that there is no course open to the Government, if it would keep its pledges and have peace in Egypt, but to restore the National party; and, if that is impossible, then annexation by Europe, if not by England, is the only end.

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

Tewfik has seemed to me up to the present to stand in the way of such a possible arrangement, and on this ground especially I have from time to time opposed him; but, if it could be shown to me that the peace and happiness of Egypt was compatible with his rule, I should not surely out of obstinacy refuse to be reconciled.

The questions, however, of the Soudan and Egypt may for the immediate present perfectly well be kept apart; and I see no reason why the Government should hesitate to communicate with me on the former if not on the latter. They have publicly declared the Soudan to be independent of Egypt, and Mr. Gladstone has recently assured me through you that he earnestly desires to maintain its freedom.

Yours affectionately,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

*Confidential.*

10, Downing Street, *April 16, 1885.*

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Mr. Gladstone is afraid that he cannot draw a distinction for present purposes between Egypt and the Soudan; and so I am obliged again to point out the difficulty of his holding communications with yourself on the subject of your correspondence with him.

It is to be observed that H.M. Government has received no application from any agent of the Mahdi to be allowed a pass through the British lines to enable him to deliver a message. I cannot say with what response such an application might meet.

Yours always,

E. W. HAMILTON.

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

*Private.*

10, Downing Street, *25 April, 1885.*

MY DEAR WILFRID,

My last note was not intended to invite further remarks. It aimed rather at hinting that under altered circumstances the correspondence should close. I am afraid this must be the case. I have no authority to communicate further with you on the matter.

Yours always,

E. W. H.

## *Appendix C*

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

10, Downing Street, 12 *May*, 1885.

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Mr. Gladstone is much pleased by your kind gift. The little volume will much interest him; and he hopes you will accept his best thanks. He says it will be a pleasure to him to turn from the Soudan to Proteus.

Yours affectionately,

E. W. HAMILTON.

MR. HAMILTON TO MR. BLUNT

10, Downing Street, Whitehall, 11 *June* 1885.

MY DEAR WILFRID,

Many thanks for your kind note. I hope we have never met but as friends; and that the only difference which pending changes will make will be that I may see more of you in relations of "greater freedom and less responsibility." I am afraid for some little time to come I shall be awfully pressed by the ordeal of packing. I have to turn out not only of office, but of home.

In haste.

Yours affectionately,

E. W. H.

MR. BLUNT TO THE RIGHT HON. ROBERT BOURKE, M.P.

10, James St., *July* 3, 1885.

MY DEAR BOURKE,

As you are doubtless considering the Soudan question just now at the F.O. I think it may be of assistance to you to know briefly *what has passed between me and the late Government in regard to possible negotiation with the Mahdi.*

It began in April, 1884, when I wrote to Mr. Gladstone in connection with schemes then on foot for rescuing Gordon, and offering my services as mediator. Mr. Gladstone seems himself to have had some inclination to accept, but on reference to the rest of the Cabinet my offer was declined.

Secondly I made an attempt in December, through one of the Peace Societies, to gain a hearing. I had ascertained that the Mahdi would be accessible to offers of withdrawal for Gordon and the garrison from Khartoum; and I went to Hawarden with the hope of seeing Mr. Gladstone and explaining the position to him. But I was not received.

Thirdly, after the fall of Khartoum, I again wrote to Mr.

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

Gladstone delivering a message I had received from a religious-political personage in correspondence with the Mahdi proposing to open negotiations for peace or truce. It was just before Graham's second campaign in March; and this time Mr. Gladstone responded, and a correspondence followed which led to my being authorised to give certain messages to the personage in question, and I went abroad at Easter to deliver them. It was then proposed to send a messenger through the British Lines to explain the pacific views of the Government, and arrange for the opening of more formal negotiations, and it seemed as if the matter would be arranged; when for some reason which I do not exactly know the thing collapsed. I fancy it was on account of the news spread just at that time of a rival Mahdi having sprung up in Kordofan and the idea that Mohammed Ahmed was no longer in full power at Khartoum, but I am not sure. In any case the correspondence suddenly came to an end.

Although all this was more or less confidential as between myself and Downing Street, there is no reason I think now that I should make any mystery about it to you, especially as it would probably be open still to Lord Salisbury if he liked to take the negotiation up at the point where Mr. Gladstone dropped it—and I should be glad if you would show this letter to Lord Salisbury and offer him the confidential perusal of the papers I have relating to it. I will not say more at present than that I still think it would be possible as it would certainly be most desirable to come to terms with the Mahdi.

Yours very truly,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

[N.B.—I cannot find any answer to this letter, nor do I remember its purport. It led to nothing, the Mahdi's death being shortly after announced. But for this it is probable that Lord Salisbury would have negotiated.]

MR. BLUNT TO THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

*September, 1885.*

MY LORD,

I have the honour to lay before your Lordship the fact that I have received a summons through the Lords of H. M. Treasury to present myself before the Tribunal of First Instance at Cairo on the 19th of October next on a matter connected with a property I hold in Egypt, and to beg your Lordship to inform me whether I shall receive there the protection usually accorded to

## *Appendix C*

British subjects. I make this request in consequence of a notification served on me two years ago by Sir Evelyn Baring with Earl Granville's approval to the effect that I should not then be allowed to land at Suez on my passage from India.

For further particulars regarding the case of my exclusion from Egypt by the late Government I beg to refer your Lordship to Blue Book, Egypt, No. 27, of 1884, containing my correspondence with the Foreign Office; to the report of a debate in the House of Commons of the 4th August of the same year; and to the enclosed memorandum.

Your Lordship will observe that Sir Evelyn Baring's action against me seems to have been based originally upon a misstatement of Sherif Pasha regarding a visit paid to Egypt in 1883, and afterwards to a fear entertained by the late Government that my influence there would be prejudicial to their policy. But I venture to hope that your Lordship will not regard me with the same apprehension, and that, having inquired into the facts, you will restore to me the protection generally accorded to British subjects abroad. I may mention that my prolonged absence from Egypt has occasioned and is occasioning me considerable money losses.

I am, my Lord, your obedient humble servant,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY TO MR. BLUNT

Foreign Office, Oct. 5, '85.

MY DEAR MR. BLUNT,

We have applied to the Egyptian Government to obtain permission for you to return—but we have received the most decided negative. Of course it is in our power to apply pressure to the Egyptian Government. But if we do so, we shall make ourselves responsible for the consequences. It is therefore a matter of duty to us, first to ask you, whether you will undertake not to meddle in any sense with political questions or projects while you are there? If you will give us this undertaking we will telegraph to Egerton to do his best.

Yours very truly,

SALISBURY.

MR. BLUNT TO THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY

10, James St., Oct. 6, 1885.

MY DEAR LORD SALISBURY,

I most readily undertake not to meddle with political questions or projects while in Egypt, my object in going there being first to

## *Correspondence with Downing Street*

look after my property and secondly to assert the right I possess as an Englishman of claiming the protection of my Government while travelling abroad.

Nor do I wish, if it can be arranged that the case I am cited to appear on can be postponed so long as till December or January, to complicate Sir Henry Drummond Wolff's diplomacy by appearing at Cairo during his special mission. I quite understand that my arriving there with him on whatever errand might cause embarrassment. But, if I do not now insist upon my right, I run the risk of being perpetually excluded from a country where I have property and where I may one day desire to reside.

I therefore hope that you will insist with the Egyptian Government on the necessity of permitting my visit unmolested.

Yours very truly,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY TO MR. BLUNT

Châlet Cécil, *September 10th, '85.*

DEAR MR. BLUNT,

I am much obliged to you for your letter. We are in communication with Egypt upon the subject matter of it. I have no wish to cause you any inconvenience, and I hope it will be possible for us to accede to your wishes. Supposing, however, that we can do so, it will be necessary to interpose some delay in the manner you suggest, because I am afraid that your appearance and that of Sir Drummond Wolff at the same moment in Egypt might lead to unauthorised and wholly exaggerated rumours upon questions of future policy.

Yours very truly,

SALISBURY.

THE MARQUESS OF SALISBURY TO MR. BLUNT

Foreign Office, *October 10, '85.*

DEAR MR. BLUNT,

I did not get your note till my return from Newport. I telegraphed immediately and have received to-night the answer that the Khedive, as a matter of deference to H. M. G. is willing to permit you to come to Egypt, freely for the purpose of looking after your private affairs. The permission is evidently given with much apprehension. I need only add that now my honour as well as yours are involved in your abstaining from any political action—but that I feel assured we may confidently count upon.

Believe me, yours very truly,

SALISBURY.



## APPENDIX D

### AUTHOR'S CORRESPONDENCE WITH LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

Gastein, *August 3, 1883.*

MY DEAR BLUNT,

Many thanks for your letter, also for the Cairo papers which amused me. I am sorry to tell you I have not received your book, "The Future of Islam." I hope it will reach me as I have every opportunity of reading so interesting a work with the care and attention which it deserves. Have you done anything yet about getting into Parliament. Northcote has come to awful grief over the Canal which has been much more fatal to him than to Gladstone. I hope Gorst and Wolff will make long and damaging speeches against the Khedive on Baring's vote; Mind you egg them on. This is a horrid dull place and we are badly lodged. I wish I had done with it.

Yrs. most sincerely,

RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL, M.P., TO MR. BLUNT

Gastein, *August 14, 1883.*

MY DEAR BLUNT,

I have to thank you for your two very interesting letters and enclosures. I cannot see my way to doing anything myself in the matter, for I am too far off to communicate effectually with you and secondly it is a *sine qua non* of these baths that one should do absolutely nothing. I hope you will write to the Times just to keep the thing alive, and in the winter by one or two speeches in the country I shall try to rub it all in. The awkward fact remains that the Government has made no answer to my indictment and in all probability cannot make one. You appear to have given up your intention of going to Ceylon to see Arabi which I am sorry for. This a desperately dull place and time hangs heavily. The Baths are lowering I think and one feels quite indisposed for any exertion. I shall hope to be back in London by the 2nd week in September in case you should still be there. We leave this on the 29th.

Yrs. most sincerely,

RANDOLPH S. C.

P.S. I have to thank you for your most interesting book which reached me safely. When is Ninet's book coming out?

## *Correspondence with Lord R. Churchill*

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL, M.P., TO MR. BLUNT

Innsbruck, (end of) *August* 1883.

MY DEAR BLUNT,

I arrived here this morning from Ischl and found your letter for which many thanks. I have read your poem with pleasure and I need not say with perfect sympathy. Publish it. Poetry often makes converts where prose fails. I have no doubt that you are a Cassandra and that we shall pay dearly for our freaks in Egypt. But it is a despairing task to try and right the wrong. But I mean to do what I can in my little way when the proper season for extra Parliamentary utterances may arrive. I have a horrid idea that the advent of the opposition to office might be worse for Egypt than any conceivable eventuality. I imagine from your last letter that you are still decided on your journey to India, and I wish you a safe and speedy return.

The idea of having Arabi elected to the new Senate is ingenious, but to be effective he should be elected in many districts. Otherwise it might turn to ridicule.

Believe me Yours most faithfully,  
RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL, M.P., TO MR. BLUNT

Blenheim Palace, *Dec.* 26, 1883.

MY DEAR BLUNT,

I have to thank you for three long and highly interesting letters. I have not written before because I really did not know whether letters had much chance of reaching you. However if I do not write you will think I do not value your letters which would be a great error on your part. I have not much to tell you. I hope by the time you get this that you will have seen the speech I made at Edinbro' on Egypt which is fully reported in the Times of the 19th. I cannot tell you what effect it produced as you would think me very conceited. All I can say is that I am more than satisfied. Tewfik's position grows more hopeless every day. There is no Government in Egypt at all. I think we shall be able to make it very hot for the G. O. M. when Parliament meets. Your poem was very highly praised in the reviews. Gorst is in India at Hyderabad on legal business of the Nizam. Please remember me most kindly to Lady Anne and accept for her and yourself from me the warmest wishes of the season. Do not delay your return too long. We must have stirring times in the spring.

Yours ever,  
RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

## *Appendix D*

WRITTEN BY MR. BLUNT AND APPROVED BY LORD RANDOLPH  
CHURCHILL

"AM I A TORY DEMOCRAT?"

*May 1885.*

With regard to English Home Politics I am prepared to support the Conservative party. That is to say, I desire no change in the existing Constitution or in the relations between Church and State. I am opposed to merely secular Education. I am a strong supporter of the House of Lords. On the land question I should like to see any measure introduced which should make the acquisition of land easier for the man of the people, believing this would be a popular, and in the truest sense, a Conservative measure. I consider, however, that the principles of liberty and property are closely connected, and I am altogether opposed to the Radical views of State ownership in land.

I am inclined to favour the idea of special commercial advantages being given to the British Colonies and India; and I am anxious to see the union between the Colonies and the Empire preserved.

In India I am for large reforms in the direction of self-government, believing these to be absolutely necessary on financial and political grounds if India is to remain loyal.

So, too, in Ireland I am in favour of Home Rule. I consider it urgent to accept the principle of Nationalism, both for Ireland's sake and for England's. My motto would be "Ireland for the Irish and England for the English." The plan has succeeded in Hungary and Galicia in reconciling the Hungarians and Poles to the Austrian Crown. Why not, therefore, in Ireland?

Foreign politics are my strongest ground. With regard to these I am quite clear in my opinion that what is required for England is a return to plain dealing and respect for international law. These have been grossly outraged during the last four years by Mr. Gladstone's Government, and it is we with our complicated commercial interests in every part of the globe that will eventually suffer from the example given. Our relations with the States of Europe should be based upon a recognition of the fact that our system of parliamentary and popular government makes special alliances and secret treaties impossible. Our old-fashioned diplomacy, with its tortuous dealings, its equivocations and its concealments, is out of date and needs reform; and I would have the contrary to all these things introduced as a cardinal point of policy. As towards Europe we should make the most of our insular position, increase our navy and protect our shores. But in

## *Correspondence with Lord R. Churchill*

Asia we cannot be insular, and we must submit to the conditions of Empire as long as India remains in our charge. In this view we need the alliance of the Mohammedan nations against Russia, and I am in favour of England accepting the full responsibility of her position, as the heir of a great Mohammedan Empire. My quarrel with Mr. Gladstone's action in Egypt was not based on any principle of non-intervention, for I am not a non-interventionist, but because he intervened unjustly, unwisely and in such a way as to alienate Mohammedan sympathies. I consider that a duty of reparation is required of England for the wrong done to the Egyptians and I advocate a reconciliation with the Sultan and a restoration of the Egyptian National party. I need hardly say that I am in favour of immediate peace with the Soudan.

Lastly, I consider that justice, not mere expediency, should be the determining law of our conduct towards all nations. I am strongly averse to the Manchester doctrine which allows injustice to weaker nations in the interests of finance and trade, though not of military glory. I believe, on the contrary, that it is England's duty to protect weaker nations from injustice where they come in contact with her. Nor can I convince myself that a high standard of national morality is incompatible with the extremest Conservative principles. I believe, on the contrary, that much of what was best in the so-called "Midlothian" doctrines has more real affinity to Tory than to Whig instincts; and I should be glad to see these adopted, now they have been discarded by the Radicals, as part and parcel of Conservative ideas. Truth, justice, liberty—these are great names, going at this moment in beggars' weeds about the world. Can these find an asylum in the new temple of Tory Democracy?

WILFRID BLUNT TO LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

*June 8, 1885.*

MY DEAR CHURCHILL,

I am glad you have stated so clearly the Conservative policy, in nearly all of which I heartily agree, though on some points, such as Ireland, I have larger views than you are prepared for of Home Rule. The necessity for an inquiry into the working of the Indian Government is very urgent, and the fact that you should have included it in your programme, and are to support Mr. Slagg's motion, gives me more hope than any thing else which has happened regarding India during the past year. The truth is that if India had to trust solely to the Whigs for reform it might wait till eternity, or rather till that crash came which certainly will come

## *Appendix D*

if the rigidity of the present bureaucratic system is not modified. The Whigs are bureaucrats born and bred and will not stir a finger to help us.

With regard to Egypt too, I think you are right. The day for such a policy as Mr. Chamberlain's, which he has just announced, has gone by, and the only agreement which France is likely to come to with Mr. Gladstone is one which will put Egypt practically into France's hands. Two years ago, or even perhaps a year ago, before the conference and the Nile campaign, Egypt's complete independence, under a strong and popular government might have been secured, but Mr. Gladstone would not hear of it then, and by persisting in keeping Tewfik as the corner stone of his policy he has thrown away his chance. Now France will not be content with anything from him less than her own protectorate, or Europe with anything less than the letter of her bond. To get back our right to give Egypt liberty, the first condition will be that we guarantee her debt; the second that we make peace with the Sultan and act under his authority. Here, again, therefore, I look rather to you than to the Whigs for practical help. One knows by experience so exactly what Mr. Chamberlain's arrangement would come to—an independent Egypt would be an Egypt separated from the rest of the Mohammedan world, but governed really in the sole interests of France and the bondholders. The form of a "native" government would be preserved, perhaps, but the form only. Egypt's "independence by arrangement with Europe" means Egypt for the bondholders, with France for their protector and Ismail for their king. If Mr. Chamberlain had said a word about repentance for past errors I could have better believed him; but we heard all the promises and declarations he now makes, two years ago, and in far stronger language from Mr. Gladstone himself, and with what result? No; I prefer your programme for Egypt, though it seems to promise less.

I will take this opportunity of giving you my view of what a Conservative Government might do for Egypt and generally for Western Asia. The Whigs will never do anything but harm, because they are Whigs and because they hate the Mohammedans, and the Radicals will never do anything at all, because they are Radicals and will undertake no responsibility. You know that the Mohammedan faith is in solution—that it is seeking to place itself on a new basis—to regenerate its political and social life. Enormous abuses exist everywhere, enormous injustices. The poor are ground down by the rich, the weak by the strong. The whole earth, as Arabi used to say, is famished for justice, and calls out for a deliverer. The recognition of this was the secret of his own influence. It is the secret of the Mahdi's. It may any

## *Correspondence with Lord R. Churchill*

day be the secret of England's. But in Mohammedan lands it is not sufficient to administer an equal law for it to be accepted by the people even for their own good. The law must be connected with their religious beliefs and sanctioned by their religious authority. I am not arguing whether it is best so—though I believe it is best—but am stating a fact. And it is the perverse refusal to acknowledge facts which has made of Lord Granville's policy in Egypt so piteous a failure. His idea would seem to have been, and Sir Evelyn Baring's with him—if idea at all they had—that the people's faith and social traditions were a "negligible quantity," and that, no matter what the law and no matter who administered it, it would be accepted with thanks. For this reason, though Tewfik was notoriously regarded as a traitor to his faith and nation, they placed him in authority, and men with him for Ministers whose only merit was that they had preferred their interests to their beliefs and were without moral principle or religious prejudice. Even these, however, in later times have refused to serve them, and they have been forced to take up with Nubar and his speculating crew of Armenians as the element supple enough to do their bidding. This has had its effect. The whole of the religious forces of the country are against them, and the whole of the people. Their reforms have remained sterile, their attempts to pacify, impotent. The people have refused their friendship and their justice, and will have none of their advice. The Liberal party of Mohammedan reform have been driven out of the country, the honest men have been driven from the Administration, and the mass of the people into the arms of the Mahdi.

It is in the power of England, and England alone, to repair the evil done—and, what is more, it is England's duty. But it cannot be effected except at the cost of assuming Egypt's sole protection, and the protection also of general Mohammedan interests. The Sultan must be taken into confidence, peace must be made with the Mahdi, and Arabi must be recalled. Europe, too, must be brought out by accepting Egypt's debt. These conditions observed, all difficulty, it will be found, will disappear, and the regeneration of Egypt may at last be begun, and with it gradually of all the Mohammedan East.

It seems to me, therefore, that the Conservative Party, if it acts on your idea, has a great and satisfactory work before it, which, if honestly performed, and avoiding the snare of turning Egypt's protection into a means of providing Englishmen with places and pay, may yet redeem the past and give reality to the dreams of reformers. You especially, with your sympathy for popular causes, will know that the only foundation of success in the East, as in the West, is the consent of the people. Get the Egyptian people

## Appendix D

on your side, and all Mohammedans will follow you, and with hardly an effort you will transform the world.

I wish you, therefore, all success in your electoral campaign. You have given too many proofs of your sincerity and steadfastness in this matter of Egypt for me to doubt you, and I know that you will do your best for her. Of the present Government I have long ceased to have any hope.

[N.B.—This letter was read to and approved by Lord Randolph Churchill for publication in the "Times," with the alteration of a single phrase concerning Ireland, the words "than you are prepared for of Home Rule" being changed into "than you are apparently yet prepared for."]

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL TO MR. BLUNT

*Most Private.*

India Office, Aug. 13, 1885.

DEAR BLUNT,

The enclosed explains itself. Will you see to it?

Yours ever,

RANDOLPH S. C.

COPY OF TELEGRAM FROM SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF

(*Enclosure.*)

Dated Vienna, 12 August, 1885.

Received at London Office, 5.10 p.m.

"I think it would be well for Jemal-ed-din Afghani to come. Have you (any objection?),<sup>1</sup> if involving no responsibility or complicity on my part, and if it can be done without his coming into collision with Turkish authorities. I leave this probably to-morrow evening or Friday morning."

MR. A. W. MOORE TO MR. BLUNT

*Private.*

India Office, 15 August /85.

DEAR MR. BLUNT,

I have just deciphered the enclosed from Sir H. Wolff. Lord Randolph is unwell and in bed, but I shall see him during the afternoon. I think it is best however to send you the telegram at once, as I understand the present arrangement is that Jemal-ed-deen leaves to-morrow.

Please let me hear from you what I am to reply to Sir H. Wolff.

Yours very truly,

A. W. MOORE.

<sup>1</sup> This is necessary to the sense, but the group or some equivalent has been omitted in cyphering.—A. W. M.

## *Correspondence with Lord R. Churchill*

<sup>2</sup>  
COPY OF A TELEGRAM FROM SIR H. DRUMMOND WOLFF

(*Enclosure.*)

"Buda Pest, 15 August.

"From something I have heard it would be well for Jemal-eddeen not to leave England till I can telegraph to you from Constantinople."

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL, M.P., TO MR. BLUNT

India Office, *November 1, 1885.*

DEAR BLUNT,

Many thanks for your letter and enclosures which I return. I feel sure that your lecture on Egypt at Newcastle must have been profoundly interesting and instructive to the audience and a little more circulation of such facts would do much good. You will certainly not receive an encouraging reply from Lord Salisbury about Arabi. Even if he was disposed (as I should be) to favour your views he would not dare take such a step on the eve of the Elections.

Yours ever,

RANDOLPH S. CHURCHILL.

MR. BLUNT TO LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL

Crabbet Park, *Dec. 24, 1885.*

MY DEAR CHURCHILL,

I am obliged to come to an immediate decision about continuing my connection with Camberwell or indeed in any active form with party politics, my pressing difficulty being Ireland. About this, now that Mr. Gladstone has taken up Home Rule, it is necessary for me to speak and at once to my Electors; and, unless I hear from you that there is still hope of an agreement between Lord Salisbury and Mr. Parnell on a really solid basis, I shall conclude, as everybody tells me it is, that Conservatism and Home Rule are for the present incompatible terms and give up trying to make them agree. I fear I have not in me the spirit of a good party man, but I thought at one time I could help you individually in the pursuit of better things. Egyptian affairs seem in the same deadlock they were a year ago, and altogether I am far from hopeful or disposed for further combat.

Yours very truly,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.



## *Appendix D*

LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL TO MR. BLUNT

*Private.*

India Office, *Dec.* 26, 1885.

MY DEAR BLUNT,

There is no question or doubt about the matter. If you want Home Rule you must go to Gladstone for it. We cannot touch it.

Yours ever,

RANDOLPH S. C.

## APPENDIX E

### ARABI'S PROGRAMME OF 1883 AND MOHAMMED ABDU'S VIEWS

#### 1. MR. BLUNT'S LETTER REPRINTED FROM THE "TIMES" OF 13TH DECEMBER 1883

Colombo, 5th Nov., 1883.

SIR,

I am sure the "Times" has many readers who will be interested to receive an account from an authentic source of the manner of life and present views of Arabi Pasha and his fellow exiles in the place of residence which nearly a year ago was assigned to them by the British Government.

I have been staying with them now for over three weeks, as their guest, and am therefore able to speak with some authority as to their ideas; and I think the time has come when these may be of service to the public, and, if I may be allowed to suggest it, perhaps even to those all-wise authorities who are still seeking to regenerate Egypt by putting round men into square holes, and square into round from their official chairs in Downing Street.

With regard to the material welfare of the exiles, I am glad to have an excellent account to give. Although some of them suffered at first from the extreme dampness of the climate, all are now acclimatized; and even Toulba Pasha, who six months ago was pronounced by the doctors to be incurable with asthma, is enjoying perfect health.

They are all, too, I think, contented in mind and grateful for the treatment they receive from the Colonial authorities, which has been throughout most courteous to them; and except for certain inequalities in the amount of their allowances, with which I will not here trouble you, they would have nothing to complain of beyond the unavoidable bitterness which mingles with the bread of all exiles.

The way of life of the exiles is simple. Each family occupies a separate dwelling, and most of them have chosen to reside in a rather remote suburb of Colombo, which has ceased to be fashionable, and where house rent is proportionately low. They send their children to school, attend the local mosques, pay visits to each other or to their neighbours, and attempt, with more or less success, themselves to learn a little English. Their society they find in the numerous Mohammedan community at Colombo,

## *Appendix E*

which, unlike such communities in many parts of India, is entirely mercantile, and possesses not a few men of substance, whose commercial establishments the more practical of the exiles hope that some day their sons will enter, and thus be enabled to earn an independent livelihood.

The Mohammedan community regard their Egyptian guests with feelings of the highest respect, as martyrs to their religion, and especially Arabi, as its late most famous champion; and so strong is this feeling regarding him among the lower class in Colombo that on Fridays, whatever mosque Arabi may choose to attend is sure to be thronged with a special crowd of worshippers. Besides this, however, there are certain English houses where the exiles are well received; and, on the whole, I think I may say that they are as popular as their ignorance of English will allow with the official community and the official residents.

I have naturally had constant conversations with the exiles on political matters, and more especially with Arabi, and have learned from him and unlearned much as to the events of last year. We have spoken, too, not a little of the future, and of the hopes which the national leader still cherishes of being one day recalled to Egypt, there to work out to its accomplishment the plan of reform he had conceived, and which I firmly believe that he alone possesses the genius to realize. For, whatever may have been his faults and failings (and they were doubtless great and many in his conduct both of the political and of the military campaigns of last year), I have been more than ever impressed during my present visit with the reality of Arabi's claim to be considered a patriot and a man of genius. By a man of genius I understand one who is capable of large and new ideas, who has the passion to impress these strongly upon others, and who above all possesses the courage and persistence required to work them to their end. These qualities Arabi certainly has, and I know of no other Egyptian of whom anything corresponding can be said.

His view of the present situation in Egypt is worth quoting:

"The English Government is attempting," he says, "an impossible task. They wish to make Tewfik popular and they wish to introduce reforms. But Tewfik will only remain popular as long as he is supported by the English troops; and when these are withdrawn he will fall. Personally, Tewfik is without a friend in Egypt. The Egyptians hate him for having betrayed his country, and the Circassians despise him for having betrayed his religion. The better friend he is to the English the less chance he has of conciliating his countrymen. In one way or other he will disappear. Then it will be for the Powers finally to decide what it is they really intend for Egypt. If they mean to annex it, one or

## *Arabi's Programme*

other of them will do so at the cost of a new revolt. If not, they must allow the Egyptians to choose their ruler and to work out their freedom for themselves."

The choice of a ruler should be made, Arabi thinks, by the Notables. The fellahin are not sufficiently instructed yet for a plebiscite. But the Sheikhs of the villages with the Notables of the towns would form a reasonable elective body. They would choose whom they would, a Mohammedan, a man of mark, Arabi hopes an Egyptian. But before investing him with power they would bind him by some Constitutional form which should prevent the recurrence of mere arbitrary rule, the rule which has ruined Egypt. Lord Dufferin's charter, Arabi considers, is insufficient for that purpose. It is a make believe, too weak to restrain the abuse of power, and liable through its weakness to become itself an instrument in the hands of despotism. Egypt, however, under a leader elected by the Notables, would find Notables capable of asserting and maintaining their rights; and a Constitutional Chamber would form itself without the need of any more foreign assistance. The Liberal Party, it is true, is now crushed and in hiding; but it would start from the ground with the least encouragement and find life again. Arabi does not at all despair of his countrymen, could the present unnatural régime be replaced by one sanctioned by public approval. The approval of the people is the basis of all stable government; and, whoever the new ruler of Egypt is, he must be made to understand that Egypt is not given him as a property but as a trust. Ismail Pasha thought all Egypt was his private garden. Tewfik Pasha is being taught to think that there is no law but what rests on his decree. This must not be in the future; the Prince must obey the law, not make it.

Again, the English Government is trying to introduce reforms, but through what instruments? It has driven away all the real reformers. They are in exile or in prison, or have been fined and otherwise frightened by police persecution to live "underground." The men who are left are either those who are too timid or too indifferent to join the party of liberty, or else the very men against whom the reformers rose. "How," asks Arabi, "can the English Government expect to establish justice through the Pashas who served Ismail, or liberty for the Egyptians through those very Turks and Circassians who have always hated liberty, and who look upon the Egyptians as their natural servants?"

With regard to finance, Arabi is of opinion that the best chance of permanently saving the solvency of the country lies in a new arrangement with the creditors. He says that the calculations of the Budget in recent years have been made without reference to

## *Appendix E*

the periodical recurrence of seasons of scarcity. There have been now five good Niles in succession, and there must come soon a bad one, which will upset the estimates. Also no allowance has been made for the recent great loss of capital by the fellahin, the murrains which have destroyed their oxen, the debts they have incurred, their now universal poverty. Unless the burdens of the fellahin are made very light for them for several years to come, they will never recover their prosperity and the land will become deteriorated and impoverished. Arabi is of opinion that in the interest of the creditors themselves it would therefore be prudent to lower the rate of interest for a fixed number of years, full payment to be resumed only at the end of the term when the country would be able to afford it. He thinks this, with great economy everywhere, is the best means of averting bankruptcy. The private debts of the fellahin should be settled also without delay by an arrangement to be made with the creditors by the Government; and I may say here that while I was recently in Egypt I ascertained from some of the leading money lenders that a composition would probably be accepted by them at from eight to ten millions, the total debts being valued by the same persons at about fifteen millions.

The future of the Suez Canal we have thoroughly discussed together, and it is Arabi's opinion, as it has long been mine, that the Canal is certain, sooner or later, to be internationalized. Arabi considers that it would be far better for Egypt that she should abandon as soon as possible all sovereign rights over it. The Isthmus of Suez, he says, is not necessary to Egypt, and the connection as long as it exists will form a pretext with Europe for intervention. If ceded to Europe this danger would cease, and Egypt might even claim a money indemnity for the rights yielded and so relieve herself of part of her financial difficulties.

Another important point on which the late national leader has distinct views is the Soudan question. Although he is of opinion that a certain connection will always be necessary between the lower and the upper waters of the Nile, he holds that in the present military and financial position of Egypt it is unwise to attempt the reconquest of all, or perhaps any of the lost provinces. He believes that the movement of the so-called Mahdi is not one merely of fanaticism, or that it is only a revolt of the slave dealers. He thinks that Mohamed Ahmed commands the goodwill of the inhabitants, and that it would be far wiser for the Egyptian Government to come to terms with him than to continue their military operations against him. The Soudan brings nothing into the Cairo treasury, and if Egypt is to enjoy liberty at home she should avoid ideas of conquest abroad. What terms

## Arabi's Programme

could be made with the Mahdi Arabi has been too long out of Egypt to judge; but from the communications which reached him while in power, he does not believe a friendly arrangement acknowledging Egypt's suzerainty to be impossible. The suzerainty of the ruler of Egypt the Soudanese would probably be glad to acknowledge, for it would protect them against European aggression.

Lastly, Arabi suggests the following as the most urgent matters requiring reform in his country:

"1. That a settlement should be made by the Government of the existing debts of the peasantry, accompanied with a return to the old laws affecting the mortgaging of land and the recovery of debt so that the peasantry shall be thenceforth protected against usury.

"2. That the mixed tribunals should be abolished.

"3. That there should be a reformed common law in Egypt for all who reside there, placing Europeans and Egyptians on an equal footing in civil and in criminal matters.

"4. That there should be security against arbitrary arrest and imprisonment (*habeas corpus*).

"5. That the village Shcykhs should be chosen by the villages, not appointed as now by the Mudirs.

"6. That the abuses connected with forced labour should be reformed.

"7. That education should be extended to girls as well as boys in Egypt.

"8. That domestic slavery should be completely abolished.

"9. That the position of officials in public offices should be made independent of ministerial caprice.

"10. That taxes should be made equal to all, foreigners alike with Egyptians.

"11. That a settlement should be made as soon as possible of the Moukabala claims."

Such are Arabi's ideas. I believe many of his reforms will be found identical with those contemplated by Sir Evelyn Baring, but I fear their realization will have to wait the advent of a more enlightened policy than any which now prevails at Cairo. As Arabi says, schemes of reform are of value only when in the hands of reformers, and there is no sign as yet in Egypt of any such being employed. Still, common sense will in the long run assert itself over political experiment, and there is an old proverb about the stone which the builders rejected, which may well in the present instance prove itself a true one, and I cannot help thinking that the day will come when the man who first pro-

## *Appendix E*

claimed Egyptian wrongs will be called upon to right them, and when Arabi, the first fellah who ever gloried in the name "Egyptian," will be brought back with something more than his old prestige to Egypt.

A rather severe attack of fever, from which I am hardly yet recovered, prevents me from continuing this train of thought. But I hope on a future occasion to renew it, and in the meanwhile I am sure that Arabi's friends may make themselves happy as to his present lot. He is not yet forty-five years of age, and can well afford to wait a while for the hour of his restoration, and till it comes he could hardly have a pleasanter home or a more secure abode than that which Providence and the humanity of the British public have chosen for him.

I am your obedient servant,

WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT.

### II. INTERVIEW WITH SHEYKH MOHAMMED ABDU, AS PUBLISHED IN THE "PALL MALL GAZETTE," AUGUST 17TH, 1884

Sheykh Mohammed Abdu is, we are inclined to believe, the first real Egyptian who has visited this country. We have had among us false Egyptians in plenty—Turks, Circassians, Syrians, Armenians, Jews—all claiming the nationality of the Nile; but a true son of the Ahl el Ful, "the Race of Beans," never. Sheykh Mohammed Abdu, however, is an undoubted fellah. He wears a blue gown and a white turban, talks neither French nor English nor even Turkish, but only his mother tongue, Arabic, and is without the least varnish of western manners. He is a man of middle height, dark-skinned, black-bearded, and keen-eyed, grave in his general demeanour, but possessed of a pleasant smile, and, when excited, speaking with much modest eloquence and cheerful vigour. His countenance is decidedly an agreeable one, and brimful of intelligence. His father was and is still a peasant of the Delta, cultivating forty acres of land at Mehallet Nasr, and laying no claim to nobility of birth other than that given by countless generations of peasant ownership on the same plot of ground. But the son is far more now than a peasant. Sent twenty years ago as a promising boy to Cairo, he received his education in the ancient religious seminary of El Azhar, and is now one of the most distinguished of its Ulema, or rather was, for, in common with the rest of the Liberal religious party in the university, he is in disgrace with the powers that be, and is now an exile both from it and from Egypt. Although by temperament a moderate man, he joined Arabi and the popular movement before the war, became one of

## *Mohammed Abdu interviewed*

its chief leaders, and was involved in its ruin; and after Tel-el-Kebir he was singled out by his eloquence no less than by his liberalism as a dangerous man, and having narrowly escaped hanging was glad to reach Syria with his head safe upon his shoulders, but condemned to three years' exile and its attendant penury. Now he is on his first visit to Europe, to see with his own eyes the country which has been the ruin of his own. These particulars our representative, who called two days since on the Sheykh at Mr. Wilfrid Blunt's house in James Street, learned from his lips, and being acquainted with Arabic he was able to hold with him the following conversation:

*Our Representative:* Without discussing past history, which we all admit to have contained fearful mistakes, what is your opinion of the present state of Egypt and of the policy now to be pursued?

*Sheykh Mohammed Abdu:* Since I have been in England all have asked me the same question. Every Englishman says he wishes Egypt well; but which of your statesmen has tried to prove his declarations? We Egyptians of the Liberal party believed once in English Liberalism and English sympathy; but we believe no longer, for facts are stronger than words. Your liberality we see plainly is only for yourselves, and your sympathy with us is that of the wolf for the lamb which he designs to eat. You have ruined everything that was good in us so that you may have an excuse for keeping possession of our country.

*O. R.:* Believe me, this is not true. It may appear to you so; but it is not so. Neither Mr. Gladstone, nor any of the Ministers, wish otherwise than to leave Egypt as soon and as absolutely as possible. No one wishes to annex your country.

*Sheykh:* If so, why not leave it at once? The only thing that the English Government has taught us is to be united in the wish to see you gone. Before the war and during the war we quarrelled with each other. We wished to break down the tyranny of our rulers; we complained of the Turks as foreigners; we wished to improve ourselves politically, and to advance as the nations of Europe have advanced in the path of liberty. Now we know that there are worse evils than despotism, and worse enemies than the Turks. We see in them our brothers in religion, if not in race; and if you would only leave us alone with them we should know how to get on in peace. There is no Mohammedan in Egypt so oppressed as to wish for any more of your help. We ask only one thing of you, and that is that you will leave us at once and for ever.

And Tewfik, do you include him in your forgiveness of the Turks?



## Appendix E

*Sheykh*: Tewfik Pasha did us a great wrong in bringing you into our country. He joined the enemies of his religion at the time of the war, and it is impossible he can command our respect. But if he should repent, and especially if he should get rid of you, we might yet forgive him. Only we desire no traitors with Egyptian faces and English hearts.

And the French? Our leaving Egypt now would surely mean that they would occupy your country in our place.

*Sheykh*: We do not think so. The French know that they could not gain our consent to their rule any more than you have gained it for your own. We should resist them, as we have resisted you. We want no foreign rulers from any country, and we know how to make all such rule impossible. The French could not in any case do us more harm than you have done.

And the Mahdi?

*Sheykh*: Mohammed Ahmed is only dangerous to Egypt through your presence there. Were you to leave Egypt he would neither wish to attack us nor would his doing so be any danger. At present he has the sympathy of the masses, because they see in him a deliverer from Christian aggression, and they will join him when he comes to them.

And when will this be?

*Sheykh*: The partisans of Mohammed Ahmed are already in the Said (Upper Egypt), but he will only himself advance when Khartoum is taken. Your Government are doing all they can to strengthen him.

How so?

*Sheykh*: By the treaty they have made with the King of Abyssinia. This has made every man a fanatic, for it is written in our traditions, and is known to all, that through the Abyssinians our Holy City, Mecca, will be one day attacked and destroyed. The people everywhere see in this a new danger to their religion. How can your statesmen have made an alliance with this barbarous people? How can they have added this new trouble to the rest?

But were not all the Soudan people fanatics already?

*Sheykh (laughing)*: The Soudani are no more fanatics than I am. When I taught philosophy at Cairo many of the Egyptian students were afraid to come to my lectures; but there were eighty-four students from the Soudan, and every one of them came. When, however, they are threatened with a foreign invasion they become fanatical, just as you would be if a Mohammedan army were in the streets of London.

And has this anything to do with the news of a rising in Arabia?

*Sheykh*: The news is true. We had been expecting it for a long

## *Mohammed Abdu interviewed*

while; and I do not doubt that your treaty with the Abyssinians has hastened it. When they are threatened, the Moslems take up arms. The people of Yemen are not fanatics more than the Soudani; but they love their liberty, as all the Arabs do.

And what ought we to do to allay the storm?

*Sheykh*: Cease to threaten us, and leave our country.

But what would become of the Christians in Egypt were our troops to leave? Would there not be new massacres?

*Sheykh*: There have been no massacres in Egypt except those caused by yourselves. The arrival of your fleet at Alexandria made the riots there begin. The landing of your troops brought on the riots at Tantah. There was no loss of Christian life until you came; nor will there be any when you go away. We have no quarrel with Christians as long as they abide by our laws and do not attempt to interfere with our Government.

There is then, you think, no obstacle to peace and prosperity in Egypt except our presence there? Would you not wish to see the National party restored before we go? Would you not like yourself to return to Egypt?

*Sheykh*: If I believed that your Government had any serious wish for our good I would propose a policy. But what is the use of my wasting words?

Speak, nevertheless. Whatever the Government may mean or wish, there are many in England who would see justice done to Egypt at any cost.

*Sheykh*: If England wanted to repair the wrong she has done us she would, as I have said, give us a first proof of her sincerity by ordering back her troops from Egypt. Next she would agree with the Powers of Europe and his Majesty the Sultan, with regard to a new ruler for us. It is not for me to say who this ruler should be. But whoever may be chosen, he should be some one not distasteful to the people and approved by the Sultan, and he should be named for a term of years, say seven or ten, at the end of which term the people should be allowed to elect their rulers finally for themselves. If he proved an honest man he might then retain office. But if dishonest, the people would have the comfort of thinking that he would not be there for ever, and so would take patience.

But how could we ascertain the wishes of the people? By what form of election?

*Sheykh*: Any new ruler now who should be a Moslem, and should come into office as the deliverer of Egypt from the English troops, would be loved by the Egyptians. Only he must be a Mohammedan, and, if possible, an Egyptian by birth. It is essential, however, that he should be content with limited power.

## Appendix E

What we want is not a new king, but a chief of our Egyptian nation, acting under the religious sovereignty of the caliphate. This kind of ruler the Egyptians understand, and they do not want a king.

And under such a ruler you and your fellow exiles could return to Egypt? What do you say about Arabi?

*Sheykh*: I should like to see his return. If he holds office Arabi's place is in the Council, which must always supplement and control the ruler of Egypt. He speaks well. His ideas are noble. He is an honest man. His influence would all be on the side of good. But he is too careless of details to be a good administrator or a good general. Let him return as President, if they choose him, of the Mejliss—that is his place.

And the Ministry? What our Government complains of is that they cannot get a working set of men to rule the country.

*Sheykh*: It is their fault if they have failed. Egypt is not wanting in honourable men, or men of capacity. But you insist on having those who will do your work; and no honest man in Egypt will work for the English Government. Again, you insist that they must rule your way and speak your language. The honest men generally do not speak English. They do not love English ways. Let us have a ruler we like, and we will all join to help him. We all want reform. We all want justice. We all want instruction. But there is an old proverb which says that "if the fish stinks at the head there is no freshness in the tail," and we want a ruler we can respect. Give us an honest chief for our nation, get him the sanction of our Sovereign the Sultan, and leave us to ourselves. With God's blessing we will have peace. We will even try to pay our debt.

But do all the Egyptians think as you do? I am inclined to believe that nine out of ten of the fellaheen would sooner have their taxes lessened by a Christian Government than raised by a Mohammedan.

*Sheykh*: Do not delude yourself. The fellaheen are overtaxed, but at the present moment they do not complain of their taxes. They think first of how to deliver their country from the stranger; and, if it were possible, they would willingly pay more to see this end accomplished. I know it, as I have correspondents everywhere in Egypt. You might abolish all taxation, and they would not bless you if at the same time you took it as an excuse to stay. No, no. Leave us now, and we will call on God to reward you as our benefactors. But do not attempt to do us any more good. Your good has done us too much harm already.

## APPENDIX F

### EXTRACTS FROM LADY ANNE BLUNT'S DIARY

*Dec. 8, 1882, Friday* [10, James Street].—General C. G. Gordon came to breakfast at 9. I am only sorry, now I have made his acquaintance, not to have known him sooner. He does not appear to be otherwise than in perfect possession of perfect common sense. So much has been said to imply his being "touched" in the head that I put this down as a very distinct impression. But he is a man of ideas and in a prominent position, and as such it is convenient to find his ideas utopian or "mad." He staid about two hours talking to Wilfrid—told us he believed the Government now "sincerely" (because it suits them) intend to carry out liberal policy—Chamber of Notables, etc.—in Egypt. Wilfrid replied that he would believe it when he saw that on the Budget question they act in such a manner, and he will judge them by what they settle about taxation. If they lighten the taxes of the fellahin it will be a proof of their sincerity. Nothing short of that will do, as the condition of the poor people is too desperate to be otherwise mended. General Gordon would not allow that any party in Egypt could really abolish slavery. It was in their nature to keep slaves—they could not change their nature. He does not, I think, quite know the state of feeling in the Mohammedan world or make allowance for the growth of a determination to reform on the part of those who, not having great possessions of slaves or anything else, will not be making great sacrifices in joining to suppress it.

He is going out to "Palestine," he says, next week. He must be being sent, though he did not say it, to inquire into the state of the Mussulman world there. Wilfrid promised to send the papers about the Sheykhs in Jerusalem to him (copies) and asked him to occupy himself with their case, which he said he would inquire into.

And so we parted. I hope we shall see him again.

*August 18, 1883* [London].—At 10 o'clock Colonel [D.H.] Stewart came to luncheon. He has become very official in his views, though not in his manners. He spoke of the hanging of the Bedouins at Tintah, and said that a friend of his who saw it remarked how easily they died; they had hardly to be touched by the rope before they were dead. There would be no fear of any Englishman being attacked in the desert, he thought, for a long time owing to the terror spread by these executions. He seemed surprised when

## Appendix F

I said on the contrary that anywhere in the Arabian desert it would be very unsafe in consequence. Wilfrid added, of course in the Sinai peninsula it would be safe—there it always was safe (the danger had been from the war). In the end Colonel Stewart exclaimed, "Ah, well, I see we shall never agree, I wish England to be successful, justly if possible, and unjustly if it cannot be justly." He went away at 3.

Sept. 30 [Cairo].—List of persons arrested in connection with the pretended "Société des Vengeurs":

Huseyn Bey Fehmy	Huseyn Eff. Sagr
Mustafa Bey Sidky	Saad Eff. Zaghloul
Abd el Razak Bey	Mustafa Eff. Nashaat
Abd el Rahman Bey Hoja	Mahmud Eff. Soudani
Mohammed Bey Fenni	Mohammed Bey Tahir
Ali Bey Fauzi	Osman Bey (his son)
Sheykh Ahmed Nur	Ahmed Eff. Rashaat
Mohammed Bey Shami	Mohammed Said (the French doctor)
also one Iskander and five servants.	

Sept. 30.—Suleyman's account of Yusuf Abu Diab's death; Yusuf was a great friend of his (Suleyman's), and of Abd el Aal whose A.D.C. he was, a very good fellow, and all that had been said against him was false. On the day of the Tantah massacre Yusuf abu Diab arrived from Damietta at 4 of the day. The massacre had begun at 1 of the day and was still going on, for it lasted twelve hours or more. At the station on getting out of the train Yusuf saw a poor Christian woman from Alexandria whom the people were about to kill. Yusuf saved her and taking her by the hand conducted her to the Governorat, to the Mudir Ibrahim Adhem, who was sitting in his room. Yusuf placed her in the Mudir's charge, and afterwards reproached the Mudir for sitting still there while the massacre was going on. He said, "You are Mudir and all the troops and police are under your orders. You must take soldiers and go out and stop this. I shall inform Arabi Pasha of what you have allowed to happen." He took the next train and went to inform Arabi. A few days after, Ali Pasha Fehmi was sent to Tantah to arrest the Mudir and bring him to Cairo where he was imprisoned in the Kasr en Nil for a few days and then sent to his house and ordered to remain there.

After the war Suleyman (the narrator) was for a month in prison with Yusuf. He had been arrested with Abd el Aal saying, "If you are to die I will die with you," and he was with Abd el Aal in prison at Cairo. In the meantime Ibrahim Adhem was reinstated by Tewfik at Tantah, and hearing Yusuf was in prison at Cairo he had him sent for to be tried before the Commission of

## *Extracts from Lady Blunt's Diary*

Inquiry at Tantah. On his arrival Ibrahim came to visit Yusuf. Suliman was present in the courtyard of the prison. Ibrahim Adhem took Abu Diab by the moustache and said, "The day of the massacre here you came and brought a *Nasranieh* to me; you abused me and you said you would inform Arabi Pasha. Was it you who did this?" "It was I." "*Inshallah*, you shall not come out of this but to be hanged." This was just outside the room in the courtyard. Ibrahim Adhem then brought half-a-dozen men, Copts and Muslims, from the station and Abd er Rahman the zabib of Tantah, and said to them, "You will go before the *Mejliss Tahkik*, and say that on the day of the massacre I saw Yusuf abu Diab saying to the people, "Kill the Christians," and also that he often told Arabi Pasha that he ought to "kill Tewfik or let me do so," but he was not willing. A certain Mahriz Bey of Alexandria also bore witness against him falsely; these men swore through fear. The Commission sent Yusuf back to the Court Martial at Cairo with the *procès-verbal*, and the Court-Martial sentenced him to be hanged. Three days later he was sent to Tantah and executed. He was brave. Suleyman remained with him to the end. His last words to the people standing round him were "O my brothers, I suffer injustice. But God grant you may not see a day the like of this again and that I may be the last of those unjustly condemned." Then Ibrahim Adhem came up and said, "O Yusuf Effendi, forgive me." And Yusuf answered, "I do not forgive with my tongue, for if I should forgive with my tongue my heart would not forgive, and if my heart should forgive my children here would not forgive, and if my children should forgive, our Lord (God) would not forgive, for you are the cause of my being unjustly destroyed." Then he said, "Give me some water." And they gave it him and he drank a few mouthfuls and said, "Put the rope on me."

## APPENDIX G

### LETTERS TO MR. BLUNT ALLUDED TO IN, AND EXEMPLIFYING, THE TEXT

#### I. FROM SIR WILLIAM AND LADY GREGORY (EXTRACTS)

(*From Lady Gregory.*)

Coole, *Sep.* 20, 1883 (received in Egypt). I am very glad you will stay in Egypt, even long enough to let in a little ray of light on what is going on. Moberly Bell is really excelling himself just now. I don't know if you have missed his accounts of the triumphal progress of the "amiable and virtuous" (Tewfik). I am delighted at it, because, as I wrote to Chenery, no one can say it is necessary to keep troops in the country to keep up so popular a ruler! The account of the prisons also would have been entertaining if they were not revolting—so many poor wretches kept there for months and years, and then the door is opened and they are shut up again, after having been allowed to kiss Moberly's boots! I am afraid Clifford Lloyd, the new "Adviser," won't be an acquisition. I don't know him, but by all accounts he is ambitious, pretentious, and autocratic. He kept the country quiet here by driving the whole population of a town into prison, on suspicion, and his photograph reminds me of Colvin. There is not much to say of Ireland, for there is a strange lull in the agitation of the last few years. The people for the moment are busy with the harvest, and I fancy Parnell is trying to keep things as quiet as possible until the next session, when Gladstone has, I believe, promised him a very large measure of Home Rule, much more than his colleagues approve of . . . I hope Arabi's election will take place, so that we may put M.P. after his name in future. I hope they will think also of electing you, and that you will become the Randolph of debate in the Cairo House of Commons. What a farce the whole thing is! It will be as before. The wretched Notables will be left alone until they speak of the Budget, and then will be gagged.

*Oct.* 4. Sir William writes to me from London that you are credited with having gone to India with the intention of overturning English supremacy and establishing Mohammedan rule and rapine throughout the Peninsula. So I think you have still a chance of Tower Hill! Kinglake especially has been lamenting over you.

## *Letters to Mr. Blunt*

*Oct. 17.* Thank you for your letter from Suez. It gave me great pleasure to hear of the success of your visit (to Cairo), for I call it a success having seen so many of your friends, and learned that the Khedive's state is so hopeless. I was pretty sure Baring would not do much for you; he has only just begun, and has not yet realized the difficulty of his position, and I am sure the Government here are trusting to him now as their last hope of helping them out of their mess, and won't take any new line till he fails. I am glad the poem ("The Wind and the Whirlwind") is to be published. It will make a more lasting impression than any prose could do, and ever since it was written I have felt it was pure waste of steam power keeping it shut up. Sir William is very much struck with it, and I feel it must convert the world. If this should reach you in Ceylon do homage to Arabi for me.

*Nov. 13.* I see Moberly Bell takes Gladstone's announcement of the withdrawal of the troops calmly, as they will be quite as effective at Alexandria, and easy to bring back at a moment's notice. None the less, I shall be glad when they are out of Cairo. I hate the idea of ever seeing them there, and perhaps the Khedive may think they are really going to let him be his own master, and commit some atrocity which Gladstone will have to notice, and which will give England an excuse to let him topple over.

*December 18.* Your letter in the "Times" (from Colombo) appeared the same day I heard from you. Sir William tells me to say how extremely good he thinks it. The time has nearly come when you will be appealed to, the mess is so great, and the bankruptcy of the country seems within measurable distance, and, indeed, is the first thing to hope for, and every one is so much at sea about the Soudan, and all the philanthropists will be down on the Government for allowing Zebehr, the king of the slave-dealers banished by Gordon, to be sent back at the head of an army. It will be just the thing for those benevolent beings—Randolph and Labouchere—to take up.

*Jan. 10, 1884.* I saw in the "Times" that you had arrived and been warmly received at Calcutta. I wonder how Colvin received you. I think the time has come when you are wanted in Egypt. Dicey goes there to-day, a fellow passenger of Sir William's (on his way to Ceylon), evidently to help to form the Nubar-Dicey Ministry, which I have always looked forward to as the last possible combination before Arabi's return. I am glad old Sherif has gone. We shan't hear much more of his enlightened policy! If you could find any Nationalists in Egypt who would dare to lift up their voice and call for Arabi's return, I believe the English Radicals would take up the cry. Both Labouchere and Randolph



## Appendix G

are speaking out like men, but they must have some support from Egypt. Sir William sails to-day for Colombo. He writes from London that Hayward is very ill, shut up in his room and hardly expected to recover. Kinglake says of him: "He is too weak to hold his cards at whist, but not too weak to d—— his partner." I am sorry Chinese Gordon goes to the Congo instead of the Nile.

*August 1.* Many thanks for the printed correspondence, which is full of interest. I have been looking over your letters to me of last year, and have copied the only passage relating to Mr. Hamilton or Knowles, which I enclose. I would lay as little stress as possible on the encouragement you had from Downing Street, as the G.O.M. is capable of denying everything, and as much as possible on the incontrovertible fact of your threatened arrest. I hope the debate will come on soon. I was sure Mohammed Abdu would create a good impression, between his graceful dress and his graceful manner, which recalled Arabi's. Mind you cultivate Parnell, now you have broken the ice. He will be a great power in the next Parliament, and his support will be worth a good deal.

(Extract enclosed.) "*Sep. 3, 1883.* Both Knowles and Button encourage me to try the elections, and say that Baring is sure to be delighted to see me, and will perhaps help. It appears he has *carte blanche* to make another new policy for the Government, and as he is one of Lord Ripon's strongest supporters in India, it is supposed that he will favour Arabi's return, or, at any rate, the restoration of a National Party in some form or other."

(Second extract enclosed) *Sep. 21.* "Everything up to the moment has gone most prosperously. The morning we left I got a note from Mr. Hamilton asking to see me before I went, and I accordingly went, after nearly a year's absence to Downing Street, and found him very amiable. I told him exactly what I was going to do, and he approved and said he was sure Baring would be very pleased to see me, and that he would write to Lord Ripon's private secretary to do all he could for me in India.\* About Egypt I told him I should try and get Baring to restore the National Party, but unless he would help me it was quite useless my trying, and I should not stay in Egypt. So I shall know as soon as I get to Cairo whether it is possible or not. I am certain Gladstone wants to restore, but wants to have his hand forced by a manifestation of popular desire in Egypt."

(From Sir William Gregory.)

Coole, *Aug. 24, 1844.* I have read with great interest Mohammed Abdu's replies to his interviewer. They are very valuable,

## *Letters to Mr. Blunt*

and would be ten times more so if anything could pierce the crust of our English stupidity and self-complacency. But we have made up our minds that the Egyptians whom we have been bombarding and slaughtering ought to love us, and that if they don't it is their perversity, which only time and subjection can remove. I shall be at Dalmeny on the 27th, and I daresay Gladstone will speak to me about Egypt, but he has made up his mind about it, that all the troubles of Egypt are due to military mutineers of whom Arabi was the instigator; that Tewfik is a virtuous and enlightened young prince to whom the honour of England is pledged, and that to secure him as Khedive the exile of Arabi and his friends must be maintained. You know how intolerant he is of a difference of opinion. So I daresay he will not allow me even to make an observation from a different point of view. I do not see how Arabi is to return, but I am of opinion, were he permitted to do so, it would be possible to establish a fairly decent Government in Egypt, a far better one than ours has been, and which would, at all events, suit the governed.

*(From Sir William Gregory.)*

Coole, Oct. 5. Your second Indian article (on Race Hatred) is admirable, and I fear too true. I had no idea things were as bad as you describe, and I much fear there is little hope of improvement. The only chance is the personal character of the Viceroy and publicity. I wish our newspapers would take up the subject. The English second and third-class women are, as you say, the worst offenders. They are generally below their husbands, who are elevated by education and responsibility, and make themselves odious by their vulgarities and pretensions. The treatment of natives in Ceylon is very different. There the civil servants are generally very courteous and friendly with them, and there is no doubt that a most kindly feeling subsists between the races. It is not so, however, universally; in Colombo and Kandy the planters and merchants' clerks give themselves most offensive airs to natives, but in the purely native districts the relations are excellent. I hear from Indians that the contrast is remarkable, like going into another hemisphere. Still things are not as they ought to be. A young man of high native family constantly goes to Oxford and Cambridge, and is there received as a friend and an equal, is asked to all parties, and shares in all amusements. When he returns to Ceylon he is not tabooed, it is true, but he knows he is looked down upon as an inferior by merchants' clerks and planters, probably sons of pastrycooks and ladies' maids. This I always endeavoured to combat, and Sir Arthur Gordon is

## Appendix G

doing the same. Mere civility and want of rudeness is not enough. A native gentleman should be made to feel that you regard him as your equal, in short, as an Englishman. He thoroughly understands and resents condescending civility. I am going to write to Dufferin, and to recommend your article to him.

The chances for Arabi and his friends are not encouraging. I should like to see National bankruptcy proclaimed as an answer to French threats.

(From Lady Gregory.)

Coole, *March 29, 1885*.—I wish a better fight could have been made on the Egyptian Convention. My only hope for Egypt now is in the Mahdi. Osman Digna seems to be profiting by all the good advice the "Times" has been giving him as to the best mode of fighting.

*April 14*. We came here a little too soon and the landscape looked as hard and dry as a Hobbema, but it is now as soft and mysterious as a Corot. We spent last week in Dublin to manifest our loyalty. The Royal visit has been so far a "great success"—that is to say, the "foreign invaders" and also Lord Spencer were cheered through the streets all through Dublin. Whether that means much I can't say; it is an excitable population and I saw a man who walked through the cleared space carrying two large band boxes cheered as much as anyone, "St. Patrick's Day," when played at the laying of a foundation stone, was cheered more than all; but the Prince was equal to the occasion and waved his hat as if it was meant for him. The Princess looked very pretty and not more than five-and-twenty at the ball in her white dress and diamonds. The ball the prettiest sight I ever saw. . . . I feel as if I had seen a crystallization of the pomps and vanities of the wicked world. Enough of that for a long time.

As an antidote I spent to-day in visiting some of our own poor people. It is the best part of living in Ireland that they are always bright and amusing and intelligent and witty. One old woman asked me to come and see an old man. "He was a real gentleman," she said, "if I asked him for five or seven shillings he never said, 'I haven't it,' and if he went out to cut his corn he never raised his back till the sun went down." She also told me, "If I had a little pig, I'd be in Heaven." Another, I hope meaning a compliment, said she had at first sight taken me for the priest's sister and was going to say, "How's Father Con-sidine?" Then, when she recognized me, "Aren't we happy to have such a plain lady?" You will be tired of Ireland if I write any more.

## *Letters to Mr. Blunt*

*May 5.*—What a terrible indictment your letter is against the Government, and how well deserved! Sir William desires me to say he goes with you in every word of it, which he does not always do. How ignominiously the whole affair is ending! It's a comfort to think Wolseley won't have a triumphal procession down Piccadilly this time. I am very anxious to know what Randolph advises you and what you make up your mind to about Parliament. I believe you would get in as a Tory Democrat easily enough. You could hit hard enough at the Government to please an English mob which enjoys hard-hitting as a substitute for prize fights. The only good thing that has reached me about the Prince's visit is that one spectator at his entry was heard to say to his neighbours, "I see a good many Radical hats in the crowd." "I suppose," said the other, "a Radical hat is a hat without a crown."

*May 15.* Very many thanks for the sonnets and your long letter. I knew you would be jubilant at the retreat and guessed you had been working for it. What pleases me most is thinking of Lord Wolseley having to eat his speech about the "hundred years," and also to think what a "cheer-up" this ignominious campaign must be to Arabi in Ceylon. It was delightful your sending the sonnets to Gladstone.

*June (?)*. I suppose any change must be good (alluding to the change of Government), and yet I don't think the G. O. M. has been sufficiently punished for his evil deeds. I hope Randolph will hold to his present principles, as far as the East is concerned, but the politician in and out of power is generally as different as the patient Turkish peasant and the tyrannical Turkish Pasha. As for you, you will never be able to support any Government, but will always be in opposition.

*June 19.* Randolph for India! I can think of nothing else; it amuses me so much the idea of Colvin's face when he hears it, and Lord Dufferin taking his orders from him, and Lord Reay, who went out in the strength of Gladstone's name. Will he be able to do any good, I wonder? One must never expect too much of people in office. Was it not delightful Arabi being cheered at St. James's Hall? It is rather hard being so far away from all the excitement.

*July 21.* I thought I recognized B.'s hand in the account of Wolseley's reception. What a parade would have been made if he had brought Gordon back! Lord Wolseley and Baring have told a friend of mine that they look on Drummond-Wolff's appointment as disastrous for Egypt, which makes me hopeful, as do the letters (in the "Times") of the "Twenty years Resident in Egypt," in which one finds the flavour of Moberly Bell—"only the old sea-serpent done up again."

## Appendix G

*August 14.* I think you ought to write a sonnet on the Mahdī's death. The central idea about him to me is that he is the only man of the nineteenth century who is known by his deeds and not at all by his words. I wrote some lines myself, with which I herewith present you, but not expecting compliments.

### SONNET ON THE MAHDI'S DEATH

The Guide of Islam, silent, strong, world-known,  
Looked for peace won through battle's bloody fame,  
His brave, rash adversary now o'erthrown  
Who blindly in the tyrant's livery came.  
His ally, his foe's enemy, the Sun  
Had struck as if in scorn the parting host,  
The task that made a nation almost done,  
A people freed but at most cruel cost.  
But hardly had he viewed the promised land  
When blasting sickness came and struck him low,  
And a scared face was his and failing hand  
Who was so mighty but an hour ago,  
And a hushed army round the dim tent stood  
Wherein their Chief gave up his sword to God.

Write the sonnet yourself and use my last two lines, which I confess to thinking good, and publish it in your name. I have a feeling that something ought to be done to dignify the Mahdī's memory, such efforts have been made to vulgarize it.

### II. FROM SIR ALFRED LYALL

Nainee Tal, *May 21st*, 1883.

MY DEAR BLUNT,

I must send a reply to your letter from Knebworth, though people in England do not usually set much store by letters from India, which is beyond the civilized world. What I want to say is that I am very glad you are coming out to India to study the country—this time; and that I much hope you will pay me a visit. I have some rather extensive knowledge of Upper India, and of the leading natives, so that I may be able to put you in the way of seeing things as they are. In regard to the very curious point mentioned in your letter, why Rajputs are (to use the technical words) exogamous and Arabs endogamous, I can't offer an explanation; save only by saying that Islam overrides and sweeps away all the obsolete prejudices of blood or caste that are at the bottom of exogamy. Read McLennan, Morgan, and Maine—but

## *Letters to Mr. Blunt*

none of them will tell you exactly whence comes the idea lying at the root of the term "incest," *i.e.*, the offence of marrying within certain prohibited degrees.

When you come out we will talk of Local Self-Government and the native magistrates' jurisdiction over Europeans. I am myself a consistent liberal in these matters: I think, with you, that our best chance of consolidating an Anglo-Indian empire out here lies in abolishing privileges and bringing forward the leading natives to political equality with ourselves. But we have been going so long on the other tack that the operation of changing our course has to be managed with a steady hand, and not too suddenly. Now there has been a lack of political seamanship in high quarters; and the vessel has got broadside to the wind, and has shipped a sea or two; I think we shall get right soon, and I hope we shall not alter our policy. But it must be always remembered that the whole business of governing India is an experiment on a very large scale. I always maintain that it has not been attempted, on this scale, since the days of the Romans; and no one can yet decide whether the policy of taking the natives into our confidence, or of keeping them out of all real power, is the better for the *English*. For myself, having to choose between two risks, I would select the risk of letting in the native; though if we do this in a hurry we may spoil everything, and provoke confusion, with a sanguinary reaction—just as things went too fast and led to a premature crisis in Egypt.

Sincerely yours,  
A. C. LYALL.

Camp, *January 16th, 1884.*

MY DEAR BLUNT,

The foolish and violent article about you in the "Pioneer" of this morning moves one's indignation for more reasons than one. These attacks all emanate, to my knowledge, from Calcutta.

I have hitherto written nothing whatever to officials in these provinces regarding your movements, as I believed you would prefer this. But I shall now send word to Allygarh, and to the Commissioner of Rohilcund, who is in political charge of Ranpore, that it would be a total mistake to suppose that in these provinces the Government takes any sinister view of your proceedings. I am taking every opportunity of declaring that I know you to have no intention whatever of propagating or encouraging disloyalty.

I hope you will keep me informed of your fortunes.

Very sincerely yours,  
A. C. LYALL.

## *Appendix G*

Lieut.-Governor's Camp, N.W. Provinces,  
*November 8th, 1884.*

MY DEAR BLUNT,

I am certainly doing what is possible on my part, to aid Amir Hassan's University project; but I fear he is beginning to discover sundry difficulties, especially in the way of lukewarmness and jealousies among his co-religionists. For myself, I am glad to assist any measure that may tend to uplift the heads of the Mohammedans of these parts. I am not at all afraid politically of Islam in India; if they were at any time disposed to make themselves troublesome, they would have to take the Hindus into very serious account. I mention this because people are inclined to have fits of vague panic about the Mussulmans. If the Russians ever find it worth while to make a strong demonstration against India, they would make a mistake in letting loose the Affghans upon us, for that would throw into our hands all the fighting power and enthusiasm of the Hindus. But I doubt the Affghans being so shortsighted as to help the Russians across the Indus, as the subjugation of Affghanistan would be the inevitable result of Russian success. The "St. James's Gazette" makes a great cry over Macgregor's "confidential" memorandum, which seems to have been very freely circulated. I totally dissent from the notion that we are on the brink of some great catastrophe; though it is certain that our army is far too weak, and that we could not enter upon a campaign against a European invader. These military chiefs know little or nothing of the real state and temper of the Indian people, or of the elements of internal trouble with which we have to deal. And the articles in the "Times" upon the armies of Native States are written upon second-rate information, and are likely to be very mischievous if they have influence in high quarters.

So much of Indian politics. I took no personal offence whatever at your articles in the "Fortnightly." They are not intended to be pleasant to the Anglo-Indian official; and I may perhaps venture to say that here and there they are unnecessarily unpleasant. But I do not conceal my opinion, in discussing them out here, that there is truth in much of what you say, though to my mind the paper on race hatred is rather overstrained, and wants the strength of moderation. I wish you had given your readers some momentary glimpse of the other side of the shield. Nevertheless you have, as I tell the folk here, given us much that is salutary criticism, and there is no doubt that we Anglo-Indians are often a rough unpicturesque development of the contact between East and West; some of us finding ourselves rather too suddenly placed in unfamiliar situations, and having emerged un-

## *Letters to Mr. Blunt*

expectedly into the fierce light that beats upon office. On the other side, the Indians themselves do see both sides of the shield, and do not object to abate much in the matter of high politeness, in consideration of a strong and intelligent sort of administration, impartial among jarring races and creeds. They are themselves not yet ready to supply this kind of government, and they know its value. Also they know, much better than most English, what a bad government, by exceedingly courteous Asiatics, means. Moulvi Sami-ullah is just back from Egypt. I can see that he is considerably impressed by the badness of administrative institutions in Egypt; is rather inclined to ridicule them. As for such very discreditable incidents as that of Patna, they *must* occur now and then until the natives themselves pluck up courage to hit back or otherwise violently resent any personal insult. Laws and magistrates can do much, but can never protect a whole people that does not stand up for itself. Our magistrates are very fairly impartial between the two races in Court; and the people are rather too fond of airing their grievances in a helpless manner.

However, Lord Ripon has done a good deal towards stirring up the natives to a sense of independence and a desire to look after themselves—they now begin to see that if they will only come forward the English nation will meet them half way. Lord Dufferin has but to let the heaven work, and not to give countenance to a reaction.

In Egypt I can anticipate nothing but complications. I cannot see how we can possibly stand balancing as we do at present, keeping everything in suspense, without some final stumble; and yet it is becoming too late to withdraw. Probably our abandonment of the Soudan (which I think is necessary) will heighten the comparison and accelerate some crisis—the Soudan is just the country that entangles the forces of a civilized State, and where expeditions are as water poured into the sand.

Yours sincerely,  
A. C. LYALL.

Lieut.-Governor's Camp, North-West Provinces, India.

*February 23rd, 1885.*

MY DEAR BLUNT,

I am very sorry that my prediction as to the Soudan, quoted in your letter to me of Jan. 23rd, seems likely to be verified, as well as many predictions made by you. Never was such a demented policy followed so blindly to inevitable failure and disrepute, in open disregard of all the warnings of our Oriental experience, as that we see still being pursued in Egypt. However, I find, to my



## Appendix G

great relief, that the *contre coup* of our Egyptian blunders is not much felt in India, where they are mostly indifferent to the Mahdi and to our proceedings generally, though of course there is much talk of our unlucky adventures in that country. The Mahomedan generally is mainly interested in the Sultan; and Upper India keeps its eyes fixed on Afghanistan and on Russia's doings in Central Asia.

I have just read your "Fortnightly" article on Hyderabad affairs, which article will, you fear, entirely finish Lord Lytton's regard for you. I think, on the contrary, that he ought to be very much obliged to you; for instead of laying upon the Viceroy the whole burden of your displeasure at Salar Jung's treatment in 1876-77-78, you have discharged all your wrath upon that anonymous bureau that you call the Calcutta Foreign Office. Not Lord Lytton, it appears, but poor little Tommy Thornton, who acted as Foreign Secretary at that time, and whom Lord Lytton treated with scant ceremony, was the author of the policy of curbing Salar Jung. I observe that throughout your paper you denounce and convict of the highest crimes the Calcutta Foreign Office, and that the Viceroys and Governor-Generals are represented as sinning mainly by inadvertence. This peculiar tactic was introduced by the "Statesman" newspaper, and is intelligible in a journal that selects an antagonist who cannot hit back when attacked; for of course the Foreign Office, being impersonal and bound to secrecy, is dumb. I tried to induce Lord Ripon to let me roll over the "Statesman" when it once libelled me directly, but he wouldn't let me use confidential papers. I should hardly have expected, however, that so fearless and honourable an adversary as yourself would have adopted the same method.

I suppose I ought not to see anything comic in being accused of being "even more absolutely without moral scruple than" an English Foreign Secretary, or in reading that the history of the doings of the Calcutta Foreign Office, with which I was long connected about the time of which you are treating, is one of the most scandalous in diplomatic annals; that the Calcutta Foreign Office deliberately encouraged the Nizam in vice and dissipation in order to retain power in his state; and, finally, that it is indirectly responsible for Salar Jung being poisoned; but the situation is so novel that its ridiculous side most moves me. It seems clear to me that you are *not* behind the scenes, or you would see the thing in the same comic light; for it is quite in my power to prove that all these wild accusations against gentlemen who are just like yourself in honour and integrity, are unfounded and erroneous. You must not reply that you are attacking a system, or a department, not individuals; the policy of the Indian Foreign Office is dis-

## *Letters to Mr. Blunt*

strictly directed by the individuals, the Viceroy and his Foreign Secretary, from time to time in office. And when you write that the policy of the Calcutta Foreign Office is one of organized aggression with a view to annexation—a policy carried on, you imply, in despite of well-meaning Governors-General—you are not only wrong, but the reverse is far nearer the truth. Take the instance of Beiar, it is demonstrable by published papers that the attempt to annex and the whole policy of seizure was entirely Lord Dalhousie's own. With Lord Dalhousie's departure the whole process of annexation (except for rebellion) ceased some thirty years ago; his annexations were rather opposed than supported by the local officials: and I challenge you to bring an instance in which the Calcutta Foreign Office has since advocated Indian annexations. In regard to the assertion for which, to my amazement, you vouch on your personal testimony, that the Calcutta Foreign Office is responsible for attempts made to corrupt the Nizam's youth, I am quite sure you could not prove it, for I know I could prove the contrary.

I hope you will ponder these words, and consider whether such very serious charges ought to be made, except when you are face to face with men who can answer, or except when you actually produce, as you do nowhere in your article, the evidence on which you rely.

Lord R. Churchill stayed with me two days. I liked him much: he seemed reasonable and moderate, and open-minded upon all Indian questions. India is moving forward very fast—whither, the gods alone know; or perhaps the gods are moving forward themselves too fast to have much time for speculation on anything but their own future. The Russian scare acts as a drag upon Indian radicalism; the advanced party does not want to let in Russia, and is beginning to perceive that only the English can keep her out long.

I am yours sincerely,  
A. C. LYALL.

Lieut.-Governor's Camp, N.W. Provinces, India.

*May 4th, 1885.*

MY DEAR BLUNT,

I was very glad to see from your letter of March 25th, that you are quite ready to exchange explanations upon the disputable points in your article to which our correspondence refers. I will not go farther into the entangled questions of Hyderabad politics, except to say that I am prepared, if necessary, absolutely to prove all that I have averred. For example, I will prove that I, as

## Appendix G

Foreign Secretary, wrote letters insisting that greater care should be taken of the young Nizam's training and education, and that I pressed the point orally and by writing much more closely than Sir Salar Jung quite liked. Also I can prove, undeniably, that at my instance the Government of India proposed to bring to an issue the "Statesman" attacks upon Sir R. Meade by authorising, indeed ordering, Sir R. Meade to prosecute the "Statesman" in London. It was the *India Office* which refused to allow the prosecution; the Calcutta Foreign Office and Meade were quite ready and resolute. But I cannot quote documents, much less publish them, without the consent of the Foreign Office and the India Office, so I cannot answer public attacks.

As you write in such friendly strain you will perhaps excuse me for expressing regret that the force and benefit of your articles on Indian affairs should be so much diminished (as they really are) by incautious use of unverified information. I have nothing whatever to say against the position you take up as an advanced Liberal and a Reformer in Indian politics, though I may not agree with all your views, or as to ways, means, and opportunities of reform: but it seems to me that your ends would be more likely to be met if you assumed a more impartial attitude. You will never persuade the English nation that Anglo-Indian officials are all fools or knaves. You were quite right to quote my letter in writing to the India Office. I intended it as a manifesto on your side, but I should guess you could afford to pass by Lepel Griffin. He is down on his luck just now, having lost the Foreign Secretaryship, and having been excluded from Raoulpindi Durbar, and he is consequently very sore indeed after such a tumble. I am inclined to be sorry for him as he is an able fellow in his way; but never did man more completely write himself down. He has a vaunting and exaggerated style that irritates people generally, and alarms the cautious officials in high places. His letter in the "Times" (early in April) for instance, about his having been intimately acquainted with one hundred ruling princes of India, is absurd grandiloquence; he only knows half a dozen worth mention politically.

It is hardly worth while that I should write to you about the present state of Indian feeling; for I fear you agree with Lord R. Churchill's dictum that the English official knows less than nothing about what the natives think. Nevertheless, I may say that to me the Indian people at large appears to have come out wonderfully well during the critical suspense we have been going through as to war or peace with Russia. If war came, I believe we should have the country well behind us, and supporting us against the Russians, and I have little fear of internal tumults or disorders

## Letters to Mr. Blunt

so long as we hold our own beyond or on the North-West frontier. The Russians are, I think, entirely mistaken in their notion that they could stir up any trouble against us in India, where, on the contrary, they have a very bad reputation; and I fancy the natives do not worry themselves so much as you imagine about our bureaucratic manners and blunders, so long as they feel they have a strong and honest government to keep the peace and keep out invaders. This is not, of course, the view of the advanced Liberal native, who naturally wants to rise, but the great Conservative propertied classes have this feeling just now.

I thought war was coming. Russia gave us a fair challenge by seizing Panjdeh; but now I suspect that Gladstone is only easing us down, and had never any intention of incurring more blood-guiltiness. His foreign policy has been most unlucky. He evidently has no head for this part of government, and his dealings with the Soudan have been lamentable. Apparently he will fulfil your prediction that "it will end by their absconding without making any arrangements at all."

I wish you would stand for a good Radical constituency and join John Morley. I believe you are at heart much nearer the extreme left than the extreme right; and you could arrange to say nothing about the game laws until you had saved your common country, abolished the Foreign Office and the Indian Council, and given India a dozen provincial parliaments. Sincerely yours,

A. C. LYALL.

### III. LIEUT.-GENERAL GLOAG TO MR. BLUNT

2, Tanfield Court, Inner Temple, E.C.

August 19th, 1886.

DEAR SIR,

I read your letter in the "Times" of yesterday with great satisfaction, on the subject of Burmah. As I have been all over that country, I know a great deal about it, and will not fail from time to time, as heretofore, to do my best to expose those who have befooled Lord Dufferin.

1. Inquiry must be held into the real causes of the Annexation.
2. I long ago pointed out that Young Thibô, reputed son of the late King Mengdom Meng, was neither a drunkard nor a debauchee, nor yet cruel. Sir Grant Duff can tell now what he is, as he has had him in charge.
3. An inquiry must be held into the method of making the Contracts entered into by Mengdom Meng with the Bombay Burmah Trading Company *in re* the Teak Forests; and maps and plans of

## Appendix G

the forests furnished, as also the number of trees cut down, and the number of young trees planted.

4. A general inquiry into the conditions of trade in force between us and the late Mengdom Meng, for the present King Thibô is a mere youth, crassly ignorant of most things.

I fully anticipate that independent members will take the question up in the House, and you should do your utmost to help them as I also will do. I wrote long ago (1878) that annexation was wrong commercially and morally, as well as quite unnecessary. A strong Resident, well supported, with a well-appointed establishment should have been located at Mandalay in 1879 when Mengdom Meng died, the slave question for ever settled, and order made to prevail, and the laws remodelled and respected—quietly; if not, under gentle but strong means. I shall be glad to see you continuing along the paths of reason, truth, honesty and justice in this matter.

Yours sincerely,

A. K. GLOAG, Lieut.-General, late Comr. R.A. in British Burmah.

National Liberal Club, *August 25th*, 1886.

\* \* \* \* \*

The whole affair has been a monstrous wicked thing *ab initio*. I did write to the "Times," but probably my letters were more truthful than they would have been agreeable to the mercantile bodies at Calcutta and Rangoon who I believe have been in the main the sole cause of our policy in Burmah. Yours truly,

A. K. GLOAG.

# INDEX

*For the convenience of readers the public position of each principal person here named is given with a biography in brief.*

**AARIF, MOHAMMED BEY,**  
326, 330, 332, 333, 334,  
339.

Abbas, Khedive, the present,  
proposal of appointing him  
still a minor with a Regency,  
6, 8, 15, Appendix B.

Abbasi, Sheykh Mohammed el,  
Sheykh-el-Islam at Cairo, 70.

Abd-el-Aal Pasha, fellah Colonel,  
exiled with Arabi, 21, 68, 69,  
276, 323, Appendix F.

Abd-el-Kader Pasha, Governor  
of the Soudan in 1882, reason  
of his refusing to return there  
in 1884, Appendix A. *Also*  
15, 16, 77, 81, 170, 171, 189,  
208.

Abd-el-Mutaleb, Sherif of Mecca,  
333.

Abd-el-Rahman, Amir of Afghan-  
istan, 264, 396, 397, 409, 444,  
466.

Abd-el-Rasul, of Cashmere, 494,  
500.

Abd-el-Razak Bey, F.R.G.S., ex-  
• director of Naval College, im-  
prisoned at Cairo in 1883, 70,  
71, Appendix F.

Abdallah-el-Taishi, the Khalifa,  
successor to the Mahdi, 505.

Abdallah Ibn Saoud, Nejdi,  
living at Constantinople, 327.

Abdu, Sheykh Mohammed, re-  
ligious reformer, afterwards  
Egyptian Grand Mufti, living  
in exile at Paris in 1884, 208,  
284, 286; in England in 1884,

270; interviewed for "Pall  
Mall Gazette," 277, Appen-  
dix E; author's correspondence  
with, 219, 277, 279, 284, 286,  
Appendix B; at the House  
of Commons, 272; his talk  
with Labouchere and Lawson,  
273; with Churchill, 274. *Also*  
66, 71, 98, 207, 208, 215, 219,  
224, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274,  
275, 276, 278.

Abdul Aziz, Ottoman Sultan, 329,  
339.

Abdul Hamid, Ottoman Sultan,  
his character, 238, 302, 308,  
309, 317, 318, 326, 327, 328,  
337, 338; he favours Halim,  
302, 321; his spies, 309; "un  
misérable et un fou," 309, his  
horses, 303, 305, 341, 389;  
his Selamluk, 318; his attitude  
towards the Grand Duke Nicho-  
las, 308; he only trusts the  
Germans, 322, 333; his rela-  
tions with Dufferin, 302, 303,  
305, 322, 348; with other am-  
bassadors, 305, 316, 317, 322;  
his manœuvres, 327; his  
women, 329, 337; his dislike  
of the ex-Khedive Ismail, 378,  
447; author's letter to, 360,  
389, Appendix B; proposed re-  
volt against in 1885, 490, 491,  
493. *Also* 15, 44, 50, 53, 80,  
155, 177, 208, 238, 242, 248,  
301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306,  
307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312,  
314, 321, 322, 329, 332, 333,

## Index

- Abdul Hamid, Ottoman Sultan  
—*continued*.  
338, 339, 340, 341, 358, 361,  
363, 365, 366, 367, 368, 375,  
378, 387, 398, 399, 403, 405,  
417, 418, 434, 436, 441, 449,  
451, 454, 455, 474, 475, 476,  
477, 480, 485, 486, 487, 488,  
492, 501.
- Abu Diab, Yusuf Bey, aide-de-  
camp to Abd-el-Aal, unjustly  
hanged at Tantah, 21, 24, 69,  
325, 335, Appendices B and F.
- "Abu Naddara," an Arabic  
journal published at Paris. *See*  
Sanua.
- Adhem, Ibrahim Bey, adherent  
of Tewfik and Mudir of Tan-  
tah, his responsibility for the  
massacres at Tantah, 21, 324,  
325, 335. *Also* Appendices B  
and F.
- Ahmed Assad, Sheykh, secret  
agent of the Sultan sent to  
Egypt in 1882, 327.
- Ahmed, Mohammed. *See* the  
Mahdi.
- Ala-ed-Din Pasha, adherent of  
Tewfik, appointed Governor-  
General of Soudan in 1883, 81.
- Aleysh, Sheykh Mohammed el,  
Sheykh of the Malekite rite at  
Cairo, imprisoned by Tewfik in  
1882, and died in prison, 81.
- Alexandria, bombardment of, 2,  
24, 63; riots at, 19, 20, 21,  
52, 73, 83. *Also* Appendix B.
- Amir Ali, Mr. Justice, now mem-  
ber of Privy Council, 242, 348.
- Ali Fehmi Pasha, fellah Colonel  
of the Guards, A.D.C. to  
Khedive, exiled with Arabi,  
65, 276, 324.
- Ali Yusuf Bey, traitor at Tel-el-  
Kebir, 275, 323.
- Allnatt, Mrs., 387; correspond-  
ence with, Appendix A.
- Amir Hassan, Rajah of Mahmu-  
dabad, 297, 413.
- Amnesty promised by Dufferin  
in 1882, but broken in 1883,  
19, Appendix C.
- Anderson, Mary, Miss, 419, 420.
- Appleton, Mr., 353.
- Arab race at Newmarket, 262,  
263, 264, 265, 272; at Cairo,  
315.
- Arab studs in Poland, 221, 295,  
296.
- Arabi, Ahmed Pasha, leader of the  
Egyptian revolution of 1882, his  
recall to Egypt contemplated,  
7, 8, 11, 12, 41, 42; Gordon's  
opinion of, 9; his memoran-  
dum sent to Dufferin, 13, 33,  
76, 77, Appendix B; his views  
on the Soudan, 16, 35, 77, 78,  
Appendix E; author's corre-  
spondence with, Appendix B;  
account of his behaviour at  
Tel-el-Kebir, 69, 323. *Also* 1,  
5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 15,  
17, 21, 29, 31, 40, 41, 42, 49,  
51, 52, 53, 61, 68, 69, 72, 76,  
77, 78, 79, 83, 98, 140, 170,  
211, 212, 213, 224, 228, 230,  
234, 235, 237, 238, 242, 245,  
246, 249, 251, 253, 254, 257,  
260, 268, 270, 276, 281, 305,  
310, 313, 323, 325, 379, 381,  
387, 440, 454, 461, 477, 503.
- Argyll, Duke of, 437, 450, 456.
- Armenia, 337, 338, 342.
- Atlee, Mr. Falconer, Consul at  
Paris, 284, 289.
- Austin, Alfred, Poet Laureate,  
friend of the author, 392.
- Awwam, Effendi, Arabi's secre-  
tary, said to have betrayed  
Gordon, 421, Appendix C.

## *Index*

- Azarian, Monseigneur, Patriarch of the Catholic Armenians at Constantinople, 337; his opinion of Sultan Abdul Hamid, 338.
- Baker, Sir Samuel, well-known traveller, preceded Gordon as Governor of Equatorial Province of the Nile, 95, 97; his high salary, 100; his letter to the "Times" of 1st January, 1884, 161; Gordon's visit to, in 1884, 172. *Also* 100, 102, 104, 153, 161, 171, 172, 176.
- Baker, Valentin Pasha, brother of Sir Samuel, head of Egyptian gendarmerie, formerly Colonel of the 10th Hussars, 201; his defeat at Teh, 5th February, 203. *Also* 54, 161, 177, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 386; author's personal recollection of, 201.
- Bakir, Mirza, exiled Persian Sufi living in London, 273, 274; engaged as Oriental secretary to author, 276, 499.
- Balfour, Arthur, Rt. Hon., M.P., afterwards Prime Minister, 410, 424, 435, 450.
- Bannerman, Henry Campbell, Rt. Hon. Sir, M.P., Under-Secretary at the Admiralty, afterwards Prime Minister, his strange denial in the Palmer case, 23.
- Barnes, Rev. Dr., vicar of Heavitree, Gordon's religious adviser, 138, 139, 171, 172.
- Baring, Sir Evelyn. *See* Cromer.
- Barttelot, Sir Walter, M.P., 489.
- Belkis, Queen, 314.
- Bell, Moberly, Mr., "Times" correspondent at Alexandria, 348; same as "Twenty Years' Resident," 456. *Also* Appendix G.
- Beresford, Charles, Admiral Lord, M.P., 63, 365.
- Berzati, Gordon's secretary in the Soudan, afterwards killed with Hicks, 191.
- Bible, Gordon's, correspondence about the recovery of, 387, 389, Appendix A.
- Bilgrami, Seyd Huseyn, afterwards member of the Indian Council, 371.
- "Bitters," Francis Gore Currie, author's cousin living in Paris, 284, 287, 410.
- Bismarck, Prince, author's recollection of, 286; his connection with the Rothschilds, 260, 350, 395. *Also* 1, 220, 222, 255, 260, 262, 345, 350, 357, 371, 391, 394, 395, 400.
- Bismarck, Count Herbert, 395.
- Black Art, the, 259.
- Blignières, M. de, French Financial Controller in Egypt, 51.
- Blind, Karl, German revolutionist living in exile in London, 354, 356.
- Blount, Sir Edward, formerly British Consul at Paris, 389.
- Bourke, Rt. Hon. Robert, M.P., Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, afterwards Lord Connemara, Governor of Madras, 28, 220, 226, 278, 349, 388, 450.
- Bowen, Lord Justice, 451.
- Bowles, Thomas Gibson, M.P., editor of "Vanity Fair," 343, 361, 369.
- Brand, Hon. Henry, M.P., Surveyor-General of the Ordnance, 1883-1885, afterwards 2nd



# Index

- Brand, Hon. Henry, M.P.—*continued*.  
Viscount Hampden and Governor of New South Wales, friend of the author, 228, 239, 241, 247, 248, 249, 255, 259, 374, 443, 446, 452.
- Brett, Hon. Reginald, M.P., private secretary to Lord Hartington, afterwards Lord Esher, his friendship with Gordon, 8, 12, 150; his connection with the press, 162, 164. *Also* 173, 174, 227, 351, 369, 375.
- Broadley, Mr. A. M., Arabi's Counsel in 1882, 67, 257, 270; his connection with the ex-Khedive Ismail, 353.
- Brocklehurst, General, intimate friend of Gordon, 173, 174; author's talk with, 225.
- Brodrick, Rt. Hon. St. John, M.P., afterwards Lord Middleton and Chief Secretary for India, 494.
- Buckle, Mr. G. E., editor of the "Times" in succession to Mr. Chenery, 210, 219, 220, 250, 271, 348, 367.
- Buller, General Sir Redvers, 379, 384.
- "Bungo," the Hon. Sir Michael Herbert, of the Paris Embassy, afterwards Ambassador at Washington, friend of the author, 387.
- Burmese War, 497, 498, 499, 501, 502, 503. *Also* Appendix G; author protests against, 502.
- Burnaby, Colonel Fred, author of "The Ride to Khiva," 213, 232; killed at Abu Klea, 362, 406.
- Burne, Sir Owen, head of the Secret Department at India Office, 250.
- Burt, Rt. Hon. Thomas, M.P., working man member, 248, 428.
- Burton, Sir Richard, the well-known explorer, 101; Gordon's letter to, 137.
- Burton, Lady, Gordon's letter to, 130.
- Butler, General Sir William, in command of the garrison at Alexandria, his testimony about the bombardment of Alexandria, 475; as to Gordon's being refused permission to land in Egypt, 146.
- Butros Pasha Ghali, Coptic Notable, afterwards Prime Minister in Egypt, assassinated in 1910, 69.
- "Button," Hon. Algernon Bourke, on the staff of the "Times," cousin and friend of the author, 25, 209, 210, 212, 214, 216, 219, 220, 222, 223, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 231, 235, 236, 238, 241, 242, 243, 245, 248, 249, 250, 254, 255, 257, 259, 260, 261, 262, 264, 269, 283, 352, 359, 360, 361, 363, 364, 365, 367, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 375, 376, 384, 385, 389, 391, 393, 394, 395, 397, 402, 406, 409, 412, 418, 425, 445, 450, 452, 478.
- Buxton, Mr. Francis, M.P., 405, 438.
- Buxton, Rt. Hon. Sydney, M.P., 405.
- Camberwell Election, Chapter XII, 471, 472; author is defeated at, 504, Appendix D.
- Cambridge, H.R.H. George, Duke of, 180, 205, 206, 239.

# Index

- Campbell, Sir George, M.P., Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, 235.
- Campbell, Lady Archibald, 446.
- Campbell, Lady Colin, 478.
- Carmichael, Sir James, M.P., private secretary to Gladstone, 268.
- Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Joseph, M.P., President of the Board of Trade in Gladstone's Cabinet, 2, 251, 254, 274, 369, 370, 384, 440, 441, 489.
- Chandler, Rev. Dr. Arthur, Bishop of Blomfontein, cousin of the author, 479.
- Chaplin, Rt. Hon. Henry, M.P., 386.
- Chapman, Rev. Hugh, Vicar of St. Luke's, Camberwell, afterwards Chaplain of the Savoy, 504.
- Charmes, Gabriel, French journalist, his legends about the author, 67; reason of his quarrel with Nationalist Government in 1882, 67. *Also* 243.
- Charter, Lord Dufferin's, 29, 32, 33, 62, 76; letter to author, Appendix C.
- Chenery, Mr., editor of the "Times," 30, 31, 32, 210, 349; account of his death, 210.
- Cherif Pacha. *See* Sherif.
- Churchill, Rt. Hon. Lord Randolph, M.P., Chief Secretary for India under Salisbury, afterwards Chancellor of the Exchequer, personally described, 26, 213; his indictment of Tewfik, 28, 29, 211, Appendix B; Morley's opinion of, 252; his popularity with Orientals, 274, 276, 465, 468, 496; his ideas about India, 211, 350, 370, 412, 413, 439, 444; would recall Arabi, 238, 260, 414, 454; his ideas about Egypt, 414, 444, 454, 455, 461, 486; on Tory Democracy, 429; he promises to support a Parliamentary inquiry into the Indian Government, 439, 496, 497; at the India Office, 452, 453, 456, 457, 460, 461, 464, 485, 491, 494; his views on Irish Home Rule, 445, 465, 469, 483; his connection with the Drummond Wolff mission, 454, 461, 475, 478, 480, 481, 485, 486, 487, 491, 503; his discussion with Jemal-ed-Din, 466; on a proposed revolution at Constantinople, 491, 493; his share in the annexation of Burmah, 497, 498, 501, 503. *Also* 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 32, 38, 210, 211, 213, 218, 219, 235, 238, 245, 259, 262, 266, 278, 349, 350, 370, 371, 390, 408, 412, 413, 418, 419, 424, 429, 432, 435, 438, 440, 441, 443, 446, 447, 448, 450, 452, 453, 464, 466, 467, 468, 469, 479, 480, 481, 482, 492, 494, 495, 496, 500; author's correspondence with, Appendix D.
- Clark, Dr., M.P., 356, 435.
- Coetlogon, Colonel, in command of Khartoum garrison, 1883, 85, 155, 186.
- Colvin, Sir Auckland, Anglo-Indian official, English Financial Controller in Egypt, afterwards Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces of India, 12, 38, 41, 44, 51, 52, 282, 421, 452.
- Connaught, H.R.H. the Duke of, 372.

## Index

- Cookson, Sir Charles, British Consul at Alexandria, 63.
- Coptic Patriarch, 69.
- Cordery, Mr., Anglo-Indian official, resident at Hyderabad, 239, 250, 348, 486, Appendix G.
- Corti, Count, Italian Ambassador at Constantinople, 300; author's conversations with, 301, 305, 315, 320, 321, 327; his account of the Berlin Congress, 320. *Also* 319, 341, 364.
- Cotton, Sir Henry, M.P., 478.
- Courtney, Rt. Hon. Leonard, M.P., now Lord Courtney of Penwith, 359, 377, 397, 399, 402, 420, 428, 432.
- Cowper, Hon. Henry, friend of the author, 483, 484.
- Cromer, Earl of, formerly Sir Evelyn Baring, his appointment to Cairo in 1883, 38; his "Nineteenth Century" article, 42; his views in 1883, 42, 59, 60; his reputation in Egypt, 51, 55, 57; his character, 54, 59, 60, 61; his early career, 58; author's talks with in 1883, 58, 60, 61; his connection with Lord Northbrook, 58; his untrustworthiness as an historian, 61, 151, 152, 157; his responsibility for Hicks, 84; his quarrel with Gordon in 1879, 124, 125, 247; his "Modern Egypt," v, viii, 144, 152, 155; his antagonism to Gordon, 151, 152, 167; his misquotation of a dispatch, 157, 171; his complaint as to the "Pall Mall Gazette," 152, 153, 154, 161, 162, 166, 167, 176; his responsibility for Gordon's failure, 157, 192, 193, 197, 198, 199, 202, 214; his unpublished letter to Gordon (date, 22nd January 1884), 194; is considered a failure, 223, 231, 344, 410; Lord Hardinge's opinion of, 374; to be recalled, 449, 450, 451. *Also* 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 70, 74, 75, 76, 83, 84, 85, 102, 122, 124, 125, 144, 148, 150, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 160, 162, 163, 166, 167, 170, 171, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 182, 186, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 214, 215, 219, 222, 223, 224, 225, 228, 231, 247, 254, 257, 321, 344, 345, 374, 393, 410, 429, Appendices A and C.
- "Curly," Colonel George Knox, 231.
- Currie, Mr. Bertram, banker, member of the Indian Council, cousin of the author, and friend of Gladstone, 214, 352, 419, 420, 421.
- Currie, Sir Donald, M.P., ship-owner, friend of Gladstone, 44, 235.
- Currie, Mr. George, cousin of the author, 365, 370.
- Currie, Sir Philip, afterwards Lord, private secretary to Lord Salisbury, head of Foreign Office and Ambassador, cousin of the author, 130, 227, 373, 378, 386, 438, Appendix C.
- Curzon, Rt. Hon. George, M.P., afterwards Lord Curzon of Kedleston, friend of the author, 451.
- Dalhousie, Earl of, 431.

# Index

- De la Warr, Earl of, political ally of author, 223, 225, 257.
- Deli Nuzret, 327.
- Dervish Pasha, the Sultan's envoy to Egypt in 1882, he accepted bribes, 327, 328.
- Dickenson, Dr., of the Constantinople Embassy, 338.
- Dilke, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles, M.P., Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Gladstone's Ministry, 10, 31, 169, 179, 247, 251, 254, 257, 330, 345, 346, 352, 360, 369, 371, 374, 383, 391, 390; his saying that Egypt would be "annexed under another name," 406. *Also* 440, 445, 452.
- Dillon, John, M.P., his letter to Morley, 252.
- Disraeli, Benjamin, Lord Beaconsfield, story of, 244. *Also* 412.
- Drummond, Sir Victor, K.C.M.G., afterwards Her Majesty's Minister at Munich, friend of the author, 287.
- Dufferin, Earl of, Ambassador at Constantinople, afterwards Viceroy of India, author's personal recollection of, 4; his Egyptian settlement, 4, 7, 18, 29, 30, 31, 32, 49, 62, 68, 141; his opinion of Arabi, 7, 8, 13; author's correspondence with, 20, Appendix C; his relations with Sultan Abdul Hamid, 303, 305, 322, 333, 344, 348; his responsibility for Burmah, 497, 498. *Also* 2, 4, 5, 7, 8, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 41, 49, 62, 68, 73, 76, 81, 141, 145, 146, 148, 149, 152, 161, 222, 236, 238, 283, 302, 305, 318, 322, 333, 344, 409, 454, 486, 497, 498.
- Earle, General, killed in the Soudan, 377, 386.
- Earle, Mrs., 399.
- Egerton, Sir Edwin, *chargé d'affaires* at Cairo, afterwards Ambassador at Madrid, 223, 495.
- Elections, Egyptian, how managed, 52, 56, 68, 72, 73.
- Elliot, Sir Henry, formerly Ambassador at Constantinople, 301.
- Escott, Mr. T. H. S., editor of "Fortnightly," 392.
- Europe, responsible for the ruin of the Soudan, 79, 80.
- Exclusion from Egypt, the author's, 75, 207, 218, 222, 245, 246, 247, 256, 274, 275, 278, 487, 492, 495. *Also* Chapter VIII and Appendix C.
- Executions at Alexandria and Tantah, 22, 24, 26, 29, 53. *Also* Appendix B.
- Faris, Selim Effendi, journalist at Constantinople, author's talks with, 304, 305, 317, 321, 327, 329, 332, 339, 341, 358, 489, 490, 493.
- Fehmy, Hassan Pasha, Sultan's envoy to London in 1885, 358, 359, 360, 361, 363, 366, 367, 368, 372, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 382, 389, 394, 407, 425.
- Fenni, Mohammed Effendi, 71.
- Ferid Bey, first Secretary of Turkish Embassy, 385, 448; his communication as to proposed revolution in Turkey, 489. *Also* 493.
- Ferry, M. Jules, French Prime Minister, 229, 262, 351.
- Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmund, Under-Secretary for Foreign

## Index

- Fitzmaurice, Lord Edmund—  
*continued.*  
Affairs, afterwards Lord Fitzmaurice, 144, 150, 164, 174, 189, 203.
- Flower, Mr. Cyril, M.P., afterwards Lord Batteisea, 438.
- Ford, Sir Clare, afterwards Ambassador at Constantinople, 436.
- Forster, Rt. Hon. W. G., M.P., Chief Secretary for Ireland 1880-1882, 257, 261.
- Fowzi, Ibrahim Bey, with Gordon in the Soudan, Arabist in 1882, accompanies Gordon to Khartoum in 1884, 175, 196, Appendix A.
- Gessi Pasha, served in the Soudan under Gordon, 116, 117, 119, 191; Suliman Zebehr shot by, 191.
- Ghose, Mr. Lal Mohun, Indian delegate, 496, 497.
- Giegler Pasha, German official in the Khedivial service, 154.
- Gladstone, Rt. Hon. Herbert, M.P., afterwards Lord Gladstone, made use of by his father politically, 213, 250, 379.
- Gladstone, Rt. Hon. W. E., M.P., Prime Minister, his intention of restoring Arabi, 7, 11, 41, 42, 44, 45, 46, 57, 381; author's correspondence with through Sir E. Hamilton, 75, 76, 223, 228, 234, 246, 247, 249, 256, 347, 349, 393, 399, 400, 408, 433, 487, 489, Appendix C; Hartington's intrigue against, 160, 161, 164, 167, 168, 169, 177, 205, 352; was he responsible towards Gordon? 175, 182, 183, 184, 203; he uses his son Herbert, 213, 250, 379; a political gambler, 215; his speeches, 226, 240, 278, 385, 386, 405, 425; at Hawarden on Christmas Eve, 356; violent language about, 362; at the play, 377; his defeat in the House, 9th June 1885, 443; Bright's letter to, 445; Cardinal Manning's opinion of, 500; he pronounces for Home Rule, 504. *Also* 1, 2, 3, 9, 17, 19, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, 38, 40, 49, 56, 67, 72, 134, 171, 173, 179, 210, 212, 214, 217, 222, 224, 226, 227, 228, 229, 232, 235, 237, 239, 242, 245, 249, 251, 252, 255, 259, 260, 261, 269, 273, 276, 283, 345, 346, 357, 359, 360, 364, 369, 378, 379, 380, 389, 390, 391, 392, 407, 424, 425, 426, 431, 436, 445, 472, 488, and Appendices A and C.
- Gobineau, Count, author of "Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines," friend of the author, 288.
- Godley, Sir Arthur, K.C.B., Under-Secretary of State for India, 225, 239, 250, 391, 392.
- Gordon, General Charles George, Pasha, "Chinese Gordon," vii, viii; his letters to author, 9, 10, 11, 12, 140; he calls on author, 10, 135; his testimony about Arabi, 9, 11, 12, 140; his character examined, 87, 88-94; his early work in the Soudan, 87-121; his Bible Christianity, 91; his chastity, 93; "Hailing the tram of the world," 94; he enters Ismail's

## Index

- service, 95; his interview with Sherif, 101; he is considered mad, 8, 94, 103, 122, 132, 136; his fatalism, 108-112; on the financial inquiry, 123; his quarrel with Cromer in 1878, 124, 131; Gordon and Lesseps, 125; his quarrel with Nubar, 129, 131; at the Foreign Office, 130; Rivers Wilson's recollection of, 132; in India, 133, Appendix A; at Jerusalem, 136-143; his religious monomania, 136, 138; his last mission to Khartoum, 144-206; "an unfit person," 151; he resigns his commission, 163; interviewed by Stead, 164; to have *carte blanche*, 166; to Sarawak the Soudan, 169; he visits Barnes, 171; his fighting plan, 177; Gordon and the Ministers, 179; was he disobedient? 181-206; his Foreign Office instructions, 182; his mistake about the Mahdi, 185, 191; Gordon and Zebehr, 190; the change of plan at Cairo, 188, 194; his mission extended by Cromer, 194-199; was help promised him? 204-206; at Khartoum, 207-209, 212. *Also* 213, 214, 216, 218, 221, 223, 224, 225, 226, 230, 231, 232, 233, 235, 236, 240, 243, 247, 248, 283, 287, 299, 348, 364, 370, 373, 374, 376, 387, 389, 392, 416, 452, 453.
- Gordon Papers, Appendices A and C.
- Gordon, Sir Henry, brother of General Gordon, 174; his correspondence with Gladstone and others, Appendix A.
- Gordon, Colonel Louis, viii, Appendix A.
- Gorst, Rt. Hon. Sir John, M.P., 28, 211, 213, 219.
- Goschen, Rt. Hon. George Joachim, M.P., afterwards Lord, 126, 261, 267, 269, 270, 322, 375, 390.
- Gower, Mr. George Leveson, private secretary to Mr. Gladstone, 1880-1885, friend of the author, 210.
- Gower, Hon. Frederick Leveson, M.P., Lord Granville's brother and private secretary, 237, 451.
- Graham, General Sir Gerald, 203, 213, 214, 402, 416, 427, 428, 430; his letters about Gordon, Appendix A.
- Granville, Earl, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1880-1885, chief obstacle to an honest settlement in Egypt, 17, 18, 31; his position in Gladstone's Cabinet, 168; his letters to Gladstone and Baring proposing Gordon, 150, 173, 175; confirms author's exclusion from Egypt, 245; Morley's opinion of, 252; Staal's description of, 398; his assurance to Bright about Alexandria, 445; out of office, 445. *Also* 2, 8, 17, 31, 67, 72, 74, 75, 85, 150, 154, 155, 163, 167, 168, 169, 170, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 182, 189, 192, 194, 195, 206, 207, 235, 237, 254, 351, 359, 361, 365, 367, 374, 375, 378, 385, 391, 394, 395, 455, and Appendix G.
- Gregory, Sir William, friend and political ally of author, 29, 32, 242, 245, 266, 282, 347, 349,

## Index

- Gregory, Sir William—*continued*.  
378, 440, 476; his letters to author, Appendix G.
- Gregory, Lady, friend and political ally of author, 25; letter from, 29. *Also* 30, 31, 32, 242, 245, 247, 253, 257, 265, 266, 373, 380, 389, 400, 486; extracts from her letters, Appendix G.
- Griffin, Sir Lepel, high Anglo-Indian official, 391, 413, 414, 444, 465.
- Gros Bois, 285.
- Hafiz Behram Agha, Sultan's chief eunuch, 318.
- Hake, Mr. Egmont, author of "Chinese Gordon," 159, 439; employed to lecture on Gordon by Lord Salisbury, 475.
- Halim Pasha, Prince, legitimate successor to the Khedive Ismail, Pretender to Khedivate, his conversation with the author, 337; his correspondence with the author, 389, Appendix B. *Also* 6, 13, 14, 15, 36, 50, 230, 249, 302, 310, 313, 315, 321, 336, 440.
- Halim, Princess, 314, 336.
- Hamilton, Sir Edward, Gladstone's chief private secretary, 1880-1885, friend of the author, his correspondence with the author, 278, 331, 340, 400, 401, 407, 420, 433, Appendix C. *Also* 45, 65, 75, 76, 134, 216, 217, 218, 223, 224, 227, 228, 231, 246, 247, 252, 254, 259, 275, 451.
- Harcourt, Rt. Hon. Sir William Vernon, M.P., Home Secretary in Gladstone's Cabinet, 229, 378, 390, 448.
- Hardinge, Hon. Charles, of the Diplomatic Service, private secretary to Lord Dufferin at Constantinople, afterwards Ambassador at St. Petersburg and Viceroy of India, 263, 364, 374, 489; his opinion of Baring, 374.
- Harrison, Mr. Frederic, Head of the Positivist Society, and friend of author, his conversations with the author, 248, 371, 431, 436; his speech at Westminster Town Hall, 4th March, 392. *Also* 251, 253, 254, 256, 383, 451, 497.
- Hartington, Marquess of, afterwards Duke of Devonshire, Secretary of State for India in Gladstone's Cabinet, his responsibility for the Gordon mission, 247, 248; his intrigue against Gladstone, 164, 165, 167, 369, 370. *Also* 2, 8, 150, 162, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 173, 177, 178, 179, 203, 204, 214, 241, 252, 254, 276, 345, 390, 407, 408, 429, 432, 440, 445, 472, 473, 486.
- Haymerlé, Baron, Prime Minister of Austria, early friend of author, 300.
- Henderson, Consul at Aleppo, 303, 323.
- Herbert, the Hon. Auberon, friend of the author, 213, 353; his individualist ideas, 483.
- Herbert, Hon. Sir Michael, friend of author. *See* "Bungo."
- Herbert, Hon. Sidney, M.P., afterwards Earl of Pembroke, friend of author, 450.
- Hicks Pasha, General, 78, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 141, 146, 149,

# Index

- 150, 152, 153, 154, 159, 191,  
200, 214, 386.
- Hicks Beach, Sir Michael, M.P.,  
afterwards Lord St. Aldwyn,  
239, 240, 252, 390.
- Hill, Mr., editor of "Daily News,"  
232.
- Hobart Pasha, Admiral the Hon.  
Augustus, in the Turkish ser-  
vice, author's conversations  
with at Constantinople, 302;  
sent as Sultan's private envoy  
to London, 364. *Also* 304,  
366, 368, 378, 398, 416, 417,  
441.
- Holkar, Maharajah, 454.
- Holland, the Rev. Scott, Canon  
of St. Paul's, 240.
- Hope, Edward, author's private  
secretary, 283, 469.
- Howard, George, M.P., after-  
wards Earl of Carlisle, friend  
of author, 237, 255, 259, 261,  
267, 272, 404, 417, 462.
- Howard, Mrs. George, after-  
wards Countess of Carlisle,  
friend of author, 42, 215, 232,  
237, 246, 249, 255, 259, 261,  
265, 282, 402, 405, 415, 416,  
418, 419, 425, 434, 440, 445,  
462.
- Hughes, Tom, author of "Tom  
Brown's Schooldays," 361.
- Hunter, Professor, 400.
- Hussey Pasha, aide-de-camp to  
the Sultan, 319, 403.
- Ibrahim Adhem Bey, Mudir of  
Tantah, partisan of Khedive  
Tewfik, 324; his connection  
with riots at Tantah. *See*  
Tantah.
- Ibrahim - el - Senoussi, Sheykh,  
403.
- Ibrahim Bey. *See* Moëthy.
- Inglefield, Colonel, 415.
- Ismail, ex-Khedive, his connec-  
tion with Gordon, 89, 96, 98-  
104, 112, 118, 120, 122, 123,  
125, 126, 127, 128, 130; his  
intrigues in London, 245, 257,  
277, 279, 377, 447; author's  
talk with, 279, 280; Ismail as  
a boy, 311, 312; he lends  
money to the King of Italy,  
315; his deposition in 1879,  
329; is patronized by Bis-  
marck, 358; Arabi refuses to  
have anything to do with, Ap-  
pendix B. *Also* 50, 230, 239,  
249, 281, 301, 359, 378.
- Jamil Pasha, 303.
- James, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry, M.P.,  
afterwards Lord James of  
Hereford, 278.
- Jemal-ed-Din Afghani, Seyyid,  
well-known Moslem reformer  
living in exile at Paris, proposed  
mediation with the Mahdi  
through, 224, 226, 228, 286,  
287, 338, 389, 409, 410, 411,  
Appendix B; his correspond-  
ence with author, Appendix B;  
in England, 464; his talks with  
Churchill, 465-468; his talks  
with Drummond Wolff, 473,  
478; he is to help Wolff in  
his mission, 480, 481, 482,  
486, 487; he leaves England  
angry, 500, 501; his death in  
1902, 501. *Also* 40, 45, 46,  
47, 208, 237, 272, 358, 368,  
376, 386, 387, 388, 412, 444,  
449, 457, 458, 461, 473, 474,  
475, 476, 477, 479, 485, 488,  
489, 491, 492, 499.
- Jews in Poland, 290, 293.
- Jowdat, Ismail Bey, head of  
Cairo police during the war,



# Index

- Jowdat, Ismail Bey—*continued*.  
in exile at Constantinople in  
1884, 310, 313, 319; his evi-  
dence on the Alexandria and  
Cairo massacres, 319, 323, 330,  
339, 340, Appendix B; in  
London, 342, 343, 356, 357;  
ordered to Constantinople,  
358. *Also* 434, 486, 487, 488.
- Jung, Nawab Salar, Prime Min-  
ister to the Nizam, 55, 239,  
371, 413.
- Kandil, Seyd, Chief of Police at  
Alexandria in 1882, con-  
demned to prison for asserted  
connection with Alexandria  
riot, 69, 71. *Also* Appendix B.
- Khalil, Sheykh Mohammed, dis-  
ciple of Sheykh Mohammed  
Abdu, 66.
- Kerr, General Lord Mark, 370,  
371, 372.
- Khair-ed-Din Pasha, ex-Vizier,  
242, 245, 302, 303, 305, 307,  
329.
- Kiamyl, Prince, cousin of the  
Khedive, 326.
- Kimberley, Earl of, Chief Secre-  
tary for India in the Gladstone  
Cabinet, 452.
- Knowles, Sir James, editor of  
the "Nineteenth Century Re-  
view," friend of Gladstone, 40,  
41, 42, 44, 209, 210, 246, 247,  
249, 275, 359.
- Kurds, proposed rising of, 330,  
342, 343.
- Labouchere, Rt. Hon. Henry,  
M.P., friend of author, 28, 213,  
214, 230, 252, 261, 271, 272,  
273, 274; his conversations  
with the author, 379, 380, 393,  
399, 424, 427, 429.
- Lagergren, Mr., Swedish traveller,  
299.
- Laing, Mr., Director of the Regie  
at Constantinople, 326.
- Laing, Miss, formerly companion  
to Princess Nazli, 313.
- Lamb, Lady Caroline, 283.
- Lambert, professional tennis  
player, 434.
- Lampson, Sir Curtis, Bart., neigh-  
bour and friend of author, 401.
- Langiewitz, General, Polish pa-  
triot, 316.
- Lascelles, Sir Frank, G.C.B.,  
Acting Diplomatic Agent in  
Egypt, afterwards Ambassador  
at Berlin, friend of author, 243,  
254, 257, 259, 261, 281.
- Lavison, Mr., secretary to ex-  
Khedive Ismail, 279.
- Lawson, Sir Wilfrid, Bart., M.P.,  
28, 212, 213, 219, 232, 240,  
252, 255, 259, 266, 271, 273,  
274, 275, 276, 279, 282.
- Layard, Rt. Hon. Sir Henry, ex-  
Ambassador at Constantinople,  
317, 365.
- Leconfield, Henry, Lord, cousin  
of author, 347, 357, 448.
- Lee, Sir Henry Austin, K.C.M.G.,  
private secretary to Lord E.  
Fitzmaurice at the Foreign  
Office, afterwards English repre-  
sentative on the Suez Canal  
Committee, 373.
- Leigh, Mr., of the Diplomatic  
Service, afterwards Lord New-  
ton, 287.
- Leitner, Dr., Orientalist, 236.
- Leopold, King of the Belgians,  
101, 136, 143, 150, 158, 159,  
163, 164, 178, 182, 187.
- Lesseps, Count Ferdinand de,  
his connection with Gordon,  
122, 123, 124, 125, 126.

# Index

- Lloyd, Mr. Clifford, Chief of Police in Ireland, employed in Egypt in 1884, 14, 267, 325.
- Locker-Lampson, Mr. Frederick, poet and friend of the author, 498.
- Long, Colonel Chaillé, American Colonel, served with Gordon in the Soudan, 178.
- Lords, the House of, 266, 271.
- Lorne, Marquess of, afterwards Duke of Argyll, 404, 408, 409.
- Lothian, Schomberg, 9th Marquess of, Chief Secretary for Scotland in Salisbury's Cabinet, friend of author, 437, 449, 452, 472.
- Lowther, Rt. Hon. James, M.P., 226, 263, 379, 392.
- Lucan, Field-Marshal Lord, 426, 427.
- Lubienski, Rev. Father, a Polish priest, 292, 293.
- Lumsden, Sir Peter, 370, 396.
- Lyall, Rt. Hon. Sir Alfred, Lieutenant-Governor of North-West Provinces of India, afterwards member of Indian Council, friend of author, 252; his letters to author, Appendix G.
- Lymington, Lord, M.P., now Earl of Portsmouth, 242, 377.
- Lyons, Lord, Ambassador at Paris, 132, 209, 344, 359.
- Lytton, Earl of, ex-Viceroy of India, afterwards Ambassador at Paris, friend of the author, 133, 222, 257, 258, 390, 399, 451.
- Mahdi, Mohammed Ahmed, the, 13, 15, 16, 70, 77, 78, 80, 82, 86, 149, 153, 155, 156, 161, 176, 182, 185, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 198, 200, 203, 204, 208, 209, 212, 215, 217, 218, 221, 223, 224, 225, 227, 230, 231, 234, 235, 237, 240, 257, 261, 266, 267, 269, 272, 348; his character, 351, 442; his death, 459, 472, 505. *Also* 355, 362, 368, 369, 373, 379, 380, 384, 386, 387, 388, 393, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 411, 413, 416, 434, 438, 442, 444, 455, 466.
- Malet, Sir Edward, Consul-General at Cairo, afterwards Ambassador at Berlin, 15, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 50, 51, 63, 73, 82, 83, 84, 146, 286, 374, 393, 422; his position with Bismarck, 346, 395.
- Malkum Khan, Prince, Persian Ambassador in London, 277.
- Manning, Cardinal, 383, 384, 462, 469, 497.
- Massowa, 376, 387.
- Maxwell, Sir Benson, Adviser to the Egyptian Government in the department of Justice, 62, 63, 265.
- McCarthy, Mr. Huntley, M.P., 422, 423, 461.
- McCarthy, Mr. Justin, M.P., author's conversations with, 422, 423, 469, 476.
- McGrath, Canon, 469.
- Mediation proposed by author in the Soudan, 223, 224, 225, 227, 228, 234, 352, 354, 355, 356, 384, 386, 387, 388, 389, 444, 455, Appendices B and C.
- Mehariz Bey, Deputy Mudir at Tantah, his part in the riots, 325, 335. *Also* Appendix B.
- Merv, the Russians at, 467, 468.
- Metemmeh, 365, 368, 372, 373. *Also* Appendix A.

## *Index*

- Meynell, Mr. Wilfrid, friend of the author, 475, 478, 504.
- Midhat Pasha, his character, according to Vefyk Pasha, 314; his death, 339.
- Milner, Alfred, journalist, afterwards Governor of South Africa and Lord, 61, 487.
- Minshawi, Ahmed Bey, afterwards Minshawi Pasha, 21; his visits to the author, 334, 338; his evidence as to the Tintah massacre, 335, 336, 339, 340, 341; his letter to author, Appendix B.
- Mirza Bakir. *See* Bakir.
- "Modern Egypt," v, viii; its unreliable character as history, 61.
- Moelhy, Ibrahim Bey, at one time private secretary to ex-Khedive Ismail, living as an exile in London in 1885, 354, 355, 357, 358, 359, 368, 381, 385, 401, 403, 408, 409, 434, 458, 459, 480, 487, 488, 491, 494.
- Moffitt, Mrs., Gordon's sister, viii, Appendix A.
- Mohammed Assad Bey, Muteserif of Candia, uncle-in-law of Aarif Bey, 342.
- Moore, Mr. A. W., Lord Randolph Churchill's private secretary, 485, 495, 498.
- Moore, Mr. Lionel, Oriental secretary at Constantinople, and friend of the Prince of Wales, his conversations with the author, 63, 64, 65, 67.
- Morier, Sir Robert, Ambassador at St. Petersburg, 346, 385.
- Morley, Rt. Hon. John, M.P., formerly editor of the "Pall Mall Gazette," afterwards Cabinet Minister and Lord, his prediction about Lord Cromer, 39; his repentance for bringing about the war of 1882, 152; his "Life of Gladstone," 169; his conversations with the author, 232, 233, 234, 251, 260, 383, 420; his opinion of certain public men, 251, 252, 253; he is for "strong government, the cutting off of heads," 251. *Also* 144, 221, 252, 254, 256, 377, 385, 390, 402.
- Morocco, French plan to annex, opposed by Communists, 353.
- Morris, William, poet and friend of the author, 408, 488, 496, 499.
- Munir Pasha, Chamberlain to the Sultan, 328, 332, 339.
- Mustafa Bey Nejdî, Arabi's doctor, living in exile at Constantinople, 313; his account of Tel-el-Kebir, 323; as to Alexandrian riots, 325. *Also* 336, 339, 341, Appendix B.
- Musurus Pasha, Turkish Ambassador, 322, 341, 491.
- Nadir Shah gives Arab horses to the Turcomans, 479.
- Napier, Major, now Lord Napier of Magdala, 225.
- Napier, Hon. Mark, Counsel with Broadley at Arabi's trial, friend of author, 221, 372, 373, 456, 478; proposes with others to rescue Gordon, 221.
- Naworth Castle, 288.
- Nazieh, Princess, cousin of Khedive Tewfik, 42.
- Nebbi Ullah, Scyd, Khan of Lucknow, 382, 473.
- Nélidoff, M. de, Russian Ambassador at Constantinople,

# Index

- early friend of author, 300, 316, 339, 398.
- Neville, Lady Dorothy, 436.
- Nicholas, Grand Duke, commanding the Russian army before Constantinople in 1878, 388.
- Ninet, Swiss patriot who sided with the Egyptian Nationalists in 1882, 313.
- "Nineteenth Century Review," author's article on Egyptian Revolution in, 9, 11; article by Sir E. Baring on Lord Ripon's policy in India, 42, 43; author's article on proposed Arab race at Newmarket in, 237.
- Nizam, the, of the Deccan, 388, 397, Appendix G.
- Noailles, M. de, French Ambassador at Constantinople, 301, 319, 320.
- Northcote, Sir Stafford, afterwards Earl of Iddesleigh, leader of the Opposition, Chief Secretary for Foreign Affairs under Salisbury, 219, 220, 252, 261, 262.
- Northbrook, Earl of, First Lord of the Admiralty in Gladstone's Cabinet, his financial proposals, 344, 345, 346, 352, 370; with regard to native evidence, 347; his letter to Gordon, Appendix A. *Also* 8, 22, 23, 58, 133, 134, 150, 169, 179, 247, 278, 284, 299, 359, 410, 429, 447, 458.
- Novikoff, Madame de, 245, 277, 378, 447.
- Nubar Pasha, Armenian Prime Minister in Egypt, 30, 95, 102, 103, 118, 122, 129, 131, 140, 141, 170, 171, 175, 176, 178, 190, 194, 195, 197, 199, 214, 223, 243, 268, 287; his quarrel with Gordon in 1878, 129, 247.
- Obeid, Mohammed Bey, fellah officer killed at Tel-el-Kebir, 355.
- Odessa, 297.
- O'Kelly, James, M.P., Parnellite member, correspondent of the "Daily News" during Dongola Expedition, 231, 272.
- Omar Pasha Lutfi, partisan of ex-Khedive Ismail, Governor of Alexandria, later War Minister, his connection with the Alexandrian riots, 19, 20, 21, 24, 52, 63, 71, 73, 83, Appendices B and C.
- Omdurman taken by the Mahdi, January 1885, 363.
- Osborn, Colonel, friend of Native India, 220.
- O'Shea, Captain William, M.P., 429.
- Osman, Prince, cousin of the Khedive, 326.
- Osman Digna, the Emir, Mahdist leader, 54, 161, 200, 203, 394, 400, 426, 437.
- Paget, Sir Augustus, Ambassador at Vienna, and Lady Paget, 287.
- Pain, Olivier, French Socialist, reward offered for him dead or alive, 442, 486.
- "Pall Mall Gazette," the, 152, 154; its change of front about Egypt, 161. *Also* 162, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 183, 223, 227, 247, 253, 255, 274, 350, 351, 353, 354.
- Palmer, Mr. Edward, Professor of Arabic at Cambridge, venge-

# Index

- Palmer, Mr. Edward—*continued*.  
 ance taken on Bedouins for his death, 22, 23; debates in Parliament, 28; Consul West on the Palmer case, 53; Northbrook's responsibility for, 179.
- Parnell, Mr. Charles Stuart, M.P., 251, 270, 272, 273, 379, 412, 414, 415, 422, 423, 429; author's talk with, 427, 428.
- Pauncefote, Sir Julian, permanent Under-Secretary of State, afterwards Ambassador in America, 495.
- Peace and Arbitration Association, 352, 353, 354, 356, 431.
- Penjdeh, 467.
- Pettit, match between Lambert and, professional tennis player, 435.
- Poles and Ruthenians, 290, 294.
- Policy, Prussian, of claiming the old Dutch colonies, 396.
- Pollen, Mr. John Hungerford, secretary to Lord Ripon, friend of the author, 363, 432, 465.
- Poore, Major R., disciple of Urquhart, 377.
- Potocki, Count Alfred, at Crabbet, 221, 222; author's visit to him at Lançut, 289, 290, 291, 292; at Antonine, 293, 294; his Arab stud, 295, 296.
- Pratt, Mr. Hodgson, philanthropist, organizer of the Peace and Arbitration Society, 352, 353.
- Press, use made of by Governments, 117, 161, 162, 164, 165, 166, 250, 369.
- Primrose Day with Churchill, 418.
- Protens, Love sonnets of, "Mr. Gladstone turns to with delight," 433.
- Punch Dinner, 275.
- Quakers against peace, 378.
- Queen. *See* Victoria.
- Ragheb Nashid, 276.
- Ragunath Rao, Rajah, a letter from, 494.
- Rafaat, Osman Bey, secret agent of the Khedive, 324, Appendix B.
- Rama Swami, Indian delegate, 494, 499.
- Raouf Pasha, Governor-General of Soudan in succession to Gordon, 10, 15.
- Red Sea, origin of the name, 314.
- Reform in *Foreign Policy*, author's lecture on, 497.
- Reign of Terror at Cairo, 66.
- Riaz Pasha, Prime Minister in Egypt, 11, 30, 55, 73, 126, 131, 146, 243, 251, 336.
- Ripon, Marquess of, Viceroy of India, 58, 133, 134, 239, 251, 349, 363, 375, 397, 412, 413, 432, 450, 452, 465.
- Roberts, General Sir Frederic, now Field - Marshal Earl Roberts, 430.
- Rosebery, Earl of, afterwards Prime Minister, his connection with the Rothschilds, 395; his connection with the Turf, 237.
- Rothschild, Nathaniel Lord, 229, 242, 255, 272.
- Rothschilds, Messieurs, their connection with the "Times," 213; Bismarck's quarrel with, in Frankfort, 260; holders of Egyptian Stock, 160, 212, 214, 350.
- Russia and Afghanistan, 444, 466.
- Russia and India, 444, 466, 467.

## Index

- Saad-el-Zaghloul Effendi, assistant editor of the "Wakaya" under Mohammed Abdu, Minister of Public Instruction under Cromer, 1906, now Minister of Justice, in prison, 71; author procures his release, 74, 75.
- Sabit Pasha, Tewfik's agent at Constantinople, 305.
- Sabunji, Rev. Louis, editor of "Nahlek," Oriental secretary to author, 45, 50, 51, 52, 66, 74, 76, Appendix B.
- Salisbury, Marquess of, 73, 132, 235, 252, 255, 320, 321, 332, 391, 446, 452, 465, 468, 472, 478, 486, 487, 493, 495, 501, 502, 503, 505; takes office, 448, 449; engages to support Tewfik, 457; author's correspondence with, Appendix C.
- Sami, Mahmoud Pasha, el Barodi, Nationalist ex-Prime Minister, exiled with Arabi, 64, 72, 276, 324.
- Sanguscko, Prince, 294.
- Sanua, James (Sheykh Abu Naddara), Egyptian Nationalist living in exile at Paris, and editor of "Abu Naddara," author visits him at Paris, 45; his puppet show and newspapers, 46. *Also* 47, 65, 208, 219, 387, 388.
- Saoud el Tihawi, Sheykh, Bedouin Sheykh, his action at Tel-el-Kebir, "in the pay of both sides," 323.
- Saracens, Arab chivalry inherited from, 362.
- Selborne, Lord Chancellor, 406.
- Seljukian Sultans, descendants of, at Konia, 301.
- Seymour, Admiral Sir Beauchamp, Lord Alcester, his proclamation after bombarding Alexandria, 2, 475.
- Seymour, Mr. Walter, friend of the author, 370, 382, 456.
- Shaftesbury, Lord, his warning to the Prince of Wales, 282.
- Shakespeare, "As You Like It" in open air, 446.
- Sheffield, Mr. George, private secretary to Lord Lyons at Paris, considers Gordon's case hopeless, 209; author's conversations with, 344, 345, 346, 410. *Also* 284, 359.
- Shemsî, Emin Bey, Nationalist deputy in 1882, 71, 72, 73.
- Sherif Pasha, Prime Minister in 1883, 30, 62, 71, 72, 101, 102, 124, 125, 126, 128, 151, 156, 160, 233, 243.
- Sidki, Mustafa Bey, landed proprietor at Shubra, imprisoned in 1883, 71.
- Sinadino, M. Ambroise, Greek banker at Alexandria and agent of the Rothschilds, "Mecca pilgrims kept without water," 298.
- Sinnett, Mr. A. P., well-known Theosophist, he explains the black art, 258, 259.
- Siva Prasad, Rajah, says a royal order would override caste difficulties, 496.
- Slavery, two ways of dealing with, 96-99.
- Slagg, Mr., M.P., his motion for an inquiry into Indian Government, 439.
- Souakin, 376, 380, 400, 402, 409, 416, 426, 427, 455.
- Spencer, Earl, 391; a born administrator, 268.
- Staal, M. de, Russian Ambassador in London, friend of author,

# Index

- Staal, M. de—*continued*.  
 222, 269, 298, 436, 445, 446,  
 452, 454.
- Stanley of Alderley, Henry, Lord,  
 friend of the author, 24, 242,  
 245, 302, 308, 310, 342, 345,  
 361, 367, 372, 377, 394, 407,  
 416, 452.
- Stanley, Lady, of Alderley, 364,  
 371.
- Stanley, Hon. Lyulph, M.P.,  
 afterwards Lord Sheffield, friend  
 of author, 212.
- Stead, Mr. William, editor of the  
 "Fall Mall Gazette," 1883-  
 1885, Gordon's mission un-  
 justly attributed to by Cromer  
 in "Modern Egypt," 152, 153,  
 162, 165, 166, 167, 168; he  
 interviews Gordon at South-  
 ampton, 164, 171; used by the  
 Whigs, 169; his "scream of  
 triumph," 183; author inter-  
 viewed by, 220, 221, 351, 353,  
 354, 355; described by Mor-  
 ley, 253. *Also* 158, 170, 176,  
 369, 426, 447, 484.
- Stewart, Colonel D. H., 81, 146,  
 147, 148, 179, 181, 187, 189,  
 196, 365; author's recollection  
 of, 287, 299, Appendix F.
- Stewart, General Sir Herbert, in  
 command of the relief column,  
 killed at Abu Klea, 362, 364,  
 367, 368, 379, 406.
- Suliman Sami Bey, Nationalist  
 Colonel of the Alexandria gar-  
 rison, hanged by the Khedive,  
 23, 24; refused to give up  
 certain papers incriminating  
 the Khedive, 69, Appen-  
 dix B.
- Sullivan, Sir Arthur, musical com-  
 poser, 413.
- Sullivan, Sir Edward, Bart., 419.
- Sultan, the Ottoman. *See* Abdul  
 Hamid.
- Sultan Pasha, fellah Notable and  
 Constitutionalist, betrayed the  
 Nationalists to the Khedive in  
 1882, and accompanied Wolse-  
 ley on the campaign of Tel-el-  
 Kebir; received £10,000 and  
 a knighthood from the British  
 Government, 46, 50, 71, 72,  
 275, 324, Appendix B.
- Talbot, General the Hon. Sir  
 Reginald, 367.
- Tamai, battle of, 409.
- Tantah, riots at, evidence in re-  
 gard to, 19, 21, 28, 324, 325,  
 334. *Also* Appendices B, C, F.
- Taschaud, M., 381.
- Tebbutt, Mr. Charles, banker of  
 St. Ives, political friend of  
 author, 504.
- Tel-el-Kebir, battle of, 3, 6, 16,  
 36, 46, 49, 65, 74, 75, 77, 79,  
 201; traitors at, 275; described  
 by Arabi's doctor, 323.
- Temple, Dr., Bishop of Exeter,  
 afterwards Bishop of London,  
 Gordon's visit to, 172; party  
 at Fulham, 451. *Also* 139,  
 172, 243.
- Temple, Sir Richard, ex-Indian  
 official, afterwards M.P., 498.
- Tennis at Hampton Court, 434,  
 435.
- Tewfik, Khedive, an impediment  
 to an honest settlement in  
 Egypt, 5, 7, 8, 17, 32, 56, 65,  
 68, 77, 80, 81, 82, 83, 141,  
 217, 369, 414, 454, 457; his  
 connection with the riots, 28,  
 31, 52, 211, 347, Appendices  
 B, C; his weak and treacher-  
 ous character, 49, 50, 249,  
 411; Gordon's quarrel with,

## Index

- 122; he makes peace with Gordon, 197; his firman to Gordon, 197; Arabi's attitude towards, Appendix B. *Also* 1, 4, 11, 13, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 30, 33, 47, 48, 51, 55, 62, 64, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 76, 120, 122, 130, 131, 140, 151, 153, 156, 157, 160, 162, 169, 170, 187, 189, 190, 194, 201, 212, 214, 218, 225, 228, 230, 232, 234, 253, 254, 266, 268, 284, 328, 336, 349, 360, 365, 366, 456.
- Thebaw, King of Burmah, 497, 502; General Gloag's letters about, Appendix G.
- "Times," the, 1, 25, 30, 32, 76, 99, 153, 160, 161, 162, 166, 172, 175, 211, 213, 216, 219, 230, 231, 246, 248, 249, 253, 254, 257, 265, 274, 275, 354, 360, 361, 365, 367, 385, 397, 399, 426, 435, 445, 447, 455, 459.
- Tory Democracy, "Am I a Tory Democrat?" 429, 443, 444, 445, Appendix D; old Tories, 439. *Also* 414, 441, 463, 465.
- Trevelyan, Rt. Hon. George, Bart., M.P., Chief Secretary for Ireland, his description of Clifford Lloyd in Ireland, 268. *Also* 267, 391.
- Tulba Pasha, commander of garrison at Alexandria in 1882, afterwards at Kafr Dawar, exiled with Arabi, 63, 64, 324.
- Turkey, dying, 305; ruined by commercial treaties, 307; in Asia, 342; intended revolution in, 490, 491, 493.
- Urquhart, David, author of "Spirit of the East," 377; Cardinal Manning's opinion of, 500.
- Varkar, Mr. Chandra, 496, 499.
- Vefyk Pasha, ex-Grand Vizier, 242, 245, 302; "a man of crotchets," 303; author's visit to "a most remarkable man," 306; "our Sultans worthless," 307; "the English have lost their political sense," 308; on the Sultan, 309; on Egypt, 310, 311; author breakfasts with him, 313; on Arabian history, 314; Count Corti's opinion of, 315; his son, 340.
- "Vengeurs, Les," 70, Appendix F.
- Victoria, Queen, speech on opening Parliament, 32; her letter to Miss Gordon, 204, 205, 206, Appendix A; Hassan Fehmy's audience with, 369.
- Villayet Ali, Nawab, 296.
- Villiers, Hon. Frank, Lord Salisbury's private secretary, afterwards Sir Francis Villiers, Ambassador at Lisbon, 495.
- Vivian, Hon. Crespigny, afterwards Lord, and Ambassador at Rome, 123, 127, 128.
- Volhynia, condition of peasantry in, 298.
- Waddington, M., French Ambassador in London, 254; at the Congress of Berlin, 320, 321.
- Wagram, Prince, friend of author, author's visit to, at Gros Bois, 284, 285; visits Windsor, 479.
- Wales, Prince of, afterwards King Edward VII, 211, 235, 347, 348, 360, 368, 371, 392, 427, 447.



# Index

- Wallace, Sir Mackenzie, 318.
- Walsham, Sir John, Bart., of the Diplomatic Service, 287, 289.
- Warren, Colonel, 22, 23; his method of dealing with Bedouins, 53.
- Watson, General Sir Charles, friend of Gordon, 150, 194, 197; his letters about Gordon, Appendix A.
- Webb, Mr. Godfrey, clerk of the House of Lords, cousin of the author, 410.
- Wentworth, Lord, afterwards Earl of Lovelace, brother-in-law of author, 432, 456.
- West, Mr., British Consul at Suez, 52, 53.
- Whittaker, Mr., editor of the "Levant Herald," conversation with author, 303, 304; on the Sultan's method of dealing with Ambassadors, 316; he explains Dufferin's failure, 322. *Also* 368, 441.
- Wilson, General Sir Charles, Consul in Asia Minor, afterwards at Cairo and Khartoum, 15, 20, 146, 170, 416; author's recollection of, 147, 149; his letters relating to Gordon, Appendix A.
- Wilson, Sir Rivers, Finance Minister in Egypt, friend of author, 93, 127, 128, 129, 132, 226, 229, 230, 495, 496; his recollection of Gordon, 132.
- Windsor Park, 439.
- Winton, Mr. De, Anglo-Egyptian official, his talk with the author on Egypt, 277.
- Wolff, Sir Henry Drummond, afterwards Ambassador, 28, 211, 219, 220, 262; his mission to Constantinople and Egypt, 456; his plans in Egypt, 473; his conversations with Jemal-ed-Din, 474, 475, 476, 477. *Also* 360, 382, 390, 408, 413, 418, 436, 448, 449, 451, 454, 455, 458, 461, 480, 481, 488, 489, 490, 491, 494, 504.
- Wolseley, Sir Garnet, afterwards Lord, 1, 4, 5, 8, 50, 78, 150, 159, 173, 174, 177, 203, 204, 205, 226, 228, 236, 238, 275, 299, 342, 346, 347, 348, 349, 363, 364, 366, 374, 375, 386, 394, 400, 461; his position at the Horse Guards, 393; his plan of campaign, 406; is angry with the Government, 406; and the Nile Expedition, 415, 416; wants to renew Soudan campaign, 425, 429; resolution for recall of, 431; his return from Soudan, 459.
- Wood, General Sir Evelyn, in command of the army of occupation, 49, 51, 150, 194, 197, 201.
- Wood, Mr. Martin, of the Arbitration and Peace Society, he accompanies author to Harwarden, 356, 357; at the National Liberal Club, 435.
- Wortley, Stuart, Colonel, 373.
- Wyndham, Rt. Hon. George, M.P., afterwards Chief Secretary for Ireland, cousin of author, 376, 419, 438, 442.
- Wyndham, Sir Hugh, K.C.B., Secretary of Embassy at Constantinople, 298, 299, 301, 363, 364, 374.
- Wyndham, Hon. Percy, M.P. for Cockermouth, cousin of the author, 236, 266, 271, 274, 298, 299, 363, 364, 375.
- Wynford, Lord, 353.

## *Index*

- Yildiz Palace, the Sultan at, 327;  
horses paraded at, 341
- Yusri, Ismail, President of the  
Commission on the Tintah  
massacres, 325.
- Zanzibar-Bismarck's designs on,  
394, 395.
- Zebchr Pasha, chief of the slave  
traders, 116, 119; recruits a  
Soudanese force, 190, 200;  
would he have betrayed Gor-  
don? 191, would have saved  
Gordon many mistakes, 192;  
real reason for his arrest, 403.  
*Also* 200, 494, 495.
- Zogheb Naghib, Syrian merchant  
of Alexandria, conversations  
with the author on board  
ship, 47, 49, 50, 51.



